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In this thesis I draw attention to ‘overlapping norms’ as a distinct feature of EU law, 
show why EU lawyers should be concerned about how they inter-relate, and make the 
case for clearly articulated and consistently applied principles that govern their inter-
relationship. 
 
Norm overlap occurs when more than one norm could apply in a particular case and 
each of those norms is a variation on the same basic right, command, prescription or 
permission. As this thesis shows, norm overlap is prevalent in EU law as a result of 
three main factors: the highly substantive content of the Treaties, the close relationship 
between unwritten general principles of Union law and written sources of EU law, and 
the quality of legislative drafting. Despite the frequent occurrence of norm overlap in 
EU law, its existence has gone largely unacknowledged in legal scholarship. Similarly, so 
have the constitutional consequences that stem from how the ECJ determines the inter-
relationship between overlapping norms. 
 
Through a series of case studies, linked by the EU’s commitment to protection against 
discrimination, I examine how the ECJ determines questions of priority between 
overlapping norms. Specifically, I test the role of basic priority principles – such as 
respect for express clauses and the principles of lex superior, lex posterior and lex specialis – 
in determining the inter-relationship between norms. Although under-discussed in the 
case law of the ECJ and EU legal scholarship, these priority principles provide a useful 
starting point against which to compare ECJ practice. Extensive doctrinal research leads 
to two important findings. First, the ECJ usually applies existing priority principles to 
determine the inter-relationship between overlapping norms, even though it does not 
tend to refer to these principles explicitly. Secondly, when the ECJ does depart from 
these priority principles, it is usually without proper justification and often negatively 
impacts upon legal certainty, institutional balance, the balance of powers between the 
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This thesis draws attention to ‘overlapping norms’ as a distinct feature of European 
Union (EU) law and the constitutional implications that stem from how the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ)1 interprets their inter-relationship. Through several case studies, 
linked by the EU’s commitment to protection against discrimination, this thesis shows 
the relevance of existing approaches to norm inter-relationship – respect for priority 
clauses and the principles of lex superior, lex posterior and lex specialis – in the context of 
norm overlap. Although rarely articulated by the ECJ, extensive case law analysis shows 
how ECJ practice is usually consistent with the application of these principles. 
Furthermore, where the ECJ departs from these principles there are often serious 
consequences for legal certainty, institutional balance, the balance of powers between 
the EU and the Member States, and rights protection. 
 
1. THE CONCEPT OF OVERLAPPING NORMS 
At the core of this thesis is the idea that norms of EU law can and do overlap. Overlap 
occurs when two or more provisions of EU law are prima facie applicable in a specific 
case.2 
 
Norm overlap cuts across existing categories of norm inter-relationship that focus on 
the (ir)reconcilability of norms i.e. whether norms ‘conflict’ or ‘accumulate’. The key 
concern is whether two or more norms could apply in a given situation rather than 
whether it is possible to comply with both. Each norm is thus likely to be a variation of 
the same basic right, command, prescription or permission. Norm overlap is a distinct 
method of classifying norms and, as explained more fully below, encompasses both 
                                               
1 The term ECJ is used in opposition to Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) which refers to 
the composite of ‘[t]he Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts’ (Article 19(1) TEU). 
2 Norms are defined as legally valid (i.e. binding) provisions of EU law that are capable of application by 
the ECJ, see J Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European Jurisprudence 
(OUP 1993) 59. The definition of ‘norm’ adopted excludes competence norms as they do not raise 
questions of application. The subject matter of competence norms does sometimes coincide with both 
other competence norms (see e.g., Articles 19(1) and 157(3) TFEU) and other provisions of Union law 
(see e.g., Articles 45, 46 and 48 TFEU). For further discussion of competence norms, see: Chapter 1, 
Section 2.3, which discusses the coincidence between the free movement rules and Treaty provisions 
empowering the Union legislature to adopt measures to achieve free movement; and Chapter 3, Section 
3.2, which discusses whether Article 52(2) CFR applies to competence norms. For additional analysis of 
the inter-relationship between competence norms, see G Conway, ‘Conflicts of Competence Norms in 
EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of the ECJ’ (2010) 11(9) GLJ 966. 
Introduction 
2 
conflicting norms and accumulating norms (an exhaustive categorisation of norm 
interaction developed by Pauwelyn).3 To exemplify this point further, the following 
discussion considers when accumulating and conflicting norms will and will not overlap. 
 
Norms accumulate when they ‘add rights or obligations to already existing rights or 
obligations (without contradicting any of these rights or obligations)’.4 Accumulation is a 
broad category; in our daily lives we comply with multiple accumulating norms and 
many of these will not overlap. For example, a norm requiring I switch the lights off 
when leaving a room will accumulate with another demanding I clean my teeth in the 
morning. No overlap arises between these norms given the distinct subject matter of 
each norm: no conflict, but no overlap either. Norms also accumulate where they 
address different parties. Consider a rule requiring I switch the lights off when leaving 
my office and another rule instructing the office manager to switch off any lights left on 
at the end of the day. The norms accumulate because it is possible for both actors to 
comply with them, but there is no overlap given the different scope ratione personae. 
 
However, some accumulating norms will overlap. One such instance occurs when a 
norm simply ‘confirm[s] already existing rights or obligations, without either adding to 
or detracting from these rights or obligations’.5 As an example, consider a fire safety 
notice in an office and an office environmental policy that both require that I switch the 
lights off when I leave a room. An overlap exists since the latter norm replicates the 
obligation already found in the fire safety notice. Norms will also accumulate and 
overlap when one norm is an explicit exception to the other;6 for example, a norm 
requiring that I switch the lights off when leaving a room will overlap with another 
norm that requires I switch the lights off when leaving the room unless an alarm sounds. 
 
                                               
3 According to Pauwelyn, ‘[i]f two norms do not conflict, they necessarily accumulate (and vice versa)’, see 
J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International 
Law (CUP 2003) 161. More recently Jeutner proposed the concept of a ‘legal dilemma’, see V Jeutner, 
Irresolvable Norm Conflicts in International Law: The Concept of a Legal Dilemma (OUP 2017). 
4 Pauwelyn (n 3) 161. 
5 Pauwelyn (n 3) 161. 
6 Pauwelyn (n 3) 163. 
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Conflicting norms will normally overlap. As a basic definition, norms conflict when one 
norm ‘constitutes, has led to, or may lead to, a breach of the other’.7 This definition encompasses 
a range of circumstances including where one norm is a non-explicit exception to another. 
A norm requiring that I always turn off the light when I leave the room will both conflict 
with and overlap with a rule demanding I leave a room immediately when an alarm 
sounds.8 Similar rights, prescriptions, permissions and commands that have varying 
parameters will also conflict and overlap. Taking one of Pauwelyn’s examples, a conflict 
arises when one rule prescribes that on Saturdays I must jog 10 km in the park and 
another rule prescribes that on Saturdays I must jog 20 km in the park;9 although I can 
satisfy both by running 20 km, ‘compliance with the first norm (jogging 10 km) would 
mean violating the second (20 km).’10 An overlap arises here since either norm could 
apply prima facie. Norms can also conflict and overlap when they are mutually exclusive. 
To take another of Pauwelyn’s examples, one rule prescribing that on Saturdays at 8am I 
must be jogging in the park will overlap and conflict with another rule prescribing that 
at that very same time I must be working in my office.11 The norms overlap since prima 
facie both prescribe what I should be doing on Saturday morning. 
 
There is no need for overlapping norms to have the same source or hierarchical status; 
overlap occurs across different sources, but also between norms of the same source. In 
EU law, overlaps occur between: 
• two or more norms of secondary law;12 
                                               
7 Pauwelyn (n 3) 176 (emphasis in original), see also the discussion at 180-87. For other definitions of 
norm conflict see e.g. CW Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 BYIL 401, 451; H 
Hamner Hill, ‘A Functional Taxonomy of Normative Conflict’ (1987) 6(2) Law and Philosophy 227; W 
Czapliński and G Danilenko, ‘Conflicts of Norms in International Law’ (1990) 21 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 3, 12; A Elhag, J Breuker and P Brouwer, ‘On the Formal Analysis of Normative 
Conflicts’ (2000) 9(3) Information & Communications Technology Law 207; E Vranes, ‘The Definition of Norm 
Conflict in International Law and Legal Theory’ (2006) 17(2) EJIL 395. 
8 To avoid confusion with accumulation, those norms will only conflict ‘when the question of whether the 
two norms are in a “rule-exception” relationship is not explicitly regulated in either norm’, see Pauwelyn 
(n 3) 183. Otherwise, the norms accumulate. 
9 Pauwelyn (n 3) 181. 
10 Pauwelyn (n 3) 181. 
11 Pauwelyn (n 3) 183. 
12 E.g. the rights of pregnant workers are protected by Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 
on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant 
workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding [1992] OJ L 348/1 and Directive 2006/54/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation 
(recast) [2006] OJ L 204/23. 
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• two or more Treaty provisions;13 
• provisions of the Treaties and the Charter;14 
• secondary law, general principles, the Charter and the Treaties;15 
• secondary law and the Charter;16 
• secondary law and Treaty provisions;17 
• general principles and Treaty provisions;18 
• general principles and the Charter;19 
• general principles, Treaty provisions and the Charter;20 and 
• general principles, Treaty provisions and secondary legislation.21 
As Chapter 1 will show, EU law is replete with norm overlaps. 
 
2. MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis centres around one core research question: how does the ECJ interpret the 
inter-relationship between overlapping norms of EU law? 
                                               
13 E.g. the prohibition on nationality discrimination is found in Articles 18 and 45 TFEU. 
14 E.g. the right to vote and stand in municipal elections is found in Article 20(2)(b) TFEU and Article 40 
CFR. 
15 E.g. the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of sex is given expression in Article 157(1) TFEU, 
Article 21(1) CFR, the general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex (recognised in Case 
149/77 Defrenne III EU:C:1978:130) and Directive 2006/54. 
16 E.g. the right of employees to information and consultation is found in Article 27 CFR and Directive 
2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community [2002] OJ 2002 L 
80/29. The ECJ discussed the overlap between these two provisions in Case C-176/12 Association de 
médiation sociale EU:C:2014:2. 
17 E.g. rules on unfair competition are found in Article 101 TFEU and Regulation 1/2003 of 16 
December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
18 E.g. Article 13 TEU and the principle of institutional balance (recognised as a general principle in Case 
C-70/88 Parliament v Council (Chernobyl) EU:C:1990:217). 
19 E.g. the general principle of protecting human dignity (recognised by the ECJ in Case C-377/98 
Netherlands v Parliament and Council EU:C:2001:523) and Article 1 CFR. 
20 E.g. the rules on the Union’s liability for its actions in Article 340 TFEU and Article 41(3) CFR and as 
general principle of Union law (recognised in Joined Cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P FIAMM and 
FIAMM Technologies v Council and Commission EU:C:2008:476). 
21 E.g. the principle of proportionality is given expression in Article 5(4) TEU and Directive 
2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the 
internal market [2006] OJ L 376/36, Article 15(3)(c) and is a general principle of Union law (recognised in 




Prompting the decision to ask this question, and to examine the ECJ’s approach to 
overlapping norms, were two linked observations. The first observation was to 
recognise the role played by differing expressions of the same right in several 
problematic ECJ cases and, in particular, the (then) recent ECJ decision in Dano.22 At 
the heart of the complexities arising in the Dano case seemed to be the coincidence of 
four distinct rights to equal treatment found amongst primary and secondary Union law: 
Article 20 CFR, Article 18 TFEU, Directive 2004/3823 and Regulation 883/2004.24 The 
potential applicability of several distinct (yet similar) norms in the circumstances of the 
case was striking; how had this level of replication come about and what was the 
relationship between these provisions? 
 
The second observation was that the Dano decision suggested a shift in how the ECJ 
approached the relationship between similar norms of primary and secondary law. In 
the earlier decisions of Martínez Sala25 and Trojani,26 the ECJ held that Union citizens 
could rely on the broad prohibition on nationality discrimination found in primary law 
outside of situations regulated by secondary Union law.27 In contrast, the ECJ in Dano 
considered that ‘a Union citizen can claim equal treatment with nationals of the host 
Member State only if his residence in the territory of the host Member State complies 
with the conditions [laid down in Union secondary law]’.28 The effect of the decision 
was to treat the right to equal treatment in Union secondary law as exhaustive of the 
primary right, leading to the conclusion that the ECJ ‘poured the content of the primary 
                                               
22 Case C-333/13 Dano EU:C:2014:2358. 
23 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States [2004] OJ L 158/77, Article 24. 
24 Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166/1, Article 4. 
25 Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala EU:C:1998:217. 
26 Case C-456/02 Trojani EU:C:2004:488. 
27 E.g. under Regulation 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community [1968] OJ Spec Ed (II) 475 or Regulation 1408/71 of the Council of 14 
June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving 
within the Community [1971] OJ Spec Ed (II) 416. 
28 Dano (n 22), para. 69 (emphasis added). Although it does not alter the observation that a difference 
emerges in the ECJ’s underlying approach, it should be noted that there were some differences between 
the Martínez Sala and Trojani cases and the decision in Dano. In particular, Miss Dano may not have met 
the conditions for lawful residence under German law and the legislative framework had changed, see 




right to equal treatment into a statement in secondary law.’29 Again, this shift in 
approach sparked several questions; what about the principle of lex superior? Is Union 
secondary law able to determine the limits of the Treaties and, if so, in which situations? 
What are the constraints on how the ECJ interprets the relationship between norms? 
Despite extensive critique of the Dano decision in EU scholarship,30 the ECJ’s approach 
to the relationship between norms received relatively little attention. 
 
These two linked observations – the existence of several similar provisions and the 
departure from expected principles – triggered an investigation into the existence of 
overlapping norms and the principles determining priority between them. During this 
study what became apparent was not only the scale of norm overlap but also how the 
ECJ’s approach usually concurred with that suggested by the classical principles of norm 
inter-relationship, i.e. the principles of lex superior, lex posterior and lex specialis (which 
accord priority to the norm which is hierarchically superior, later in time or more 
specific respectively). However, as returned to below, these priority principles receive 
scant discussion by the ECJ.  
 
The large numbers of norm overlaps, combined with an under-theorisation of how the 
ECJ should resolve them, sits uncomfortably with the potential effects of the ECJ’s 
approach. As Dano itself shows, how the ECJ resolves questions of norm inter-
relationship is not simply a theoretical issue, but can alter the outcome of a given case; 
arguably, the ECJ’s approach to norm inter-relationship lay at the very heart of the 
decision to deny Ms Dano certain social benefits. How the ECJ interprets the inter-
relationship between overlapping norms of EU law is, therefore, a question with very 
real practical relevance. 
 
                                               
29 N Nic Shuibhne, ‘Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of Union Citizenship’ 
(2015) 52(4) CMLRev 889, 909. 
30 E.g. H Verschueren, ‘Preventing “Benefit Tourism” in the EU: A Narrow or Broad Unterpretation of 
the Possibilities Offered by the ECJ in Dano?’ (2015) 52(2) CMLRev 363; Thym (n 28); M Cousins, ‘Case 
Comment on Dano’ (2015) 22(2) Journal of Social Security Law 95; N Nic Shuibhne, ‘“What I Tell You Three 
Times is True” Lawful Residence and Equal Treatment after Dano’ (2016) 23(6) MJ 908; C O’Brien, ‘Civis 




3. RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING LITERATURE 
By examining the ECJ’s approach to the inter-relationship between overlapping norms, 
this thesis makes three contributions to existing literature: 
• conceptual: developing the notion of norm overlap, which can include but can 
also differ from norm conflict; 
• substantive: demonstrating how principles of interpretation that exist for 
national and international law are surprisingly under-discussed for EU law, but 
actually bring utility, even if partly modified, for the inter-relationship between 
overlapping norms of EU law; and 
• empirical: systematically analysing the ECJ’s approach to norm overlap in a 
manner not previously attempted and showing that, despite the lack of clear 
articulation, ECJ practice is largely consistent with basic priority principles. 
Furthermore, when the ECJ departs from these principles, this often results in 
negative constitutional consequences. 
These points will now be explained in more detail. 
 
First, this thesis adds to existing literature by drawing attention to the prevalence of and 
the complexity created by overlapping norms in EU law. The closest that existing 
scholarship comes to recognising norm overlap as a distinct concept is the notion of 
‘multi-sourced equivalent norms’ developed by Broude and Shany in the context of 
international law. Introducing their edited collection, they describe multi-sourced 
equivalent norms as:  
… “equivalent” because … they are not always identical, and an understanding of 
their interrelationship requires deeper study. They are “multi-sourced” because … 
equivalent international norms are rarely conjoined like the analogous parts of a 
verse. Rather, equivalence is found between distant sources of international law, and 
across fields of international law that otherwise might have little in common with 
each other. Furthermore, normative parallelism often exists unnoticed and 
unacknowledged, although pregnant with problems of law and policy, that lie 
dormant until unexpected contexts and unintended developments bring them to the 
fore.31 
                                               
31 T Broude and Y Shany, ‘The International Law and Policy of Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms’ in T 
Broude and Y Shany (eds), Mutli-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law (Hart 2011) 1-15, 2. 
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This thesis owes an important theoretical debt to their work; the definition of norm 
overlap and its significance builds on the idea of equivalent norms and their contention 
that even subtle differences between norms can lead to complex questions of norm 
inter-relationship.  
 
The specific studies into multi-sourced equivalent norms included within Broude and 
Shany’s edited collection are, however, only of limited relevance. What underpins the 
different contributions is the fragmentation of international law resulting from the 
emergence of specialised and/or self-contained regimes regulating different subject 
areas. As Koskenniemi notes:  
What once appeared to be governed by “general international law” has become the 
field of operation for such specialist systems as “trade law”, “human rights law”, 
“environmental law”, “law of the sea”, “European law” and even such exotic and 
highly specialized knowledges as “investment law” or “international refugee law” 
etc. – each possessing their own principles and institutions.32 
Broude and Shany’s work addresses the questions that arise when different specialised 
systems include broadly similar norms. In contrast, this thesis deals with only one legal 
system – that of the EU – and so problems of multiple regimes and of selectivity 
between regimes do not arise.33 
 
In the context of EU law, several scholars touch upon the idea of norm overlap as and 
when overlaps arise in practice. However, existing analyses tend to be piecemeal in 
nature and do not recognise norm overlap as a recurring feature of Union law. For 
example, Lenaerts and De Smijter, Arnull, Craig and Rossi all highlight the ‘replication’ 
of and ‘overlap’ between some Treaty rights in the Charter.34 However, their recognition 
of one challenge presented by norm overlap – i.e. how the Charter should inter-relate 
                                               
32 ILC, ‘Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law’ (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (‘Fragmentation Report’), para. 8. 
33 This thesis does not examine interactions between EU law and overlapping norms of national and 
international law. For example, in the UK, an overlap exists between the principle of equal pay set out in 
Article 157 TFEU, ILO Convention No 100 on Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for 
Work of Equal Value (adopted 29 June 1951, entered into force 23 May 1953) 165 UNTS 303 and the 
Equality Act 2010. 
34 K Lenaerts and E de Smijter, ‘A “Bill of Rights” for the European Union’ (2001) 38 CMLRev 273, 282; 
A Arnull, ‘From Charter to Constitution and Beyond: Fundamental Rights in the new European Union’ 
[2003] PL 774, 778; P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP 2011) 232; LS Rossi, 
‘Same Legal Value as the Treaties: Rank, Primacy, and Direct Effects of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights’ (2017) 18(4) GLJ 771, 775. 
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with similar provisions in the Treaties – forms part of more wide-ranging discussions 
about the Charter and fundamental rights protection and not questions of norm inter-
relationship. Similarly, Semmelmann, Hofmann and Mihaescu and Gualco all discuss the 
codification of general principles and the resulting ‘overlap’ between general principles 
and written expressions in the Charter and secondary Union law;35 and the existence of 
different primary and secondary law instruments prohibiting nationality discrimination 
has recently gained increased scholarly attention.36 Each of these contributions focuses 
on one specific issue and does not recognise broader questions stemming from norm 
overlap. This thesis fills this theoretical void by explicitly highlighting norm overlap as a 
distinct concept of Union law. 
 
The second contribution made by this thesis is to fill a gap in existing literature on the 
role of priority principles in EU law and in the reasoning of the ECJ. While there is 
extensive scholarship on norm inter-relationship, existing literature mostly addresses the 
issue of norm conflicts in international law.37 At present, very little EU legal scholarship 
                                               
35 C Semmelmann, ‘General Principles in EU Law between a Compensatory Role and an Intrinsic Value’ 
(2013) 19(4) ELJ 458, 464; HH Hofmann and BC Mihaescu, ‘The Relation between the Charter’s 
Fundamental Rights and the Unwritten General Principles: Good Administration as the Test Case’ (2013) 
9 EuConst 73, 77; E Gualco, General Principles of EU Law as a Passe-Partout Key within the Constitutional Edifice 
of the European Union: Are the Benefits Worth the Side Effects? (2016) Birmingham Law School Institute of 
European Law Working Paper No. 5. 
36 E.g. H Verschueren, ‘Free Movement of Persons in the European Union and Social Rights: An Area of 
Conflicting Secondary Law Instruments?’ (2011) 12(2) ERA Forum 287; Nic Shuibhne, ‘Limits Rising, 
Duties Ascending’ (n 29); C O’Brien, ‘The ECJ Sacrifices EU Citizenship in Vain: Commission v United 
Kingdom’ (2017) 54(1) CMLRev 209; N Nic Shuibhne, ‘Integrating Union Citizenship and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ in D Thym (ed), Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and 
Solidarity in the EU (Hart 2017) 209-240; A McDonnell, ‘Equality for Citizens in the EU: Where Did All 
the Flowers Go?’ in LS Rossi and F Casolari (eds), The Principle of Equality in EU Law (Springer 2017) 199-
228. 
37 See e.g. Jenks (n 7); N Bobbio, ‘Des critères pour résoudre les antinomies’ (1964) 18(1/4) Dialectica 237; 
M Akehurst, ‘The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law’ (1976) 47(1) BYIL 273; Czapliński and 
Danilenko (n 7); JB Mus, ‘Conflicts between Treaties in International Law’ (1998) 45(2) Netherlands 
International Law Review 208; G Marceau, ‘Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions’ (2001) 35(6) 
Journal of World Trade 1081; Pauwelyn (n 3); A Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented 
Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis’ (2005) 74(1) NJIL 27; Vranes (n 7); D Shelton, ‘Normative 
Hierarchy in International Law’ (2006) 100(2) AJIL 291; ILC, ‘Fragmentation Report’ (n 32); N 
Prud’homme, ‘Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying A More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?’ (2007) 
40(02) Israel Law Review 356; WA Schabas, ‘Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of 
Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum’ (2007) 40(2) 
Israel Law Review 592; M Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights’ (2009) 
20 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 69; R Michaels and J Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms or 
Conflict of Laws: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of Public International Law’ (2011-2012) 
22(3) Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 349; CJ Borgen, ‘Treaty Conflicts and Normative 
Fragmentation’ in DB Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP 2012) 448-471; J Vidmar, ‘Norm 
Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a Vertical International Legal System?’ in E de 
Wet and J Vidmar (eds), Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights (OUP 2012); D Pulkowski, 
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addresses the role of priority principles in the EU legal system. The site of existing 
discussion is within broader discourses on the ECJ’s legal reasoning38 or efforts to 
theorise the hierarchy of norms in the EU.39  
 
The conclusions reached in relation to international law on the meaning and appropriate 
use of priority principles, cannot be directly transposed to the EU context on account of 
its sui generis nature.40 Although the EU is an international organisation, founded on the 
basis of a Treaty between Member States, the EU legal order differs from international 
regimes: there is a hierarchy between norms (with the Treaties akin to a constitutional 
text), a legislature (albeit variously constituted), and a centralised judiciary. The ECJ 
itself repeatedly affirms this point, stating that the EU: 
… is based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its 
institutions can avoid review of the conformity of their acts with the basic 
constitutional charter, the [EU] Treaty, which established a complete system of legal 
remedies and procedures designed to enable the Court of Justice to review the 
legality of acts of the institutions.41 
The EU legal order is not directly comparable to a domestic regime either. In contrast 
to the written constitutions of most of the Member States, the EU’s constitutional text 
is far more substantive and includes policy goals such as free movement. Furthermore, 
when compared to states, the EU lacks democratic legitimacy.42 By discussing the role of 
                                               
The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict (OUP 2014) 13-42; D Shelton, ‘International Law and 
“Relative Normativity”‘ in MD Evans (ed), International law (4th edn, OUP 2014) 138-165; Jeutner (n 3). 
38 See e.g. Bengoetxea (n 2); G Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (Hart 2012); G 
Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (CUP 2012). 
39 F Dowrick, ‘A Model of the European Communities’ Legal System’ (1983) 3(1) YEL 169; R Bieber and 
I Salome, ‘Hierarchy of Norms in European Law’ (1996) 33(5) CMLRev 907; Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (n 
34) 57-66; H Hofmann, ‘Legislation, Delegation and Dmplementation Under the Treaty of Lisbon: 
Typology Meets Reality’ (2009) 15(4) ELJ 482; J Ziller, ‘Hierarchy of Norms: Hierarchy of Sources and 
General Principles In European Union Law’ in U Becker and others (eds), Verfassung und Verwaltung in 
Europa Festschrift für Jürgen Schwarze zum 70. Geburtstag (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2014) 334-352; D Curtin 
and T Manucharyan, ‘Legal Acts and Hierarchy of Norms in EU Law’ in D Chalmers and A Arnull (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (OUP 2015) 103-125. 
40 On the nature of the EU, see e.g. B de Witte, ‘The European Union as an International Legal 
Experiment’ in G de Búrca and J Weiler (eds), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism (CUP 2011) 19-56; 
W Phelan, ‘What Is Sui Generis About the European Union? Costly International Cooperation in a Self-
Contained Regime’ (2012) 14(3) International Studies Review 367; J Klabbers, ‘Sui Generis? The European 
Union as an International Organization’ in D Patterson and A Södersten (eds), A Companion to European 
Union Law and International Law (Wiley-Blackwell 2016) 3-15. 
41 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi v Council and Commission EU:C:2008:461, para. 281. See 
also, Opinion 1/91 Re the EEA Agreement EU:C:1991:490, para. 21. 
42 See e.g. G Majone, ‘Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”: The Question of Standards’ (1998) 4(1) ELJ 5; A 
Follesdal and S Hix, ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and 
Moravcsik’ (2006) 44(3) JCMS 533; A José Menéndez, ‘The European Democratic Challenge: The 
Forging of a Supranational Volonté Générale’ (2009) 15(3) ELJ 277; VA Schmidt, ‘Democracy and 
Introduction 
11 
priority principles in the context of EU law, this thesis fills a lacuna in existing 
scholarship. 
 
The third contribution made by this this thesis is to build upon existing piecemeal 
analyses of norm inter-relationship in EU law by providing a wide-ranging survey of the 
ECJ’s approach to the inter-relationship between overlapping norms. Most existing 
doctrinal analyses of norm inter-relationship in EU law do not address the relevance of 
priority principles but instead tend to focus on the outcome of the ECJ’s approach. For 
example, Hofmann and Mihaescu appraise the inter-relationship between the Charter 
and general principles from the perspective of achieving maximum rights protection.43 
Taking a distinct approach, Syrpis and Davies both analyse the ECJ’s approach to the 
inter-relationship between primary and secondary Union law from the perspective of 
institutional balance.44 Verschueren discusses the inter-relationship between secondary 
norms in the field of nationality discrimination, but positions his analysis within a 
broader critique of Union citizenship.45 This thesis differs from these existing 
contributions by focusing on the question of what principles determine the inter-
relationship between norms rather than on the impact of applying those principles. 
 
Only one article by Semmelmann in the European Law Journal comes close to the analysis 
carried out by this thesis. She examines the continuing role of general principles once 
codified and offers an initial categorisation of the case law according to the approaches 
the ECJ might take to the relationship between general principles and overlapping 
written sources.46 However, her analysis, only focuses on one kind of overlap and largely 
concerns the contested status of general principles. Her contribution leaves considerable 
space for a more systematic analysis of the inter-relationship between overlapping 
norms. As she herself admits, ‘[t]he role of and the interaction between the various 
                                               
Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and “Throughput”‘ (2013) 61(1) Political 
Studies 2. 
43 Hofmann and Mihaescu (n 35) 82. 
44 G Davies, ‘Legislative Control of the European Court of Justice’ (2014) 51(6) CMLRev 1579; P Syrpis, 
‘The Relationship between Primary and Secondary Law in the EU’ (2015) 52(2) CMLRev 461. 
45 H Verschueren, ‘The Relationship between Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 and Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 
Analysed through ECJ Case Law on Frontier Workers’ (2004) 6 EJSS 7; Verschueren, ‘Free Movement of 
Persons in the European Union and Social Rights’ (n 35); H Verschueren, ‘Free Movement of EU 
Citizens: Including for the Poor’ (2015) 22(1) MJ 10. 
46 Semmelmann (n 35). 
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sources, in particular in the area of equal treatment, are highly complex and ask for rules 
that either prioritise the various sources or govern their interaction otherwise.’47 This 
thesis takes her research further, by assessing what rules do – in practice – govern the 
interaction between overlapping norms. 
 
4. THE CASE STUDY 
It would be impossible to examine, within the confines of a doctoral thesis, the question 
of how norms do and ought to overlap across the entirety of EU law. This thesis 
therefore restricts the framework of analysis to the prohibition on discrimination in EU 
law, which provides a broad backdrop to the whole thesis. Each chapter focuses on a 
different prohibited ground of discrimination to allow for an in-depth discussion of how 
the ECJ resolves questions of norm overlap. 
 
A distinction should be drawn between the prohibition on discrimination – the case 
study adopted – and the wider notion of equality. This thesis examines the development 
of overlaps between norms which prevent ‘[EU] and national authorities from imposing 
differential treatment without good reason.’48 Excluded are norms enshrining the 
principle of equality in a wider sense tied to more substantive notions of the social 
good,49 this includes overlaps between norms of Union law requiring positive action to 
secure equality such as Articles 23 and 26 CFR and Article 157(4) TFEU. 
 
The reasons for selecting non-discrimination as a case study are twofold. First, non-
discrimination norms expand across a wide cross-section of EU law due to the different 
roles played by the prohibition on discrimination throughout the EU’s history.50 
                                               
47 Semmelmann (n 35) 466. 
48 T Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 62. 
49 N Bamforth, ‘Sexual Orientation Discrimination after Grant v South-West Trains’ (2000) 63(5) MLR 694, 
710. Barnard argued that the EU was moving towards a substantive principle of equality after Case C-
13/94 P v S EU:C:1996:170 (C Barnard, ‘The Principle of Equality in the Community Context: P, Grant, 
Kalanke and Marschall: Four Uneasy Bedfellows?’ (1998) 57(2) CLJ 352, 360). Tridimas questions, 
however, whether the EU could protect a substantive notion of equality, see Tridimas (n 48) 62. 
50 On the different roles played by the prohibition on discrimination in Union law, see e.g. C Barnard, 
‘The Economic Objectives of Article 119’ in TK Hervey and D O’Keeffe (eds), Sex Equality Law in the 
European Union (Wiley 1996) 321-34; G de Búrca, ‘The Role of Equality in European Community Law’ in 
A Dashwood and S O’Leary (eds), The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1997); G 
More, ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment: From Market Unifier to Fundamental Right?’ in P Craig and G 
de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (1st edn, OUP 1999) 517-553, 518. 
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Removing nationality discrimination was instrumental in securing the common market; 
as a consequence, prohibiting nationality discrimination are several directly effective 
Treaty provisions51 and secondary law measures aiming to give effect to those 
provisions.52 The principle of non-discrimination later took on a additional role as an 
autonomous ‘constitutional’ right; the adoption of additional legislative bases and 
express commitments to equal treatment at Amsterdam spurred on this development. In 
the process of this transformation in the principle of equal treatment – from an 
instrumental and economic principle to a fundamental right – the Union legislature 
adopted several additional non-discrimination measures, which must then interact with 
the prohibitions on discrimination found in general principles and later enshrined in the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.53 
 
The second reason for selecting non-discrimination as a case study is because of its 
aforementioned status as a fundamental right. How overlapping norms inter-relate can 
affect the outcome of ECJ decisions and so the use of non-discrimination as a lens adds 
salience to the discussion due to its importance in securing the participation of 
disadvantaged groups and minorities in the workplace and beyond.54 Furthermore, the 
prohibition on discrimination is of express importance to the EU polity; Article 2 TEU 
states that ‘[t]he Union is founded on the values of respect for … equality’ while Article 
10 TEU provides that ‘[i]n defining and implementing its policies and activities, the 
Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’55 Adopting non-discrimination as a case 
study enhances, therefore, the practical importance of the findings set out in this thesis 
since how overlapping norms inter-relate can affect individual rights. 
 
The fundamental importance of the principle of non-discrimination also means that 
cases involving discrimination claims often attract considerable comment in the 
academic literature.56 Much of this literature focuses on the outcome of the case: does the 
                                               
51 Articles 18, 34, 35, 45, 49, 56, 63, 157 TFEU. 
52 E.g. Directive 2006/54; Regulation 883/2004; Regulation 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L 141/1. 
53 An in-depth exposition of overlapping norms prohibiting discrimination is provided in Chapter 1. 
54 On access to services, see e.g. Case C-83/14 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria EU:C:2015:480. 
55 See also Articles 3(3) and 8 TEU and Article 157 TFEU. 
56 For recent discussions, see e.g. C Kilpatrick, ‘Non-Discrimination’ in S Peers and others (eds), The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart 2014) 579-604; C O’Cinneide, ‘The Constitutionalization 
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ECJ sufficiently protect the rights of disadvantaged groups or not? In choosing non-
discrimination as a case study, this thesis offers a broader perspective on non-
discrimination and offers an added value perspective to the existing literature. 
 
5. A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
This thesis employs a doctrinal methodology. The choice of methodology reflects the 
responsibility of the ECJ – alongside national courts tasked with interpreting Union law 
– for resolving questions of norms inter-relationship.57 
 
Analysing ECJ case law has two advantages. First, it demonstrates the practical import 
of how norms overlap. Inconsistencies in how the ECJ resolves cases, as well as the 
implications that then flow, become clear. Examining ECJ case law shows the 
consequences of how norms inter-relate for rights protection, institutional balance, legal 
certainty and the scope of Union law. Furthermore, the constitutional implications of 
ECJ decisions in turn justify the attention placed on interpretative principles58 rather 
than advocating e.g. wholesale reform of Union law-making processes. However, the 
analysis does raise questions about the quality of EU legislation, which will be 
highlighted where relevant. 
 
                                               
of Equality within the EU Legal Order: Sexual Orientation as a Testing Ground’ 22(3) MJ 370; E Muir, 
‘Pursuing Equality in the EU’ in D Chalmers and A Arnull (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union 
Law (OUP 2015) 919-941; D O’Dempsey, ‘Age Discrimination in the light of CJEU Case Law’ (2016)(1) 
European Equality Law Review 22; Rt Uitz, ‘The Old Wine and the New Cask: The Implications of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights for European Non-Discrimination Law’ (2016)(3) European Anti-
Discrimination Law Review 24; G de Beco, ‘Is Obesity a Disability: The Definition of Disability by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union and Its Consequences for the Application of EU Anti-Discrimination 
Law’ (2016) 22(2) Columbia Journal European Law 381; N Jääskinen, ‘Discrimination on Grounds of 
Obesity’ in S Vogenauer and S Weatherill (eds), General Principles of Law: European and Comparative 
Perspectives (Hart 2017) 355-364; A Tryfonidou, ‘Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity’ in S Vogenauer and S Weatherill (eds), General Principles of Law: European and Comparative 
Perspectives (Hart 2017) 365-394; J Mulder, EU Non-Discrimination Law in the Courts: Approaches to Sex and 
Sexualities Discrimination in EU Law (Hart 2017). 
57 As follows from Article 19(1) TEU. It is widely acknowledged that the ECJ is the institution 
responsible for determining interactions between norms. For instance, when discussing the impact of the 
entry into force of the Charter, Hofmann and Mihaescu note that the ‘existing Treaty has left this 
question [of what role general principles continue to play] very much to the Court’, see Hofmann and 
Mihaescu (n 35) 74. 
58 For a similar argument in the context of subsidiarity, see e.g. G de Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity 
and the Court of Justice as an Institutional Actor’ (1998) 36(2) JCMS 217; T Horsley, ‘Reflections on the 
Role of the Court of Justice as the “Motor” of European Integration: Legal Limits to Judicial Lawmaking’ 
(2013) 50(4) CMLRev 931. 
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Secondly, considering how the ECJ approaches overlapping norms makes it possible to 
identify the role played by existing approaches in practice. Focusing on ECJ case law 
allows for the identification of interpretative principles that the ECJ respects even if 
only implicitly. 
 
6. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis contains six substantive Chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 outlines the development of overlapping norms prohibiting discrimination. 
Taking a chronological approach to the development of EU law, the Chapter shows the 
sheer number of overlaps that have accrued in the area of non-discrimination alone. The 
Chapter demonstrates that the responsibility for creating overlaps does not lie wholly 
with any one of the three main avenues of norm development (i.e., judicial 
interpretation, the adoption of secondary law or Treaty amendment). Instead, this 
Chapter argues that there are three main factors behind the build-up of overlapping 
norms: first, the highly substantive nature of EU primary law that is often directly 
enforceable in the Member States; secondly, the use of written norms as inspirational 
sources for the development of unwritten general principles of Union law; and, thirdly, 
the poor quality of legislative drafting. 
 
Chapter 2 starts with the existence of norm overlaps and explains why EU lawyers 
should be concerned about the inter-relationship between overlapping norms. The 
Chapter demonstrates how the ECJ’s approach to norm inter-relationship can affect the 
outcome of proceedings due to (even small) differences between largely similar norms 
relating e.g. to their content, capacity for direct effect or hierarchical status. However, 
different modes of interaction between overlapping norms can also have more serious 
constitutional implications; this Chapter sheds light on the possible consequences for 
the protection of fundamental rights, the principle of institutional balance, the balance 
of powers between the EU and its Member States, and the principle of legal certainty. 
Having underscored the importance of the ECJ’s approach to the inter-relationship 
between overlapping norms, the Chapter then turns to assess the guidance offered to 
the ECJ here by existing legal tools and principles concerning norm inter-relationship. 
Specifically, this Chapter examines the potential role of priority clauses and the 
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principles of lex superior, lex specialis and lex posterior in structuring the inter-relationship 
between overlapping norms. The contention is that these principles, in theory, offer 
workable and normatively justified guidance to the ECJ when resolving questions of 
norm inter-relationship. 
 
Chapters 3-6 assess whether ECJ case law coheres in practice with the priority clauses and 
priority principles outlined in Chapter 2. Each Chapter uses a different specific overlap 
as a testing ground and adopts a similar structure. After setting out the case study 
adopted, each Chapter then considers (hypothetically) the guidance offered by either a 
relevant priority clause or (one of) the principles of lex superior, lex specialis and lex posterior 
in that specific context. This forms a baseline against which to compare ECJ practice. 
The focus is not on what principles the ECJ expressly purports to be relying upon; the 
ECJ’s terse reasoning style would make such an exercise futile. Instead, each Chapter 
looks to how – more practically – the ECJ prioritises overlapping norms. 
 
Chapter 3 addresses the inter-relationship between overlapping norms of primary and 
secondary law where there is a hierarchy between norms. Using the prohibition on 
discrimination of grounds of sex as a case study, this Chapter analyses the inter-
relationship between Article 157 TFEU and overlapping secondary law and Article 21(1) 
CFR and overlapping secondary norms prohibiting sex discrimination. This Chapter 
tests whether ECJ case law coheres with respect for the principle of lex superior and 
whether the lex superior principle works well in the context of norm overlap. The 
conclusion reached is that, although that case law complies with the principle of lex 
superior, this principle requires some modification for the context of EU law and norm 
overlap. 
 
Chapter 4 turns to assess the ECJ’s approach to the inter-relationship between 
overlapping norms of primary law and, specifically, how the ECJ approaches priority 
clauses. The Chapter looks at how the ECJ resolves the inter-relationship between 
different Treaty provisions prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality (i.e. 
between Article 18 TFEU and Articles 34, 45, 49, 56, 63 TFEU) and between those 
Treaty provisions and Article 21(2) CFR. Characterising these different overlaps are 
express priority clauses – located in Article 18 TFEU and in Article 52(2) CFR – that 
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mediate the inter-relationship between overlapping Treaty norms and between the 
Treaties and the Charter. The main finding here is that ECJ practice is almost always 
consistent with the understanding of priority clauses articulated by this thesis. 
 
Chapter 5 considers how the ECJ interprets the relationship between overlapping 
secondary norms. To test the ECJ’s approach to norm inter-relationship when a priority 
clause does not fully determine norm interactions, this Chapter focuses on the 
prohibition on nationality discrimination as it relates to Union citizens seeking equal 
access to social benefits in a host Member State. ECJ practice is assessed for its 
compatibility with priority clauses and the principles of lex specialis and lex posterior. The 
main finding is that, where there is a priority clause, the ECJ almost always respects the 
guidance offered by that clause. In the absence of a priority clause, the Chapter argues 
that that lex specialis principle offers a workable system for prioritising between 
overlapping norms of secondary law. However, the ECJ does not expressly refer to that 
principle and the ECJ does not always prioritise the lex specialis. 
 
Chapter 6 considers the continuing role of general principles following the entry into 
force of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In contrast to other Chapters it is not 
obvious which priority clause or principle might guide the ECJ here. None of the 
horizontal provisions in the Charter addresses its relationship to overlapping general 
principles. Furthermore, the unwritten nature of general principles leads to uncertainty 
over their status, rank and ‘date of birth’ making it difficult to apply, in turn, the 
principles of lex superior, lex posterior and lex specialis. It is argued, however, that the 
Charter can be understood as a lex specialis in relation to overlapping general principles 
on account of its constitutional significance and overarching aim to replace general 
principles by putting them on a written footing. To test the ECJ’s approach in practice 
this Chapter uses the prohibition on status discrimination (e.g. on grounds of age, sex, 
sexual orientation etc.) as a case study. Overall, ECJ practice coheres with this 
understanding although greater clarity over the continuing role of general principles 
would be welcome. 
 
In the end this thesis reaches three main conclusions. First, norm overlap is a recurrent 
phenomenon in EU law and raises distinct questions due to the similarities and 
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connections between overlapping norms. Secondly, the ECJ rarely articulates the 
principles or rules governing norm interactions, which can lead to inconsistent 
outcomes and resulting legal uncertainty. Thirdly, existing approaches to norm inter-
relationship i.e. respecting priority clauses and the principles of lex superior, lex specialis 
and lex posterior often offer workable guidance upon which– in practice – the ECJ often 
impliedly relies. Were the ECJ to articulate these principles clearly and to apply them 
consistently, the doctrinal analysis carried out by this thesis suggests this would 
qualitatively improve the resolution of norm overlaps. Overall, the significance of how 
overlapping norms inter-relate – as borne out by the individual case studies – requires 
guiding principles that focus our attention on the justifications for prioritising norms. A 
key finding is that existing approaches to norm inter-relationship already provide a 
system of norm inter-relationship that balances constitutional values in hard cases. 
However, the ECJ does not always rigorously adhere to this approach (and sometimes 






The Development of Norm Overlaps 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
What is the scale of norm overlap in the EU and what are the main drivers that lead to 
its existence? There would be little point devoting an entire thesis to a rare phenomenon 
and so this opening Chapter demonstrates the prevalence of norm overlap in the EU 
legal system. This Chapter also shows the responsibility of several actors in creating 
norm overlaps, which in turn makes their removal and prevention difficult. 
 
This Chapter takes a chronological approach to the development of overlapping norms 
in the field of non-discrimination, setting out the factors behind the proliferation of 
norm overlaps across four different phases of the EU’s history. Phase I shows the 
development of overlaps from the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome until just 
before the Treaty of Maastricht. Most overlaps in this Phase stemmed from the 
recognition that several Treaty provisions are directly effective and the existence of 
secondary law alongside these provisions. Phase II starts with the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty and continues until the ‘solemn proclamation’ of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. In this Phase, several constitutional changes – such as the creation 
of Union citizenship and the addition of legislative bases to promote equal treatment 
within the EU – laid the groundwork for future overlaps. Phase III continues from 2001 
until just before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. Creating overlaps during this 
Phase were attempts by the Union legislature to consolidate and recast existing 
legislation in the fields of nationality and sex discrimination as well as an increased role 
for general principles. Phase IV extends from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
to the present day. The key development addressed here is the entry into force of the 
Charter. The Chapter concludes that, in summary, there are three main drivers of 
overlap: (1) the unusually substantive nature of EU primary law; (2) the codification of 
general principles in, and their extrapolation from, written sources of Union law; and (3) 
poor legislative drafting. 
Chapter 1 – The Development of Overlapping Norms Prohibiting Discrimination 
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While aiming to be as comprehensive as possible, this Chapter necessarily simplifies 
certain aspects of EU non-discrimination law. By focusing on the bigger picture, rather 
than on the minutiae of each norm prohibiting discrimination, the Chapter shows the 
sheer number of overlaps that have accrued. In doing so, this Chapter sets the scene for 
the remainder of the thesis and provides a backdrop for the more detailed discussion in 
later chapters. The Chapter does not attempt to evaluate the EU’s substantive policy 
choices relating to the protection of equal treatment, which receive extensive discussion 
elsewhere.1 For simplicity, this Chapter uses current Treaty numbering and refers to 
previous versions only where necessary, e.g. because of previously different wording for 
amended Treaty provisions. 
 
2. PHASE I: 1957-1990 
2.1. Non-Discrimination and the Treaty of Rome 
Phase I charts the development of overlaps between norms prohibiting discrimination 
from the founding EEC Treaty until 1990. The Treaty of Rome included prohibitions 
on discrimination on three distinct grounds: first, a prohibition on discrimination on 
grounds of nationality (Articles 18, 34, 35, 45, 49, 56 and 63(1) TFEU); secondly, a 
prohibition on discrimination on grounds of sex specifically as regards pay (Article 157 
TFEU); and, thirdly, a prohibition on discrimination between producers and consumers 
in the context of agriculture (Article 40(2) TFEU). These prohibitions on discrimination 
in the Treaty of Rome still form part of the EU Treaties, albeit in an amended form. 
Most overlaps accrued in the fields of nationality and sex discrimination; however, it is 
worth beginning the discussion by mentioning Article 40(2) TFEU. The inspirational 
role played by Article 40(2) TFEU led to the development of a general principle of 
equality that underscores each of the overlaps outlined below. 
 
                                               
1 There is already an abundance of literature on this, see e.g. C McCrudden (ed), Women, Employment and 
European Equality Law (Eclipse 1987); S Fredman, ‘European Community Discrimination Law: A Critique’ 
(1992) 21(2) ILJ 119; H Fenwick and TK Hervey, ‘Sex Equality in the Single Market: New Directions for 
the European Court of Justice’ (1995) 32(2) CMLRev 443; M Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European 
Union (OUP 2002); TK Hervey, ‘Thirty Years of EU Sex Equality Law: Looking Backwards, Looking 
Forwards’ (2005) 12(4) MJ 307; M Bell, Racism and Equality in the European Union (OUP 2009); J Mulder, 
EU Non-Discrimination Law in the Courts: Approaches to Sex and Sexualities Discrimination in EU Law (Hart 
2017); LS Rossi and F Casolari (eds), The Principle of Equality in EU Law (Springer 2017). 
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2.2. Extrapolating a General Principle of Equality 
According to Article 40(2) TFEU (ex Article 40(3) EEC), the organisation of 
agricultural markets ‘shall exclude any discrimination between producers or consumers 
within the Union.’2 Early on, the ECJ recognised Article 40(2) TFEU as a specific 
written expression of a potentially far-reaching general principle of equality. In 
Ruckdeschel,3 the ECJ held that: 
… the prohibition of discrimination laid down in [Article 40(2) TFEU] is merely a 
specific enunciation of the general principle of equality which is one of the 
fundamental provisions of [EU] law. This principle requires that similar situations 
shall not be treated differently unless the differentiation is objectively justified.4 
This was a significant development; the general principle of equal treatment underlies all 
the non-discrimination norms discussed throughout this thesis. The ECJ’s decision in 
Ruckdeschel also provides an early illustration of one of the reasons why norm overlap 
exists, i.e. the ECJ derives ‘autonomous’ general principles from written sources of 
Union law. The ECJ must then determine how those general principles interact with 
overlapping written expressions. 
 
Discussion now turns to outline the more detailed non-discrimination rules found in the 
Treaty of Rome prohibiting nationality discrimination and requiring equal pay. 
 
2.3. The Development of Overlapping Norms Prohibiting Nationality 
Discrimination 
Central to achieving the common market5 was the abolition of a ‘host of discriminatory 
rules and practices whereby the national governments traditionally protected their own 
producers and workers from foreign competition.’6 To excise protectionism and create 
an integrated European market, the Treaty set out a series of free movement rights and 
empowered the Union legislature to act to remove obstacles to intra-EU movement. 
                                               
2 On this provision, see e.g. Joined Cases 7/54 and 9/54 Ind. sidé. luxembourgeoises v High Authority 
EU:C:1956:2; Case 8/55 Fédération charbonnière de Belgique v High Authority EU:C:1956:11. 
3 Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel EU:C:1977:160. 
4 Ruckdeschel (n 3), para. 7. See also e.g. Case 103/77 Royal Scholten-Honig EU:C:1978:186, para. 26; Case 
138/79 Roquette v Council EU:C:1980:249, para. 6; Case 139/79 Maizena v Council EU:C:1980:250, para. 6. 
5 Article 2 EEC referred to the EEC’s aim of ‘establishing a Common Market and progressively 
approximating the economic policies of Member States’. 
6 F Jacobs, ‘An Introduction to the General Principle of Equality in EC Law’ in A Dashwood and S 
O’Leary (eds), The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1997) 1-12, 1. 
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This led to a two-pronged system: a Treaty provision setting out an overarching goal 
alongside secondary Union law aiming to further that goal.7 
 
Treaty provisions forming the first prong (the overarching goal) are Article 18 TFEU 
(ex Article 7 EEC) – specifying that ‘[w]ithin the field of application of this Treaty and 
without prejudice to the special provisions mentioned therein, any discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality shall hereby be prohibited’ – and the Treaty rules on the free 
movement of goods (Articles 34 and 35 TFEU, ex Articles 30 and 34 EEC), workers 
(Article 45 TFEU, ex Article 48 EEC), establishment (Article 49 TFEU, ex Article 52 
EEC), services (Article 56 TFEU, ex Article 59 EEC) and capital (Article 63(1) TFEU, 
ex Article 67(1) EEC). Each provision encompasses a prohibition on measures that 
discriminate on grounds of nationality and restrict intra-EU movement.8 Each of the 
above Treaty provisions is then followed by series of specific provisions empowering 
the Union legislature to take action towards achieving free movement;9 measures 
adopted on the basis of these provisions form the second prong. 
 
The inclusion of free movement rights in the Treaty text means that ‘[t]he EU’s 
constitutional text is unusually substantive, detailed and concrete’.10 As will be set out in 
greater detail below, this two-pronged system and the substantive nature of EU primary 
                                               
7 This draws on Craig who argues that ‘[e]ach of [the free movement rules] encapsulates a basic statement 
of principle which will then be filled out with a variety of legislation’, see P Craig, ‘Once upon a Time in 
the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC Law’ (1992) 12(4) OJLS 453, 463. 
8 On goods, see e.g. Case 251/78 Denkavit Futtermittel EU:C:1979:252, para. 6; Case 15/79 Groenveld 
EU:C:1979:253, para. 7. On workers, see e.g. Case C-279/93 Schumacker EU:C:1995:31, para. 26; Case C-
55/00 Gottardo EU:C:2002:16, para. 35. On establishment, see e.g. Case 2/74 Reyners EU:C:1974:68, para. 
24. On services, see e.g. Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen EU:C:1974:131, para. 25. On capital, see e.g. Case C-
302/97 Konle EU:C:1999:271, paras 23-24; Case C-423/98 Albore EU:C:2000:401, paras 16-17. The ECJ 
refers to the free movement provisions as giving specific expression to the prohibition on nationality 
discrimination in Article 18 TFEU, see e.g. Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal (Golden Shares) 
EU:C:2002:326, para. 24 (capital); Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz EU:C:2007:492 (services); 
Case C-311/08 SGI EU:C:2010:26, paras 31-32 (establishment and capital); Joined Cases C-53/13 and 
C-80/13 Strojírny Prostějov EU:C:2014:2011, paras 31-32 (services); Case C-474/12 Schiebel Aircraft 
EU:C:2014:2139, paras 20-22 (workers and establishment); Case C-583/14 Nagy EU:C:2015:737, para. 24 
(capital); Case C-296/15 Medisanus EU:C:2017:431, para. 65 (goods). 
9 In the Treaty of Rome, the relevant legislative bases were: Article 7 EEC (non-discrimination); Article 
33(7) EEC (goods); Articles 49 and 51 EEC (workers); Articles 54-57 EEC (establishment); Articles 63 
and 66 EEC (services); Articles 69 and 70(1) EEC (capital). The legislative bases in the Treaty of Rome do 
not correspond directly with those in the Treaty of Lisbon following several Treaty amendments. The 
legislative bases relating to free movement and the prohibition on nationality discrimination in the Lisbon 
Treaty are: Article 18 TFEU (non-discrimination); Articles 48 and 51 TFEU (workers); Articles 52(2) and 
53 TFEU (establishment); Articles 64(2) and 64(3) TFEU (capital). 
10 P Syrpis, ‘The Relationship between Primary and Secondary Law in the EU’ (2015) 52(2) CMLRev 461, 
484. 
Chapter 1 – The Development of Overlapping Norms Prohibiting Discrimination 
 23 
law form root causes of norm overlap; once the ECJ instilled life into the Treaty and 
granted direct effect to the free movement rules, overlap became inevitable between 
those Treaty rules and any acts of the Union legislature to advance free movement. 
 
2.3.1 Overlaps Concerning Workers 
Dating from the late 1950s, successive measures to secure the free movement of 
workers – based on Articles 46 and 48 TFEU – enshrined the prohibition on nationality 
discrimination.11 At the end of the transitional period, the Council adopted two 
important regulations for the free movement of workers: Regulations 1612/6812 and 
1408/7113 alongside several other measures relating to workers and former workers.14 
 
Regulation 1612/68 concerned access to employment, working conditions and rights of 
residence for family members in a host Member State.15 Regulation 1408/71 
coordinated social security entitlements across the EU. Yet, despite addressing distinct 
                                               
11 Aiming to achieve social security coordination were: Regulation 3/58 concerning the social security of 
migrant workers [1958] OJ 30/561 (no official English version); Regulation 4/58 laying down the 
procedure for implementing Regulation 3/58 [1958] OJ 30/597 (no official English version). Governing 
the free movement of workers more generally were: Regulation 15/61 of 16 August 1961 on initial 
measures to bring about free movement of workers within the Community [1961] OJ 57/1073 (no official 
English version); Council Directive on administrative practices and procedures concerning settlement, 
employment and residence in a Member State of the Community of workers and their families from 
another Member State [1961] OJ 80/1513 (no official English version). The latter two measures were 
replaced by: Regulation 38/64/EEC of 25 March 1964 of the Council concerning the free movement of 
workers within the Community [1964] OJ 62/965 (no official English version); Directive 64/240/EEC of 
25 March 1964 on the abolition of restrictions on the movement and residence of Member States’ 
workers and their families within the Community [1964] OJ 62/981 (no official English version). 
12 Regulation 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within 
the Community [1968] OJ Spec Ed (II) 475. 
13 Regulation 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons and their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ Spec Ed (II) 416. 
Accompanying Regulation 1408/71 was Regulation 574/72 of the Council of 21 March 1972 fixing the 
procedure for implementing Regulation 1408/71 [1972] OJ Spec Ed (I) 160. 
14 Council Directive 68/360/EEC of 15 October 1968 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Community for workers of Member States and their families [1968] OJ Spec Ed (II) 
485; Regulation 1251/70 of the Commission of 29 June 1970 on the right of workers to remain in the 
territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State [1970] OJ Spec Ed (II) 402; 
Directive 72/194/EEC of 18 May 1972 extending Directive 64/221/EEC to workers exercising the right 
to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State [1972] OJ Spec Ed 
(II) 474. 
15 Regulation 1612/68 granted extensive equal treatment rights to workers in a host Member State 
including as regards the ‘conditions of employment and work’, ‘social and tax advantages’, ‘access to 
training in vocational schools and retrain­ing centres’ and to rights set out in collective agreements 
(Article 7) as well as requiring that any children ‘shall be admitted to that State’s general educational , 
apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the same conditions as the nationals of that State’ 
(Article 12). 
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aspects of free movement law, Regulations 1612/68 and 1408/71 overlapped in one 
discrete area: equal access to certain social benefits. Regulation 1408/71 grants ‘workers 
who are or have been subject to the legislation of one or more Member States and who 
are nationals of one of the Member States’16 equal access to social security benefits,17 
while Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68 grants ‘[a worker who is a national of a 
Member State] … the same social and tax advantages as national workers’.18 The 
existence of overlap is not entirely attributable to the Union legislature here;19 after 
initially interpreting the concepts of ‘social security’ and ‘social advantages’ as mutually 
exclusive,20 the ECJ later expanded the definition of ‘social advantages’ to include ‘social 
security’21 and thereby created an overlap between the Regulations. 
 
Not long after the adoption of this secondary law framework for securing free 
movement, the ECJ conferred Article 45 TFEU – according to which ‘freedom of 
movement for workers shall be secured’ – with direct effect and created further overlaps 
with the equal treatment provisions in both Regulations.22 The result from the 
perspective of overlap was (and still is) a primary law prohibition on nationality 
discrimination that sits above the Regulations designed to give effect to that same right. 
 
To flag the complex questions that can result from norm overlap, consider the 
divergences between Article 45 TFEU and the overlapping Regulations. In terms of 
personal scope, Article 45 TFEU does not expressly limit free movement rights to those 
with Member State nationality or those who reside in a host Member State.23 
                                               
16 Article 2(1). Regulation 1408/71 also applies to stateless persons, refugees and the survivors of workers. 
After amendment it also covered the self-employed, see Council Regulation 1390/81 extending to self-
employed persons and members of their families Regulation 1408/71 [1981] OJ L 143/1. 
17 Article 3(1). Article 4 sets out the social security benefits covered. 
18 Article 7. Later extended to former workers by Regulation 1251/70. 
19 As will be discussed further in Chapters 2 and 5, the Union legislature specified the inter-relationship 
between the measures. According to Article 42(2) of Regulation 1612/68 that measure ‘shall not affect 
[Regulation 1408/71]’. ⁠ 
20 In early case law the ECJ implied that a social security benefit could not also be a social advantage, see 
e.g. Case 1/72 Frilli EU:C:1972:56, para. 4. 
21 E.g. Case C-111/91 Commission v Luxembourg (childbirth and maternity allowances) EU:C:1993:92, paras 22, 
32. 
22 This was said to be on account of its ‘absolute nature’, see Case 167/73 Commission v France (Merchant 
Seamen) EU:C:1974:35, para. 45. 
23 Consider also the difference between Article 45 TFEU and Regulation 1612/68 and Regulation 
1408/71. Article 45 TFEU and Regulation 1612/68 apply to ‘workers’, while Regulation 1408/71 applies 
to persons ‘insured, compulsorily or on an optional continued basis, for one or more of the contingencies 
covered by the branches of a social security scheme for employed persons’. See Regulation 1408/71, 
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Regulations 1612/68 and 1408/71 both only apply to ‘nationals of one of the Member 
States’24 and require a cross border connection.25 As a result of this difference, it falls to 
the ECJ to decide whether the personal scope of Article 45 TFEU should be interpreted 
in line with that of overlapping secondary law. In terms of material scope, Article 45(2) 
TFEU refers only to ‘employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and 
employment’, while Regulation 1612/68 grants equal access to ‘social advantages’. 
Again, it falls to the ECJ to determine the interactions between overlapping primary and 
secondary Union law here. Should the ECJ interpret Regulation 1612/68 in line with 
Article 45 TFEU and restrict the interpretation of ‘social advantages’ to benefits 
‘connected with employment’?26 Or, should the ECJ interpret the notion of ‘social 
advantages’ broadly as disconnected from the context of employment?27 The issues 
flagged here are now long-resolved, but similar questions about the inter-relationship 
between overlapping norms of primary and secondary law still recur.28 
 
2.3.2 Overlaps Concerning Establishment and Services 
Articles 49 and 56 TFEU prohibit rules discriminating against self-employed persons 
and service providers on grounds of nationality. The second paragraph of Article 49 
TFEU explains that ‘[f]reedom of establishment shall include the right to engage in and 
carry on non-wage-earning activities, and also to set up and manage enterprises … under 
the conditions laid down by the law of the country of establishment for its own nationals’ (emphasis 
added). Similarly, Article 57 TFEU (defining ‘services’) refers to how ‘a person 
supplying a service may … temporarily exercise his activity in the State where the 
service is supplied, under the same conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.’ As 
with Article 45 TFEU, the ECJ conferred Articles 49 and 56 TFEU with direct effect.29 
                                               
Article 1(a)(i). A person could, therefore, conceivably fall within the scope of Regulation 1408/71 but not 
Article 45 TFEU as in Case 75/63 Unger EU:C:1964:19, [1964] ECR 177, 185. The personal scope of 
Regulation 883/2004 (replacing Regulation 1612/68) is also broader than that of Article 45 TFEU and 
Regulation 492/2011 (replacing Regulation 1612/68). 
24 Regulation 1408/71, Article 2(1). See also, Regulation 1612/68, Article 7(1). 
25 Regulation 1612/68, Article 7(1). 
26 The ECJ initially took this approach. In Michel S, the ECJ held that Regulation 1612/68 only extended 
to benefits ‘connected with employment’ (Case 76/72 Scutari EU:C:1973:46, para. 9). 
27 The ECJ now adopts this approach, see e.g. Case 249/83 Hoeckx EU:C:1985:139, para. 20; Case 59/85 
Reed EU:C:1986:157, paras 26-29. 
28 See Chapter 3. 
29 Reyners (n 8), para. 32 (Article 52 EEC); Van Binsbergen (n 8), para. 27 (Articles 59 and 60 third paragraph 
EEC). Controversy surrounded the ECJ decision to recognise the Treaty rules on establishment and 
services as directly effective. Articles 52 and 59 EEC set out the aim of achieving free movement ‘within 
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Recognising the Treaty rules as directly effective created overlaps with secondary norms 
that aimed to secure free movement. For example, an overlap developed between 
Articles 49 and 56 TFEU and Directive 73/148,30 which required Member States to 
abolish restrictions on: 
… (a) nationals of a Member State who are established or who wish to establish 
themselves in another Member State in order to pursue activities as self-employed 
persons, or who wish to provide services in that State; [and] 
(b) nationals of Member States wishing to go to another Member State as recipients of 
services.31 
Again, norm overlap here raised complex questions that are worth highlighting even if 
they are now resolved. The Directive was somewhat broader than the overlapping 
freedom to provide services set out in Article 49 TFEU and extended to service recipients,32 
                                               
the framework of the provisions set out below’ and are then followed by instructions for the Council to 
‘draw up a general programme for the abolition of existing restrictions on freedom of establishment 
within the Community’ (Articles 54(1) and 63(1) EEC). This wording implies that these goals can only be 
achieved via secondary legislation and Dehousse notes that, at the time, general consensus accepted the 
need for ‘Council directives … to give effect to the rule that nationals of other member states were to be 
allowed to set up and carry on business in the same way as a member state’s own nationals’ (R Dehousse, 
The European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial Integration (Macmillan 1998) 80). The ECJ responded to 
these concerns in Reyners and held that the general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality 
was ‘one of the fundamental legal provisions [of the EU that could] be made easier by, but not made 
dependent on, the implementation of a programme of progressive measures’ (paras 24, 36). 
30 Council Directive 73/148/EEC of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and 
residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the 
provision of services [1973] OJ L 172/14 (replacing Directive 64/220/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the 
abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for nationals of Member 
States with regard to establishment and the provision of services [1964] OJ Spec Ed (I) 115). Also relating 
to free movement, but not including a prohibition on nationality discrimination were: Directive 
64/221/EEC of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement 
and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or 
public health [1964] OJ Spec Ed (I) 117; Directive 75/34/EEC of 17 December 1974 concerning the 
right of nationals of a Member State to remain in the territory of another Member State after having 
pursued therein an activity in a self-employed capacity [1975] OJ L 14/10; Directive 75/35/EEC of 17 
December 1974 extending the scope of Directive 64/221/EEC on the coordination of special measures 
concerning the movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health to include nationals of a Member State who exercise the right to 
remain in the territory of another Member State after having pursued therein an activity in a self-
employed capacity [1975] OJ L 14/14. 
31 Article 1 (emphasis added). 
32 In Luisi and Carbone, the ECJ recognised the right to receive services as a necessary corollary of the right 
to provide services, see Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone EU:C:1984:35, para. 10. On how 
‘EU law on the free movement of persons had been Court-fuelled but legislature-led’ see, N Nic 
Shuibhne, ‘The Third Age of EU Citizenship: Directive 2004/38 in the case law of the Court of Justice’ in 
P Syrpis (ed), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market (CUP 2012) 331-362, 334-336. 
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leaving the ECJ to decide whether to interpret the Treaty broadly and in line with 
overlapping secondary law.33 
 
2.3.3 Overlaps Concerning Goods and Capital 
The development of overlaps in the fields of goods and capital took a different 
trajectory than those relating to persons. 
 
In relation to goods, the only relevant measure – Directive 70/5034 – expired at the end 
of the transitional period.35 This was just as Articles 34 and 35 TFEU gained direct 
effect36 and so no overlap arose. In the period since, no overlaps have developed due to 
the nature of the available legal bases. The most appropriate legal basis for measures 
relating to goods is Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 100 EEC), which empowers the 
Council to issue directives ‘for the approximation of such legislative and administrative 
provisions of the Member States as have a direct incidence on the establishment or 
functioning of the Common Market’ (emphasis added).37 Directives adopted on the 
basis of Article 114 TFEU do not prohibit nationality discrimination but instead 
stipulate common standards for the Member States meaning overlaps do not develop. 
 
In relation to the free movement of capital, no overlaps emerged – despite the existence 
secondary law38 – on account of the ECJ’s ruling in Casati that Article 63(1) TFEU (then 
                                               
33 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the utility of the principle of lex superior in this context. 
34 Directive 70/50/EEC of 22 December 1969 based on the provisions of Article 33 (7), on the abolition 
of measures which have an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports and are not covered by 
other provisions adopted in pursuance of the EEC Treaty [1970] OJ Spec Ed (I) 17. 
35 Article 33(7) EEC was the only legislative basis specifically relating to goods and was itself limited to 
the transitional period. 
36 Case 74/76 Ianelli e Volpi EU:C:1977:51, para. 13 
37 The unanimity requirement (later removed) meant that few directives were adopted. Weiler notes that 
‘[t]he Treaty rule on decision-making and the Court’s jurisprudence on the preemptive effect of such 
decision-making combined to chill the climate in which the [EU] and its Member States were to make 
critical decisions to eliminate the numerous barriers to a true common market. Not only was it difficult to 
achieve consensus on one [EU} norm to replace the variety of Member State norms, but also there was 
the growing fear that once such a norm was adopted, it would lock all Member State into a discipline 
from which they could not exit without again reaching unanimity’ (J Weiler, ‘The Transformation of 
Europe’ (1991) 100(8) Yale Law Journal 2403, 2457). 
38 Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty [1988] OJ L 
178/5. 
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Article 67(1) EEC) lacked direct effect.39 An overlap only developed in this field in 1995 
on account of amendments made to Article 63(1) TFEU (then Article 73c(1) EC).40 
 
2.3.4 The General Prohibition on Discrimination 
Overlapping with each of the sector specific prohibitions on nationality discrimination is 
Article 18 TFEU, which the ECJ recognised as directly effective in Forcheri.41 Prima facie, 
the relationship between Article 18 TFEU and overlapping primary law seems quite 
simple.42 Article 18 TFEU is specifically ‘without prejudice to the special provisions [in 
the Treaties]’ ostensibly denoting the legality of e.g. Article 45(4) TFEU (ex Article 48(4) 
EEC), which permits continued discrimination for jobs in the public service. 
 
The broad wording of Article 18 TFEU contrasts with the more specific expressions of 
the prohibition on discrimination set out in secondary Union law. Tricky questions 
surrounded the inter-relationship between Article 18 TFEU and overlapping secondary 
norms. For example, in Forcheri, the Italian wife of a Community official undertook 
vocational training in Brussels where she and her husband resided (and he worked). The 
Belgian institution charged her a higher enrolment fee (for non-nationals) than that 
charged to Belgian nationals. Mrs Forcheri challenged differences in the fee charged as 
nationality discrimination. Union secondary law did not grant the spouse of a migrant 
worker equal access to education, Regulation 1612/68 only granted this right to the 
children of migrant workers. Again, the ECJ had to determine the extent to which the 
interpretation of primary law should take account of overlapping secondary law. Could 
Mrs Forcheri rely on this residual non-discrimination provision to claim equal treatment 
rights outside of those articulated in secondary law? As is now well-known, the ECJ 
held that Mrs Forcheri could rely on Article 18 TFEU.43 
 
                                               
39 Case 203/80 Casati EU:C:1981:261, para. 10. 
40 Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94 Sanz de Lera EU:C:1995:451, para. 41. 
41 Case 152/82 Forcheri EU:C:1983:205, para. 18. 
42 For further discussion, see Chapter 4. 
43 Forcheri (n 41), paras 17-18. See also e.g. Case 293/83 Gravier EU:C:1985:69, paras 23-25; Case 186/87 
Cowan EU:C:1989:47. 
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2.4. The Development of Overlapping Norms Prohibiting Sex Discrimination 
Article 157(1) TFEU (ex Article 119 EEC) sets out the principle of equal pay for men 
and women.44 By requiring Member State action, Article 157(1) TFEU was something of 
a misnomer within the EEC Treaty’s provisions on social policy, which mostly 
contained a number of rather weak objectives.45 As originally introduced, the provision 
obliged Member States to ‘ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the 
principle of equal remuneration for equal work as between men and women workers’. 
 
2.4.1 Constructing the Basic Framework of Overlapping Norms 
Article 157(1) TFEU had little impact for almost the first fifteen years of its existence. 
Although the Commission reminded the Member States of their responsibility to secure 
equal pay in 1960,46 the Member States instead agreed among themselves to postpone 
this obligation.47 As a consequence of Member State inactivity, other actors sprang into 
action and set in motion a chaotic process of norm development and, later, norm 
overlap. 
 
At the EU level, shifts in policy debates led to greater concerns for sex equality, not just 
equal pay. Several reports either prepared for or carried out by the Commission in the 
late 1960s highlighted the discrimination women faced at work.48 In addition, women in 
the workplace became increasingly mobilised49 leading to mounting fears of industrial 
                                               
44 Motivating the inclusion of a right to equal pay was not any particular concern for the rights of women. 
Almost exclusively economic concerns led to Article 157 TFEU’s inclusion in the Treaty framework. The 
French government in particular had argued for a level playing field in terms of social protection in order 
to prevent the comparative disadvantage of countries with higher levels of social protection (France had 
recently recognised a right to equal pay for men and women), see e.g. J Forman, ‘The Equal Pay Principle 
under Community Law – A Commentary on Article 119 EEC’ (1982) 9(1) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 
17, 19; C Barnard, ‘The Economic Objectives of Article 119’ in TK Hervey and D O’Keeffe (eds), Sex 
Equality Law in the European Union (Wiley 1996) 321-34; C Hoskyns, Integrating Gender: Women, Law and 
Politics in the European Union (Verso 1996) 54-57; RA Cichowski, ‘Judicial Rulemaking and the 
Institutionalization of European Union Sex Equality Policy’ in A Stone Sweet, W Sandholtz and N 
Fligstein (eds), The Institutionalization of Europe (OUP 2001) 113-136, 117-18. 
45 Hoskyns explains that Article 119 EEC differed from other Treaty provisions in the social policy field 
due to the fact that it was originally intended for another chapter of the Treaty, see Hoskyns (n 44) 57. 
46 Commission, ‘Recommendation by the Commission to the Member States relating to Article 119 of the 
Treaty’ [1960] EEC Bull Nos 6&7, 45-47. The Treaty of Rome obliged Member States to implement the 
principle of equal pay for equal work by the end of the first stage of the common market i.e. by 31 
December 1961. 
47 Council, ‘Decisions Adopted by the Council at the End of the Year’ [1962] EC Bull No 1, 8-10. 
48 See further Hoskyns (n 44) 83-84 and the references cited therein. 
49 In 1966, there had been a particularly lengthy strike for equal pay in Herstal (Belgium). Hoskyns argues 
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action in the early 1970s due to the poor economic situation.50 Responding to these 
developments, the Council of Ministers invited the Commission to draw up a Social 
Action Programme.51 Top priority was a directive on equal pay for men and women,52 
although the Commission also envisaged further acts to improve the position of women 
more generally. 
 
Parallel to these policy developments, Belgian labour lawyer Eliane Vogel-Polsky began 
a litigation strategy to test her theory that Article 157 TFEU was ‘self-executing’.53 
Vogel-Polsky brought a series of cases before the Belgian courts on behalf of a former 
air hostess: Ms Defrenne. The Belgian airline Sabena terminated Ms Defrenne’s contract 
of employment when she reached the age of forty – a practice maintained only for 
women. The Belgian courts referred several questions to the ECJ asking whether 
Sabena’s conduct breached Article 157 TFEU, including a question on the direct effect 
of Article 157 TFEU. The first case to reach the ECJ did not address this point but 
instead concerned retirement pensions, which – on account of their connection to social 
policy – are not ‘pay’ under Article 157 TFEU.54 As a result, the legislative programme 
continued with many in the institutions believing Article 157 TFEU lacked direct 
effect.55 
 
These nascent developments – the commencement of a legislative programme and the 
litigation of Article 157 TFEU – came to a head at fairly similar times, dramatically 
altering the landscape of sex equality norms. In 1975, the EU legislature adopted 
Directive 75/117 on equal pay between men and women,56 which obliged Member 
                                               
the Herstal strike is often understood as an important factor in increasing the visibility and awareness of 
women’s rights in the workplace, see Hoskyns (n 44) 65-68. 
50 J Shaw, J Hunt and C Wallace, Economic and Social Law of the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) 
348. 
51 [1972] EC Bull Vol. 5, No. 10, 19. 
52 Commission, ‘Social Action Programme’ (1973) Information Memo P-52/73, 1. 
53 In 1967, Vogel-Polsky wrote an important article in a Belgian legal journal arguing for the ECJ to 
recognise Article 157 TFEU as directly effective (or ‘self-executing’), see E Vogel-Polsky, ‘L’Article 119 
du traité de Rome – peut-il être considéré comme self-executing?’ Journal des Tribunaux (Brussels, 15 April 
1967), cited by Hoskyns (n 44) 68. Vogel-Polsky’s argument focused on the comparability of Article 157 
TFEU with Article 110 TFEU, which the ECJ had recently recognised as directly effective in Joined Cases 
31/62 and 33/62 Lütticke EU:C:1962:49. 
54 Case 80/70 Defrenne I EU:C:1971:55, paras 7-8. 
55 Hoskyns draws attention, in particular, to one Commission official in charge of wage policy who was 
unsure of the direct effect of Article 119 EEC and who believed that ‘legislation at the national level was 
required to cover continuing gaps and inadequacies’, see Hoskyns (n 44) 85. 
56 Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
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States to give effect to the equal pay principle. Less than a year later, the ECJ in Defrenne 
II recognised Article 157 TFEU as capable of direct effect.57 Importantly, and in 
contrast to the solely vertical effects of directives,58 the ECJ held that Article 157 TFEU 
was capable of vertical and horizontal direct effect.59 
 
By recognising the Treaty as directly effective the ECJ created ‘a genuinely individual 
right in [EU] law to non-discrimination’.60 As above, the existence of a substantive and 
directly effective Treaty right led to an overlap with secondary Union law implementing 
that Treaty norm. Mirroring the issues flagged in Section 2.3, Article 157 TFEU and 
Directive 75/117 did not place identical obligations on the Member States. The 
Directive granted a right to equal pay for equal work and ‘work to which equal value is 
attributed’ and so expanded beyond the right in Article 157 TFEU (before amendment) 
to equal pay for the same work.61 However, in contrast to the Directive, Article 157(1) 
TFEU could be invoked in disputes between private parties. The result was to set up 
two alternative rights to equal pay: one under the Directive with a slightly broader 
substantive scope (equal pay for work of equal value) and the other under the Treaty, 
which could be relied upon against private parties. 
 
A question recurring throughout this Phase is how Article 157 TFEU should inter-relate 
with overlapping secondary law. The question is somewhat different here than in the 
context of nationality discrimination. No legislative basis accompanied Article 157 
TFEU as originally drafted in the EEC Treaty. Unlike with e.g. Regulation 1612/68 and 
Article 45 TFEU, the basis of Directive 75/117 is not an empowering provision 
specifically linked to Article 157 TFEU. In fact, the basis for Directive 75/117 was 
Article 114 TFEU (ex Article 100 EEC) on the approximation of legislation for the 
                                               
States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women [1975] OJ L45/19. On 
the adoption of which see, C Docksey, ‘The European Community and the Promotion of Equality’ in C 
McCrudden (ed), Women, Employment and European Equality Law (Eclipse 1987) 1-22, 3. 
57 Article 157 TFEU is capable of direct effect in cases where discrimination ‘may be identified solely with 
the aid of the criteria based on equal work and equal pay’. When discrimination ‘can only be identified by 
reference to more explicit implementing provisions of a Community or national character’ Article 157 
TFEU does not have direct effect, see Case 43/75 Defrenne II EU:C:1976:56, para. 18. 
58 See Case 152/84 Marshall EU:C:1986:84, para. 48; Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori EU:C:1994:292, para. 24. 
59 Defrenne II (n 57), para. 39. 
60 Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (n 1) 45. 
61 This brings the law of equal pay into line with ILO Convention No 100 on Equal Remuneration for 
Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (adopted 29 June 1951, entered into force 23 May 
1953) 165 UNTS 303. 
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purposes of the establishment and functioning of the internal market. This internal 
market basis contrasts with the location of Article 157 TFEU in the Treaty chapter on 
social policy. This raises the question whether the disconnect between the legislative 
basis and Article 157 TFEU affects how that Treaty provision should inter-relate with 
overlapping secondary Union law (a point picked up again in Chapter 3). 
 
Returning to the creation of further overlaps, two developments followed swiftly from 
the adoption of Directive 75/117. In 1976, the Union legislature adopted Directive 
76/207 on equal treatment between men and women in access to employment, 
vocational training and working conditions.62 Soon after, the ECJ expressly recognised 
the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex.63 According to the ECJ 
in Defrenne III, the ‘elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of [the] 
fundamental rights’ protected by EU law.64 By recognising a general principle requiring 
equal treatment between men and women, a further layer of overlap is added to all of 
the overlaps discussed in this sub-Section. 
 
Defrenne III leaves two key issues unresolved: first, does the content of the general 
principle requiring equal treatment between men and women differ from written 
expressions of the same right in e.g. Directives 75/117 and 76/207; secondly, how does 
that general principle inter-relate with written expressions of the prohibition on sex 
discrimination. The decision in Defrenne III did not clarify either the differences between 
the general principle and Directive 76/207 or the relationship between them. Impliedly, 
the temporal scope of the general principle was similar to that of Directive 76/207; the 
ECJ ruled that Ms Defrenne could not rely on the general principle to claim equal 
treatment from a date prior to Directive 76/207’s entry into force since the EU had not, 
at that time, ‘assumed any responsibility for supervising and guaranteeing the 
                                               
62 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and 
working conditions [1976] OJ L 39/40. The legal basis was not Article 114 TFEU, but the residual 
provision for achieving EU objectives in (what is now) Article 352 TFEU. 
63 Applicants before the ECJ had argued for the recognition of a general principle prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of sex in Case 20/71 Bertoni v Parliament EU:C:1972:48, para. 3. The ECJ held 
that the Staff Regulations cannot treat officials differently according to their gender if this creates 
‘arbitrary difference of treatment between officials’ (Bertoni v Parliament, paras 12-13). The ECJ thereby 
implies the existence of a general principle prohibiting sex discrimination but does not explicitly recognise 
any such principle. 
64 Case 149/77 Defrenne III EU:C:1978:130, paras 26-27. 
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observance of equality between men and women in working conditions other than 
remuneration’.65 The apparent similarity between Directive 76/207 and the overlapping 
general principle led to questions over ‘the exact force of the principle of equal 
treatment and its relative weight … where secondary legislation actually permits 
discrimination.’66 
 
By 1978, a complex framework of highly similar norms prohibiting sex discrimination 
had developed following norm development in different avenues: judicial, legislative and 
Treaty amendment. Hierarchically superior, with horizontal and vertical direct effect, 
was Article 157 TFEU. However, before amendment, this Treaty provision was of 
narrower substantive scope than Directive 75/117. Following hierarchically was a 
general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of sex that expanded beyond equal 
pay.67 At the bottom of the norm-hierarchy, at least in a formal sense, were two 
directives: Directive 75/117 on equal pay and Directive 76/207 on equal treatment. 
When more than one of these norms is prima facie applicable, the ECJ is tasked with 
determining how each source should work together. 
 
2.4.2 Adding Further Secondary Norms 
Added to these existing complexities were Directive 79/768 on social security and 
Directive 86/37869 on equal treatment in occupational social security schemes. The 
former aimed to fill the gaps left by Defrenne I and prohibited discrimination on grounds 
of sex as regards statutory schemes or social assistance benefits that protected against 
sickness, invalidity, old age, accidents at work, occupational diseases and 
unemployment.70 As a sensitive area for the Member States, agreement was particularly 
difficult to reach,71 and as a result the measure contained a number of limitations 
                                               
65 Defrenne III (n 64), para. 30. 
66 G de Búrca, ‘The Role of Equality in European Community Law’ in A Dashwood and S O’Leary (eds), 
The Principle of Equal Treatment in EC Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1997) 13-34, para. 2.07. 
67 The ECJ held that working conditions such as retirement age, at stake in Defrenne III, fell outside the 
scope of Article 157 TFEU in Defrenne III (n 64), para. 24. 
68 Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle 
of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security [1979] OJ L 6/24. 
69 Council Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes [1986] OJ L 225/40. 
70 Directive 79/7, Article 3. 
71 Shaw, Hunt and Wallace (n 50) 372. Initially, the aim had been to include rules on social security within 
the Equal Treatment Directive, but these had to be removed in order to secure agreement on the Equal 
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regarding pensionable age, survivors’ pensions and other advantages relating to 
pensions.72 The latter aimed to secure equal treatment in private schemes. Due to 
lobbying pressure from the pensions and life insurance industries, Directive 86/378 also 
permitted derogations from principle of equal treatment. 
 
The relationship between the directly effective right in Article 157 TFEU and 
overlapping secondary law emerges again here. Before the adoption of Directive 86/378 
on occupational social security schemes, the ECJ recognised that benefits received 
under contractual schemes amounted to ‘pay’ for the purposes of Article 157(1) 
TFEU.73 Given the exception-riddled nature of the Directive, the ECJ was again faced 
with the inter-relationship between overlapping primary and secondary Union law, this 
time where a potential conflict arises.74 The resulting decision in Barber essentially 
overruled the derogations from equal treatment in Directive 86/378. 
 
2.5. Summary 
To conclude, by the end of Phase I a complex picture of overlapping norms prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of both nationality and sex had developed. Underscoring 
these overlaps was a general principle of equality derived from the far narrower 
guarantee of equality between producers and consumers in the agricultural field. The 
discussion highlighted three different causes of norm overlap: first, the existence of a 
highly substantive Treaty framework given effect by secondary Union law; secondly, the 
use of written sources of the prohibition on discrimination to derive overlapping general 
principles; finally, the Union legislature’s failure to consider potential overlaps between 
secondary measures. 
 
                                               
Treatment Directive, see S Prechal and N Burrows, Gender Discrimination Law of the European Community 
(Dartmouth 1990) 163. 
72 Directive 79/7, Article 7. 
73 Case 170/84 Bilka EU:C:1986:204, para. 22. 
74 The ECJ in Barber held that it could not, see Case C-262/88 Barber EU:C:1990:209, para. 32. The 
Treaty-framers themselves appeared to recognise this when, following the Barber decision, the Maastricht 
Treaty included a Protocol specifically addressing the ECJ’s decision in Barber. 
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3. PHASE II: 1991-2000 
3.1. Overview 
Phase II extends from the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty until the adoption of 
the Amsterdam Treaty. New overlaps arising during this Phase mostly stem from the 
use of written Union law as an inspirational source for general principles of Union law. 
Several developments during this Phase also lay the groundwork for further overlaps to 
develop; the Treaty of Amsterdam added new legislative bases empowering the Union 
legislature to advance equal treatment, while the growing importance of fundamental 
rights protection led to the drafting and solemn proclamation of an EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
 
3.2. The Development of Overlapping Norms Prohibiting Nationality 
Discrimination 
The Maastricht Treaty did not alter the Treaty framework set out in Phase I; the basic 
structure of the general prohibition in Article 18 TFEU and the more specific free 
movement provisions remained unchanged. Creating a further overlap during this 
Phase, the ECJ recognised the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality 
as a general principle of Union law. Furthermore, a change that cannot go unmentioned 
is the creation of Union citizenship; nationals of Member States were now citizens of 
the Union ‘with the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States’75 and soon Union citizenship would be heralded as the ‘the fundamental status of 
nationals’.76 This Treaty change paved the way for further overlaps – as discussed in 
Phase III – and altered the context within which existing overlapping provisions 
interacted. 
 
A new overlap in the field of nationality discrimination developed following the ECJ’s 
decision in Corsica Ferries in which it explicitly recognised that the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality is a general principle of Union law.77 That 
                                               
75 Article 8(1) EC (now Article 21(1) TFEU). 
76 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk EU:C:2001:458, para. 31. 
77 Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries EU:C:1994:195, para. 19. See also, e.g. Case C-262/96 Sürül 
EU:C:1999:228, para. 64; Case C-171/01 Wählergruppe Gemeinsam EU:C:2003:260, para. 59; Case C-28/04 
Tod’s and Tod’s France EU:C:2005:418, para. 36; Case C-40/05 Lyyski EU:C:2007:10, para. 33; Case C-
222/07 UTECA EU:C:2009:124, para. 37; Case C-382/08 Neukirchinger EU:C:2011:27, para. 30; Case C-
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judgment is worth noting here since the ECJ’s use of written norms to inspire general 
principles is a reason behind the accumulation of overlapping norms. The ECJ does not 
clarify whether the general principle is identical to Article 18 TFEU (in terms of e.g. 
what triggers its application, its content and its capacity for direct effect) or whether it 
might apply in situations not covered by Article 18 TFEU. 
 
Turning back to the creation of Union citizenship, which potentially altered the 
situations in which applicants can invoke Article 18 TFEU and the overlapping general 
principle, Article 18 TFEU applies to all situations falling ‘within the scope of the 
Treaties’, subject to any more specific provisions in the Treaties. The creation of Union 
citizenship, and the accompanying rights inter alia to move and reside, expanded the 
scope of the Treaties. By the end of Phase I, the ECJ had recognised limited situations 
in which non-economically active persons could rely on Article 18 TFEU.78 With the 
creation of Union citizenship, the potential arose for Member State nationals to rely on 
the ‘status of citizen of the Union in order to assert the principle of non-discrimination, 
throughout the entire area in which the case law applies’.79 This would dramatically alter 
the potential to rely on Article 18 TFEU where a Union citizen could not rely on 
existing secondary law.  
 
However, Article 21(1) TFEU further complicated matters by adding the caveat that 
Union citizens only have the right to move and reside ‘subject to the limitations and 
conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect’. 
This provision turns the hierarchy of norms on its head by subjecting the primary law 
right to move and reside to limits contained in secondary law. Article 18 TFEU is only 
‘without prejudice to any special provisions’ in the Treaties and so does not contain 
similar restrictions. If a Union citizen seeks to rely on Article 18 TFEU in situations not 
covered by the free movement rules, could the capacity for secondary law to limit 
primary law rights ‘be imputed back to Article 18 indirectly by way of Article 21 TFEU 
                                               
628/11 International Jet Management EU:C:2014:171, paras 34, 59; Schiebel Aircraft (n 8), paras 19-20; Case C-
171/13 Demirci and Others EU:C:2015:8, para. 50. 
78 Limited exceptions had developed, see e.g. Forcheri (n 41); Gravier (n 43). 
79 Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala EU:C:1997:335, Opinion of AG La Pergola, para. 23. 
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as a “special provision” in the Treaty’?80 And what role is there here for the general 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds on nationality?  
 
Agreeing with Nic Shuibhne, even just posing the above questions ‘induces normative 
migraine’.81 However, such questions strike at the heart of what principles or express 
clauses determine the inter-relationship between Article 18 TFEU and overlapping 
secondary law. In the early 1990s, these questions were of particular importance given 
the adoption of several measures specifically addressing the position of the economically 
inactive. Under Directives 90/364,82 90/36583 and 93/9384 a national of a Member State 
could claim a right of residence in a host Member State so long as they had sufficient 
resources and sickness insurance.85 If the limitations in Union secondary law could limit 
Article 18 TFEU, mobile Union citizens would be unable, for example, to claim equal 
access to social benefits without meeting the requirements of sufficient resources set out 
in secondary law.86 
 
3.3. The Development of Overlapping Norms Prohibiting Sex Discrimination 
By the end of Phase I, the picture of overlapping norms prohibiting sex discrimination 
was quite a mess: there was a directly effective Treaty right to equal pay, various 
secondary laws and a general principle prohibiting sex discrimination of uncertain scope. 
During Phase II, there is a major overhaul of the Treaty and legislative framework 
prohibiting sex discrimination. Most changes do not create new overlaps; but where 
overlaps do develop, responsibility lies with the legislature. 
 
                                               
80 N Nic Shuibhne, ‘Limits Rising, Duties Ascending: The Changing Legal Shape of Union Citizenship’ 
(2015) 52(4) CMLRev 889, 909. 
81 Nic Shuibhne, ‘Limits Rising, Duties Ascending’ (n 80) 935. 
82 Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence [1990] OJ L 180/26, Article 
1(1). 
83 Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-
employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity [1990] OJ L 180/28, Article 1(1). 
84 Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students [1993] OJ L 
317/59, Article 1. Replacing Council Directive 90/366/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for 
students [1990] OJ L 180/30. 
85 Students only had to ‘attest’ to having sufficient resources. 
86 How the ECJ resolved these questions during this Phase is well-known. The ECJ interpreted the free 
movement provisions in light of Union citizenship to develop a series of Treaty-based non-discrimination 
rights beyond those in existing secondary law, see e.g. Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala EU:C:1998:217, paras 
22-63; Grzelczyk (n 76), para. 13; Case C-209/03 Bidar EU:C:2005:169, para. 43. 
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During the 1990s, a renewed interest in social policy87 and a shift to more centre-left 
governments88 led to the promulgation of several measures aiming to ensure equality 
between men and women such as Directive 92/85 on the protection of pregnant 
workers,89 Directive 96/34 on parental leave,90 Directive 97/80 on the burden of proof91 
and Directive 97/81 on part-time work.92 These measures mostly concerned different 
aspects of equal treatment and so did not overlap with one another. However, by 
adopting Directive 92/85 on pregnant workers, the Union legislature created an overlap 
with Directive 76/207 on equal treatment between men and women in employment. 
This overlap is worth considering in more detail since it shows the role of legislative 
drafting in creating overlaps. 
 
Before the Union legislature adopted Directive 92/85 on pregnant workers, the ECJ 
held that refusing to hire or renew the contract of a female worker on account of her 
pregnancy amounted to direct discrimination on grounds of sex prohibited by Directive 
76/207.93 Despite this existing case law, Directive 92/85 does not reflect the state of the 
law at the time of its adoption; Article 10 of the Directive, requires only that Member 
States ‘take the necessary measures to prohibit the dismissal of workers … during the 
period from the beginning of their pregnancy to the end of the maternity leave’.94 In 
contrast to Directive 76/207, Directive 92/85 does not prohibit a refusal to hire or to 
renew a fixed-term contract on grounds of pregnancy.95 Did the Union legislature intend 
                                               
87 Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (n 1) 11. 
88 Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (n 1) 48. 
89 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers who have recently given birth or are 
breastfeeding [1992] OJ L 348/1. 
90 Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded 
by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC [1996] OJ L145/11. 
91 Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination 
based on sex [1998] OJ L 14/6. 
92 Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-
time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC [1997] OJ L 14/9. 
93 On refusal to hire, see Case C-177/88 Dekker EU:C:1990:383, para. 12; later extended to include the 
non-renewal of a fixed-term contract on grounds of pregnancy in Case C-438/99 Jiménez Melgar 
EU:C:2001:509, para. 47. The ECJ clarified the limits of the prohibition on discrimination in Hertz. Ms 
Hertz suffered from an illness attributable to pregnancy in the period after the end of her maternity leave. 
The ECJ held that was not unlawful for her employer to dismiss her after the end of her maternity leave 
as pregnancy-related illness should, at that point, be treated as indistinguishable from any other illness, see 
Case C-179/88 Hertz EU:C:1990:384, para. 16. 
94 Directive 92/85, Article 10. 
95 The original proposal emanating from the Commission’s equality unit did provide for protection during 
selection, however, this was removed from the official proposal, see E Ellis, ‘Protection of Pregnancy and 
Maternity’ (1993) 22(1) ILJ 63, 63. 
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to limit the right to non-discrimination to women in employment? The Union legislature 
left the ECJ to determine the impact of the newer directive on the existing legal 
framework, despite foreseeing the potential overlaps and inevitable tension; the drafting 
process led to the removal of a priority clause clarifying the relationship between 
measures and specifying that the directive on pregnant workers is ‘without prejudice to 
the provisions of the Council Directives concerning equal treatment for men and 
women’.96 
 
Underscoring each of the new directives adopted during this Phase was the general 
principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex recognised in Defrenne III. The 
ECJ did not clarify the role or autonomous value of the general principle in Phase I. 
Expounding on the distinct contribution of the general principle, in this Phase the ECJ 
relied upon the general principle to interpret Directive 76/207 as precluding 
discrimination on the grounds of gender reassignment.97 The limits of the general 
principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex were, however, also further 
specified during this Phase. In Grant, the ECJ refused to interpret Article 157 TFEU as 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation98 on the grounds that 
general principles ‘cannot in themselves have the effect of extending the scope of the 
Treaty provisions beyond the competences of the [EU].’99 In consequence, the precise 
role of the general principle prohibiting sex discrimination in the context of norm 
overlap remained unclear. 
 
As Phase II drew to a close, the Treaty framework prohibiting sex discrimination 
underwent several changes. Alongside certain amendments entrenching a commitment 
to sex equality,100 the Amsterdam Treaty added two further legislative bases. Article 19 
                                               
96 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the protection at work of pregnant women 
or women who have recently given birth’ COM(90) 406 final, 4. 
97 Case C-13/94 P v S EU:C:1996:170, paras 18-19. This jurisprudence was extended to matters relating to 
‘pay’ in Case C-117/01 K.B. EU:C:2004:7, para. 26. There are other instances of legislation being read 
broadly in combination with general principles e.g. Case C-83/14 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria 
EU:C:2015:480. 
98 Case C-249/96 Grant EU:C:1998:63, para. 28. 
99 Grant (n 98), para. 45. The ECJ maintained this position in D and Sweden v Council despite interventions 
from a number of Member States and the addition of a legislative basis in the Treaties, see Joined Cases 
C-122/99 P and C-125/99 P D v Council EU:C:2001:304, para. 52. 
100 See, in particular, the mainstreaming provisions in Articles 8 and 10 TFEU. In addition, Article 157(4) 
TFEU allowed for positive discrimination to enhance the position of women. 
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TFEU (discussed again below) empowered the Council to ‘take appropriate action to 
combat discrimination based on sex’. Article 157(3) TFEU specified that the Parliament 
and Council ‘shall adopt measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation, including the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value.’ 
The inclusion of sex in both legislative bases epitomises the somewhat haphazard 
development of EU equality law flagged throughout this Chapter. What makes the 
inclusion of sex within Article 19 TFEU all the more needless is that measures adopted 
on that basis (unlike Article 157(3) TFEU) require unanimity. As a final change to the 
Treaty framework – and to show how better drafting can ameliorate the complexities 
created by norm overlap – the Amsterdam Treaty brought Article 157(1) TFEU into 
line with Directive 75/117 to require ‘equal pay for work of equal value’. 
 
3.4. The Transformation of Non-Discrimination into a Fundamental Right  
Heightened activism during the 1990s also led to several major changes relating to equal 
treatment (in a more general sense) making their way into the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
During this Phase, the number of pan-European NGOs rose101 alongside increased 
action on the part of the Commission102 and the European Parliament.103 The 
cumulative effect of these campaigns led to several changes in the Amsterdam Treaty 
including a new empowering provision to tackle discrimination.104 According to Article 
19(1) TFEU: 
                                               
101 E.g. the Starting Line Group, which campaigned for an anti-racism directive and a legislative basis for 
anti-racism legislation, and the European Disabled People’s Parliament, which called for a general anti-
discrimination clause. See further, Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (n 1) 68, 106. 
102 In 1988, a communication from the Commission proposed that the Council make a resolution against 
racism and xenophobia. The resulting Council resolution watered-down the Commission’s proposal to 
such an extent that the Commission refused to be associated with it. See Commission, ‘Proposal for a 
Council resolution on the fight against racism and xenophobia (Communication)’ COM(88) 318 final; 
Council, ‘Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 
meeting within the Council of 29 May 1990 on the fight against racism and xenophobia’ [1990] OJ C 
157/1. 
103 The European Parliament commissioned a number of reports into the rise of racism and xenophobia 
in Europe, most notably European Parliament, ‘Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee of Inquiry 
into the Rise of Fascism and Racism in Europe (Evrigenis Report)’ (1986) A2-160/85/rev; European 
Parliament, ‘Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia (Ford Report)’ (1990) A3-195/90. See 
further, C Brown, ‘The Race Directive: Towards Equality for all the Peoples of Europe?’ (2001) 21(1) 
YEL 195, 199; Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (n 1) 62. 
104 Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (n 1) 106. For an extensive discussion of the events 
leading to the introduction of Article 19 TFEU, see M Bell and L Waddington, ‘The 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference and the Prospects of a Non-Discrimination Treaty Article’ (1996) 25(4) 
ILJ 320. 
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Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the 
powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in 
accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of 
the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. 
The inclusion of a legislative basis (rather than a prohibition) did not add to existing 
overlaps per se, but it paved the way for overlaps outside the fields of nationality and 
sex discrimination. 
 
Such was the momentum for legislation countering discrimination, particularly on 
grounds of race, that the Commission began preparing a legislative package before the 
Treaty of Amsterdam had even entered into force.105 To capitalise on the attention 
surrounding race and the perceived ‘dangers of ethnic conflict within an enlarged EU’,106 
the Commission set out plans for two directives and a programme of action designed to 
complement the legislation.107 The first proposed directive aimed ‘to combat 
discrimination in the labour market’ on all the grounds specified in Article 19 TFEU, 
except for sex. Given the greater support for action regarding race, the second proposed 
directive aimed ‘to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin’ in the 
labour market and beyond. Before the end of 2000, the legislature adopted both 
Directive 2000/43 (prohibiting discrimination on grounds of race)108 and Directive 
2000/78109 (prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation).110 
                                               
105 Following its extraordinary meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999, the Council invited the 
Commission to come forward with proposals on the fight against racism and xenophobia. 
106 D Schiek, ‘Broadening the Scope and the Norms of EU Gender Equality Law: Towards a 
Multidimensional Conceptions of Equality Law’ (2005) 12(4) MJ 427, 438. 
107 Commission ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on certain Community measures to 
combat discrimination’ COM (1999) 564 final, 8. According to the Commission, the directive would 
provide ‘a solid basis for the enlargement of the European Union which must be founded on the full and 
effective respect of human rights’, adding that enlargement made ‘it essential to put into place a common 
European framework for the fight against racism’, see Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin 
(Explanatory Memorandum)’ COM (1999) 566 final, 4. 
108 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22. For evaluation of the content 
of the Directive, see, Brown (n 103) 204ff; Bell, Racism and Equality in the European Union (n 1) Chapter 4. 
109 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16. 
110 For discussion of the differences between the directives, see e.g. L Waddington and M Bell, ‘More 
Equal than Others: Distinguishing European Union Equality Directives’ (2001) 38(3) CMLRev 587; D 
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In addition to these developments, the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne 
European Council announced the intention to establish a Charter containing the 
fundamental rights applicable at Union level to ‘make their overriding importance and 
relevance more visible to the Union’s citizens’.111 Despite the potential for the Charter 
to create many new instances of overlap,112 the Charter did not gain binding force 
during this Phase. Postponing the potential complexities of norm overlap for several 
years, the Charter was merely ‘solemnly proclaimed’ by the European Parliament, 
Council of Ministers and European Commission at Nice on 7 December 2000. 
 
3.5. Summary 
To conclude, by the end of Phase II, two further instances of overlap had developed: a 
general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality underscored the 
existing framework of primary and secondary law that developed during Phase I and a 
discrete overlap developed between secondary Union law relating to pregnant workers. 
Furthermore, changes to the Treaty framework – specifically the creation of Union 
citizenship – altered the context within which existing overlaps operated. 
 
Two main themes emerge from the discussion. The first concerns the ambiguities that 
arise from the ECJ’s tendency to derive general principles from written sources of EU 
law. The nature of general principles, the contours of which only become clear 
following judicial elaboration, mean that it is often not apparent whether they will play 
an autonomous role in the context of norm overlap. P v S showed that sometimes 
general principles will add to overlapping written provisions; however, whether the 
general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality would provide any 
additional protection remained unclear by the end of this Phase. The second theme 
worth reflecting on is the role of the Union legislature and the Treaty-framers in both 
adding to and – at least in part – resolving issues of norm overlap. The overlap in 
relationship to pregnant workers suggests a lack of care on the part of the Union 
                                               
Schiek, ‘A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law?’ (2002) 8(2) ELJ 290; E Howard, 
‘The Case for a Considered Hierarchy of Discrimination Grounds in EU Law’ (2006) 13(4) MJ 447. 
111 Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council on June 4 1999’, Annex IV. 
112 Outlined in Section 5 below. 
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legislature to ensure the relationship between secondary measures is clear (or, indeed, 
that those measures do not coincide in the first place).  
 
We turn to Phase III with a fundamentally different outline of EU equality law. A 
conception of non-discrimination as a human right sits alongside the notion of equal 
treatment as a market principle. The Treaty of Amsterdam adds new legislative bases 
(followed by new directives) and elevates the status of equality to an aim of the EU. 
Outside of the formal Treaty structure, there is also a non-binding Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. With these changes comes the potential for new overlaps to 
develop. 
 
4. PHASE III: 2001-2009 
During Phase III – from signing the Treaty of Nice to the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty – we revisit much of the secondary law relating to nationality and sex 
discrimination adopted during Phase I. Characterising this Phase are attempts to 
consolidate and simplify existing secondary law, much of which had now been in force 
for several decades. Continuing from Phase II, the ECJ continues to battle with the 
relationship between general principles and overlapping written sources.  
 
4.1. Nationality Discrimination: Recasting and Consolidating the Legislative 
Framework 
Characterising the development of overlapping non-discrimination norms in Phase III is 
the consolidation of and addition to the legislative framework. Of particular note for 
present purposes are: (1) Directive 2004/38 consolidating the existing law on the rights 
of Union citizens to move and reside;113 (2) Regulation 883/2004 overhauling the law on 
social security coordination;114 and (3) Directive 2006/123 aiming to open up the market 
in services.115 The measures are diverse, addressing very different aspects of free 
                                               
113 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States [2004] OJ L 158/77. 
114 Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166/1. 
115 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
services in the internal market [2006] OJ L 376/36. 
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movement, yet each – within varying parameters – grants Union citizens the right to 
equal treatment with nationals of a host Member State. 
 
Directive 2004/38 aimed ‘to codify and review’ and to ‘simplify and strengthen’ the 
complex corpus of secondary law on the rights of workers, self-employed persons, 
students and the economically inactive.116 In consequence, the Directive repealed several 
earlier free movement and residence measures117 and amended Regulation 1612/68 
(although the Directive left the equal treatment provisions of that Regulation – Articles 
7 and 12 – untouched118). While the Directive mostly concerns the right to move and 
reside, Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 – found among the ‘[p]rovisions common to the 
right of residence’ – includes a general prohibition on nationality discrimination. 
According to which: 
(1) Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the Treaty 
and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory 
of the host Member State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that 
Member State within the scope of the Treaty.119 The benefit of this right shall be 
extended to family members who are not nationals of a Member State and who have 
the right of residence or permanent residence (emphasis added). 
(2) By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the host Member State shall not be 
obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three months of 
residence or, where appropriate [to jobseekers]120 nor shall it be obliged, prior to 
acquisition of the right of permanent residence, to grant maintenance aid for 
studies…to persons other than workers, self-employed persons, persons who retain 
such status and members of their families. 
                                               
116 Recital 3. 
117 Directive 68/360; Directive 73/148; Directive 90/364; Directive 90/365; Directive 93/96. 
118 Regulation 1612/68 was later replaced by Regulation 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L 141/1. No 
changes are made to the equal treatment provisions aside from renumbering: Article 12 becomes Article 
10. 
119 Emphasis added. A Union citizen will be ‘residing on the basis of’ the Directive in the following 
circumstances: (1) during the first three months of residence (Article 6); beyond this, (2) if they are 
working or are self-employed (Article 7(1)(a)); (3) if they are economically inactive but have (or can attest 
to if they are students) sufficient resources as well as comprehensive sickness insurance (Article 7(1)(b)-
(c)); or (4) if they are family members of a Union citizen satisfying any of the above (Article 7(1)(d)). 
Additionally, third country nationals accompanying or joining a Union citizen falling within one of the 
above categories will be able to benefit from the right to equal treatment (Article 7(2)). 
120 According to Article 14(4)(b) a Union citizen who has entered the territory of the host Member State 
in order to seek employment and their family members ‘may not be expelled for as long as the Union 
citizens can provide evidence that they are continuing to seek employment and that they have a genuine 
chance of being engaged.’ 
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The breadth of Article 24 leads to new overlaps with all pre-existing norms prohibiting 
nationality discrimination mentioned so far. Furthermore, Article 24 of the Directive 
also overlaps with Articles 7 and 12 of Regulation 1612/68 since Union citizens working 
and living in a host Member State will be lawfully resident under the Directive. 
 
In many ways the addition of a further non-discrimination norm created added 
complications. In particular, the Directive appears in tension with the Treaty-based 
rights to equal treatment it aimed to codify; for example, by requiring that Union 
citizens reside on the basis of the Directive or by permitting Member States to refuse 
jobseekers social assistance benefits.121 Again, it falls to the ECJ to determine the inter-
relationship between primary law and overlapping secondary measures, not to mention 
the general principle of non-discrimination. 
 
Regulation 883/2004, designed to coordinate entitlement to and responsibility for social 
security across the EU, entered into force on the same day as Directive 2004/38. After 
39 amendments to Regulation 1408/71, Regulation 883/2004 expressly aimed to 
replace, ‘while modernising and simplifying’, the existing rules on the coordination of 
social security systems.122 Article 4 of Regulation 883/2004 grants ‘persons to whom this 
Regulation applies’ equal access to social security benefits123 and special non-
contributory benefits.124 The persons covered by Regulation 883/2004 extend beyond 
                                               
121 G Davies, ‘Legislative Control of the European Court of Justice’ (2014) 51(6) CMLRev 1579, 1600 and 
the references cited in n 92. For differing interpretations of Article 24(2) in relation to jobseekers see e.g. 
Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras EU:C:2009:344; Case C-67/14 Alimanovic EU:C:2015:597. A 
difference also emerges concerning the position of students. In Bidar, the ECJ accepted that a Union 
citizen could claim equal access to maintenance aid after three years of residence if they could evidence a 
‘certain degree of integration into the society’ of the host Member State’, see Bidar (n 86), paras 57, 62. 
However, the Directive requires five years of residence, a limit seemingly accepted in Case C-158/07 
Förster EU:C:2008:630 even before the Directive had entered into force. 
122 Regulation 883/2004, Recital 3. Legislative overhaul was required due to the bifurcation of Member 
State welfare systems along two lines – social insurance and means tested systems – and the increasing 
privatisation of welfare, see M Fuchs and R Cornelissen, ‘Introduction’ in M Fuchs and R Cornelissen 
(eds), EU Social Security Law: A Commentary on EU Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009 (CH 
BECK/Hart/Nomos 2015) 1-18, para. 16. 
123 Social security benefits are listed in Article 3(1) and encompass (a) sickness benefits; (b) maternity and 
equivalent paternity benefits; (c) invalidity benefits; (d) old-age benefits; (e) survivors’ benefits; (f) benefits 
in respect of accidents at work and occupational diseases; (g) death grants; (h) unemployment benefits; (i) 
pre-retirement benefits; (j) family benefits. 
124 Special non-contributory benefits share characteristics of both social security and social assistance. 
They were introduced in response to a number of decisions of the ECJ in which several non-contributory 
means-tested benefits were classed as ‘social security’ by Regulation 1247/92 of 30 April 1992 amending 
Regulation 1408/71 [1992] OJ L 136/1247/92. The rules on special non-contributory benefits are now 
found in Article 70 of Regulation 883/2004. 
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workers and the self-employed to include the economically inactive, i.e. ‘nationals of a 
Member State … who are or have been subject to the legislation of one or more 
Member States’ and their family members.125 The expansive personal scope of the 
Regulation leads to overlaps with the Treaty provisions on the free movement of 
persons, Article 18 TFEU, Regulation 1612/68, and Directive 2004/38.  
 
Notwithstanding the simplification aims of both Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 
2004/38, and their concurrent drafting, the measures are at variance with one another. 
For example, Regulation 883/2004 deliberately extends equal treatment rights to the 
economically inactive;126 so long as a Union citizen has been subject to the legislation of 
one or more Member States, they will be able to claim equal access to social security 
benefits and special non-contributory benefits in their Member State of residence127 
(defined as where their ‘centre of interests’ lies128). However, Article 24(2) of Directive 
2004/38 allows Member States to deny applicants ‘social assistance’ during the first 
three months of residence. The coincidence between social assistance and special non-
contributory benefits means that where Regulation 883/2004 grants Union citizens a 
right to equal treatment, Directive 2004/38 may permit Member States to refuse equal 
treatment. Again, the Union legislature leaves the ECJ to determine the priority between 
overlapping norms. 
 
Directive 2006/123 on services in the internal market adds further equal treatment 
rights to the provisions outlined above. This Directive specifically addresses service 
providers and service recipients. As regards service providers, Directive 2006/123 
specifies that ‘Member States shall not make access to or exercise of a service activity in 
their territory subject to compliance with any requirements which… [are] directly nor 
indirectly discriminatory with regard to nationality’.129 In relation to service providers, 
the Directive requires that Member States ‘ensure that the recipient is not made subject 
to discriminatory requirements based on his nationality or place of residence.’130  
                                               
125 Article 2(1). 
126 Recital 42. 
127 Article 11(3)(e). 
128 Regulation 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 laying 
down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems [2009] OJ L 284/1, Article 11(1). 
129 Article 16(1)(a). 
130 Article 20(1). 
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The prohibitions on nationality discrimination in Directive 2006/123 overlap with the 
Treaty rules on services as well as with Regulation 883/2004, which now extends the 
prohibition on discrimination to all EU citizens ‘who are or have been subject to the 
legislation of one or more Member States’. Directive 2006/123 also overlaps with 
Directive 2004/38, which grants equal treatment to all persons residing lawfully on the 
basis of that Directive. As Directive 2004/38 grants a right of residence to all Union 
citizens during their first three months of residence in a host Member State, most 
service providers and recipients (who will most likely only stay in a host Member State 
for a short period of time) will be able to rely on Article 24 of that Directive. Tensions 
could arise if, for example, a recipient of services stayed in a host Member State for 
longer than three months. To be lawfully resident under Directive 2004/38 a service 
provider or service recipient would need sufficient resources and comprehensive health 
insurance. 
 
In sum, during Phase III the Union legislature added several new overlapping norms 
prohibiting nationality discrimination. What is striking about the promulgation of so 
many secondary measures, each granting a right to equal treatment and each adopted so 
close in time to one another, is the lack of priority clauses specifying their inter-
relationship. Despite the aims of simplification, many of the secondary norms adopted 
during this Phase led to tensions with overlapping Treaty-based and secondary law 
rights. By now, the intricacies of the multi-level prohibition on nationality discrimination 
should be evident as should the difficult choices facing the ECJ regarding how these 
different provisions should inter-relate. With each additional measure, the magnitude of 
the task facing the ECJ grows as does the archipelago of provisions prohibiting 
nationality discrimination. 
 
4.2. Sex Discrimination: Amending the Legislative Framework 
Several changes to secondary law prohibiting sex discrimination also occurred during 
this Phase. Over Phases I and II, the Union legislature adopted several directives each 
prohibiting discrimination in discrete areas such as pay, employment, social security and 
occupational social security. During this Phase, the Union legislature attempted to 
rationalise and extend this framework. In doing so, however, the Union legislature often 
Chapter 1 – The Development of Overlapping Norms Prohibiting Discrimination 
 48 
overlooked the potential for norm overlap and, more worryingly, for conflicts between 
overlapping norms. 
 
The first development occurred in 2000 when the Commission proposed amending 
Directive 76/207 on equal treatment between men and women.131 The resulting 
measure, Directive 2002/73,132 defines direct and indirect discrimination,133 widens 
discrimination to include harassment,134 makes provision for positive action135 and 
includes reference to pregnancy and maternity rights.136 In defining indirect 
discrimination, the Directive appears to overrule the harmonised definition set out in 
Directive 97/80 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex.137 
According to Directive 97/80, indirect discrimination occurs when ‘an apparently 
neutral provision, criterion or practice disadvantages a substantially higher proportion of 
the members of one sex’.138 Directive 2002/73 added a hypothetical element and 
specified that indirect discrimination covers measures ‘would put persons of one sex at a 
particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex’.139 What makes the task 
of the ECJ so tortuous here is that Directive 2002/73 does not explicitly repeal – even 
in part – Directive 97/80. Altering a harmonised definition implicitly, and without 
wholesale reform, reflects negatively on EU legislative practice and evidences – yet again 
– the Union legislature’s role in creating messy overlaps that the ECJ must then ‘clean 
up’. 
 
                                               
131 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions’ 
(Explanatory Memorandum) COM(2000) 0334 final, para. 3. 
132 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 
amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions [2002] OJ L 269/15. 
133 Article 2(2). 
134 Article 2(3). 
135 Article 2(8). 
136 Article 2(7). 
137 Directive 97/80, Article 1(1)(a). The definition is harmonised across the following directives: Directive 
75/117 on equal pay; Directive 76/207 on equal treatment; Directive 92/85 on the protection of pregnant 
workers; and Directive 97/81 on part-time work. 
138 Article 2(2). 
139 Article 2(2) (emphasis added). 
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Not long after Directive 2002/73, although after a ‘lengthy and arduous process’,140 
came Directive 2004/113 extending the prohibition on sex discrimination to the access 
to and the supply of goods and services.141 The Directive, based on Article 19 TFEU, 
attempts to bring the law on sex discrimination further in line with Directives 2000/43 
and 2000/78 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race and on the basis of religion 
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation respectively). Directive 2004/113 applies:  
… to all persons who provide goods and services, which are available to the public 
irrespective of the person concerned as regards both the public and private sectors, 
including public bodies, and which are offered outside the area of private and family 
life and the transactions carried out in this context.142 
As it extends the prohibition on discrimination to new fields, the Directive does not 
overlap with existing secondary law or Article 157 TFEU. However, the Directive 
creates a further overlap with the general principle prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds of sex. 
 
Soon after adopting Directive 2002/73, the Commission began work on Directive 
2006/54, which ‘bring[s] together in a single text the main provisions existing in this 
field as well as certain developments arising out of the case-law of the [ECJ]’.143 
Directive 2006/54 does not consolidate all the aforementioned directives – developed in 
this Phase and in Phases I and II. The Directive replaces only the directives on pay, 
occupational social security and equal treatment.  
 
Although Directive 2006/54 provided an opportunity to simplify the law relating to 
pregnant workers, it in fact adds to the intricacies of the law in this area. According to 
Directive 92/85 on the protection of pregnant workers, ‘Member States shall take the 
                                               
140 A Masselot, ‘The State of Gender Equality Law in the European Union’ (2007) 13(2) ELJ 152, 153. 
According to Masselot, ‘[a]lthough the actual legislative process only took over one year from the 
Commission’s proposal on 5 November 2003 to the adoption of the Directive by the Council on 13 
December 2004, the drafting of this legislation by the Commission had almost taken a year prior to the 
adoption of the proposal. A working draft proposal was leaked to the public in the summer of 2003, 
leading to some industries voicing their strong opposition. The Commission had then to re-draft a new 
proposal following consultation with the industry in question’. 
141 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ L 373/37. 
142 Directive 2004/113, Article 3(1). 
143 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters 
of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L 204/23, Recital 1. 
Chapter 1 – The Development of Overlapping Norms Prohibiting Discrimination 
 50 
necessary measures to prohibit the dismissal of workers’ during a worker’s pregnancy 
and maternity leave. Offering seemingly greater protection for pregnant workers, 
Directive 2006/54 prohibits ‘any less favourable treatment of a woman related to 
pregnancy or maternity leave’.144 The Union legislature does here, at least, expressly 
require that Directive 2006/54 is ‘without prejudice’ to Directive 92/85.145 The ECJ is 
left to determine whether it would prejudice the lesser protection offered under 
Directive 92/85 to allow an applicant to rely on Directive 2006/54 when pregnant and 
disadvantaged, but not dismissed. 
 
The legislative framework underwent substantial alterations throughout Phase III. An 
expanded legislative framework sits below the general principle prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of sex and Article 157 TFEU. One cannot help but criticise 
the Union legislature again here. Despite aiming to simplify the law in this area, the 
steps taken towards consolidating and expanding the law of sex discrimination was 
piecemeal and disjointed. As a result, Directive 2006/54 does not consolidate all the 
directives on sex discrimination; in particular, Directive 79/7 on equal treatment in 
social security remains outside the recast directive. Directive 2004/113, extending the 
prohibition on sex discrimination to the access to and the supply of goods and services, 
also remains outside the recast despite simultaneously working towards recasting 
existing directives alongside proposals to expand sex equality beyond employment.146 
 
4.3. An Added Layer: The Development of New General Principles 
In Phase II, the EU introduced two directives prohibiting status discrimination: 
Directive 2000/43 and Directive 2000/78. Adding an additional level of protection 
from discrimination, in Phase III the ECJ recognised that the anti-discrimination 
directives gave specific expression to a general principle prohibiting discrimination.  
 
                                               
144 Article 2(2)(c). 
145 Article 28(2). 
146 Commission, ‘Options Paper on the simplification and improvement of legislation in the area of equal 
treatment between men and women’ , <http://csdle.lex.unict.it/Archive/LW/Data reports and 
studies/Reports and communication from EU Commission/20110906-
101840_Simplification_equality_leg_Jul03pdf.pdf> last accessed 26 August 2018. Commission, ‘Proposal 
for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between women and men in the 
access to and supply of goods and services’ COM(2003) 657 final. 
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The key development occurred in Mangold,147 amidst an allegation of age discrimination 
between Mr Mangold and his employer. Mangold concerned the use of fixed-term 
contracts, which – according to German law – required objective justification, unless the 
worker had reached the age of fifty-two. Relying on this law, Mr Mangold (aged fifty-
six) and his employer entered into a fixed-term employment contract. Mr Mangold then 
argued his contract of employment was incompatible with Directive 2000/78, which 
prohibits discrimination ‘on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation as regards employment and occupation’.148 Agreeing with Mr Mangold, the 
ECJ concluded that the law on fixed-term contracts did constitute age discrimination.149 
However, two obstacles prevented Mr Mangold from successfully relying on Directive 
2000/78. First, the deadline for transposing Directive 2000/78 had not yet passed.150 
Secondly, the dispute was between two private parties (directives lacking the capacity to 
have horizontal direct effect).  
 
The ECJ surmounted both impediments by declaring that ‘Directive 2000/78 does not 
itself lay down the principle of equal treatment in the field of employment and 
occupation.’151 According to the ECJ, the Directive merely lays down a general 
framework for combatting discrimination whereas the source of ‘the actual principle 
underlying the prohibition of those forms of discrimination… [is] in various 
international instruments and in the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States.’152 As a consequence, ‘the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age 
must thus be regarded as a general principle of Community law’.153 The consequence is 
an overlap between Union secondary law – Directive 2000/78 – which prohibits age 
discrimination in the field of employment and self-employment154 and a hierarchically 
superior general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age.155 
                                               
147 Case C-144/04 Mangold EU:C:2005:709. 
148 Article 1. 
149 Mangold (n 147), paras 60-65. 
150 Mangold (n 147), para. 28. 
151 Mangold (n 147), para. 74. 
152 Mangold (n 147), para. 74. 
153 Mangold (n 147), para. 75. 
154 Article 3. 
155 It is axiomatic that Union secondary law can be reviewed for its compatibility with general principles, 
see e.g. Case 114/76 Bela-Mühle EU:C:1977:96, paras 5-8; Case 122/78 Buitoni EU:C:1979:43, para. 16ff; 
Case 224/82 Meiko-Konservenfabrik EU:C:1983:219, para. 11ff; Case C-309/89 Codorniu v Council 
EU:C:1994:197, para. 26ff; Kadi (n 53), paras 283-327. 
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Since the decision in Mangold, the ECJ has recognised other grounds of discrimination 
prohibited by the anti-discrimination directives as an expression of an overlapping 
general principles prohibiting discrimination. To date, the ECJ has recognised general 
principles prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex,156 race and ethnic origin,157 
religion158 and sexual orientation.159 The ECJ has not explicitly recognised a general 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of disability but has referred to ‘the general 
principle of non-discrimination’ in such cases.160  
 
What the ECJ did not clarify in Mangold was how the general principle prohibiting 
discrimination inter-relates with its written expression in Union secondary law. 
Semmelmann outlines three possible options. According to the first, the general 
principle is ‘self-standing and independent’ and so the ‘material, personal and temporal 
scope … flow from the principle itself.’161 On this understanding, the limitations on the 
applicability of the anti-discrimination directives – for example, Directive 2000/78 only 
applies in the fields of employment and occupation – will not determine the scope of 
the general principle. Option two is termed a ‘combination reading’ where the general 
principle is ‘enforceable in combination with more concrete rules’.162 This approach 
implies that the general principle will mostly serve as an aid to interpretation of 
overlapping secondary law but may – as in Mangold – operate to extend the possible 
application of secondary law.163 The final option, ‘[a]bsolute deference to the legislature’, 
implies that: 
As soon as there is secondary legislation that covers the same subject matter as the 
respective general principle, recourse to the general principle is no longer required 
or even possible; the principle does not openly serve as an aid to interpretation nor 
does it determine the personal, material or temporal scope of the protected interest. 
                                               
156 Defrenne III (n 64), paras 26-27. 
157 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria (n 97), para. 58. 
158 Case 130/75 Prais EU:C:1976:142, para. 10. 
159 Case C-147/08 Römer EU:C:2011:286, para. 60. Although the ECJ only refers to the ‘the principle of 
non-discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation’. 
160 Case C-354/13 FOA EU:C:2014:2463, para. 32 
161 C Semmelmann, ‘General Principles in EU Law between a Compensatory Role and an Intrinsic Value’ 
(2013) 19(4) ELJ 458, 464. 
162 Semmelmann (n 161) 465. 
163 In Mangold (n 147), the situation fell outside the temporal scope of Directive 2000/78. 
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The hierarchy of norms becomes visible only when there is judicial review of 
legislation.164 
The role of the ECJ in recognising and developing general principles means that their 




The main driver behind increasing occurrences of norm overlap in Phase III was an 
attempt to consolidate and simplify existing secondary law. These legislative 
developments not only failed to remove existing tensions, but also added to them. The 
ECJ also played a part in the development of overlaps, which is evident when one 
considers the recognition of general principles prohibiting discrimination apparently 
inspired by yet then detached from existing secondary law. 
 
5. PHASE IV: 2009-2018 
From the perspective of norm overlap, the main legal innovation in Phase IV is the 
entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. According to Article 6 TEU: 
1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the 
Charter…which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties … 
2. The Union shall accede to the [ECHR] … 
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law. 
Until the EU accedes to the ECHR,165 there are therefore two legally binding sources of 
EU fundamental rights protection: the Charter and the general principles of Union law. 
 
The aim of the Charter was to ‘strengthen’ and make ‘more visible’166 existing rights in 
the EU and so the Charter text includes several non-discrimination norms. As a result, 
the Charter creates overlaps with most of the norms discussed so far. Title III of the 
                                               
164 Semmelmann (n 161) 465. 
165 The EU has not yet acceded to the ECHR and accession looks unlikely following Opinion 2/13 
Accession of the EU to the ECHR EU:C:2014:2454. The ECHR still remains important for fundamental 
rights protection in the EU in two ways: (1) as an inspirational source for general principles and (2) as a 
minimum standard for the interpretation of Charter rights (see Articles 52(3) and 53 CFR). 
166 Preamble, Recital 4. 
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Charter relating to ‘Equality’ contains several provisions prohibiting discrimination. For 
present purposes there are three key provisions.167 First, Article 20 CFR enshrines the 
general principle of equal treatment168 and specifies that ‘[e]veryone is equal before the 
law’. Secondly, Article 21(1) CFR sets out the prohibition on status discrimination and 
prohibits:  
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex,169 race, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation… 
Thirdly, Article 21(2) CFR stipulates that ‘within the scope of application of the Treaties 
and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any discrimination on grounds 
of nationality shall be prohibited.’170 
 
The entry into force of the Charter creates new overlaps and new complications. In 
particular, the Charter has a distinct framework for both the realisation and limitation of 
non-discrimination rights when compared with pre-existing sources. Article 51(1) CFR 
governs the field of application of the Charter and provides that the Charter is 
‘addressed… to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law’. 
Article 52(1) CFR sets out the legality of any restrictions to rights protected: 
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter 
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. 
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are 
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union 
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
                                               
167 In addition, Articles 22-26 CFR aim to enhance the rights of minorities or vulnerable persons. 
Specifically mentioned are cultural, religious and linguistic diversity; equality between men and women; 
the rights of the child; the rights of the elderly; and the integration of persons with disabilities. Overlaps 
with these provisions fall outside the scope of this thesis since they relate to equality in the substantive 
sense. 
168 See Section 2.2 above. 
169 Additionally, Articles 23 CFR concerns equality – in the substantive sense – between men and women 
and Article 33(2) CFR relate to that ‘everyone shall have the right to protection from dismissal for a 
reason connected with maternity’. 
170 The prohibition on nationality discrimination is additionally protected in two further Charter rights: 
Article 15(2) CFR grants Union citizens ‘the freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right 
of establishment and to provide services in any Member State’ while Article 34(2) provides that 
‘[e]veryone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits 
and social advantages in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.’ 
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Later Chapters discuss the distinction between these provisions and the corresponding 
rules for applying and limiting rights under the Treaties and general principles in more 
detail. 
 
For present purposes, it suffices to touch upon the inter-relationship between the 
Charter and existing prohibitions on non-discrimination. To begin with, where the 
Charter overlaps with Union secondary law, there is a clear relationship of hierarchy. 
Article 52(1) CFR, cited above, sets the ‘limits on limits’ and so determines the legality 
of any restrictions introduced by Union secondary law. Chapter 3 further discusses this 
issue. 
 
When it comes to overlaps with provisions of the Treaty – such as Article 157 TFEU on 
equal pay and Article 18 TFEU prohibiting nationality discrimination – there is no 
relationship of hierarchy set out in Article 6(1) TEU.171 Article 52(2) CFR instead 
governs the inter-relationship between overlapping provisions and specifies that the 
‘[r]ights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be 
exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties.’ 
Relatedly, Article 51(2) CFR provides that the ‘Charter does not extend the field of 
application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power 
or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.’ Prima facie, 
the combined effect of Articles 51(2) and 52(2) CFR suggests that where that Charter 
rights duplicate rights found in the Treaties, the Charter will be of little ‘added value’. 
Chapter 4 revisits this interpretation of Article 52(2) CFR. 
 
Article 6 TEU also leaves open the inter-relationship between the Charter and the 
general principles it codifies. Article 6 TEU reaffirms the existence of general principles 
alongside the Charter but does not set out a hierarchy between sources. Nor does 
Article 6 TEU differentiate between possible effects of different sources e.g. ‘that the 
                                               
171 Rossi notes that ‘it has even been suggested that [the Charter] could gain constitutional status, on the 
reasoning [that it] enshrines the Union’s fundamental principles and some general legal principles-such as 
ne bis in idem. If it received constitutional status, the Charter would have precedence or primacy over the 
Treaty’, see LS Rossi, ‘Same Legal Value as the Treaties: Rank, Primacy, and Direct Effects of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2017) 18(4) GLJ 771, 772. 
Chapter 1 – The Development of Overlapping Norms Prohibiting Discrimination 
 56 
Charter may give rise to rights but general principles may not’,172 leaving how 
overlapping sources of fundamental rights inter-relate the ECJ.173 The key question here 
is whether general principles prohibiting discrimination might continue to apply 
alongside the Charter. This question is not merely academic and may be of importance 
if, for example, overlapping general principles offer a higher standard of protection. 
Chapter 6 returns to these questions. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The picture left by this Chapter should be of a vast and messily overlapping array of 
non-discrimination norms. The non-discrimination framework started as a few 
instrumental and economic-oriented provisions in the EEC Treaty and developed into a 
complex multi-layered framework. Just in the field of non-discrimination alone the sheer 
number of overlaps suggests that norm overlap is of such a scale that it can no longer be 
overlooked. 
 
What the chronological analysis carried out above shows is that there are three main 
causes of norm overlap attributable to the different actors involved in creating and 
developing EU law. First, some responsibility falls on the Union legislature for failing to 
set out how overlapping secondary norms should work together. Secondly, the 
inspirational use of written sources of EU law for developing new general principles 
creates overlaps without any clear sense of whether and or how the general principle 
adds to the written framework. Thirdly, the highly substantive nature of the EU Treaties 
leads to overlaps with any secondary law seeking to give substance to broad Treaty 
rights and with several Charter rights. 
 
One actor alone could not remove all instances of norm overlap and overlap is 
sometimes unavoidable such as where secondary law implements primary rights. We are 
to some extent stuck with norm overlap and so attention turns to the ECJ as the actor 
                                               
172 T Tridimas, ‘Fundamental rights, general principles of EU law, and the Charter’ (2014) 16 CYELS 361, 
377. 
173 HH Hofmann and BC Mihaescu, ‘The Relation between the Charter’s Fundamental Rights and the 
Unwritten General Principles: Good Administration as the Test Case’ (2013) 9 EuConst 73, 74. Hofmann 
and Mihaescu go further arguing that Article 6 TEU evidences ‘the intention of the constitutional 
legislator to confer on the EU courts the power to act as the arbiter between the different and – on 
occasion – competing or overlapping sources of fundamental rights’ (81). 
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responsible for interpreting the relationship between these different layers. Chapter 2 
now turns to set out the importance of the ECJ’s interpretative choices here and 
introduces how existing priority principles might guide the ECJ when faced with 
overlapping norms. Several of the specific overlaps discussed in this Chapter are 
returned to in Chapters 3-6 where different case studies allow for a detailed examination 















Chapter 1 showed the development of a vast array of non-discrimination norms that 
variously accumulate and conflict. In this Chapter, the focus shifts from the various 
actors involved in norm-development to the ECJ as the actor responsible for ‘ensur[ing] 
that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed.’1 When 
more than one norm prohibiting discrimination might apply it falls to the ECJ to 
determine several related questions, such as: which norm should form the starting point 
of any analysis; should the ECJ interpret one norm in light of the other; and, when push 
comes to shove, which should the ECJ prioritise? How the ECJ answers these questions 
is the focus of later Chapters. Before embarking on more detailed case law analysis, this 
Chapter sets out the existing tools and legal principles that might guide the ECJ in its 
task.  
 
To start with, this Chapter offers some context and explains why the investigation 
undertaken by this thesis is of crucial importance. Section 2 shows how the ECJ’s 
approach to the inter-relationship between overlapping norms can lead to consequences 
that go beyond the outcome in an individual case. This Chapter emphasises four 
different constitutional values potentially impacted upon by the ECJ’s chosen solution 
to norm overlap: the protection of fundamental rights, the balance of power between 
the EU and the Member States, the principle of institutional balance and the principle of 
legal certainty. This is not to say these are the only consequences of the ECJ’s approach 
to the relationship between overlapping norms. The choice to dwell on these four 
variables reflects the combined impetus of their fundamental status within the EU legal 
order and their liability to be acutely affected by the ECJ’s approach to norm overlap (as 
                                               
1 Article 19(1) TEU. 
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the case law analysis undertaken for this thesis revealed). The conclusion reached by this 
Section is that decisions about norm interactions cannot be arbitrary but instead require 
a principled basis. 
 
Having established the constitutional weight that attaches to how the ECJ determines 
the relationship between overlapping norms, Section 3 outlines the existing principles 
and tools the ECJ could rely on to structure this determination. Drawing on principles 
developed in domestic legal systems and in the context of international law, Section 3 
sets out the potential relevance of priority clauses and the principles of lex superior, lex 
specialis and lex posterior – prioritising, respectively, whichever norm is the hierarchically 
superior, the more specific or the later in time – in the context of norm overlaps. The 
overall argument is that these principles offer practical guidance to the ECJ when faced 
with norm overlap. Later Chapters examine whether the ECJ adopts these principles in 
practice. 
 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE 
2.1. Overview 
Why should the inter-relationship between overlapping norms concern EU lawyers? 
Some initial scepticism is perhaps understandable here given that overlapping norms 
are, by definition, similar. However, as explained in the Introduction to this thesis, for 
norms to overlap there is no need for norms to be identical; overlapping norms can 
originate from different formal sources of Union law and compliance with one norm 
may lead to the breach of an overlapping norm (i.e. they conflict). Not only is the 
upshot of these divergences that the inter-relationship between overlapping norms can 
alter the outcome of proceedings, the ECJ’s interpretative choices can have significant 
constitutional consequences. 
 
2.2. The Protection of Fundamental rights 
The ways in which overlapping norms inter-relate potentially impacts on fundamental 
rights protection in two ways. First, on a more individual level, the ECJ’s approach can 
affect whether an applicant can avail themselves of the protections of Union law due to 
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divergences between norms. Broude and Shany demonstrate this possibility in terms of 
‘judicial borrowing’. As they explain: 
… if both international human rights law and international humanitarian law include 
an obligation to minimize civilian casualties during armed conflicts, but only the 
former provides individuals who were harmed with effective remedies, one might 
expect gradual attempts to apply human rights norms also in dispute settlement 
proceedings relating to armed conflict situations, thereby putting the traditional 
equilibrium between the rights and obligations of the parties to armed conflicts 
under increased pressure.2 
What their example makes clear is the interpretative choice that materialises when more 
than one norm is prima facie applicable and one of those norms offers greater protection 
for the individual. 
 
Chapter 1 indicated some of the differences that persist between overlapping non-
discrimination norms in EU law. One norm may have a broader personal or material 
scope, another norm may have the capacity to apply horizontally, and yet another norm 
may permit limitations on additional grounds. The prohibition on status discrimination 
in the Charter (Article 21(1) CFR) is, for example, wider than many overlapping 
secondary norms since it applies throughout the scope of application of Union law.3 
Similarly, Directive 2006/544 (on equal treatment between men and women) offers 
more extensive protection from discrimination on grounds of pregnancy5 than the 
overlapping directive relating to pregnant workers.6 How the ECJ combines different 
sources of the prohibition on discrimination – and, in particular, whether the ECJ 
prioritises the norm granting greater protection – determines the level of protection 
granted under EU non-discrimination law. As further outlined below, this potential 
impact on the result in individual cases strongly implies the need for the ECJ to justify 
                                               
2 T Broude and Y Shany, ‘The International Law and Policy of Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms’ in T 
Broude and Y Shany (eds), Mutli-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law (Hart 2011) 1-15, 10. 
3 Discussed above in Chapter 1, Section 5 and below in Chapter 3, Section 3. 
4 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters 
of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L 204/23. 
5 Discrimination on grounds of sex includes discrimination on grounds of pregnancy, see Case C-177/88 
Dekker EU:C:1990:383, para. 12. 
6 Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements 
in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding 
[1992] OJ L 348/1. Discussed in Chapter 1, Section 3.3. 
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its interpretative choices concerning norm overlap and to ensure coherence; otherwise, a 
decision to prioritise the narrower norm could attract allegations of arbitrariness. 
 
Less tangibly, how the ECJ interprets the inter-relationship between overlapping norms 
may also undermine the status of fundamental rights protection within the EU. Before 
explaining this point further, let us first reflect briefly on the stated importance of 
fundamental rights within the EU legal order. Following the gradual expansion7 and 
formalisation8 of the EU’s commitment to fundamental rights, the Treaties now bestow 
fundamental rights, alongside the principle of equal treatment, with foundational status: 
according to Article 2 TEU, the EU is ‘founded on the values of respect for human dignity 
… equality … and respect for human rights’ (emphasis added).9 Reflecting this avowed 
importance, Article 6 TEU sets out three distinct sources of EU fundamental rights: the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the ECHR,10 and the general principles of Union 
law.11 The current Treaty framework thus strongly implies the protection of 
fundamental rights is a central tenet of the EU’s constitutional order. Given the case 
study adopted by this thesis, the special significance of the principle of equality also 
warrants mention. Eliminating discrimination is one of the EU’s express policy goals; 
consistent with Article 3(3) TEU, the internal market should aim to ‘combat social 
exclusion and discrimination, and … promote social justice and protection [and] 
                                               
7 Following the recognition that ‘respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general 
principles of Community law protected by the Court of Justice’ in Case 11/70 Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft EU:C:1970:114, para. 3, the ECJ expanded the catalogue of fundamental rights protected 
as general principles and their scope of application. In Wachauf, the ECJ held that general principles apply 
to the Member State when they are ‘implementing’ Union law, see Case 5/88 Wachauf EU:C:1989:321, 
para. 19. In ERT, the ECJ held that general principles apply to acts of the Member States that fall ‘within 
the scope’ of EU law, see Case C-260/89 ERT EU:C:1991:254, para. 42. 
8 Alongside the development of general principles, the Treaty-framers cemented respect for fundamental 
rights in primary law; for example, Treaty amendments at Maastricht explicitly recognised that 
fundamental rights form part of EU law (now Article 6 TEU), while the Treaty of Amsterdam made 
compliance with fundamental rights part of the formal criteria for accession to the EU (now Article 49 
TFEU), introduced a ‘sanctioning mechanism’ against violations of fundamental rights by the Member 
States (now Article 7 TEU), and conferred upon the EU the competences to promote human rights (now 
Articles 19, 157(3) TFEU). The turning point came with the European Council’s decision to ‘establish a 
Charter of fundamental rights in order to make their overriding importance and relevance more visible to 
the Union’s citizens’ (Council ‘Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council’ June 4 1999). 
9 The Preamble to the Charter also sets out how ‘the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values 
of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule 
of law’ (Recital 2). 
10 Article 6(2) TEU obliges the EU to accede to the ECHR, although when this will happen is unclear 
following Opinion 2/13 Accession of the EU to the ECHR EU:C:2014:2454. 
11 Article 6(3) TEU reaffirms that ‘[f]undamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the 
Union’s law’. 
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equality between women and men’. In all of its actions, the EU must strive ‘to eliminate 
inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women’12 and ‘to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation.’13 
 
Turning now to the possible implications of the ECJ’s approach to norm inter-
relationship for fundamental rights protection. How the ECJ prioritises (or does not 
prioritise) the Charter of Fundamental Rights and general principles can damage the 
avowedly integral nature of fundamental rights to the EU legal order. If, for example, 
the ECJ were systematically to subjugate Charter rights to overlapping secondary Union 
law or Treaty provisions, this might contradict the stated importance of fundamental 
rights to the EU as well as the express aim of the Charter to ‘strengthen the protection 
of fundamental rights’.14 Over time, consistently applying the norm offering lesser 
protection might undermine the notion that the EU is founded upon respect for human 
rights. While this does not mean that the ECJ should always resolve norm overlaps in a 
way that secures the maximum level of fundamental rights protection,15 the EU’s 
constitutional commitment to fundamental rights should infuse the ECJ’s interpretative 
choices here.  
 
2.3. Balance of Powers between the EU and the Member States 
The inter-relationship between overlapping norms may also impact upon the delicate 
balance of powers between the EU and the Member States. One of the characteristics of 
the EU is that it is a body of limited powers. Initially motivating the creation of (what is 
now) the EU was the predicted advantages that would follow from pooling decision-
making in certain spheres. As the ECJ recognised in Van Gend en Loos, the Member 
States ‘limited their sovereign rights, albeit in limited fields’ to achieve certain goals.16 To 
this day the EU remains based on this idea; the EU possesses the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States and any ‘competences not conferred upon the 
                                               
12 Article 8 TEU. 
13 Article 10 TEU. 
14 Preamble, Recital 4. 
15 For an argument to this effect in the context of the inter-relationship between the Charter and general 
principles, see HH Hofmann and BC Mihaescu, ‘The Relation between the Charter’s Fundamental Rights 
and the Unwritten General Principles: Good Administration as the Test Case’ (2013) 9 EuConst 73. 
16 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos EU:C:1963:1; [1963] ECR 1, 12. 
Chapter 2 – Existing Approaches 
 64 
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.’17 The functional allocation of 
powers between the supranational (EU) level and the national (Member State) level 
means the EU is akin to a federal system with ‘divided sovereignty [that] is guaranteed 
by the national or supranational constitution and umpired by the supreme court of the 
common legal order.’18 Crucial here is the power of the ECJ – as ‘umpire’ – ‘to strike the 
appropriate balance’19 between the EU and the Member States. As a corollary of this 
power, when the ECJ determines the inter-relationship between overlapping norms, it’s 
interpretative choices may impact the balance of powers between the EU and the 
Member States. 
 
What makes the ECJ’s approach to norm overlap so crucial is that maintaining a balance 
between the powers of the EU and of the Member States is key to the proper 
functioning of the EU. First, it enables ‘proper political accountability within States 
(because the Union affects their internal balances of power) and the appropriate 
allocation of that political accountability between the Union and the States (so that 
citizens know who is responsible for what).’20 Secondly, maintaining balance ensures 
that decisions are taken as closely as possible to those affected and so can thereby better 
‘reflect the interests of the population concerned … [and] enhance the individual’s sense 
of dignity and autonomy within the larger community.’21  
 
Reflecting the fundamental importance of ensuring the balance of powers, the Treaties 
include several mechanisms to prevent over-centralisation and the encroachment of the 
EU on national prerogatives. The principles of conferral and subsidiarity govern the 
existence and exercise of the EU’s powers. According to the former, ‘the Union shall act 
only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States’,22 
                                               
17 Article 4(1) TEU. 
18 K Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism’ (1990) 38(2) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 205, 263. 
19 Lenaerts (n 18) 205. As Lenaerts outlines, ‘the Court of Justice does not pronounce on the division of 
powers between the [EU] and the Member States by way of a simple definition of the powers granted to 
the [EU] as opposed to those which remain for the Member States. Its jurisprudence should rather be 
characterized as a continuum delineating the specific powers of the [EU] and possibly the implied powers linked 
to them, the non-specific powers of the [EU] and, finally, as a “leftover category”, the residual powers of the 
Member States’, see Lenaerts (n 18) 216-17 (emphasis in original). 
20 Case C-58/08 Vodafone and Others EU:C:2009:596, Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, para. 1. 
21 G Bermann, ‘Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United 
States’ [1994] Columbia Law Review 331, 340. 
22 Article 5(2) TEU. 
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while the latter specifies that the Union shall only exercise its competence ‘if and in so 
far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States … but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level.’23 Further emphasising the limited nature of 
the EU’s powers, the Lisbon Treaty added a catalogue of Union competences 
(specifying whether those competences are exclusive, shared or complementary)24 and 
includes an express guarantee to safeguard the national identity of the Member States, 
including ‘their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional 
and local self-government.’25 The Treaties are also replete with references to the limited 
nature of Union competence: Article 6(1) TEU clarifies that the entry into force of the 
Charter ‘shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the 
Treaties’;26 similarly, Article 51(2) CFR states that ‘[t]he Charter does not extend the 
field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new 
power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.’ 
The unavoidable message is that ‘the bounds of the scope of EU law are strict; they should 
correspond strictly to the competences attributed to the EU.’27 
 
Despite the emphasis in the Treaties on conferral and the limits of Union competences, 
a tension arises in practice due to the asymmetry between the Union’s competences and 
what falls within the scope of application of Union law. Even in areas falling outside the 
competences of the Union, where Member States retain power, national measures must 
still comply with the Treaties. In the words of the ECJ: 
Whilst it is not in dispute that EU law does not detract from the powers of the 
Member States the power of the Member States [recognized in particular in the 
areas of direct taxation, social protection, education, attribution of nationality, civil 
status of persons], the fact remains that, when exercising those powers, the Member 
States must comply with EU law.28 
                                               
23 Article 5(3) TEU. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a new role for national parliaments in monitoring 
respect for subsidiarity, see Articles 12 and 69 TEU and Protocol (No 2) on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
24 Articles 4-6 TFEU. 
25 Article 4(2) TEU. 
26 See also e.g. Articles 3(6) and 6(2) TEU. 
27 L Azoulai, ‘The ‘Retained Powers’ Formula in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice: EU law 
as Total Law?’ (2011) 4 EJLS 192, 196 (emphasis in original). 
28 Case C-73/08 Bressol EU:C:2010:181, para. 28 as cited by Azoulai (n 27) 194. 
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To illustrate this point, consider a national rule restricting the sale of foreign lottery 
tickets; the Member States retain the power to regulate lotteries, however, the national 
rule must still comply with the free movement rules.29 The role of the ECJ in 
determining the balance of powers between the EU and the Member States becomes 
palpable here. Part and parcel of the ECJ’s responsibility to interpret and apply the 
Treaties is the power to determine the outer boundaries of the Treaties;30 a broad 
interpretation of – to take examples from Chapter 1 – the free movement rules or the 
meaning of ‘pay’ under Article 157 TFEU will directly impact on the freedom of 
Member States. 
 
In some ways, how the inter-relationship between overlapping norms impacts the 
balance of powers is the inverse of its potential impact on fundamental rights 
protection. A decision by the ECJ to prioritise a broader norm that grants more 
extensive protection from discrimination will inevitably restrict a Member State’s room 
for manoeuvre. When the ECJ faces questions about interactions with primary Union 
law, there exists a greater potential impact on the balance of powers. The 
constitutionalisation of the Treaties via the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy,31 
combined with the fact that the ECJ is the only institution responsible for interpreting 
the Treaties,32 means that interpretations of the Treaty ‘effectively become the Treaty’.33 
Powers lost to the Union can be difficult to retrieve. This is significant given that the 
‘internal market … social policy … [and] economic, social and territorial cohesion’ are 
all areas of shared competence.34 
 
Where the ECJ’s approach to the inter-relationship between overlapping norms is most 
likely to upset the balance of powers is where an overlap arises with what Davies terms 
a ‘purposive power’ i.e. powers defined in terms of an overarching aim.35 Chapter 1 set 
                                               
29 This example is borrowed from G de Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as 
an Institutional Actor’ (1998) 36(2) JCMS 217, 221. 
30 Article 19(1) TEU. 
31 Van Gend en Loos (n 16) 12; Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL EU:C:1964:66. 
32 Article 19(1) TEU. 
33 G Davies, ‘Legislative Control of the European Court of Justice’ (2014) 51(6) CMLRev 1579, 1584 
(emphasis in original). See further, Protocol No 2 on Article 157 TFEU, which marked an attempt by the 
Member States to impose their own understanding of Article 157 TFEU. 
34 Articles 2(2)(a)-(c) TFEU. 
35 G Davies, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’ (2015) 21(1) ELJ 2, 2. 
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out the two-pronged system for abolishing nationality discrimination in the Treaties. 
The first prong consists of directly effective Treaty rights to free movement. Article 45 
TFEU, for example, states that ‘[f]reedom of movement for workers shall be secured 
within the Union’. The second prong consists of secondary law adopted to e.g. ‘bring 
about freedom of movement for workers, as defined in Article 45’.36 In the context of 
an overlap between Article 45 TFEU and secondary Union law giving more specific 
expression to that right, how the ECJ determines the inter-relationship between those 
norms is crucial for the balance of powers. Any limits contained in that secondary law 
need not influence the ECJ’s interpretation of Article 45 TFEU;; furthermore, any 
obstacle to intra-EU movement, even if not prohibited by secondary law, could still fall 
foul of the overlapping Treaty provision. 37 
 
The cross-cutting nature of EU fundamental rights also means that when overlaps arise 
with the Charter or with general principles, how the ECJ determines their role can 
further limit the retained powers of the Member States. Particularly worrisome here is 
the ECJ’s tendency, as outlined in Chapter 1, to utilise written sources of Union law as 
an inspirational source of general principles. In so doing, the ECJ entrenches secondary 
Union law, making it difficult for Member States to overturn. The ECJ also further 
limits Member State discretion since general principles bind the Member States in all 
situations falling within the scope of EU law. As Lenaerts and Gutiérrez Fons explain:  
Vertically, the application of general principles may displace long-standing legal 
traditions at odds with the constitutional foundations of the Union. Even in areas 
where the Union does not enjoy legislative competence as such, the joint application 
of the substantive law of the Union and of general principles may force the national 
legislature to accommodate its policy choices to EU law. Stated differently, where a 
national measure falls within the scope of EU law, general principles may 
“circumscribe” (or “frame”) the powers retained by the Member States.38 
Where a written norm prohibits discrimination in one specific sector, the recognition of 
an overlapping general principle may thus curtail Member State powers in additional 
areas. 
 
                                               
36 Article 46 TFEU. See also Article 48 TFEU. 
37 Davies ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’ (n 35) 3. 
38 J Gutiérrez-Fons and K Lenaerts, ‘The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of 
EU Law’ (2010) 47(6) CMLRev 1629, 1629. 
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2.4. Respect for Institutional Balance 
How the ECJ determines the inter-relationship between overlapping norms can also 
impact the horizontal distribution of powers under the Treaties and may fall foul of the 
requirement to ‘practice mutual sincere cooperation’ between institutions.39 The role of 
the ECJ, to ensure ‘that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed’,40 entails the responsibility to resolve norm interactions. In how it does so, 
though, lies the potential for the ECJ to act outside its allocated role. 
 
According to Article 13(2) TEU, ‘[e]ach institution shall act within the limits of the 
powers conferred on it in the Treaties’.41 More concretely, this obligation means that 
one institution ‘cannot deprive the other institutions of a prerogative granted to them by 
the treaties themselves’.42 Expanding further on what respect for institutional balance 
implies, the ECJ in Chernobyl held that ‘each of the institutions must exercise its powers 
with due regard for the powers of the other institutions’ (emphasis added).43 When 
exercising its interpretative function, the ECJ – sitting among the Union’s institutions44 
– should ensure ‘due regard’ for the powers of the Union legislature and not deprive the 
Union legislature of the powers allocated to that institution (as variously configured) by 
the Treaties. 
 
The practical implications of the obligation under Article 13(2) TEU (i.e. what upsets 
institutional balance) are not easy to decipher and defining the boundary between the 
role of the ECJ and the Union legislature is particularly tricky. When listing the EU’s 
institutions, Article 16(1) TEU attributes legislative functions jointly to the European 
Parliament and the Council45 and designates the role of the ECJ as ensuring ‘that in the 
                                               
39 Article 13(2) TEU. 
40 Article 19(1) TEU. 
41 AG Trstenjak considers that the allocation of powers according to function rather than according to the 
classic conception of the separation of powers (with distinct legislative, executive and judicial branches) 
reflects the differing powers and composition of the Union institutions. In her view, ‘the [EU’s] functions 
are intended to be exercised by the organs which are best placed to perform them under the Treaties … 
to ensure that the [EU’s] aims are effectively achieved’, see Case C-101/08 Audiolux and Others 
EU:C:2009:410, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para. 104. 
42 Case 149/85 Wybot EU:C:1986:310, para. 23. 
43 Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council (Chernobyl) EU:C:1990:217, para. 22. 
44 Article 13(1) TEU. See further, G de Búrca, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Court of Justice as an 
Institutional Actor’ (1998) 36(2) JCMS 217. 
45 Articles 14(1) and 16(1) TEU. 
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interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed’.46 What makes the 
appropriate divide difficult here is that there is a certain degree of overlap between the 
roles of the Union legislature and the ECJ. Where legislative bases sit alongside directly 
effective Treaty provisions, the role of each institution coincides in practice. For 
example, alongside Article 157(1) TFEU on the principle of equal pay between men and 
women is a legislative basis – Article 157(3) TFEU – allocating to the Union legislature 
the power to ‘adopt measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women’. The hierarchical superiority of 
the Treaties means that interpretation of Article 157 TFEU will to some extent impact 
on the prerogatives of the Union legislature under Article 157(3) TFEU to decide how 
best to go about the same policy goal. The ECJ goes beyond the limits of its 
institutional prerogatives, though, when it substitutes its own decisions for those of the 
Union legislature.47 
 
When interpreting the meaning of Article 157 TFEU and its relationship with 
overlapping secondary law, there are three essentially three different approaches open to 
the ECJ.48 By relying on primary law the ECJ could (1) annul overlapping secondary law; 
(2) emasculate the legislative measure via interpretation; or (3) avoid the Union 
secondary law by recognising a directly effective Treaty right that operates in parallel. 
The Treaties specifically grant the ECJ the power to render secondary Union law null or 
invalid.49 Annulling secondary Union law does not necessarily violate the distribution of 
powers. The ECJ is more likely to violate the horizontal distribution of powers if it 
adopts options (2) or (3). If secondary Union law is not incomplete and is not in breach 
of higher Union law, it surely encroaches upon the powers of the Union legislature to 
alter the decisions it has reached. The aim here is not to cast doubt on the hierarchy of 
norms, but to shed light on how the ECJ’s interpretative choices concerning overlap can 
                                               
46 Article 19(1) TEU. 
47 K Lenaerts and A Verhoeven, ‘Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance’ 
in C Joerges and R Dehousse (eds), Good Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP 2002) 35-88, 45. 
48 Davies, ‘Legislative Control of the European Court of Justice’ (n 33) 1591. In a similar vein, Syrpis 
classifies case law on the relationship between primary and secondary law into those cases: (1) in which 
primary law ‘trumps’ secondary law; (2) in which primary and secondary law are interpreted neutrally; and 
(3) in which secondary law ‘takes priority over’ primary law, see P Syrpis, ‘The Relationship between 
Primary and Secondary Law in the EU’ (2015) 52(2) CMLRev 461, 465. 
49 Articles 263 and 267 TFEU. 
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affect the prerogatives of the Union legislature and to offer some reflections on where 
the somewhat elusive division of EU institutional powers might lie. 
 
It is not only when Treaty rights overlap with Union secondary law that the ECJ’s 
interpretative choices regarding norm inter-relationship can impact on institutional 
balance. The ECJ’s interpretative choices concerning the inter-relationship between 
primary norms might, for instance, impact upon the scope of the Union’s functional 
legislative competences under Articles 114 and 352 TFEU.50 Similarly, how the ECJ 
combines and prioritises overlapping secondary Union law can undo or remake 
legislative choices.51 
 
As noted above, Article 13(2) TEU also enshrines the requirement for institutions to 
‘practice mutual sincere cooperation’. Horsley argues this provision obliges the ECJ to 
be sensitive to legislative choices and ‘to engage in a more constructive process of inter-
institutional policymaking with the Union legislature.’52 At a minimum, therefore, the 
obligation of mutual sincere cooperation demands that the ECJ acknowledges the policy 
choices of the EU’s political institutions and justifies any decisions that impact 
significantly upon the solutions adopted by the Union legislature. In the context of 
overlap, this would seem to require a sensitivity to different outcomes that might result 
from the ECJ’s interpretation of the inter-relationship between norms. 
 
2.5. The Principle of Legal Certainty 
The preceding discussion highlighted how the ECJ’s approach to norm overlaps can 
have practical implications for applicants and can determine whether an applicant is able 
to avail themselves of the right to non-discrimination protected by EU law. If the ECJ 
prioritises overlapping norms differently in similar cases, the outcome of a case may be 
difficult to predict.  
 
If the ECJ consistently fails to resolve the inter-relationship between overlapping norms 
in the same way or according to certain guidelines, negative repercussions potentially 
                                               
50 See M Dougan, ‘Legal Developments’ (2010) 48(1) JCMS 164, 165. 
51 See Chapter 5. 
52 T Horsley, ‘Reflections on the Role of the Court of Justice as the “Motor” of European Integration: 
Legal Limits to Judicial Lawmaking’ (2013) 50(4) CMLRev 931, 933. 
Chapter 2 – Existing Approaches 
 71 
result from the perspective of legal certainty. According to the principle of legal 
certainty – a principle that forms part of the rule of law, which is one of the 
foundational principles of the EU53 – a rules should be ‘clear, precise and predictable in 
their effect, especially when they may have adverse consequences on individuals and 
undertakings’.54 More precisely, the ECJ considers that ‘[i]ndividuals must be able to 
ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations are and take steps 
accordingly.’55 Satisfying the requirements of legal certainty thus requires clearly 
articulated and consistently applied guiding principles that determine the inter-
relationship between overlapping norms.  
 
2.6. The Need for a Principled Approach  
The conclusion to be drawn here is that how the ECJ manages overlapping norms can 
have negative ramifications for the EU legal order. There is nothing new in observing 
the constitutional implications of ECJ case law. Previously un(der-)acknowledged, 
though, are the specific implications that can follow from how the ECJ interprets the 
relationship between overlapping norms. Depending on the type of overlap – i.e. 
whether overlap arises between norms of the same formal source, or between norms of 
differing hierarchical status – the repercussions may differ. Overlaps between the 
Charter and other norms of Union law are more likely to impact the importance of 
fundamental rights within the EU legal system, while overlaps between higher-ranking 
norms and secondary Union law will likely have a greater impact on the allocation of 
powers under the Treaties. 
 
Necessitating further comment are the tensions inherent between these different 
constitutional concerns. To some extent, each of the constitutional concerns outlined 
above pull in differing directions. Resolving norm overlaps in a manner that expands the 
                                               
53 Article 2 TEU. In addition, ECJ case law repeatedly affirms that the EU is based upon the rule of law, 
see e.g. Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament EU:C:1986:166, para. 23; Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños 
Agricultores v Council EU:C:2002:462, para. 38; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi v Council and 
Commission EU:C:2008:461, para. 281; Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and 
Council EU:C:2013:625, para. 91; Case C-362/14 Schrems EU:C:2015:650, para. 60. 
54 Case C-342/14 X-Steuerberatungsgesellschaft EU:C:2015:827, para. 59. See also e.g. Case C-147/13 Spain v 
Council EU:C:2015:299, para. 79; Case C-48/14 Parliament v Council EU:C:2015:91, para. 45; Case C-49/16 
Unibet International EU:C:2017:491, para. 43; Case C-322/16 Global Starnet EU:C:2017:985, para. 46; Case 
C-158/07 Förster EU:C:2008:630, para. 67, 
55 Case C-345/06 Heinrich EU:C:2009:140, para. 45. 
Chapter 2 – Existing Approaches 
 72 
scope of protection from discrimination offered by Union law will also alter the 
horizontal and vertical distribution of powers. Equally, articulating rules or principles 
governing norm interactions may lead to greater legal certainty but may not always 
secure the greatest possible level of rights protection. There will also be a difficult 
balance between competing constitutional values. This thesis does not prioritise one 
above the other. Any approach to norm overlap articulated by the ECJ should, however, 
recognise these potential implications. 
 
Bridging to the next Section (and the remaining Chapters), the constitutional weight 
attaching to ECJ decisions when it interprets the relationship between overlapping 
norms necessitates more than simply justifying interpretative choices in the immediate 
case. The need for predictability as a part of the requirements of legal certainty and the 
possibility of alternately justifying decisions in the light of competing constitutional 
values demand a more principled approach. The following Section introduces several 
existing tools and principles for resolving questions of norm inter-relationship. The 
main contention is that these principles, with minor modifications for the specificities of 
both norm overlap and the EU legal system, provide workable and normatively justified 
guidelines for determining the relationship between overlapping norms. 
 
3. EXISTING SOLUTIONS 
3.1. Overview 
This Section turns to examine the existing legal tools and principles that the ECJ could 
employ when determining the inter-relationship between overlapping norms. 
Specifically, this Section sets out the guidance offered by priority clauses and priority 
principles (i.e., the principles of lex superior, lex specialis and lex posterior) in the context of 
norm overlap, highlighting both the efficacy and the limits of each approach. Later 
Chapters examine whether the ECJ does in fact follow the guidance offered by these 
principles. 
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3.2. Priority Clauses 
For drafters (of treaties, legislation, etc.) to include a priority clause, they must foresee 
the potential for coincidence with other norms. Priority clauses56 offer an ex ante 
solution to questions of norm inter-relationship by either giving precedence to or 
subjugating one norm. A basic categorisation includes: (1) clauses providing for the 
priority of the containing norm (i.e. the provision of EU law in which the priority clause 
is located); (2) clauses assigning priority to another norm (and setting out the subsidiary 
nature of the containing norm); and (3) clauses granting priority on a case-by-case basis 
to the norm offering greater advantages e.g. more extensive protection of human 
rights.57 Each type of clause pre-determines how norms should inter-relate. 
 
The use of priority clauses is a technique employed by both the Treaty-framers and the 
Union legislature to mediate the relationship between provisions. In EU law, priority 
clauses regulate the relationship between the EU Treaties and external Treaties,58 
between provisions of the EU Treaties,59 between the Charter and other sources of 
fundamental rights,60 and between measures of secondary Union law.61 The most 
commonly used priority clauses in EU law specify that the containing norm is either 
‘without prejudice’ to or ‘shall not affect’62 another norm (or several). The prohibition 
on nationality discrimination in Article 18 TFEU is, for instance, ‘without prejudice to 
                                               
56 This thesis adopts the term ‘priority clause’ to reflect the utility of such clauses outside of conflicts 
between norms. Other labels include ‘compatibility clauses’ (W Czapliński and G Danilenko, ‘Conflicts of 
Norms in International Law’ (1990) 21 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3, 13) and ‘conflict clauses’ 
(JB Mus, ‘Conflicts between Treaties in International Law’ (1998) 45(2) Netherlands International Law Review 
208, 214; D Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict (OUP 2014) 319). 
57 Compiled based on H Blix and JH Emerson, The Treaty Maker’s Handbook (Oceana Publications 1973) 
210-22; Czapliński and Danilenko (n 56) 13; Mus (n 56) 214; ILC, ‘Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (13 April 2006) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/L.682 (‘Fragmentation Report’), para. 268; CJ Borgen, ‘Treaty Conflicts and Normative 
Fragmentation’ in DB Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP 2012) 448-471, 457; Pulkowski (n 56) 
319-21. 
58 E.g. Article 351 TFEU. 
59 E.g. Article 38 TEU; Articles 16, 18 22(2), 25, 55, 57, 218 TFEU. 
60 Articles 52(2)-(4) CFR. 
61 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 
amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions [2002] OJ L 269/15, Article 7 (mediating that Directive’s inter-relationship with Directive 
92/85/EEC). 
62 See e.g. Article 266 TFEU; Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2006 on services in the internal market [2006] OJ L 376/36, Article 23(3). 
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any special provisions’ in the Treaties.63 An example of a ‘shall not affect’ clause is 
Article 36(2) of Regulation 492/2011 on the free movement of workers, which states 
that it ‘shall not affect measures taken in accordance with Article 48 [TFEU].’64 ‘Without 
prejudice’ and ‘shall not affect’ clauses fall within the secondary category outlined above 
and explicitly subordinate the containing norm. 
 
The horizontal provisions of the Charter are also priority clauses – even if they do not 
fit so neatly within the categorisation set out above – because they set out its 
relationship with some other sources of human rights. Article 52(2) CFR comes closest 
to the traditional understanding of priority clauses and specifies that ‘[r]ights recognised 
by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the 
conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties.’ Articles 52(3) and 52(4) CFR 
do not determine priority as such, but they do set out where the content of one norm 
will dictate or influence the meaning of corresponding Charter rights. Article 52(3) CFR 
states that ‘so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the [ECHR], the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid 
down by the [ECHR]’, although it does not prevent the Charter from offering more 
extensive protection. Similarly, Article 52(4) CFR sets out the relationship between 
Charter provisions and national constitutional traditions by requiring the interpretation 
of the Charter ‘in harmony with those traditions.’  
 
Discussion now turns to the presumed meaning of ‘without prejudice’ and ‘shall not 
affect’ clauses in the context of norm overlap.65 Respect for express clauses is a corollary 
of the ECJ’s responsibility (discussed above) to ‘ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed’66 as well as the requirement of mutual 
sincere cooperation between institutions.67 Linking back to Section 2, if the ECJ ignores, 
                                               
63 See also e.g. Directive 2006/123, Article 18. For further discussion of the ‘without prejudice’ clause in 
Article 18 TFEU, see Chapter 4, Section 2. 
64 Regulation 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of 
movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L 141/1, Article 36(2). For further discussion of the 
‘shall not affect’ clause in Regulation 492/2011, see Chapter 5. 
65 Later Chapters discuss the import of the horizontal provisions in the Charter and how, in practice, they 
mediate relationships with overlapping norms. On Article 52(2) CFR, see: Chapter 3, Section 3; Chapter 
4, Sections 3; and Chapter 6, Section, 3.1. On Article 52(4) CFR, see Chapter 6, Section 3.1. 
66 Article 19(1) TEU. 
67 Article 13(2) TEU. 
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overrules or otherwise limits the operation of a priority clause it might act ultra vires its 
own competences (especially if the clause is included with the Treaties) or encroach on 
the prerogatives of the Union legislature to determine the interactions between 
measures.  
 
If overlapping norms conflict, scholarship advances two different understandings of 
what ‘without prejudice’ and ‘shall not affect’ clauses imply.68 One understanding 
suggests that these clauses require only a separate interpretation of the relevant norms:69 
each norm is on a distinct path and cannot alter (‘affect’ or ‘prejudice’) the interpretation 
of the other. A consequence of this understanding is that neither clause offers any help 
in determining the relationship between applicable norms. Which norm ought to apply 
is then, if anything, only more complicated and makes recourse to priority principles 
necessary (on which see below). The other interpretation of ‘without prejudice’ and 
‘shall not affect’ clauses is that they subjugate the norm they are part of below the 
conflicting (and prioritised) norm. This understanding is the more persuasive since it 
provides a resolution to norm conflicts and best fits the interpretation of such clauses in 
international law i.e. as meaning that one ‘treaty will take priority over another treaty or 
not in the event that a conflict occurs’.70 In theory, when overlapping norms conflict, 
‘shall not affect’ and ‘without prejudice’ clauses pre-empt the application of the 
containing norm (without invalidating that norm71) and require the application of the 
prioritised norm. 
 
What do the terms ‘affect’ and ‘prejudice’ imply in the context of overlap leading to 
accumulation (and not conflict)? Their meaning is somewhat more ambiguous in this 
context. Envisage, for example, two norms prohibiting discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation. The first is a general prohibition that expressly ‘shall not affect’ the 
second norm, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in 
                                               
68 And are evident in practice: contrast Case C-35/97 Commission v France EU:C:1998:431, para. 44 with 
Case C-287/05 Hendrix EU:C:2007:196, Opinion of AG Kokott, para. 54. For further discussion see 
Chapter 5, Section 5. 
69 Hendrix, Opinion of AG Kokott (n 68), para. 54. Cousins also refers to ‘shall not affect’ clauses as 
‘somewhat slender evidence’ for granting priority to another norm, see M Cousins, ‘Free Movement of 
Workers, EU Citizenship and Access to Social Advantages’ (2007) 14(4) MJ 343, 350. 
70 Mus (n 56) 214. See also A Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The 
Doctrine of Lex Specialis’ (2005) 74(1) NJIL 27, 40. 
71 Czapliński and Danilenko (n 56) 14. 
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relation to: (1) access to employment; (2) pay; and (3) working conditions. Where an 
ambiguity arises is over the intended meaning of the latter norm. By specifying three 
areas covered by that norm, did the drafters aim to define exhaustively those situations 
in which discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is prohibited; or did the 
drafters simply aim to set out how that provision applies more specifically in certain 
situations. If an applicant seeks to contest discriminatory conduct that does not concern 
access to employment, pay and working conditions, does the ‘shall not affect’ clause 
prevent reliance on the more general prohibition? If we assume that the legislature 
restricted the material scope of the employment-specific norm for a reason, then the 
broader norm potentially ‘affects’ the envisaged scope of the prohibition on 
discrimination. However, such assumptions imply intentions to the Union legislature 
that are not express and go against the general approach to legal reasoning adopted by 
the ECJ. 
 
Discussion returns to how the ECJ interprets priority clauses in Chapter 4 on the inter-
relationship between primary norms and, to a lesser extent, in Chapter 5 on the inter-
relationship between overlapping secondary norms. 
 
3.3. Priority Principles 
In the absence of a priority clause, scholarship concerning public international law and 
national law lists three traditionally-accepted principles for resolving questions of norm 
inter-relationship: 72 the lex superior principle, the lex specialis principle and the lex posterior 
principle (according priority between norms based on rank, specificity and date 
respectively). 
 
                                               
72 According to e.g. CW Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 BYIL 401, 436; M 
Hirsch, ‘Interactions Between Investment and Non-investment Obligations’ in P Muchlinski, F Ortino 
and C Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP 2008) 154-181, 160; R 
Michaels and J Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws: Different Techniques in the 
Fragmentation of Public International Law’ (2011-2012) 22(3) Duke Journal of Comparative & International 
Law 349, 354. Other principles of interpretation do exist, although they are not relevant to the context of 
norm overlap in EU law. The principle of lex prior, for example, requires that ‘if there is a conflict between 
two treaties made with two different States, the earlier treaty prevails’, see Jenks (n 72) 442. Lex prior only 
applies to agreements signed with third parties e.g. if parties A and B sign a treaty and then A signs a 
treaty with C, A is still bound to the treaty with B. Other principles mentioned by Jenks – although not 
widely recognised – include the autonomous operation principle, the ‘pith and substance’ principle and 
the legislative intention principle, see further Jenks (n 72) 448. 
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Before exploring what guidance each principle offers in the context of norm overlap, let 
us first dwell on the choice to examine the relevance of priority principles in this thesis 
despite – as discussed below – the ECJ rarely mentioning them explicitly. One potential 
criticism is that the principles of lex superior, lex specialis and lex posterior are only relevant 
to norm conflicts. This argument struggles, in part, because norm overlap encompasses 
norm conflicts; priority principles should, therefore, at least be of some assistance to the 
ECJ even if only when conflicts arise between overlapping norms. What is more, any 
argument that confines the relevance of priority principles to conflict resolution 
misunderstands their more general role as part of legal reasoning. As further discussed 
below, the principles of lex superior, lex specialis and lex posterior largely draw attention to 
the justifications for competing choices between norms.73 Ascertaining the more specific 
or later norm is often a way of identifying the most precise or most recent expression of 
legislative intent, while identifying the superior norm ensures the structure of the legal 
system around certain fundamental principles. This systemic role of priority principles 
means that it is misguided to treat the principles of lex superior, lex specialis and lex posterior 
as conflict rules requiring ‘mechanical application’.74 Instead, they are interpretative 
maxims forming part of legal reasoning that can assist in the determination of the inter-
relationship between norms more generally.75 
 
A different possible objection is to question the status of priority principles in EU law. 
The Treaties do not explicitly refer to the principles of lex superior, lex specialis and lex 
posterior76 and these principles are not found among the general principles of Union law. 
                                               
73 G Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (CUP 2012) 89. 
74 Pulkowski (n 56) 322. 
75 See e.g. Jenks (n 72) 407 (who argues that priority principles do not have ‘absolute validity … [but] 
must be weighed and reconciled in the light of the circumstances of the particular case’); ILC, 
‘Fragmentation Report’ (n 57) para. 27 (describing priority principles as part of ‘pragmatic process 
through which lawyers go about interpreting and applying formal law’); Conway (n 73) 19 (who treats 
priority principles as part of the ‘typology of aspects of legal reasoning’); Pulkowski (n 56) 322 n20 (who 
concludes that ‘[p]riority rules are essentially tools within the legal order that allow the interpreter to 
justify her decision according to rational criteria); S Borelli, ‘The (Mis)-Use of General Principles of Law: 
Lex Specialis and the Relationship Between International Human Rights Law and the Laws of Armed 
Conflict’ in L Pineschi (ed), General Principles of Law – The Role of the Judiciary (Springer 2015) 265-293, 266 
(referring to priority principles as ‘general principle[s] of legal reasoning’). Academic literature also singles 
out principle of lex specialis ‘as an informal part of legal reasoning, that is of the pragmatic process through 
which lawyers go about interpreting and applying formal law’⁠ and as ‘a technique which directs the 
attention of decision-makers to a more appropriate regulation’, Lindroos (n 70) 36. 
76 An exception here is the principle of lex superior, which is implicit in Article 263 TFEU requiring that 
the ECJ ‘review the legality of legislative acts … on grounds of … infringement of the Treaties or any rule 
of law relating to their application’. 
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As a result, their legal status in EU law is unclear.77 However, in line with the idea that 
priority principles form part of legal reasoning more generally, this thesis does not 
understand the ECJ as legally obliged to respect these principles. The more limited 
contention is that they provide workable and generally accepted (outside of EU law) 
interpretative guidelines for resolving questions of norm inter-relationship. These 
principles therefore offer a starting point for assessing ECJ practice since, as noted 
above, structuring norm inter-relationship in line with hierarchical superiority, specificity 
or date is often a proxy for normative concerns such as legislative intent that will in any 
case inform judicial reasoning. As such they offer a logical point of departure and a way 
into the case law of the ECJ, which often lacks detailed justification78 and rarely lays 
down interpretative maxims.79 
 
Discussion now turns to analyse each of these principles in more detail. 
 
3.3.1 Lex Superior 
Where there is hierarchy between norms, the principle of lex superior – granting priority 
to the higher-ranking norm – is prima facie applicable.80 There are differing rationales for 
the principle of lex superior. Underpinning the principle of lex superior in many instances 
will be a concern for democracy. A hierarchy between acts should reflect ‘the 
democratic legitimacy of their respective authors and adoption procedures’.81 The EU 
Treaties are, for example, hierarchically superior to secondary Union law on account of 
their ratification by each Member State of the EU. Similarly, this explains the hierarchy 
                                               
77 Even in international law a debate persists regarding ‘whether priority rules are best classified as general 
principles of international law, rules of interpretation, customary international law or something 
completely different’, see Pulkowski (n 56) 322, n 20. For an extensive overview, see E Vranes, ‘Lex 
Superior, Lex Specialis, Lex Posterior – Zur Rechtsnatur der “Konfliktlösungsregeln”’ (2005) 65 Zeitschrift 
für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 391, 392. 
78 Tridimas refers to the ECJ’s reasoning as ‘laconic, terse, succinct, even, sibylline’, see T Tridimas, ‘The 
Court of Justice and Judicial Activism’ 21(3) ELRev 199, 210, while Perju describes it as ‘overly abstract, 
vague, and elliptical’, see V Perju, ‘Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice’ (2009) 49 
Virginia Journal of International Law 307, 310. 
79 When drawing a contrast with the Appellate Body of the WTO, Ehlermann once reflected that he 
could not remember the ECJ ‘[laying] down openly and clearly the rules of interpretation that it intended 
to follow’, see CD Ehlermann, ‘Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the 
WTO’ (2002) Robert Schuman Centre Policy Paper No. 02/9, para. 43. 
80 Michaels and Pauwelyn (n 72) 354. 
81 K Lenaerts and M Desomer, ‘Towards a Hierarchy of Legal Acts in the European Union? 
Simplification of Legal Instruments and Procedures’ (2005) 11(6) ELJ 744, 745. 
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between legislative and non-legislative acts given the participation of democratic 
institutions in promulgating the former. The principle of lex superior also reflects other 
normative concerns such as the principle of attributed powers and the protection of 
certain fundamental principles. Where one norm forms the legal basis for another, the 
principle of lex superior requires that the former norm remains within the parameters of 
the empowering norm. In this way, the lex superior principle reflects a concern for 
competence.82 The principle of lex superior also ensures ‘that norms are adopted and 
remain within the scope of the fundamental principles of a given legal order.’83 For 
example, constitutions often entrench basic rights and freedoms such as equality and the 
protection of minorities. 
 
The principle of lex superior developed in the context of domestic legal systems where a 
hierarchy exists between, primarily, the constitution and legislation; but also, between 
other sources (e.g. in the UK a hierarchy exists between statute and common law). 
Following a reinterpretation of the principle to fit the non-hierarchical nature of 
international law,84 the principle of lex superior also applies where one norm is recognised 
as superior on the grounds of its fundamentality or normative import and not just its 
formal source. In international law, a norm of general international law contrary to jus 
cogens85 – i.e. a norm ‘that admit[s] no derogation and that can be amended only by a new 
general norm of international law of the same value’86 – will be invalid. The notion of a 
hierarchy based on normativity and not just on formal source has also altered the 
                                               
82 N Bobbio, ‘Des critères pour résoudre les antinomies’ (1964) 18(1/4) Dialectica 237, 254. 
83 R Bieber and I Salome, ‘Hierarchy of norms in European Law’ (1996) 33(5) CMLRev 907, 910. 
84 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
1945) 1946 UKTS 67 (‘ICJ Statute’), Article 38 does not set out an a priori hierarchy between the different 
sources of international law: treaty, custom and general principles. The notion that one norm of 
international law is not hierarchically superior to another on the grounds of the actor creating the norm or 
the procedure adopted is widespread see e.g. M Akehurst, ‘The Hierarchy of the Sources of International 
Law’ (1976) 47(1) BYIL 273, 274; Czapliński and Danilenko (n 56) 7; J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law (CUP 2003) 94-97. 
85 On which see, e.g., JA Carrillo Salcedo, ‘Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy of Norms in 
International Law’ (1997) 8(4) EJIL 583; Pauwelyn (n 84) 21; D Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in 
International Law’ (2006) 100(2) AJIL 291; Hirsch (n 72) 157; J Vidmar, ‘Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy 
in International Law: Towards a Vertical International Legal System?’ in E de Wet and J Vidmar (eds), 
Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights (OUP 2012) 13-42; D Shelton, ‘International Law 
and “Relative Normativity”‘ in MD Evans (ed), International law (4th edn, OUP 2014) 138-165. The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS 331 (‘VCLT’), Article 53 confirms the superiority of norms of jus cogens over other norms of 
international law. 
86 Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’ (n 85) 297. 
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understanding of the lex superior principle in the domestic context. In the UK, for 
instance, judges recognise a hierarchy between statutes that grant precedence to so-
called ‘constitutional statutes’87 on the grounds of their normative importance to the 
UK’s constitutional settlement.88 
 
Turning to the potential guidance offered by the lex superior principle in the context of 
overlap in EU law, a basic precondition is the existence of a hierarchy. A hierarchy 
exists between some (although not all) formal sources of Union law. Sitting above 
secondary Union law are the Treaties, the Charter and the general principles of EU law. 
Recognising their hierarchical superiority, Article 263 TFEU empowers the ECJ to 
‘review the legality of legislative acts … on grounds of … infringement of the Treaties 
or any rule of law relating to their application’ in an action brought by a Member State, 
the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission.89 A hierarchy also exists 
between different acts of the EU;90 at the top are legislative acts,91 followed by delegated 
acts92 and then implementing acts.93  
 
No normative hierarchy, akin to the notion of jus cogens, appears to exist in EU law. The 
closest the ECJ came to endorsing the idea of a ‘higher law’ was in its ruling in Kadi that 
‘no circumstances permit any challenge to the principles that form part of the very 
foundations of the Community legal order.’94 While Rosas and Armati interpret the 
                                               
87 According to Laws LJ (who first developed the notion of ‘constitutional statutes’): ‘a constitutional 
statute is one which (a) conditions the legal relationship between citizen and State in some general, 
overarching manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as 
fundamental constitutional rights. (a) and (b) are of necessity closely related: it is difficult to think of an 
instance of (a) that is not also an instance of (b) … Ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed. 
Constitutional statutes may not’ (Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195, [2003] QB 151, [62]-
[63], per Laws LJ). The UK Supreme Court later confirmed the existence of constitutional statutes in R 
(HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 WLR 324. 
88 On the normative importance of constitutional statutes, see e.g. P Craig, ‘Constitutionalising 
Constitutional Law: HS2’ [2014] PL 373, 389; F Ahmed and A Perry, ‘Constitutional Statutes’ (2016) 
37(2) OJLS 461, 467. 
89 The ECJ relies, inter alia, on the reference to ‘any rule of law relating to their application’ to justify the 
development of general principles. See e.g. T Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law (8th edn, 
OUP 2014) 146. 
90 See further P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP 2011) 57-66. H Hofmann, 
‘Legislation, Delegation and Implementation Under the Treaty of Lisbon: Typology Meets Reality’ (2009) 
15(4) ELJ 482; D Curtin and T Manucharyan, ‘Legal Acts and Hierarchy of Norms in EU Law’ in D 
Chalmers and A Arnull (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (OUP 2015) 103-25. 
91 Article 289 TFEU. 
92 Article 290 TFEU. 
93 Article 291 TFEU. 
94 Kadi (n 53), para. 304. 
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ECJ’s decision in Kadi, as ‘confirm[ing] and ma[king] more explicit a tendency 
discernible in previous case-law according to which the EU constitutional order consists 
of some core principles which may prevail over provisions of the Treaties and thus of 
written primary law’95 theirs is a lone voice. No later cases contain similar references to 
the notion that fundamental rights might prevail over the Treaties. 
 
Given the absence of a normative hierarchy in Union law, the principle of lex superior 
will not be of use where norms have the same or an equal-ranking formal source. The 
Treaties and the Charter have the same status96 as do the different legislative acts: 
regulations, directives and decisions.97 The contested rank of general principles is also 
problematises the application of the principle of lex superior to the inter-relationship 
between general principles and written primary law. Some academic literature accords 
general principles parity with the Treaty and the Charter and refers to general principles 
as ‘constitutional’98 and as ‘primary law’.99 On this view, the principle of lex superior is of 
little help. Sometimes general principles are even recognised as superior to the 
constitutive Treaties.100 Craig and de Búrca, however, explicitly recognise general 
principles as falling below primary law and refer to general principles as the ‘second tier 
of the hierarchy of norms’.101 Even on this view the relevance of hierarchy is unclear 
since the ECJ cannot review the general principles of Union law for their compatibility 
with the Treaties and/or Charter. 
 
The guidance offered by the lex superior principle will differ depending upon the 
(ir)reconcilability of overlapping norms. Even where a conflict arises, the lex superior 
principle does not require (although it does not prohibit) the mechanical application of 
the hierarchically superior norm. In many cases, relying directly on the inferior norm 
will make good sense from the perspective of the EU’s constitutional values. First, 
                                               
95 A Rosas and L Armati, EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction (2nd edn, Hart 2012) 43. 
96 Article 6(1) TEU. Article 52(2) CFR governs the relationship Treaties and the Charter. For further 
discussion see Chapter 4. 
97 Article 289(3) TFEU. 
98 See Case C-101/08 Audiolux and Others EU:C:2009:626, para. 63. 
99 See Audiolux and Others Opinion of AG Trstenjak (n 41), para. 70; Rosas and Armati (n 95) 56; K 
Lenaerts and others, European Union law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2011). 
100 AG Toth, ‘Human Rights as General Principles of Law, in the Past and in the Future’ in B Ulf and J 
Nergelius (eds), General Principles of European Community Law: Reports from a Conference in Malmo, 27-28 August 
1999 (Kluwer Law International 2000) 73-92, 78. 
101 P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2011) 109. 
Chapter 2 – Existing Approaches 
 82 
where an overlap exists between primary and secondary Union law, it makes sense to 
begin with the ‘more specific instrument’102 that ‘offer[s] structure, detail and 
certainty’.103 Secondly, relying on Union secondary law as a starting point better respects 
the principle of mutual sincere cooperation between institutions104 by requiring the ECJ 
to begin its analysis with the Union legislature’s interpretation of a particular right. 
Thirdly, starting with the lower-ranking norm best fits with the idea that higher-ranking 
norms act as a check on their legality. Finally, interpreting lex superior as a rule requiring 
the application of the hierarchically superior rule ignores the possibility – particularly in 
the context of rights – that Union secondary norms might expand on primary norms. 
Applying the hierarchically superior norm would therefore be to apply the norm of 
more limited scope. 
 
Where overlapping norms conflict, the lex superior principle requires that the higher-
ranking norm prevails. As the ECJ ruled in Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl, ‘an individual 
measure which is contrary to a general measure of higher rank in the hierarchy of norms 
is inevitably unlawful.’105 In this sense, the lex superior principle is closely connected to 
the EU system of strong judicial review106 under which the ECJ can annul or invalidate 
secondary Union law (under Articles 263 and 267 TFEU respectively) ‘on grounds of 
lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement 
of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers.’107 
Under the lex superior principle, where the scope of secondary law is narrower than that 
of overlapping primary law, the primary norm should prevail.  
 
However, the broad wording of EU primary law and the lack of specificity inherent in 
the general principles of Union law make it difficult to determine when primary law 
should take precedence; could a higher-ranking norm not always be interpreted as 
having a wider scope than overlapping secondary law? The standards developed by the 
ECJ for identifying a breach of the Treaties perhaps offer better guidance here as to 
                                               
102 Case C-143/16 Abercrombie & Fitch Italia EU:C:2017:235, Opinion of AG Bobek, para. 21. 
103 P Syrpis, ‘Theorising the Relationship between the Judiciary and the Legislature in the EU Internal 
Market’ in P Syrpis (ed), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market (CUP 2012) 3-24, 7. 
104 Article 13(2) TEU. 
105 Case C-441/97 P Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl EU:C:2000:643, para. 32 
106 The phrase ‘strong judicial review’ comes from J Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial 
Review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346. 
107 Article 263 TFEU. 
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when the ECJ ought to give precedence to the primary law norm. According to the ECJ, 
when the adoption of secondary Union law requires the legislature to make ‘political, 
economic and social choices … [and] to undertake complex assessments … the legality 
of a measure adopted in that area can be affected only if the measure is manifestly 
inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent institutions are 
seeking to pursue’.108 Where secondary Union law impinges upon fundamental rights 
protection, the ECJ requires more anxious scrutiny and will ensure ‘the review, in 
principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all [EU] acts in the light of the 
fundamental rights’ protected as general principles of Union law and enshrined in the 
Charter.109 The standard of review for the legality of Union acts fleshes out the lex 
superior principle here.  
 
There is, however, one sense in which the lex superior principle is ill-suited for resolving 
conflicts between overlapping norms. Where secondary law offers more extensive 
protection from discrimination than the overlapping primary law, a conflict will most 
likely emerge. For example, to repurpose the example employed in the introduction, 
consider a primary law norm that on Saturdays I must jog 10 km in the park and 
another a secondary law norm that requires me to jog 20 km. The cross-cutting legal 
bases in EU law will sometimes empower the Union legislature to add to existing 
obligations and, so long as the Union legislature did not exceed its competences (or 
otherwise act unlawfully), the validity of such a measure will not be called into question. 
Something of a tension emerges here between the dictates of the lex superior principle 
and the outcome of legality review. On the assumption that the lex superior principle 
requires the higher-ranking norm to take precedence in the context of a norm conflict, 
this would mean that lower-ranking norms cannot expand upon higher-ranking norms. 
As such, applying the principle of lex superior in the event of a conflict between 
overlapping norms may sometimes lead to illogical consequences. In the context of 
norm conflict, the principle of lex superior is perhaps better subsumed by legality review. 
 
                                               
108 Joined Cases C-453/03 and C-11-12, 194/04 ABNA and Others EU:C:2005:741, para. 69. See also, e.g. 
Case C-84/94 UK v Council (Working Time) EU:C:1996:431, para. 58; Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament 
and Council (Deposit guarantee directive) EU:C:1997:231, paras 55-56; Case C-210/03 Swedish Match 
EU:C:2004:802, para. 48; Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others 
EU:C:2005:449, para. 52; Case C-549/15 E.ON Biofor Sverige EU:C:2017:490, para. 50. 
109 Kadi (n 53), para. 326. 
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Outside of its role in judicial review, the principle of lex superior acts more as a more 
systemic principle110 and addresses two main interpretative maxims to the ECJ. First, as 
Syrpis notes, ‘the adoption of secondary legislation should not affect the way in which 
primary law is interpreted.’111 The only exception is the so-called ‘Tedeschi principle’; 
according to this principle, where overlapping secondary law intends to harmonise a 
particular area, recourse to primary law is only possible to assess the validity of 
secondary Union law.112 Second, when interpreting Union secondary law ‘preference 
must be given as far as possible to the interpretation which renders it compatible with 
the Treaty and the general principles of law.’113 In this way, the principle of lex superior 
ensures coherence in the legal order by ensuring the interpretation of lower-ranking 
norms in light of hierarchically superior norms that supposedly enshrine fundamental 
principles. 
 
Finally, the principle of lex superior takes precedence over the principles of lex specialis and 
lex posterior.114 Furthermore, it follows from the hierarchy of norms that a secondary law 
norm cannot purport to take precedence over a hierarchically superior norm. Matters 
are more complicated when it comes to the relationship between the principle of lex 
superior and priority clauses, for example, where primary law explicitly subjugates itself to 
a lower-ranking norm. The issue remains somewhat unresolved. Article 21(1) TFEU 
specifies that ‘[e]very citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid 
down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect’ thereby creating 
what Syrpis terms a ‘normative inversion’.115 
 
                                               
110 Conway (n 73)155. 
111 Syrpis ‘The Relationship between Primary and Secondary Law in the EU’ (n 48) 461. 
112 See Case 5/77 Tedeschi EU:C:1977:144, para. 35; Case C-37/92 Vanacker EU:C:1993:836, para. 9; Case 
C-324/99 DaimlerChrysler EU:C:2001:682, para. 32; Case C-309/02 Radlberger Getränkegesellschaft and S. Spitz 
EU:C:2004:799, para. 53; Case C-321/05 Kofoed EU:C:2007:408, Opinion of AG Kokott, para. 67. 
113 T Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 29. See also Case C-314/89 Rauh 
EU:C:1991:143, para. 17; Joined Cases C-402/07 and C-432/07 Sturgeon and Others EU:C:2009:716, para. 
48. 
114 Michaels and Pauwelyn (n 72) 354. See also, Bobbio (n 82) 355, who argues that, although in theory 
the principle of lex superior should take precedence over the principles of lex specialis and lex superior, in 
practice the demands of justice may mean granting precedence to the more specific norm. 
115 Syrpis, ‘The Relationship between Primary and Secondary Law in the EU’ (n 48) 473. 
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The guidance offered by the lex superior principle in the context of specific overlaps and 
whether ECJ practice concurs with this approach will be examined further in later 
Chapters. In particular, the role played by the lex superior principle in the context of 
norm overlap will be examined further in Chapter 3 (on the inter-relationship between 
overlapping primary and secondary Union law) and in Chapter 6 (on the inter-
relationship between the Charter and overlapping general principles).  
 
3.3.2 Lex Specialis 
In the absence of a hierarchy between norms, ruling out the utility of the lex superior 
principle, the generally accepted method for determining norm inter-relationship is to 
prioritise whichever norm is more specific (the principle of lex specialis) or whichever is 
later in time (the principle of lex posterior). No hierarchy exists between the principles of 
lex specialis and lex posterior. Instead, judges must decide ‘contextually as to whether the 
degree of speciality or the time of emergence of the norm is more important’.116 
 
The principle of lex specialis grants priority to whichever norm is more specific.117 
Underpinning this principle are two main rationales. First, the more specific norm is 
said to reflect the intentions of the legislature better; the assumption is that a lawmaker, 
‘in regulating a specific area, wants to create special rules that trump the general rules in 
the field.’118 Even if one agrees with Milanovic that it is a ‘fiction’ that the legislature 
‘could not possibly have intended to legislate two hierarchically equal norms that are 
ultimately contradictory’,119 there is a second reason for respecting the principle of lex 
specialis: ‘specific rules are presumed to be particularly efficacious’.120 The greater efficacy 
                                               
116 ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law: Conclusions’ (18 July 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.702 (‘Fragmentation Report 
Conclusions’) 9. See also Pulkowski (n 56) 322-23. 
117 See generally H Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (Liberty Fund 2005) Bk. 2, Ch. XVI, sXXIX; E de 
Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature, vol 2 (Sweet, Stevens and Maxwell 1834) Ch. 
XVII, para. 316; Jenks (n 72) 446; G Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’ (1957) 33 BYIL 203, 236; Czapliński and 
Danilenko (n 56) 20; Michaels and Pauwelyn (n 72) 354; G Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of 
the EU (Hart 2012) 222; B Simma and D Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained 
Regimes in International Law’ (2006) 17(3) EJIL 483, 287. 
118 Michaels and Pauwelyn (n 72) 354. See also Pauwelyn (n 84) 388; Lindroos (n 70) 42. 
119 M Milanovic, ‘The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between Human Rights 
and International Humanitarian Law’ in JD Ohlin (ed), Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human 
Rights (CUP 2016) 78-117, 109. 
120 Pulkowski (n 56) 324. 
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of the more specialised norm stems from its greater precision and the fact that it admits 
fewer exceptions.121 
 
The ECJ recognises and applies the principle of lex specialis122 and so it is possible to 
extrapolate from existing case law how the lex specialis principle might apply in the 
context of norm overlap. However, relatively little ECJ case law on the operation of lex 
specialis exists and, in what case law there is, the ECJ does not offer a detailed exposition 
of the principle. The following discussion draws, therefore, also on literature concerning 
the operation of the lex specialis principle in the context of international law. 
 
Where there is a conflict between norms (including between overlapping norms), the 
principle of lex specialis requires that the more specific norm prevails at the expense of 
the more general norm. The ECJ in Cipra adopted a similar understanding of the 
principle of lex specialis. A conflict arose between two different provisions of a regulation 
relating to road transport.123 The first provision required drivers transporting goods by 
road to have at least eleven consecutive hours of daily rest every twenty-four hours. The 
second provision set out a different minimum rest period for vehicles with two drivers: 
eight consecutive hours every thirty hours. The dispute in Cipra concerned a vehicle 
with two drivers who had each complied with the rest periods of eight hours every thirty 
hours, but not with the requirement of eleven consecutive hours of rest in every twenty-
four hours. The ECJ held that the drivers did not also need to comply with the 
requirement of eleven consecutive hours of rest since, given the context,124 the provision 
on rest periods for vehicles with two drivers was ‘a lex specialis that prevails’125 over the 
other norm. 
 
                                               
121 Pulkowski (n 56) 324. 
122 See e.g. Case 91/78 Hansen EU:C:1979:65, para. 10; Case C-444/00 Mayer Parry Recycling 
EU:C:2003:356, paras 51-57; Case C-252/05 Thames Water Utilities EU:C:2007:276, para. 39; Case C-
582/08 Commission v UK EU:C:2010:429, paras 35-36; Case C-128/11 UsedSoft EU:C:2012:407, para. 51. 
123 Council Regulation 3820/85 of 20 December 1985 on the harmonization of certain social legislation 
relating to road transport [1985] OJ L 370/1. 
124 Case C-439/01 Cipra and Kvasnicka EU:C:2003:31, para. 35. 
125 Cipra (n 124), para. 40. See Mayer Parry Recycling (n 122), para. 57; Case C-272/03 Siig EU:C:2004:805, 
para. 16; Case C-110/03 Belgium v Commission EU:C:2005:223, para. 39; Case C-441/02 Commission v 
Germany EU:C:2006:253, para. 40; Thames Water Utilities (n 122), para. 39. 
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Importantly, though, the prioritisation of the more specific norm does not invalidate the 
lex generalis.126 Where there is a conflict between norms and the more general rule sets 
out guiding principles implemented by the lex specialis, the lex generalis may still play a role 
in determining the outcome of a case. In this context, ‘the specific rule should be read 
and understood within the confines or against the background of the general standard, 
typically as an elaboration, updating or a technical specification of the latter.’127 In Mayer 
Parry Recycling, the ECJ recognised the continuing role of the lex generalis as an aid to the 
interpretation of the lex specialis. A framework directive on waste management set out 
several overarching principles, which a specific directive later implemented in relation to 
packaging waste. When discussing the operation of the principle of lex specialis in that 
case, the ECJ held that the more specific rules of the latter directive ‘prevail … in 
situations which [it] specifically seeks to regulate.’128 However, the lex generalis 
‘remain[ed] very important for the interpretation and application’ of the lex specialis.129 
 
In theory, the principle of lex specialis should still offer some guidance to the ECJ where 
overlapping norms accumulate, although there is no ECJ case law on this point. 
Pauwelyn argues that, outside of norm conflicts, the principle of lex specialis still offers 
some guidance to judges. The principle operates as a reason for courts to start by 
examining the more specific rule.130 In many ways this reflects the logic underlying the 
lex specialis principle as aiming to identify the more efficacious norm. However: 
… to say that the lex specialis must be examined first does not amount to saying that 
the lex generalis no longer applies. Both norms apply and it makes logical sense to 
examine first the lex specialis. But nothing precludes that the lex generalis is still 
relevant and adds certain rights or obligations.131 
Where overlapping norms accumulate, then, the expectation is that the ECJ will begin 
by analysing the more specific norm. Should that norm not apply, however, there is 
nothing to prevent the more general norm applying. 
 
                                               
126 ILC, ‘Fragmentation Report Conclusions’ (n 116) 9. 
127 ILC, ‘Fragmentation Report’ (n 57) para. 56. 
128 Mayer Parry Recycling (n 122), para. 57. 
129 Mayer Parry Recycling (n 122), para. 53. 
130 Pauwelyn (n 84) 411. 
131 Pauwelyn (n 84) 412. Similarly, the ILC notes how ‘[t]he application of the special law does not 
normally extinguish the relevant general law’, see ILC, ‘Fragmentation Report’ (n 57) para. 82). 
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The difficulty with applying the principle of lex specialis is the prior question of 
identifying whether there is a more specific norm. Where norms are equally general, the 
principle of lex specialis cannot apply. Even when one norm is more specific, specificity 
per se is insufficient. The application of the principle of lex specialis also depends on the 
norms also having the ‘same subject matter’.132 A lex specialis will either be ‘an application 
of a general standard in a given circumstance’133 or ‘a modification, overruling or setting 
aside’134 of the lex generalis. The problem is that the principle of lex specialis does not, in 
and of itself, provide any criteria for identifying when two or more norms have the same 
subject matter.135 Without an articulated system for identifying when the principle of lex 
specialis applies, there is a danger that the principle may become a guise for highly 
political decisions.136 Linking back to the previous Section and the consequences of how 
the ECJ approaches questions of norm inter-relationship, the potential manipulation of 
the principle of lex specialis makes the articulation of the criteria for identifying more 
specialised norms even more important.  
 
How do we determine if one norm is lex specialis? The ECJ offers only minimal 
treatment of this point. In Otis, the ECJ held that where rules concern ‘distinct 
questions’ the principle of lex specialis does not apply.’137 However, in that case the 
difference was a palpable one and concerned Treaty provisions relating to very different 
issues. The applicants argued that a relationship of specialty existed between Articles 
317 and 322 TFEU when the former concerns the powers of the EU institutions to 
establish and implement the EU’s budget, whilst Article 335 TFEU confers legal 
capacity on the EU.138 The lack of any connection between the Treaty provisions 
prevented the identification of a lex specialis. Offering more practical guidance, legal 
scholarship proposes several different factors that courts can employ to assess the 
applicability of the lex specialis principle. The first is whether the relevant norms pursue 
                                               
132 Fitzmaurice (n 117) 236; Pauwelyn(n 84) 389; Lindroos (n 70) 44; ILC, ‘Fragmentation Report’ (n 57) 
para. 116; Pulkowski (n 56) 327; 
133 ILC, ‘Fragmentation Report’ (n 57) para. 88. 
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the same goal.139 Pulkowski argues that where ‘several treaties have been made in pursuit 
of different societal goals, it should not be presumed that states intended to privilege 
one policy goal over another one simply by virtue of opting for a more specific 
formulation under one of the treaties’.140 The same could be said for secondary Union 
law that largely concerns different subject matters but coincides in one area. A second 
factor looks to the context of the overlapping norms and their place within a wider 
system.141 No easy answer exists; the specificity, the aims and the overall context of 
different norms must be taken into account to determine whether one norm is a lex 
specialis in relation to another. 
 
The role played by the principle of lex specialis is picked up again in Chapter 5, which 
examines the ECJ’s approach when faced with overlaps between norms of secondary 
Union law. 
 
3.3.3 Lex Posterior 
The principle of lex posterior determines priority between norms according to whichever 
is later in time.142 The principle has a long-standing history in both the domestic context 
and in determining relationships between Treaties. In the UK, for example, it is trite law 
that a later statute repeals an earlier statute to the extent that they are inconsistent.143 In 
international law, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifies the principle 
as follows: where there are ‘successive treaties relating to the same subject matter’144 and 
‘[w]hen all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier 
treaty is not terminated or suspended … the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that 
its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.’145 The principle of lex 
posterior aims to ensure respect for the intentions of the legislature. The idea behind 
                                               
139 Pulkowski (n 56) 328. 
140 Pulkowski (n 56) 328. 
141 ILC, ‘Fragmentation Report’ (n 57) para. 119. 
142 See generally, Jenks (n 72) 445; Czapliński and Danilenko (n 56) 19; Mus (n 56) 219. 
143 This is known as the doctrine of implied repeal, see Ellen Street Estates v Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 
590, 595-97. 
144 This is the heading of VCLT, Article 30. 
145 VCLT, Article 30(3). 
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applying the more recent norm is that the legislature is aware of the earlier law and 
intends to overrule it.146  
 
The principle of lex posterior does not find its way into the EU Treaties nor does the ECJ 
explicitly refer to it. However, the principle may implicitly form part of the ECJ’s 
reasoning where a later norm appears to supersede an earlier one. When the principle of 
lex posterior does apply, it will prioritise whichever norm is later in time. Where 
overlapping norms conflict, the principle will not invalidate the prior norm.147 Where 
overlapping norms accumulate, the role of lex posterior is less clear. However, given the 
rationale for the principle, it would again make sense to rely on the lex posterior as the 
starting point of analysis. 
 
Where there is no difference in date between norms, the principle of lex posterior will not 
apply. The difficulty is that it is not always easy to identify which date to use and which 
norm is the later. In relation to secondary Union law, is the date of adoption or the date 
of entry into force more important? These are questions the ECJ needs to clarify for the 
principle of lex posterior to mediate successfully the relationship between overlapping 
norms. It would seem the date of adoption is the more important on the grounds that it 
best fits the rationale for the principle of lex posterior. As Lock argues, the date of 
adoption ‘coincides with the most recent manifestation of the parties’ intentions, which 
best reflects the overall object and purpose of the lex posterior rule. Its entry into force 
often happens automatically … There is not necessarily a voluntary element involved.’148 
More complex is identifying the later norm where one secondary Union law is amended, 
consolidated or recast; does the clock start again with each amendment? This would 
automatically prioritise secondary Union law in areas requiring frequent updates or may 
alter previous norm inter-relationships following a consolidation exercise, even if very 
little had changed. However, this does not fit well with the normative underpinnings of 
the lex posterior principle; consolidating legislation, for example, does not necessarily 
imply that the Union legislature intended to alter the relationship of priority between 
norms.  
                                               
146 ILC, ‘Fragmentation Report’ (n 57) para. 226. In the UK, the principle of implied repeal is also a 
consequence of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
147 Pauwelyn (n 84) 363. 
148 T Lock, The European Court of Justice and International Courts (OUP 2015) 48. 
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In relation to higher sources of Union law, the principle of lex posterior runs into greater 
difficulties. In relation to the EU Treaties, does the date of a Treaty norm ‘re-set’ with 
each round of Treaty amendments? In other words, does a Treaty provision that has 
been largely unaltered since the original EEC Treaty date back to 1957 or only to the 
latest iteration of the EU Treaties? If the latter, then principles based on the date of the 
provision will be of no assistance in determining the inter-relationship between Treaty 
provisions or between Treaty provisions and the Charter. In relation to the Charter, 
does it pre-date the Treaty of Lisbon on the grounds of its solemn proclamation in 
2000? Prioritising new additions to the Treaties seems counter-intuitive when one 
considers the aims of the lex posterior principle to identify legislative intent; Treaty 
provisions with a long history – such as the equal pay principle in Article 157 TFEU or 
the free movement rules – are often understood as fundamental to the EU on account 
of their historical significance. Even more complex is how one should judge when 
general principles enter into force as the ECJ purports only to recognise – and not 
create – general principles of EU law.149 The date on which the ECJ recognises a general 
principle will often be arbitrary since it depends on a relevant case reaching the Court. 
There are thus numerous difficulties with relying on the principle of lex posterior in EU 
law relating and it is difficult to align the guidance offered by the principle with the aim 
of respecting legislative intent. 
 
Discussion returns to the potential utility of lex posterior principle in the context of norm 
overlap in Chapter 5. 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This Chapter started by setting out the importance of how the ECJ resolves the inter-
relationship between overlapping norms since it can lead – both in individual cases and 
across a longer period – to serious constitutional implications. As background concerns, 
framing any discussion on the ECJ’s approach to norm inter-relationship, will thus be 
the potential impact on fundamental rights protection, the balance of powers between 
the EU and the Member States, institutional balance and legal certainty. One point 
                                               
149 In the context of international law, see Pauwelyn (n 84) 97. 
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which emerged from this discussion was how the potential repercussions of the ECJ’s 
approach in many ways make the argument for identifying more distinctly the principles 
that govern norm interactions. In the absence of a clearly articulated and consistently 
applied system for prioritising overlapping norms, ECJ decisions – with potentially 
serious consequences – may appear arbitrary. 
 
The ECJ does not often set out the interpretative maxims that guide it in reaching 
decisions, and the principles that guide norm inter-relationship are no exception. 
However, on a more general level, there are existing methods for resolving questions of 
norm inter-relationship: priority clauses and the principles of lex superior, lex posterior and 
lex specialis. Despite receiving scarce mention in ECJ case, and indeed in EU legal 
scholarship, this Chapter showed that these principles (although less the lex posterior 
principle) offer workable and normatively justified guidance to the ECJ when faced with 
overlaps between norms. The remaining Chapters assess ECJ practice, when faced with 
discrete overlaps, for compatibility with priority clauses and priority principles. 
 
Discussion now turns to the first case study of this thesis; Chapter 3 examines how the 
ECJ resolves overlaps between primary and secondary Union law, and the role played 






Interactions between Overlapping Primary 
and Secondary Law Norms 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter examines how the ECJ approaches the inter-relationship between 
overlapping norms of primary and secondary Union law. The conclusion reached in 
Chapter 2 was that the principle of lex superior, somewhat modified for the specific 
context of overlap, offers interpretative guidance to the ECJ when faced with overlaps 
between primary and secondary Union law. It was argued that the meaning of the lex 
superior principle invariably differs depending on the (ir)reconcilability of overlapping 
norms: should the lower-ranking norm be in breach of the higher-ranking norm, the 
principle of lex superior implies that the ECJ should strike down the incompatible 
provisions. Where overlapping norms accumulate, it was contended that the lex superior 
principle takes on a more systemic character requiring interpretation of the lower-
ranking norm in line with the higher-ranking norm, but not vice versa. 
 
As a testing ground, this Chapter assesses the role played by the lex superior principle in 
ECJ case law concerning sex discrimination. Chapter 1 outlined the extensive 
framework of secondary Union law prohibiting sex discrimination that overlaps, first, 
with Article 157 TFEU – granting the right to ‘equal pay … for the same work or for 
work to which equal value is attributed’ and, secondly, with Article 21(1) CFR 
prohibiting discrimination inter alia on grounds of sex. Using the prohibition on 
discrimination on grounds of sex as a case study here allows for an assessment of the 
ECJ’s approach to the inter-relationship between primary and secondary law since the 
EU’s inception and in relation to both the Treaties and the Charter.1 The Chapter does 
not look to the ECJ’s reasoning and the principles upon which it expressly purports to 
                                               
1 The relationship between Article 18 TFEU and Article 21(2) CFR (as discussed in Chapter 4) essentially 
pre-empts any consideration of the inter-relationship between Article 21(2) CFR and overlapping 
secondary Union law. 
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be relying. The ECJ’s terse reasoning style would make such an exercise futile. Instead, 
this Chapter looks to how – more practically – the ECJ deals with different overlapping 
norms. 
 
Extensive case law analysis shows that ECJ practice, when faced with an overlap 
between Article 157 TFEU and secondary Union law, is inconsistent and does not 
always cohere with the principle of lex superior. In most cases, the ECJ relies directly on 
Article 157 TFEU, without acknowledging the overlapping secondary law, with 
potentially serious constitutional consequences for legal certainty and institutional 
balance. The ECJ adopts a different approach to the inter-relationship between Article 
21(1) CFR and secondary Union law; still consistent with the lex superior principle, the 
ECJ – where possible – relies directly on secondary law. Comparatively, this approach 
makes the outcome of cases more predictable and is more in line with the obligation of 
cooperation between institutions. 
 
The Chapter starts in Section 2 by setting out how the ECJ resolves overlaps between 
the Treaty and secondary Union law. Section 3 then turns to analyse the ECJ’s approach 
to overlaps between the Charter and secondary Union law. 
 
2. OVERLAPS BETWEEN THE TREATIES AND SECONDARY UNION 
LAW 
2.1. Case Study: Article 157 TFEU and Overlapping Secondary Union Law 
Attention now turns to ECJ practice when faced with an overlap between Article 157 
TFEU and secondary Union law and assesses the role played by the lex superior principle 
in mediating the inter-relationship between norms. Before considering the ECJ’s 
approach in more detail, let us set out the key legal premises of the case study. As the 
law stands, Article 157 TFEU on equal pay between men and women overlaps with 
Directive 2006/54.2 The present formulation of the equal pay principle in both the 
Treaty and in secondary law is the result of a Treaty amendment at Amsterdam and the 
recast of several directives relating to sex discrimination including Directive 75/1173 on 
                                               
2 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters 
of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L 204/23. 
3 Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
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equal pay between men and women and Directive 86/3784 on equal treatment between 
men and women in the field of occupational social security. 
 
Under the current law, there are very few divergences between the principle of equal pay 
in the Treaties and overlapping secondary Union law. Article 157(1) TFEU (as 
expressed in the Lisbon Treaty) requires that ‘[e]ach Member State shall ensure that the 
principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal 
value is applied’. Closely mirroring Article 157(1) TFEU, Article 4 of Directive 2006/54 
specifies that ‘[f]or the same work or for work to which equal value is attributed, direct 
and indirect discrimination on grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions 
of remuneration shall be eliminated’. Article 157 TFEU and Directive 2006/54 both 
apply to workers,5 which the ECJ defines as those ‘who, for a certain period of time, 
performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he 
receives remuneration’.6 ‘Pay’ in Article 157(1) TFEU and ‘remuneration’ as employed 
by the Directive7 have the same meaning i.e. ‘the ordinary basic or minimum wage or 
salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker 
receives directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment, from his employer.’8 This is 
a broad definition and encompasses occupational social security benefits that are, 
somewhat confusingly (and reflecting initial misunderstandings over their classification), 
                                               
States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women [1975] OJ L45/19. 
4 Council Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes [1986] OJ L 225/40. Later 
amended by Council Directive 96/97 amending Directive 86/378 on the implementation of the principle 
of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes [1997] OJ L14/13. 
5 Directive 75/117, Article 1; Directive 86/378, Article 3; Directive 96/97, Article 3; Directive 2006/54, 
Article 4. 
6 Case C-256/01 Allonby EU:C:2004:18, paras 66-67, borrowing the definition developed in Case 66/85 
Lawrie-Blum EU:C:1986:284, para. 17. 
7 While ‘pay’ and ‘remuneration’ are used in English language versions, Edward and Lane note that the 
‘word “pay” is too narrow a translation of terms used in the original language texts (Entgelt, rémunérations, 
retribuzioni, beloning) and has given rise to much misunderstanding … Even “consideration” in article 
157(2) is shy of the mark, other texts using words (avantages; Vergütungen; voordelen) meaning advantage or 
recompense’, see DAO Edward and RC Lane, Edward and Lane on European Union Law (Edward Elgar 
2013) 868. 
8 Directive 2006/54, Article 2(1)(e). The ECJ has interpreted ‘pay’ broadly to encompass inter alia sick pay 
(Case C-66/96 Høj Pedersen and Others EU:C:1998:549, para. 32),⁠ payments received during maternity leave 
(whether under legislation or contract) (Case C-342/93 Gillespie and Others EU:C:1996:46, para. 14; Case 
C-411/96 Boyle and Others EU:C:1998:506, para. 34),⁠ travel concessions (Case 12/81 Garland 
EU:C:1982:44, para. 9),⁠ bonuses (Case C-333/97 Lewen EU:C:1999:512, para. 21) and redundancy pay 
(Case C-262/88 Barber EU:C:1990:209, para. 14). 
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treated separately by Directive 2006/54;9 Article 5 of that Directive prohibits ‘direct or 
indirect discrimination on grounds of sex in occupational social security schemes’.10  
 
One longstanding divergence between Article 157 TFEU and Directive 2006/54 
concerns their capacity for horizontal direct effect. Directives cannot be invoked in 
disputes between private parties.11 In contrast, consistent case law since the 1976 
decision in Defrenne II maintains that as Article 157 TFEU: 
… is mandatory in nature, the prohibition on discrimination between men and 
women applies not only to the action of public authorities, but also extends to all 
agreements which are intended to regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to 
contracts between individuals.12 
Qualifying the extent of the divergence, the question of horizontal direct effect only 
becomes pertinent if a Member State fails to implement Directive 2006/54 at all or 
implements it incorrectly. As the directives on equal pay explicitly regulate private 
relationships,13 the ECJ is clear that ‘wherever a directive is correctly implemented, its 
effects extend to individuals through the medium of the implementing measures 
adopted by the Member State concerned’.14 
 
The similarities between Article 157 TFEU and Directive 2006/54 are the result of 
several amendments to the Treaty framework and to secondary Union law. As noted in 
Chapter 1, it was not until the Treaty of Amsterdam that Article 157 TFEU required 
                                               
9 See e.g. Case 170/84 Bilka EU:C:1986:204, para. 22; Case C-109/91 Ten Oever EU:C:1993:833, para. 12. 
Specifically excluded from the meaning of pay, though, are ‘social security schemes or benefits, in 
particular retirement pensions, directly governed by legislation without any element of agreement within 
the undertaking or the occupational branch concerned, which are obligatorily applicable to general 
categories of workers’ (Case 80/70 Defrenne I EU:C:1971:55, para. 7). This rules out any overlap between 
Article 157 TFEU and Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security 
[1979] OJ L 6/24. 
10 Article 7 specifies that the Directive applies to ‘occupational social security schemes which provide 
protection against the following risks:(i) sickness, (ii) invalidity, (iii) old age, including early retirement, (iv) 
industrial accidents and occupational diseases, (v) unemployment’ as well as schemes ‘which provide for 
other social benefits, in cash or in kind, and in particular survivors’ benefits and family allowances, if such 
benefits constitute a consideration paid by the employer to the worker by reason of the latter’s 
employment.’ 
11 Case 152/84 Marshall EU:C:1986:84, para. 48; Case C-106/89 Marleasing EU:C:1990:395, para. 6; Case 
C-91/92 Faccini Dori EU:C:1994:292, paras 20-25. Directives can, however, have indirect effects in 
disputes between private parties, e.g. Case C-194/94 CIA Security International EU:C:1996:172; Case C-
443/98 Unilever EU:C:2000:496; Case C-201/02 Wells EU:C:2004:12. 
12 Case 43/75 Defrenne II EU:C:1976:56; para. 39. 
13 Directive 2006/54, Article 23. 
14 Case 8/81 Becker EU:C:1982:7, para. 19. 
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equal pay ‘for equal work or work of equal value’ (emphasis added). The equal pay 
provision in the Treaty of Rome (Article 119 EEC) obliged the Member States to 
‘ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle of equal remuneration 
for equal work as between men and women workers’ (emphasis added). Directive 75/117 
on equal pay first introduced the concept of work of equal value into EU law. That 
Directive thus initially expanded upon the equal pay principle in the Treaty.15 As a result, 
a divergence existed for over two decades between Article 157 TFEU and Directive 
75/117.  
 
Another difference between Article 157 TFEU and Directive 75/117 concerned the 
temporal scope of each provision. Article 157 TFEU tasked the Member States with 
implementing the equal pay principle by 1 January 1962.16 The ECJ in Defrenne II held 
that applicants could not rely on that provision retrospectively,17 i.e. from before the 
decision in Defrenne II (8 April 1976), except where legal proceedings had already 
commenced.18 The deadline for transposing Directive 75/117 fell before the decision in 
Defrenne II: 12 February 1976.19 An applicant could feasibly rely on Directive 75/117 (at 
least in vertical situations) from 12 February even when they could not rely on Article 
157 TFEU until 8 April. 
 
Further divergences (now removed) arose between Article 157 TFEU and Directive 
86/378 on equal treatment in the field of occupational social security. First, Directive 
86/378 purported to limit the temporal scope of the overlapping primary norm by 
allowing Member States until 1 January 1993 to implement equal treatment in 
occupational schemes. The temporal scope of the Directive stood in contrast to the 
                                               
15 Directive 75/117, Article 1 specified that ‘where a job classification system is used for determining pay, 
it must be based on the same criteria for both men and women and so drawn up as to exclude any 
discrimination on grounds of sex.’ Articles 2 and 3, required that Member States abolish any laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions leading to pay inequalities and ‘ensure that provisions appearing 
in collective agree­ments, wage scales, wage agreements or individual contracts of employment which are 
contrary to the principle of equal pay shall be, or may be declared, null and void or may be amended that 
the equal pay principle.’ 
16 Defrenne II (n 12), para. 56. 
17 This was: (1) on account of the ‘possible economic consequences…which undertakings could not have 
foreseen [that] might seriously affect the financial situation of such undertakings and even drive some of 
them to bankruptcy’ (Defrenne II (n 12), paras 69-70) and (2) in light of that fact ‘that, over a prolonged 
period, the parties concerned have been led to continue with practices which were contrary to Article [157 
TFEU], although not yet prohibited under their national law’, see Defrenne II (n 12), para. 72. 
18 Defrenne II (n 12), para. 75. 
19 Directive 75/117, Article 8. 
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ECJ’s decision in Bilka that pre-dated the Directive. In Bilka, the ECJ confirmed that 
‘pay’20 encompasses occupational social security schemes and: 
… is infringed by a department store company which excludes part-time employees 
from its occupational pension scheme, where that exclusion affects a far greater 
number of women than men, unless the undertaking shows that the exclusion is 
based on objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of 
sex.21 
A difference in temporal scope emerged here since Article 157 TFEU could be relied 
upon from the date of the Defrenne II judgment to claim equal treatment in the field of 
occupational social security. 
 
Secondly, a difference (and potential breach of Article 157 TFEU) emerged due to the 
permitted derogations from equal treatment set out in Directive 86/378. Article 9 of the 
Directive allowed Member States to maintain differences concerning: 
(a) determination of pensionable age for the purposes of granting old-age or 
retirement pensions, and the possible implications for other benefits: 
- either until the date on which such equality is achieved in statutory schemes, 
- or, at the latest, until such equality is required by a directive. 
(b) survivors’ pensions until a directive requires the principle of equal treatment in 
statutory social security schemes in that regard. 
Additionally, the Directive allowed for differences in worker contributions to continue 
‘to take account of the different actuarial calculation factors’ for up to thirteen years.22 
These derogations were arguably inconsistent with Article 157 TFEU. It is possible to 
justify indirectly discriminatory measures – i.e. measures which in fact discriminate 
against female workers – under Article 157 TFEU.23 However, to be objectively 
justifiable such measures had to ‘correspond to a real need on the part of the 
undertaking [be] … appropriate with a view to achieving the objectives pursued and … 
necessary to that end’.24 A real danger existed that Directive 86/378 went beyond the 
permissible limits to Article 157 TFEU. The inter-relationship between Directive 
                                               
20 Bilka (n 9), para. 22. 
21 Bilka (n 9), para. 31. 
22 Article 9(c). 
23 Case 96/80 Jenkins EU:C:1981:80, para. 11. 
24 Bilka (n 9), para. 36 
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86/378 and Article 157 TFEU is particularly pertinent here given the potential impact 
on an applicant’s claim to occupational social security benefits. 
 
To recap, before various amendments and changes two major divergences existed 
between Article 157 TFEU and overlapping secondary law. First, Directive 75/117 
appeared to go beyond the requirement of equal pay for equal work set out in the Treaty 
by also granting a right to equal pay for work of equal value. Secondly, Directive 86/378 
permitted Member States to delay the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment in certain areas. Following several amendments to the legal framework and 
the consolidation of Directives 75/117 and 86/378 in Directive 2006/54, the remaining 
divergence concerns capacity for horizontal direct effect. 
 
2.2. Lex Superior  
When norms of differing hierarchical status overlap, Chapter 2 established that the 
principle of lex superior offers a workable solution to questions concerning their inter-
relationship. The following discussion examines more specifically what reliance on the 
lex superior principle would look like in the context of overlaps between Article 157 
TFEU and secondary Union law. 
 
In the context of an overlap between Article 157 TFEU and secondary law it is easy to 
focus attention on Article 157 TFEU as the higher-ranking norm. However, in so doing, 
one can forget that the authority for the overlapping secondary norms is the Treaties. 
The Treaties not only empower the Union legislature to adopt secondary law 
prohibiting sex discrimination (post-Amsterdam Article 157(3) TFEU requires the Union 
legislature to do so), but the principle of institutional balance in Article 13(2) TEU 
requires that the Union legislature retains some discretion. Relying directly on secondary 
Union law should not be thought of as incompatible with the lex superior principle, but as 
fitting with the Treaty framework. Furthermore, as Chapter 2 set out, secondary Union 
law is often the more logical starting point because: (1) secondary Union law will 
normally be more specific and so will offer more concrete guidance in a particular case; 
(2) explicitly starting with secondary Union law better fits the obligation of mutual 
sincere cooperation between institutions; and (3) this approach fits with the idea that 
primary law offers a ‘check’ on the legality of secondary law. A measure of secondary 
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Union law will have its legal basis in the Treaties and the principle of institutional 
balance means that the Union legislature must retain some discretion.  
 
The requirements of the lex superior principle differ depending on the (ir)reconcilability 
of the overlapping norms concerned. As will be recalled from Chapter 2, where 
overlapping norms conflict there is a close relationship between the requirements of the 
lex superior principle and legality review.25 The conclusion reached in Chapter 2 was that, 
in the context of norm conflict, the ECJ should not substitute or replace the outcome 
reached under secondary law unless that secondary law is invalid i.e. where it is 
‘manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective which the competent 
institutions are seeking to pursue’.26 Applied to the case study adopted here, the 
previous Section raised several concerns about the compatibility of Directive 86/378 on 
occupational social security with Article 157 TFEU; first, by purporting to narrow the 
temporal scope of that Treaty provision and, secondly, by permitting several derogations 
from the principle of equal treatment (as regards pensionable age, survivors’ pensions 
and the use of actuarial factors in determining worker contributions). In this context, 
existing approaches to norm inter-relationship suggest that the ECJ should assess the 
compatibility of the time limit and derogations from equal treatment in Directive 
86/378 against the equal pay principle in the Treaty and render unlawful any 
incompatible provision. 
 
This approach prevents the illogical outcome mentioned in Chapter 2 whereby the 
higher-ranking norms always applies even when the overlapping secondary norm is 
compatible with that norm (and the Treaties as a whole). As the previous Section 
highlighted, a conflict initially arose between Directive 75/117 and Article 157 TFEU; 
Directive 75/117 expanded upon the equal pay principle in Article 157 TFEU by adding 
a requirement of ‘equal pay for work of equal value’ and had already entered into force 
                                               
25 Article 263 TFEU empowers the ECJ to ‘review the legality of legislative acts … on grounds of lack of 
competence … infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application’, while 
Article 267 TFEU grants the ECJ the power to rule on the ‘validity and interpretation of acts of the 
institutions’. 
26 Joined Cases C-453/03 and C-11-12, 194/04 ABNA and Others EU:C:2005:741, para. 69. See also, e.g. 
Case C-84/94 UK v Council (Working Time) EU:C:1996:431, para. 58; Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament 
and Council (Deposit guarantee directive) EU:C:1997:231, paras 55-56; Case C-210/03 Swedish Match 
EU:C:2004:802, para. 48; Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 Alliance for Natural Health and Others 
EU:C:2005:449, para. 52; Case C-549/15 E.ON Biofor Sverige EU:C:2017:490, para. 50. 
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by the time of the ECJ’s decision in Defrenne II (i.e. when the ECJ bestowed Article 157 
TFEU with prospective direct effect). Norms conflict when one norm ‘constitutes, has led 
to, or may lead to, a breach of the other’.27 Compliance with Article 157 TFEU, when it 
implies a lesser obligation than the Directive, may lead to a conflict with Directive 
75/117. The principle of lex superior suggests that the higher-ranking norm should 
prevail in the context of norm conflicts and so would permit Member States to rely 
exclusively on Article 157 TFEU. However, as argued in Chapter 2, this does not fit 
with the system of cross-cutting legislative bases under the Treaties that often empower 
the Union legislature to expand upon the basic rights contained therein. As the legality 
of Directive 75/117 is not in question, in theory, the expectation is that the ECJ will not 
resolve this conflict in favour of Article 157 TFEU.  
 
Where the validity of overlapping secondary Union law is not in question, the lex superior 
principle instead offers differing guidance aiming to secure the coherence of the legal 
order.28 Accordingly, secondary Union law should not affect the interpretation of 
overlapping Union primary law.29 When applied to the equal pay context this suggests, 
in particular, that the limitations expressed in the Directives should not be imputed back 
into Article 157 TFEU. It also suggests that Article 157 TFEU should remain applicable 
in situations not covered by overlapping secondary law such as in disputes between 
private parties. Conversely, under the principle of lex superior, the ECJ should interpret 
secondary Union law in line with overlapping primary law. When the meaning of 
secondary Union law is ambiguous, under the lex superior principle the ECJ should opt 
for an interpretation that best fits with the overlapping Treaty provision.30 More 
specifically, in the equal pay context, the ECJ should first assess whether secondary 
Union law (including derogations from the principle of equal treatment) can be 
rendered compatible with the Treaties. Furthermore, it implies that any permitted 
limitations on equal treatment should be interpreted narrowly in line with the 
overlapping Treaty right. 
                                               
27J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International 
Law (CUP 2003) 176 (emphasis in original). 
28 G Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (CUP 2012) 155. 
29 P Syrpis, ‘The Relationship between Primary and Secondary Law in the EU’ (2015) 52(2) CMLRev 461, 
461. 
30 Case C-314/89 Rauh EU:C:1991:143, para. 17; Joined Cases C-402/07 and C-432/07 Sturgeon and Others 
EU:C:2009:716, para. 48. 




In sum, where there is an overlap between the Treaty and secondary Union law, the 
principle of lex superior and the system of judicial review under the Treaties offer a 
workable system for resolving any questions of norm inter-relationship. More 
specifically, in the context of an overlap between Article 157 TFEU and secondary 
Union law existing approaches suggest that: (1) Article 157 TFEU provides a yardstick 
for the validity of the overlapping Directives; (2) where there are no validity concerns, 
the lex superior principle implies that Article 157 TFEU should guide the interpretation 
of overlapping secondary law; (3) existence of secondary law should not affect the 
meaning of Article 157 TFEU or otherwise prevent that provision from applying in 
situations not covered by secondary law. For the reasons outlined above, the ECJ 
should start its analysis with the relevant secondary law norm (Directive 2006/54 on 
equal treatment between men and women or its predecessors – Directives 75/117 and 
76/378), which – in the absence of any validity concerns – should usually be 
determinative.  
 
2.3. Consistent with Lex Superior 
Overlaps between Article 157 TFEU and secondary Union law arose in sixty-nine 
cases.31 Of these cases: (1) fifty-two involved an overlap with Directive 75/117; (2) 
fifteen involved an overlap with Directive 86/378; and (3) one involved an overlap with 
Directive 2006/54. 
 
2.3.1 Relying on the Relevant Directive 
In a minority of cases (six cases, nine per cent) the ECJ commences its analysis with the 
relevant directive.32 In each of these six cases the ECJ relied solely on the relevant 
directive. Four of these cases, each involving an overlap between Article 157 TFEU and 
                                               
31 Overlaps were identified by searching the curia.eu database. Searches were carried out for cases 
involving Article 157 TFEU (and earlier iterations) and for specific directives (i.e. Directive 75/117, 
86/378/ 96/97, 2006/54). Only cases on the right to equal pay and the meaning of this right in practice 
are included in the case law analysed and several cases relating to other aspects of sex equality were 
discarded. Case law is up to date as of 26 July 2018. 
32 Case 61/81 Commission v UK EU:C:1982:258, paras 7-10; Case 143/83 Commission v Denmark 
EU:C:1985:34, para. 14; Case 237/85 Rummler EU:C:1986:277, para. 7; Case 109/88 Handels- og 
Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund EU:C:1989:383, para. 17; Case C-457/98 Commission v Greece EU:C:2000:692; 
Case C-354/16 Kleinsteuber EU:C:2017:539, paras 24, 41. 
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Directive 75/117 on equal pay, concerned aspects of the Directive that added to Article 
157 TFEU. Commission v Denmark concerned the additional requirement (before the 
amendment of Article 157 TFEU) to grant equal pay for work of equal value in 
Directive 75/117.33 Commission v UK, Rummler and Danfoss dealt with the similar issue of 
job classification for determining whether work is of equal value.34  
 
It is worth recapping here that, where overlapping secondary Union law extends beyond 
the equal pay principle in Article 157 TFEU, a conflict arises in a strict sense. Article 
157 TFEU – as originally framed – only required equal pay for the same work; if a 
Member State implemented the requirements of Article 157 TFEU alone, this would 
not satisfy the requirements of Directive 75/117. This is well illustrated by Commission v 
Denmark. Under a Danish law implementing Article 157 TFEU, ‘[e]very person who 
employs men and women to work at the same place of work must pay them the same 
salary for the same work’.35 The Commission argued that the Danish legislation did not 
‘fulfil all the obligations resulting from Directive No 75/117 inasmuch as … it requires 
employers to pay men and women the same salary exclusively for the same work but not 
for work to which equal value is attributed’.36 Concurring with the Commission the ECJ 
held that ‘Denmark has failed to fulfil its obligations under the first paragraph of Article 
1 of Directive No 75/117 by failing … to extend the principle of equal pay to work of 
equal value.’37 Satisfying the higher-ranking norm alone here was not sufficient to 
comply with the requirements of Union law. 
 
ECJ practice in these six cases, coheres with the argument set out above that the 
principle of lex superior is ill-equipped to deal with this situation. The close association 
between the notion of lex superior and conferrals of power, under which a lower-ranking 
norm extending beyond the higher-ranking (and empowering norm) would be invalid, 
does not fit the system of purposive legal bases in the Treaties. In the context of an 
overlap between Article 157 TFEU and Directive 75/117, the legal basis for the 
Directive was what is now Article 114 TFEU on the approximation of laws ‘which have 
                                               
33 Commission v Denmark (n 32), para. 14. 
34 Commission v UK (n 32), para. 8; Rummler (n 32), para. 7; Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund (n 32), 
para. 17. 
35 Commission v Denmark (n 32), para. 4. 
36 Commission v Denmark (n 32), para. 5. 
37 Commission v Denmark (n 32), para. 14. See also Commission v UK (n 32), paras 7-10. 
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as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.’ If one 
interprets the lex superior principle as dictating that all conflicts should be resolved on the 
basis of the higher-ranking norm then this would contradict the legislature’s capacity to 
adopt approximating measures that expand upon overlapping Treaty rights. 
 
2.3.2 Applying the Hierarchically Superior Norm 
In the vast majority of cases involving an overlap between Article 157 TFEU and 
secondary Union law (fifty-eight cases, eighty-four per cent), the ECJ followed a 
different approach. In these cases, the ECJ relied solely on the higher-ranking norm: 
Article 157 TFEU. In thirty-eight of these cases, the ECJ relied on Article 157 TFEU 
and barely mentioned the overlapping Directive.38 In twenty cases, all involving 
Directive 75/117, the ECJ cites the Directive in the operative part alongside Article 157 
TFEU.39 However, in these cases the Directive is essentially subjugated to the Treaty 
provision; the ECJ states that ‘Directive 75/117 is designed essentially to facilitate the 
practical application of the principle of equal pay laid down in Article [157 TFEU] of 
                                               
38 Case 129/79 Macarthys EU:C:1980:103, para. 16; Case 69/80 Lloyds Bank EU:C:1981:63, para. 17; Jenkins 
(n 23), paras 15, 18; Garland (n 8), para. 11; Case 23/83 Liefting EU:C:1984:282, para. 15; Bilka (n 9), para. 
31; Case 192/85 Newstead EU:C:1987:522, para. 21; Case 171/88 Rinner-Kühn EU:C:1989:328, para. 16; 
Case C-33/89 Kowalska EU:C:1990:265, para. 16; Case C-184/89 Nimz EU:C:1991:50, para. 15; Case C-
173/91 Commission v Belgium EU:C:1993:64, para. 22; Case C-127/92 Enderby EU:C:1993:859, para. 19; 
Case C-132/92 Roberts EU:C:1993:868, para. 24; Barber (n 8), para. 20; Ten Oever (n 9), para. 12; Case C-
110/91 Moroni EU:C:1993:926, para. 20; Case C-152/91 Neath EU:C:1993:949, para. 34; Case C-7/93 
Beune EU:C:1994:350, para. 54; Case C-408/92 Avdel Systems EU:C:1994:349, para. 22; Case C-200/91 
Coloroll Pension Trustees EU:C:1994:348, para. 24; Case C-128/93 Fisscher EU:C:1994:353, para. 32; Case C-
28/93 van den Akker EU:C:1994:351, para. 22; Case C-57/93 Vroege EU:C:1994:352, para. 18; Case C-
435/93 Dietz EU:C:1996:395, para. 17; Case C-167/97 Seymour-Smith and Perez EU:C:1999:60, para. 65; 
Case C-218/98 Abdoulaye and Others EU:C:1999:424, para. 22; Case C-50/99 Podesta EU:C:2000:288, para. 
46; Case C-366/99 Griesmar EU:C:2001:648, para. 38; Case C-206/00 Mouflin EU:C:2001:695, para. 31; 
Case C-320/00 Lawrence and Others EU:C:2002:498, para. 39; Joined Cases C-4/02 and C-5/02 Schönheit 
EU:C:2003:583; Allonby (n 6), paras 50, 57, 79, 84; Case C-117/01 K.B. EU:C:2004:7, para, 36; Case C-
147/02 Alabaster EU:C:2004:192, para. 50; Case C-196/02 Nikoloudi EU:C:2005:141, para. 40; Case C-
17/05 Cadman EU:C:2006:633, para. 40; Case C-300/06 Voß EU:C:2007:757, para. 44; Case C-173/13 
Leone and Leone EU:C:2014:2090, para. 98. 
39 Case C-360/90 Bötel EU:C:1992:246, para. 27; Case C-297/93 Grau-Hupka EU:C:1994:406, para. 29; 
Joined Cases C-399/92, C-409/92, C-425/92, C-34/93, C-50/93 and C-78/93 Helmig EU:C:1994:415, 
para. 31; Case C-457/93 Lewark EU:C:1996:33, para. 39; Gillespie and Others (n 8), para. 20; Case C-278/93 
Freers and Speckmann EU:C:1996:83, para. 31; Case C-1/95 Gerster EU:C:1997:452, para. 25; Case C-249/96 
Grant EU:C:1998:63, para. 50; Case C-243/95 Hill and Stapleton EU:C:1998:298, para. 44; Boyle and Others 
(n 8), para. 44; Høj Pedersen and Others (n 8) paras 41, 50; Case C-187/98 Commission v Greece 
EU:C:1999:535, para. 55; Case C-285/02 Elsner-Lakeberg EU:C:2004:320, para. 19; Case C-220/02 
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund EU:C:2004:334, para. 65; Case C-19/02 Hlozek EU:C:2004:779, para. 51; 
Case C-191/03 McKenna EU:C:2005:513, para. 69; Case C-427/11 Kenny and Others EU:C:2013:122, para. 
52; Case C-335/15 Ornano EU:C:2016:564, para. 44. 
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the Treaty and thus that it in no way alters the content or scope of the principle as 
defined in that article’.40 
 
ECJ practice in these cases is consistent with the principle of lex superior interpreted as 
requiring reliance on the hierarchically superior norm. The ECJ’s reasoning in these 
cases relegates the role of overlapping secondary law. In Defrenne II,41 the ECJ 
distinguished between situations where discrimination ‘may be identified solely with the 
aid of the criteria based on equal work and equal pay referred to by the [Treaty]’ and 
situations where discrimination ‘can only be identified by reference to more explicit 
implementing provisions’.42 In so doing, the ECJ suggested that secondary Union law is 
unnecessary where: 
… the court is in a position to establish all the facts which enable it to decide 
whether a woman worker is receiving lower pay than a male worker performing the 
same tasks … In such situation, at least, Article [157 TFEU] is directly applicable 
and may thus give rise to individual rights which the courts must protect.43 
The implication is that only outside this ‘legally perfect core’44 does secondary Union 
law become relevant.  
 
The ECJ cites Defrenne II in later case law to support its conclusion that there is no need 
analyse the overlapping directives. In Macarthys, for example, the ECJ held that as the 
dispute ‘may be decided within the framework of an interpretation of Article [157 
TFEU] alone … it is unnecessary to answer the questions submitted in so far as they 
relate to the effect and to the interpretation of Directive No 75/117.’45 In those cases 
where the ECJ decides that it can rely directly on Article 157 TFEU, the ECJ is clear 
                                               
40 Helmig (n 39), para. 19; Høj Pedersen and Others (n 8), para. 29. 
41 Defrenne II (n 12). 
42 Defrenne II (n 12), para. 18. The ECJ initially drew a distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ 
discrimination here, which misleadingly suggested that Article 157 TFEU did not apply to indirect 
discrimination i.e. differentiation ostensibly based on factors not related to sex that disproportionately 
affects women (see e.g. the concerns raised in Case 69/80 Lloyds Bank EU:C:1980:290, [1981] ECR 767, 
Opinion of AG Warner, 803). The ECJ later reformulated the principle to remove the reference to 
indirect discrimination and held instead that Article 157 TFEU ‘applies directly to all forms of 
discrimination which may be identified solely with the aid of the criteria of equal work and equal pay 
referred to by the article in question, without national or Community measures being required to define 
them with greater precision in order to permit of their application’ (Lloyds Bank (n 40), para. 23). 
43 Defrenne II (n 12), paras 23-24. 
44 JH Jans, ‘The Effect in National Legal Systems of the Prohibition of Discrimination on Grounds of 
Age as a General Principle of Community Law’ (2007) 34(1) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 53, 59. 
45 Macarthys (n 38), para. 17. 
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that there is ‘no need’ to consider Directive 75/11746 and as the Directive ‘is principally 
designed to facilitate the practical application of the principle of equal pay outlined in 
Article [157 TFEU]’ it ‘in no way alters the content or scope of that principle as defined 
in the Treaty’.47 If the ECJ does interpret the relationship between Article 157 TFEU 
and overlapping secondary law to mean that secondary law only applies where more 
specific implementing measures are necessary, it is unclear when the ECJ understands 
that this would be the case. Although in the six cases outlined above the ECJ relies on 
Directive 75/117 when it expands upon the overlapping Treaty right, the ECJ adopts 
the opposite approach in several cases discussed below. 
 
Other explanations for the ECJ’s reliance on the hierarchically superior norm (aside 
from complying with the lex superior principle) focus on the effectiveness of EU law. De 
Witte suggests that the decision in Defrenne II ‘may well have been inspired by the will to 
react to the political inertia of the Council which was unable, in those years, to 
implement the integration programme formulated by the Treaty.’48 Similarly, Spaventa 
argues that the ECJ ‘might have been motivated by the dual desire of maximising the 
rights of individual claimants … and of maximising the effectiveness of Union law, so as 
to further reduce the scope for Member State’s mis-or non-implementation of’49 the 
equal pay principle. Indeed, the ECJ in Defrenne II remarked on the Commission’s failure 
to initiate infringement proceedings as ‘likely to consolidate the incorrect impression as 
to the effects of Article [157 TFEU]’⁠.50 This explanation does not, however, justify the 
ECJ’s continued reliance directly on Article 157 TFEU in more recent years. 
 
To assess why the ECJ might adopt this approach to norm inter-relationship, discussion 
now turns to assess the implications of relying directly on the higher-ranking norm 
instead of the relevant directive. Although both approaches are compatible with the lex 
                                               
46 Garland (n 8), para. 12 
47 Jenkins (n 23), para. 22. See also Newstead (n 38), para. 20. 
48 B de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Primacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), 
The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 323-362, 330. 
49 E Spaventa, ‘The Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights as General Principles of Union Law’ 
in A Arnull and others (eds), A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU law in honour of Alan Dashwood 
(Hart 2011) 199-218, 216. 
50 Defrenne II (n 12), para. 39. See also, S Van den Bogaert, ‘Horizontality’ in C Barnard and J Scott (eds), 
The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Bloomsbury 2002) 123-152, 138. 
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superior principle, considerable constitutional weight attaches to whether the ECJ 
grounds its decision in Article 157 TFEU or in overlapping secondary law.  
 
2.3.3 Overlapping Secondary Law that Complies with Article 157 TFEU 
The repercussions differ depending on the situation and whether the validity of the 
overlapping secondary law is in question. Due to the similarities between Article 157 
TFEU and overlapping secondary law, relying directly on Article 157 TFEU will not 
always alter the outcome of the case. The ECJ recognised this point in several cases 
concerning the meaning of ‘pay’ under Article 157 TFEU (the meaning of which is the 
same under both Article 157 TFEU and Directive 75/117); according to the ECJ, 
Directive 75/117 is ‘purposeless’51 when interpretation of Article 157 TFEU reaches the 
same conclusion. Similarly, in Jenkins the ECJ dismissed consideration of Directive 
75/117 as unnecessary since that Directive only aimed to ‘implement’ and ‘restate’ the 
principle of equal pay in Article 157 TFEU.52 As the case concerned the meaning of 
discrimination,53 which is common to Directive 75/117 and Article 157 TFEU, the 
ECJ’s approach probably did not alter the result. 
 
There are, however, less tangible implications of the ECJ’s approach here. By relying 
directly on the Treaty, the ECJ takes on a law-making role since the interpretation of 
Article 157 TFEU ‘cannot, therefore, subsequently be put into question by adopting 
new legislative rules.’54 As Davies notes ‘[i]t would seem that only Treaty change can 
undo such constitutionally entrenched interpretations, and targeted Treaty change to 
address a specific policy concern is of course an extremely high political hurdle.’55 By 
relying directly on Article 157 TFEU the ECJ essentially entrenches its interpretation of 
Article 157 TFEU and diminishes the freedom of the Union legislature to reframe the 
equal pay principle. In the same way, relying directly on Article 157 TFEU impacts on 
the balance of powers between the EU and the Member States. By grounding its 
                                               
51 Lloyds Bank (n 38), para. 20. See also Garland (n 8), para. 12; Newstead (n 38), para. 20. 
52 Jenkins (n 23), paras 19-20 
53 The referring court asked whether paying part-time workers (who were mostly female) less than full-
time workers amounted to indirect discrimination. 
54 R Dehousse, The European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial Integration (Macmillan 1998) 81. 
55 G Davies, ‘Legislative Control of the European Court of Justice’ (2014) 51(6) CMLRev 1579, 1582. 
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interpretations directly in the Treaty, any attempt to alter or limit the ECJ’s 
interpretation will require a Treaty, not just legislative, amendment.56 
 
In other situations, moreover, relying directly on Article 157 TFEU does alter the 
outcome. In Neath and Coloroll, the ECJ relied directly on Article 157 TFEU despite that 
Treaty norm offering lesser protection than the overlapping Directive. Both cases 
concerned defined benefit pension schemes57 under which employer contributions differed 
for men and women according to actuarial factors.58 Additionally, actuarial factors based 
on sex were relied upon: (1) to alter the pension due following early retirement;59 (2) to 
determine the amount of a pension that can be drawn down as a lump sum;60 (3) to 
determine the transfer value of the pension;61 and (4) when converting an old-age 
pension into a survivors pension.62 The ECJ was asked, inter alia, to determine whether 
this amounted to discrimination on grounds of sex.  
 
Directive 86/378 allowed the continued use of actuarial factors in occupational 
pensions but only for defined contribution schemes (and not the defined benefit schemes in 
question in Neath and Coloroll). According to Article 6(1) of the Directive:  
Provisions contrary to the principle of equal treatment shall include those based on 
sex, either directly or indirectly … for … 
(h) setting different levels of benefit, except insofar as may be necessary to take 
account of actuarial calculation factors which differ according to sex in the case of 
benefits designated as contribution-defined; 
(i) setting different levels of worker contribution;  
setting different levels of employer contribution in the case of benefits designated as 
contribution-defined [i.e. money-purchase schemes], except with a view to making the 
amount of those benefits more nearly equal.63 
Similarly, Article 9 of Directive 86/378 allowed ‘Member States [to] defer compulsory 
application of the principle of equal treatment with regard to [setting different levels of 
                                               
56 For an attempt to reverse the ECJ’s interpretation of Article 157 TFEU, see the discussion below in 
relation to the Barber decision. 
57 Neath (n 38), para. 19; Coloroll Pension Trustees (n 38), para. 4. 
58 Neath (n 38), para. 22; Coloroll Pension Trustees (n 38), para. 10. 
59 Coloroll Pension Trustees (n 38), para. 5. 
60 Neath (n 38), para. 7; Coloroll Pension Trustees (n 38), para. 6. 
61 Neath (n 38), para. 7; Coloroll Pension Trustees (n 38), para. 6. 
62 Coloroll Pension Trustees (n 38), para. 6. 
63 Emphasis added. 
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worker contribution] to take account of the different actuarial calculation factors, at the 
latest until the expiry of a thirteen year period’. By 1 January 1993 (and by the time of 
the judgments) Directive 86/378 prohibited the use of actuarial factors to determine 
employer contributions to defined-benefit pension schemes. The Directive only included 
exceptions with regard to employee contributions and defined-contribution schemes. 
 
When deciding whether the different levels of employer contributions for men and 
women amounted to discrimination based on sex in Neath and Coloroll, the ECJ relied 
solely on Article 157 TFEU. It did not engage with the provisions of the Directive 
prohibiting differing employer contributions nor did it strike down this aspect of the 
Directive. Instead, the ECJ in Neath held that the ‘inequality of employers’ contributions 
paid under funded defined-benefit schemes, which is due to the use of actuarial factors 
differing according to sex, is not struck at by Article [157 TFEU].’64 According to the 
ECJ ‘[t]hat conclusion necessarily extends to the specific aspects referred to in the 
questions submitted, namely the conversion of part of the periodic pension into a 
capital sum and the transfer of pension rights’.65 The ECJ thereby interpreted Article 
157 TFEU as offering lesser protection from discrimination in relation to employer 
contributions than the overlapping Directive66 and did not consider whether the 
Directive could still apply. 
 
This approach negatively impacts upon the principle of institutional balance as set out in 
Article 13(2) TEU. According to that provision, ‘[e]ach institution shall act within the 
limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the 
procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them.’ The ECJ further specifies that to 
comply with the principle of institutional balance ‘each of the institutions must exercise 
its powers with due regard for the powers of the other institutions.’67 The Treaties 
                                               
64 Neath (n 38), para. 32. 
65 Neath (n 38), para. 33. 
66 The ECJ did, however, interpret Article 157 TFEU as prohibiting the use of actuarial factors to 
determine employee contributions, see Neath (n 38), para. 31; Coloroll Pension Trustees (n 38), para. 80. This 
aspect of the decisions essentially invalidated several derogations of Directive 86/378 that were not at 
issue in either case (a point the ECJ in Neath, where it held that ‘The amount of those contributions must 
therefore be the same for all employees, male and female, which is indeed so in the present case’ (Neath (n 
38), para. 31)). The discussion below returns to the ECJ’s direct reliance on Article 157 TFEU instead of 
striking down overlapping secondary law. 
67 Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council (Chernobyl) EU:C:1990:217, para. 22. 
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allocate to the ECJ the responsibility of ensuring that the law is observed in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties,68 not of legislating. In the context of an 
overlap between Article 157 TFEU and secondary Union law, there is inevitably some 
coincidence between the ECJ’s role in interpreting the Treaties and task of the Union 
legislature (post-Amsterdam) to further the aim of equal treatment. However, when 
interpreting Article 157 TFEU and its relationship to overlapping secondary law, the 
ECJ ‘cannot deprive the … [Union legislature] of a prerogative granted to them by the 
Treaties themselves.’69 
 
The ECJ approach to norm overlap in Neath and Coloroll replaces a choice of the Union 
legislature on when to permit the continued use of actuarial factors with the Courts’ 
own determination of that question. The Commission’s draft proposal for Directive 
86/378 prohibited use of actuarial factors to set differing contribution rates and 
benefits.70 The Economic and Social Committee specifically picked up this point in its 
Opinion on the Commission’s proposal and argued for an exception allowing the use of 
actuarial factors to determine employee contributions.71 Ignoring these prior 
discussions, the ECJ essentially overruled this aspect of the Directive and pre-
determined the content of future directives on occupational social security. This is clear 
from the wording of Directive 96/97, the Preamble of which explicitly refers to the 
ECJ’s decisions in Neath and Coloroll. The amendments made to Article 6 of Directive 
86/378 by Directive 96/97 mimic the language used by the ECJ in Neath and Coloroll. 
For example, Article 6(h) now also includes a prohibition on different levels of benefit 
except regarding certain elements of defined-benefit schemes, specifically ‘conversion 
into a capital sum of part of a periodic pension , transfer of pension rights, a 
reversionary pension payable to a dependant in return for the surrender of part of a 
pension, a reduced pension where the worker opts to take early retirement.’72 By relying 
                                               
68 Article 19 TEU. 
69 Case 149/85 Wybot EU:C:1986:310, para. 23. 
70 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes’ COM(83) 217 final, 8. 
71 European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security 
schemes’ [1984] OJ C 35/7, 9. 
72 See also Article 6(i), which allows different levels for employers’ contributions ‘in the case of defined-
contribution schemes if the aim is to equalize the amount of the final benefits or to make them more 
nearly equal for both sexes’ and ‘in the case of funded defined-benefit schemes where the employer’s 
contributions are intended to ensure the adequacy of the funds necessary to cover the cost of the benefits 
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directly on Article 157 TFEU and imbuing that Treaty norm with a different meaning 
than overlapping secondary law – but without pronouncing on the invalidity of that 
secondary law – the ECJ encroaches on the prerogatives of the Union legislature to 
determine how to implement the equal pay principle in the field of occupational social 
security. 
 
Overturning the legislature’s choices is especially problematic here because occupational 
social security is a complex and technical area. Curtin explains that it had ‘been 
consistently argued over the years that highly complex problems such as the different 
life expectancies of men and women, different retirement ages, putative pensionable 
service during maternity leave etc. all militated against direct effect being ascribed to 
Article [157 TFEU] in the pensions sphere in the absence of implementing legislation.’73 
The Union legislature is able to consult with a wider range of stakeholders when 
adopting directives and so, from the perspective of institutional competence, the ECJ 
ought to at least engage with their decisions. As Davies notes what is missed is an 
appreciation of how: 
… the interpretation of the Treaty is a complex matter, involving abstract reasoning, 
politically-laden choices, and an awareness of policy consequences. The Court may 
have the last word on that interpretation, but it should accept that it does not have 
exclusive expertise over all these matters, so that the views of the legislature are not 
just to be absorbed within its vision, but are also to contribute to that vision.74 
Instead, by relying directly on Article 157 TFEU the ECJ avoids the views of the 
legislature entirely. 
 
A further negative implication of the ECJ’s approach here is the impact on legal 
certainty. When compared with ECJ case law discussed below (when the ECJ 
reinterprets Article 157 TFEU in light of secondary Union law) the ECJ does not 
explain why it adopts a different approach here. In Neath and Coloroll, the ECJ interprets 
the Treaty as narrower than overlapping secondary Union law. Yet, as will be discussed 
below, in several cases the ECJ interprets the Treaty broadly in light of secondary law. 
What leads to these distinct approaches is unclear. Furthermore, the ECJ’s failure to 
                                               
defined’ as was the case in Neath and Coloroll. 
73 D Curtin, ‘Scalping the Community Legislator: Occupational Pensions and “Barber”‘ (1990) 27(3) 
CMLRev 475, 484. See further Lloyds Bank. Opinion of AG Warner (n 42) 805-6. 
74 Davies (n 55) 1606. 
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engage with overlapping secondary law in Neath and Coloroll leaves the status of the 
overlapping Directive unclear. As noted above, Article 157 TFEU does not prohibit 
different employer contributions; but the Directive did and the ECJ does not clarify 
whether the use of actuarial factors is contrary to Union law. Until the Union legislature 
adopted Directive 96/97, amending Directive 86/378, it was unclear whether Directive 
86/378 still prohibited differences in employer contributions. 
 
Alongside these negative constitutional implications, it is difficult to see the comparative 
advantage to relying directly on the relevant directive. From the perspective of 
fundamental rights, the lex superior principle does not prevent the ECJ from having 
recourse to Article 157 TFEU in situations where it might offer greater protection from 
discrimination such as in disputes between private parties. For example, relying on 
secondary law as a starting point does not preclude the application of Article 157 TFEU 
in horizontal cases should a Member State fail to implement an overlapping Directive 
(correctly).75 Indeed, as discussed further below, the ECJ adopts this approach where 
Article 21(1) CFR overlaps with secondary Union law. One might criticise the decision 
of ECJ to grant Article 157 TFEU horizontal direct effect,76 but this is a distinct 
question from the inter-relationship between Article 157 TFEU and overlapping 
directives. 
 
2.3.4 Overlaps Raising Validity Concerns 
The repercussions differ when the validity of secondary Union law is called into 
question. As will be recalled from Section 2.2, two aspects of Directive 86/378 
potentially breached the right to equal pay laid down in Article 157 TFEU.77 First, 
                                               
75 There are several cases involving the incorrect implementation of the relevant sex discrimination 
directive by a Member State, see e.g. Bilka (n 9); Helmig (n 39); Alabaster (n 38); Nikoloudi (n 38). 
76 Oliver and Roth argue that ‘Defrenne II seems to go too far: instead of applying Article [157 TFEU] 
horizontally, it would have been more appropriate to rely on the obligation of the Member States to 
enforce in their national law the tenets set forth in Article 141’, see P Oliver and WH Roth, ‘The Internal 
Market and the Four Freedoms’ (2004) 41(2) CMLRev 407, 428). There is extensive literature on the 
horizontal direct effect of primary law, see e.g. D Wyatt, ‘Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Freedoms 
and the Right to Equality after Viking and Mangold, and the Implications for Community Competence’ 
(2008) 4 CYELP 1; MT Karayigit, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the Free Movement Provisions’ (2011) 18(3) 
MJ 303; C Krenn, ‘A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Effect Jigsaw: Horizontal Direct Effect and the Free 
Movement of Goods’ (2012) 49(1) CMLRev 177. 
77 For a detailed breakdown of the different aspects of Directive 86/378 that potentially breach Article 
157 TFEU, see Curtin (n 73). 
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Article 9 of the Directive permitted Member States to maintain differential treatment in 
relation to:  
(a) determination of pensionable age for the purposes of granting old-age or 
retirement pensions, and the possible implications for other benefits: … 
(b) survivors’ pensions … 
(c) [setting different levels of worker contribution] to take account of the different 
actuarial calculation factors, at the latest until [30 July 1999]. 
In contrast, Article 157 TFEU only permits indirect discrimination where there is an 
objective justification. Secondly, the Directive allowed Member States to delay 
implementing the principle of equal treatment until 1 January 1993. This temporal 
limitation appeared at odds with the ECJ’s decision in Bilka that women could claim 
equal access to occupational social security schemes from the date of the Defrenne II 
decision (i.e. 1976).78 
 
Barber exemplifies the ECJ’s approach to norm inter-relationship when faced with a 
potential breach of Article 157 TFEU by overlapping secondary Union law. The case 
concerned Mr Barber’s eligibility for early retirement. The normal pensionable age under 
his employer’s pension scheme was sixty-two for men and fifty-two for women79 and, in 
the event of redundancy, members of the scheme could claim early retirement at fifty-
five for men or fifty for women.80 Mr Barber challenged the scheme for violating the 
principle of equal pay for equal work since a woman his age (fifty-two) could claim an 
immediate pension of greater value than his severance payment. The case thus called 
into question: (1) the transposition period for implementing Directive 86/378 and (2) 
the derogation in Article 9(a) allowing Member States to maintain differences in 
pensionable age. 
 
The ECJ began by ruling that Article 157 TFEU applies to eligibility criteria for 
compulsory redundancy.81 Concerning whether the age differential in question 
amounted to discrimination, the ECJ held that: 
                                               
78 Bilka (n 9), para. 31. 
79 Barber (n 8), para. 4. 
80 Barber (n 8), para. 5. 
81 Barber (n 8), para. 11. 
Chapter 3 – Overlaps between Primary and Secondary Union Law 
 
 114 
Article [157 TFEU] prohibits any discrimination with regard to pay as between men 
and women, whatever the system which gives rise to such inequality. Accordingly, it 
is contrary to Article [157 TFEU] to impose an age condition which differs 
according to sex in respect of pensions paid under a contracted-out scheme, even if 
the difference between the pensionable age for men and that for women is based on 
the one provided for by the national statutory scheme.82 
As a result, Mr Barber could rely directly on Article 157 TFEU against his employer 
during the transposition period for Directive 86/378 when that Directive appeared to 
condone differences in pensionable age. 
 
The ECJ did acknowledge the different temporal scope of Directive 86/378, but again 
did not strike down that aspect of the Directive. The ECJ held that ‘[i]n the light of [the 
exception regarding pensionable age in Article 9(a) of Directive 86/37883], the Member 
States and the parties concerned were reasonably entitled to consider that Article [157 
TFEU] did not apply to pensions paid under contracted-out schemes and that 
derogations from the principle of equality been men and women were still permitted in 
that sphere.’84 Given these circumstances, ‘overriding considerations of legal certainty 
preclude legal situations which have exhausted all their effects in the past from being 
called in question where that might upset retroactively the financial balance of many 
contracted-out pension schemes.’85 The ECJ thereby restricted the possibility of relying 
on Article 157 TFEU retrospectively except for ‘individuals who have taken action in 
good time in order to safeguard their rights’.86 
 
The ECJ mimicked its approach in Barber in several later cases. When faced asked again 
about the effect of the derogations in Article 9 of the Directive, the ECJ relied directly 
on Article 157 TFEU. In Ten Oever, for example, the referring court asked whether 
survivors’ pensions amounted to ‘pay’ under Article 157 TFEU.87 In answering the 
question referred, the ECJ did not discuss the validity of Article 9(b) of Directive 
86/378 permitting Member States to delay implementation of the principle of equal 
                                               
82 Barber (n 8), para. 32. 
83 Barber (n 8), para. 42. 
84 Barber (n 8), para. 43. 
85 Barber (n 8), para. 44. 
86 Barber (n 8), para. 44. The Member States codified the discussion on temporal scope in Barber in 
Protocol No 2 to the Maastricht Treaty. According to the Protocol: ‘For the purposes of Article [157] of 
this Treaty, benefits under occupational social security schemes shall not be considered as remuneration 
if, and in so far as they are attributable to periods of employment prior to 17 May 1990’. 
87 Ten Oever (n 9), para. 7. 
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treatment with regard to survivors’ pensions. The ECJ instead simply held that ‘the 
survivor’s pension in question falls within the scope of Article [157 TFEU].’88  
 
Similarly, when asked about the effects of Article 8 of Directive 86/378 allowing 
Member States until 1 January 1993 to implement the principle of equal treatment, the 
ECJ did not engage with the validity of that provision. When responding to questions 
over the effects of Article 8 in Moroni, the ECJ held that 
Since with the aid of the constitutive elements of the pay in question and of the 
criteria laid down in Article [157 TFEU] discrimination may be directly identified as 
arising from the setting of different retirement ages for men and women in the 
matter of company pensions, the effects of the directive do not matter, for its 
provisions cannot in any way restrict the scope of Article [157 TFEU].89 
Contrary to what might be expected, the ECJ does not start by examining the 
compatibility of Directive 86/378 with Article 157 TFEU. Instead, the ECJ relies 
directly on the hierarchically superior norm. 
 
The upshot of each of these cases is that they essentially overruled the derogations in 
Directive 86/378 – but without saying so.90 What is problematic is not that the ECJ 
invalidated the derogation in Directive 86/378; that Article 157 TFEU conditions the 
legality of overlapping secondary law follows from the hierarchy of norms. The 
difficulty is that, the ECJ does not even engage with Directive 86/378, which appears 
contrary to the requirement that institutions ‘practice mutual sincere cooperation’ set 
out in the second sentence of Article 13(2) TEU. Horsley argues that the notion of 
mutual sincere cooperation ‘obliges the Court to engage in a more constructive process 
of inter-institutional policymaking with the Union legislature’91 and ‘places key limits on 
the Court’s freedom to adjust, supplement or simply ignore the Union legislature’s 
                                               
88 Ten Oever (n 9), para. 12. See also Avdel Systems (n 38), para. 11; van den Akker (n 38), para. 12. 
89 Moroni (n 38), para. 24. See also Beune (n 38), paras 63-65; Fisscher (n 38), paras 26-27; Vroege (n 38), 
paras 29-30; Dietz (n 38), paras 20-21. 
90 This has been recognised in the literature. Deakin describes the decision as ‘apparently overriding 
derogations contained in [Directive 86/378]’, see S Deakin, ‘Equality in Pensions Law – The Limits of 
Barber’ (1994) 53(02) CLJ 236, 237. Similarly, Curtin states that, ‘[t]he major significance however lies in 
the Court’s sotto voce indication that the exception contained in Article 9 of the Directive concerning the 
deferral of the implementation of the principle of equal treatment with regard to the determination of 
pensionable age, was contrary to the directly effective terms of Article 119’, see Curtin (n 73) 476. 
91 T Horsley, ‘Reflections on the Role of the Court of Justice as the “Motor” of European Integration: 
Legal Limits to Judicial Lawmaking’ (2013) 50(4) CMLRev 931, 933. 
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policy choices regarding the scope of EU law.’92 In the cases considered above, the ECJ 
does not explain whether the overlapping Directive is contrary to Article 157 TFEU or 
even examine whether it is invalid.93 In failing to do so, the ECJ essentially limits the 
power of the Union legislature to permit derogations from the equal pay principle and 
leaves the Union legislature with little guidance as to what will breach Article 157 
TFEU. 
 
2.4. Inconsistent with Lex Superior: Reinterpreting the Hierarchically Superior 
Norm 
In four cases (six per cent), the ECJ reinterpreted Article 157 TFEU in line with the 
overlapping secondary law. Each of these four cases again concerned the expansion of 
the equal pay principle by Directive 75/117 to encompass a right to equal pay for work 
of equal value. Yet, in these cases the ECJ interpreted Article 157 TFEU as 
encompassing the principle of equal pay for work of equal value. In JämO, for instance, 
the ECJ held that: 
It should be recalled at the outset that Article [157 TFEU] lays down the principle 
that men and women should receive equal pay for the same work or for work 
deemed to be of equal value. Thus, the same work or work deemed to be of equal 
value must be remunerated in the same way whether it is performed by a man or a 
woman.94 
Denying that the overlapping Directive had influenced the interpretation of Article 157 
TFEU, the ECJ held that ‘Article 1 of Directive 75/117, which is essentially designed to 
facilitate the practical application of the principle of equal pay outlined in Article [157 
TFEU], in no way alters the scope or content of that principle as defined in Article [157 
TFEU].’95 Similarly in Brunnhofer, the ECJ refers to how ‘the fundamental principle laid 
down in Article 119 of the Treaty and elaborated by the Directive precludes unequal pay as 
between men and women for the same job or work of equal value’.96 The effect is to 
                                               
92 Horsley (n 91) 948. 
93 Admittedly, in none of the cases above did the referring court raise the validity of the Directive. 
However, the ECJ can raise the point of its own accord, see e.g. Case 16/65 Schwarze EU:C:1965:117, 
[1965] ECR 1081, 886; Case 62/76 Strehl EU:C:1977:18, para. 10; Case C-37/89 Weiser EU:C:1990:254, 
paras 17-18; Case C-395/00 Cipriani EU:C:2002:751, para. 54. 
94 Case C-236/98 JämO EU:C:2000:173, para. 36. See also Case 157/86 Murphy EU:C:1988:62, para. 9; 
Case C-400/93 Royal Copenhagen EU:C:1995:155, para. 40; Case C-381/99 Brunnhofer EU:C:2001:358, para. 
30. 
95 JämO (n 94), para. 37 (emphasis added).  
96 Brunnhofer (n 94), para. 30 (emphasis added). 
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reinterpret Article 157 TFEU in light of overlapping secondary law contrary to the 
hierarchy of norms.  
 
The ECJ does not explicitly set out what principle of interpretation it adopts here. 
Significantly, though, the ECJ recasts Directive 75/117 as simply defining Article 157 
TFEU – i.e. spelling out its inherent meaning – rather than adding to it. The ECJ refers 
to Directive 75/117 as ‘facilitating’ and ‘elaborating’ on Article 157 TFEU in these 
cases. This appears somewhat disingenuous following the ECJ’s express recognition in 
Defrenne II that Directive 75/117 ‘implement[s] Article [157] from the point of view of 
extending the narrow criterion of “equal work”‘97 and ‘extend[s] the narrow criterion of 
“equal work” in accordance in particular with the provisions of [the ILO Convention].’98 
The ECJ does not explain this shift in approach or when it will reinterpret primary law 
in light of overlapping secondary law. This point is picked up again below to stress the 




To conclude, the main finding following an extensive analysis of ECJ case law is that – 
when faced with an overlap between Article 157 TFEU and secondary Union law – the 
ECJ adopts differing approaches to the inter-relationship between overlapping norms. 
The ECJ’s case law is mostly compatible with the principle of lex superior; however, as 
the preceding discussion demonstrated, relying solely on the higher-ranking norm can 
have negative repercussions for the balance of powers between the EU and the Member 
States, institutional balance, and legal certainty. In many instances, although not all, the 
underlying motivation seems to be to secure equal pay by grounding decisions in the 
Treaty norm (thereby avoiding the limitations of the overlapping directives while also 
reinterpreting the Treaty broadly in light of those directives). It is submitted, however, 
that the ECJ cannot fix all deficiencies with Union legislation or with Member State 
implementation. 
                                               
97 Defrenne II (n 12), para. 20. 
98 Defrenne II (n 12), para. 20. In 1951, the ILO adopted the Equal Remuneration Convention containing 
the principle of ‘equal remuneration between male and female workers for work of equal value’⁠ ILO 
Convention No 100 on Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value 
(adopted 29 June 1951, entered into force 23 May 1953) 165 UNTS 303, Article 2(1). 




Overall, it is argued that the ECJ should avoid replacing choices of the Union legislature 
with its own interpretation of how the equal pay principle should be implemented. A 
better approach, still compatible with the hierarchy of norms, would be for the ECJ to 
grounds its decision in the relevant directive. Where there are concerns about the 
compatibility of the directive with overlapping primary norms, the ECJ should explicitly 
assess the validity of that norm using its own standard of review. It is perhaps counter-
intuitive, but explicitly reviewing the legality of secondary law should lead to greater 
legal certainty and better respect the principle of institutional balance. Article 157 TFEU 
remains in two ways: first, overlapping secondary law should be interpreted in light of 
that provision; and, secondly, nothing precludes its application in situations not covered 
by overlapping directives. 
 
Discussion now turns to examine how the ECJ approaches the inter-relationship 
between Article 21(1) CFR and overlapping secondary Union law. As will be discussed, 
the ECJ adopts a markedly different approach to the inter-relationship between Article 
21(1) CFR and overlapping secondary norms to how it approaches the inter-relationship 
between Article 157 TFEU and overlapping secondary Union law. As will be argued 
below, the ECJ’s approach to overlaps between the Charter and secondary Union law 
compares favourably.  
 
3. OVERLAPS BETWEEN ARTICLE 21(1) CFR AND SECONDARY 
UNION LAW 
3.1. Case Study: Overlaps between Article 21(1) CFR and Secondary Law 
Article 21(1) CFR prohibits, inter alia, discrimination on grounds of sex. According to 
that provision ‘[a]ny discrimination based on any ground such as sex … shall be 
prohibited.’ This Charter right overlaps with most secondary Union law relating to equal 
treatment between men and women including (in chronological order): 
• Directive 79/7, which aims to secure ‘the progressive implementation … of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security’;99 
                                               
99 Article 1. 
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• Directive 2004/113,100 which aims ‘to lay down a framework for combating 
discrimination based on sex in access to and supply of goods and services’;101 
• Directive 2006/54, which consolidates several earlier directives102 and aims to 
ensure the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation;103 and 
• Directive 2010/41,104 which ‘lays down a framework for putting into effect in 
the Member States the principle of equal treatment between men and women 
engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity, or contributing to the pursuit 
of such an activity’.105 
This sub-Section highlights where protection from sex discrimination under Article 
21(1) CFR differs from that under overlapping directives. 
 
A first divergence emerges due to the sectoral nature of each of the directives i.e. they 
are limited as regards to whom and to what they apply. Directives 2006/54 and 79/7 
prohibit discrimination in the fields of employment and occupation. Both measures 
apply to the ‘working population’ defined broadly to include ‘self-employed persons, 
workers and self-employed persons whose activity is interrupted by illness, accident or 
involuntary unemployment and persons seeking employment’, and to ‘retired or 
invalided workers and self-employed persons’.106 Directive 2006/54 prohibits 
discrimination between men and women as regards as regards pay,107 occupational social 
                                               
100 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ L 373/37. 
101 Article 1. 
102 Recital 1 of the preamble states that the Directive ‘recasts by bringing together in a single text the main 
provisions of’: Directive 75/117; Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L 39/40; Directive 86/378 as 
amended by Directive 96/97; Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof 
in cases of discrimination based on sex [1998] OJ L 14/6. 
103 Article 1. 
104 Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the 
application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-
employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC [2010] OJ L 180/1. That Directive 
replaces Council Directive 86/613/EEC of 11 December 1986 on the application of the principle of 
equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a self-employed 
capacity, and on the protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood [1986] OJ 
L359/56. 
105 Article 1(1). 
106 Directive 79/7, Article 2. Directive 2006/54, Article 6 is almost identical. 
107 Article 4. 
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security schemes108 and access to employment, vocational training, promotion and 
working conditions.109 Statutory social security schemes are covered by Directive 79/7, 
which prohibits discrimination as regards the conditions of access to social security 
schemes, the level of contributions and the calculation of benefits.110 
 
Special provisions concerning self-employed work (traditionally, although not limited to, 
farming) are set out in Directive 2010/41. This Directive prohibits discrimination ‘on 
grounds of sex in the public or private sectors, either directly or indirectly, for instance 
in relation to the establishment, equipment or extension of a business or the launching 
or extension of any other form of self-employed activity’.111 The protections of the 
Directive extend to ‘self-employed workers’ and ‘the spouses [or life-partners] of self-
employed workers… where they habitually, under the conditions laid down by national 
law, participate in the activities of the self-employed worker and perform the same tasks 
or ancillary tasks.’112 
 
Directive 2004/113 broadens the scope of the prohibition on sex discrimination to 
situations falling outside of employment and occupation. The Directive prohibits 
discrimination based on sex113 by ‘all persons who provide goods and services, which are 
available to the public irrespective of the person concerned as regards both the public 
and private sectors, including public bodies, and which are offered outside the area of 
private and family life’.114 Specifically excluded, however, are ‘the content of media and 
advertising [and] education’.115 
 
Contrasting with the sectoral coverage of each directive, the applicability of the Charter 
is somewhat broader. In terms of to whom the Charter applies, Kilpatrick describes the 
personal scope of Article 21(1) CFR as ‘exceptionally broad’ and as potentially 
encompassing ‘[a]ll persons within the EU suffering any form of status 
                                               
108 Article 5. 
109 Article 14. 
110 Article 4. 
111 Article 4(1). 
112 Article 2. 
113 Article 4(1), 
114 Article 3(1). 
115 Article 3(3). 
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discrimination’.116 In a similar vein, Article 21(1) CFR is not restricted to a particular 
field. The application of the Charter is instead limited by Article 51(1) CFR under 
which, to trigger the application of the Charter, a Member State must be ‘implementing 
Union law’. Some uncertainty still surrounds what encompasses the meaning of 
‘implementing’ Union law.117 However, the ECJ has interpreted Article 51(1) CFR as 
meaning that ‘applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.’118 Potentially, then, the Charter could 
apply to persons and situations falling outside the scope of overlapping directives (e.g. 
to education) so long as another provision of EU law is applicable. 
 
A second divergence emerges concerning the permissibility of limits on equal treatment. 
Each directive allows for certain limitations on or derogations from the principle of 
non-discrimination. Across each of the directives, an indirectly discriminatory119 measure 
may be ‘objectively justified by a legitimate aim, [if] the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary’.120 Additionally, discrete derogations exist in individual 
directives: 
• Directive 79/7 allows Member States to maintain differential treatment with 
regard to pensionable age, pension benefits for those who have brought up 
children, survivors benefits and the consequences of contracting out;121  
• Directive 2004/113 allows for ‘differences in treatment, if the provision of the 
goods and services exclusively or primarily to members of one sex is justified by 
a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary’122 and permits the use of sex in actuarial calculations;123 
                                               
116 C Kilpatrick, ‘Non-Discrimination’ in S Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary (Hart 2014) 579-604, para. 21.31 
117 See further, M Dougan, ‘Judicial Review of Member State Action under the General Principles and the 
Charter: Defining the “Scope of Union Law”‘ (2015) 52(5) CMLRev 1201. 
118 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, para. 21. 
119 Indirect discrimination occurs ‘where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put 
persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the other sex, unless that 
provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that 
aim are appropriate and necessary’. Directive 2004/113, Article 2(b); Directive 2006/54, Article 2(b); 
Directive 2010/41, Article 3(b). 
120 Directive 2004/113, Article 2(b); Directive 2006/54, Article 2(b); Directive 2010/41, Article 3(b). 
121 Article 7(1). 
122 Article 4(5). 
123 Article 5(1). Discussed further below. 
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• Directive 2006/54 permits deferral of the principle of equal treatment as regards 
self-employed persons including (a) pensionable age, (b) survivors benefits and 
(c) the use of actuarial factors in setting different levels for workers’ 
contributions124 and differences in access to employment when they amount to a 
‘genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that its objective 
is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate’.125  
 
The permissibility of limits on Charter rights is set out in Article 52(1) CFR. The 
provision enumerates several criteria, which go beyond the requirements of 
appropriateness and necessity. Article 52(1) CFR requires that: 
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter 
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. 
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are 
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union 
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.126 
What is unclear is how the ‘limits on limits’ in the Charter will interact with those in 
overlapping secondary law. Could the Charter form an additional check on national 
measures, distinct from the directives?  
 
A third (and final) point of divergence emerges concerning capacity for horizontal direct 
effect. In contrast to directives, which are incapable of being invoked directly in disputes 
between private parties, the ECJ recently confirmed in Egenberger, that Article 21(1) CFR 
– prohibiting status discrimination – ‘prohibit[s] discrimination on various grounds, 
even where the discrimination derives from contracts between individuals’.127  
 
To summarise, the prohibition on sex discrimination set out in Article 21(1) CFR 
overlaps with four directives prohibiting sex discrimination in discrete fields. The 
Charter provision potentially applies in situations not covered by the directives, 
including horizontal situations, and might impose a more stringent test on any 
derogations. As such, the inter-relationship between Article 21(1) CFR and overlapping 
                                               
124 Article 11. 
125 Article 14(2). 
126 This differs from the justification framework under Article 157(1) TFEU. For further discussion of the 
inter-relationship between overlapping Charter and Treaty norms, see Chapter 4. 
127 Case C-414/16 Egenberger EU:C:2018:257, para. 77. 
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secondary law poses an important question since the ECJ’s approach might impact on 
the extent of protection available under Union law. 
 
3.2. Article 52(2) CFR and Lex Superior 
This Section offers a baseline for comparing ECJ practice and sets out the expected 
approach for when an overlap arises between Article 21(1) CFR and secondary Union 
law. It begins by considering – and refuting – the argument that Article 52(2) CFR could 
act as a priority clause here since a priority clause in the Charter would presumably 
displace the lex superior principle.128  
 
According to Article 52(2) CFR, the ‘[r]ights recognised by this Charter for which 
provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the 
limits defined by those Treaties.’ Lenaerts and de Smijter argue that Article 52(2) CFR 
applies – indirectly – to secondary Union law where a provision of the Charter overlaps 
with a legislative basis in the Treaties. In their view, Article 21(1) CFR prohibiting 
discrimination inter alia on grounds of sex overlaps with Articles 19(1) and 157(3) TFEU 
empowering the Union legislature to adopt acts prohibiting sex discrimination and 
Article 52(2) CFR applies to secondary Union law grounded in those legal bases. In their 
words: 
… as soon as the Council exercises its powers under Article [19 TFEU], the [EU] 
act in question will serve as a basis of construing the scope of the corresponding 
right recognised by Article 21(1) of the Charter. As a result, the latter right will need 
to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by that [EU] 
act’.129  
In sum, they argue that the ‘prohibition of discrimination on one of the grounds listed 
in Article 21(1) of the Charter is thus unlimited until the national or European 
legislature conditions or limits it’130 and that Article 52(2) CFR ‘refers not only to the 
[EU or FEU] Treaty, but also to the measures adopted to give effect to those 
                                               
128 As set out in Chapter 2, there is no definitive answer to whether priority clauses can determine the 
inter-relationship between overlapping norms of differing hierarchical status. Given the largely non-
hierarchical structure of international law, it is not possible to draw on comparative practice here. A 
primary law norm probably can specify that it is subject to secondary Union law; whether a secondary law 
norm can specify its priority over primary law is less clear. 
129 K Lenaerts and E de Smijter, ‘A “Bill of Rights” for the European Union’ (2001) 38 CMLRev 273, 285. 
130 Lenaerts and de Smijter (n 129) 285. 
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Treaties.’131 Their argument would subjugate Article 21(1) CFR to Directive 2004/113 
(based on Article 19 TFEU) and Directives 2006/54 and 2010/41 (based on Article 
157(3) TFEU); contrary to the hierarchy of norms, those directives would exhaustively 
define the Charter right. 
 
The implications of their argument are quite far-reaching. For instance, they question 
whether Article 52(1) CFR (which determines the permissible limits on Charter rights) 
constrains the Union legislature when adopting measures on the basis of Articles 19 and 
157(3) TFEU. In their words ‘[a] different conclusion would indeed seem to contradict 
Art. 52(2) of the Charter stating that it is up to the … Treat[ies] to determine the 
conditions and limits set to the exercise of the rights recognized by the Charter but 
based on those Treaties.’132 The logical consequence is that the Union legislature could 
limit the prohibition on discrimination in a manner exceeding the permissible ‘limits on 
limits’ outlined by Article 52(1) CFR.133 Lenaerts and De Smijter do concede that the 
‘autonomy of Art. 52(2) of the Charter does not however imply that the EU institutions 
can take whatever measures they wish to implement the … Treat[ies].’134 However, they 
do not set out what the applicable limits are. 
 
It is submitted that Lenaerts and de Smijter wrongly construe Article 52(2) CFR. First, 
their interpretation does not fit with the text of Article 52(2) CFR. As Prechal and Peers 
note, if: 
… the Charter drafters had wanted to ensure a different interpretation, they could 
have inserted words such as ‘or measures implementing them’ or ‘and by the 
measures adopted to give them effect’ in Article 52(2), or referred more generally to 
limitations permitted by ‘Union law’ in Article 52(2), just as they did in Articles 47, 
51(1) and 53 [CFR].135 
Secondly, the Explanations to Article 21(1) CFR – to which ‘due regard’ must be had – 
do not refer to Article 52(2) CFR (whereas the Explanations to several other Charter 
                                               
131 Lenaerts and de Smijter (n 129) 285 n68. 
132 Lenaerts and de Smijter (n 129) 285 n68. 
133 This is subject, of course, to the compatibility of secondary Union law with the general principles of 
Union law and the Treaties. Chapter 6 considers further the continuing role for general principles that 
overlap with Charter rights. 
134 Lenaerts and de Smijter (n 129) 285 n68. 
135 S Peers and S Prechal, ‘Scope and Interpretation of Rights and Principles’ in S Peers and others (eds), 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart 2014) 1455-1522, para. 52.94. 
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rights do refer to Article 52(2) CFR).136 Instead, the Explanations specifically 
differentiate Article 19 TFEU and Article 21(1) CFR: 
Article 19 confers power on the Union to adopt legislative acts, including 
harmonisation of the Member States’ laws and regulations, to combat certain forms 
of discrimination, listed exhaustively in that Article … In contrast, the provision in 
Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these 
areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of 
discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations 
by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers 
conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are 
implementing Union law.137 
The distinction drawn between the operation of Article 19 TFEU and Article 21(1) CFR 
implies a separation between the different norms. 
 
Thirdly, their approach renders the Charter nugatory following the adoption of 
secondary Union law. As Craig reminds us, ‘we should not lose sight of the fact that the 
fundamental rights doctrine as developed by the ECJ was used to challenge the legality 
of [EU] regulations, directives and the like’ and that ‘[t]his was premised on a normative 
hierarchy in which fundamental rights were superior to [Union] legislation and hence 
operated as a ground of judicial review.’138 If secondary Union law could limit the 
Charter it would be a backward step going against the aim of the Charter to ‘strengthen 
the protection of fundamental rights,139 not to mention the relationship between primary 
and secondary Union law as normally understood.140 
 
Finally, interpreting Article 52(2) CFR in this manner leads to considerable confusion. 
The Union legislature adopted Directive 79/7 on the basis of what is now Article 352 
TFEU. No overlap arises between Article 21(1) CFR and Article 352 TFEU since the 
latter empowers the Union legislature to act ‘[if] action by the Union should prove 
necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of 
the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary 
                                               
136 By itself this point would be insufficient to refute the application of Article 52(2) CFR to overlaps 
between Article 21(1) CFR and secondary Union law, see further Chapter 4, Section 3.3. 
137 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/17 24. 
138 P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP 2011) 228. 
139 Preamble, Recital 4. 
140 Cf Article 21 TFEU, which expressly reverses the inter-relationship between primary and secondary 
Union law. 
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powers’. Applying the approach advocated by Lenaerts and de Smijter would mean the 
inter-relationship between Directive 79/7 and Article 21(1) CFR differed from the inter-
relationship between Article 21(1) CFR and the other overlapping measures. There is 
also the additional complication in equal pay cases that Article 21(1) CFR overlaps with 
Article 157(1) TFEU; what would Article 52(2) CFR require in equal pay cases?141  
 
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that Article 52(2) CFR does not offer 
workable guidance concerning the inter-relationship between Article 21(1) CFR and 
overlapping secondary Union law. Given the Charter’s status as primary law – it has the 
‘the same legal value as the Treaties’142 – the principle of lex superior can again prima facie 
offer workable guidance to the ECJ when resolving questions of norm inter-
relationship. 
 
In the context of the specific overlap considered here (i.e. between Article 21(1) CFR 
and directives prohibiting sex discrimination), the lex superior principle does not preclude 
the relevant secondary norm forming the starting point of the ECJ’s analysis. Relying 
directly on secondary law as a starting point makes even greater sense in the context of 
overlaps with the Charter; the Charter is ‘second order in nature’ meaning that it cannot 
apply in the absence of a connection to a first order provision of Union law such as a 
directive.143 Article 21(1) CFR is therefore relevant, in the first place, as a check on the 
legality of overlapping secondary norms. Any derogations from equal treatment set out 
in secondary Union law will must not go beyond the ‘limits on limits’ set out in Article 
52(1) CFR. Where secondary Union laws complies with the overlapping Charter right, 
Article 21(1) CFR remains relevant , in the second place, as an aid to the interpretation 
of the relevant directive (and any national implementing measures). Furthermore, under 
the lex superior principle, Article 21(1) CFR may still apply if one of the directives does 
not cover a particular situation i.e. it is outside the discrete areas regulated by the 
relevant directives or involves a dispute between private parties. 
 
                                               
141 Chapter 4 discusses the inter-relationship between overlapping provisions of the Treaty and Charter 
further. Case law analysis carried out in that Chapter suggests that where Treaty and Charter norms 
overlap, the ECJ interprets Article 52(2) CFR as denying the overlapping Charter right an independent 
role. 
142 Article 6(1) TEU. 
143 Dougan (n 117) 1201. 
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3.3. ECJ Practice Consistent with Lex Superior 
Since the Charter’s entry into force, fifteen cases have arisen involving an overlap 
between Article 21(1) CFR and secondary Union law prohibiting sex discrimination.144 
Overlaps arose between 21(1) CFR and: (1) Directive 79/7 in five cases; (2) Directive 
2004/113 in one case; and (3) Directive 2006/54 in nine cases. As further elaborated on 
below, all of the cases identified cohere with application of the lex superior principle as 
set out above. 
 
Importantly, the relevant directive forms the starting point in each case. Where a 
referring court questions the validity of the relevant directive, the ECJ assesses that 
measure for its compatibility with Article 21(1) CFR. In only one case did the ECJ strike 
down a provision of overlapping secondary law: Test Achats.145 The case concerned the 
legality of Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113, which allowed the continued use of 
actuarial factors based on sex to decide insurance premiums. The ECJ held that: 
Such a provision, which enables the Member States in question to maintain without 
temporal limitation an exemption from the rule of unisex premiums and benefits, 
works against the achievement of the objective of equal treatment between men and 
women, which is the purpose of Directive 2004/113, and is incompatible with 
Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter.146 
The ECJ’s decision here confirms that it does not adopt Lenaerts’ and de Smijter’s 
interpretation of Article 52(2) CFR. 
 
The ECJ’s approach in Test-Achats is a welcome departure from the ECJ’s implicit 
overruling of Directive 86/378 on occupational social security in Barber discussed above. 
In line with the obligation to practice ‘mutual sincere cooperation’, the ECJ addresses 
the issue of invalidity in the context of an overlap involving norm conflict and then 
explains why the derogation in the Directive is contrary to Article 21(1) CFR. The ECJ’s 
core concern – and the reason for striking down the exception – was the ‘risk that EU 
law may permit the derogation from the equal treatment of men and women, provided 
for in Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113, to persist indefinitely.’147 In explaining how 
                                               
144 Cases were identified by searching the curia.eu database by provision i.e. Directive 79/7; Directive 
2004/113 and Directive 2006/54. 
145 Case C-236/09 Test-Achats EU:C:2011:100. 
146 Test-Achats (n 145), para. 32. 
147 Test-Achats (n 145), para. 31. 
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the legislature’s choices breached the overlapping Charter right, the ECJ offers future 
guidance for the adoption of non-discrimination directives. 
 
In the remaining cases the ECJ does not have recourse to the Charter. However, it is 
submitted that these cases are still consistent with the lex superior principle. Focusing 
solely on secondary law expressions of the prohibition on sex discrimination would only 
be problematic if the ECJ implied that secondary law exhaustively defined Article 21(1) 
CFR. As will be demonstrated, that does not appear to be the case in any of the 
judgments delivered to date. 
 
In six of the cases analysed, the ECJ concluded that the national measure fell foul of the 
relevant directive and amounted to discrimination on grounds of sex.148 There is no 
need to consider the protections offered by the Charter in such cases following a finding 
of discrimination. It would be incompatible with the express aims of the Charter to 
‘strengthen the protection of fundamental rights’149 and to ‘reaffirm’ existing rights 
protection150 to assess whether a national measure can be ‘saved’ by the Charter. 
Furthermore, to adopt a different understanding of ‘discrimination’ would be to depart 
from a well-established definition (largely elucidated by the ECJ itself). 
 
In seven cases, the ECJ held that the contested measure complied with the relevant 
directive. In none of these cases did the ECJ turn to consider whether the Charter 
applied. However, turning to consider the Charter would not have altered the outcome 
given the common meaning of ‘discrimination’ in EU law. In Cachaldora Fernandez, Plaza 
Bravo and Kleinsteuber the ECJ held that the remuneration of part-time workers respected 
the pro rata temporis rule and so did not discriminate.151 In Z and D, the ECJ held that it 
did not amount to discrimination on grounds of sex (which encompasses discrimination 
on grounds of pregnancy) to deny commissioning mothers in surrogacy agreements 
                                               
148 Case C-595/12 Napoli EU:C:2014:128, para. 39; Case C-222/14 Maïstrellis EU:C:2015:473, para. 53; 
Case C-531/15 Otero Ramos EU:C:2017:789, para. 63; Case C-98/15 Espadas Recio EU:C:2017:833, para. 
49; Joined Cases C-142/17 and C-143/17 Maturi and Others EU:C:2018:68, para. 40; Case C-451/16 MB 
EU:C:2018:492, para. 53. 
149 Preamble, Recital 4. 
150 Preamble, Recital 5. 
151 Case C-527/13 Cachaldora Fernández EU:C:2015:215, para. 40; Case C-137/15 Plaza Bravo 
EU:C:2015:771, para. 30; Kleinsteuber (n 32), para. 47. 
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(who do not give birth) maternity leave.152 The refusal to grant a commissioning mother 
maternity leave did not amount to discrimination on grounds of sex since a 
commissioning father would be treated in the same manner153 and there could be no less 
favourable treatment on grounds of pregnancy.154 Where the ECJ concludes, as in each 
of these cases, that women do not suffer from any disadvantage compared to men it is 
unlikely to reach a different conclusion under Article 21(1) CFR. 
 
The final case involving an overlap between Article 21(1) CFR and secondary law, 
Kratzer, raised additional complexities. Mr Kratzer applied for a job with the sole 
purpose of claiming compensation for discrimination.155 The ECJ held that he fell 
outside the personal scope of Directive 2006/54 on equal treatment between men and 
women in employment since he was not actually seeking employment156 nor could he 
‘be regarded as a “victim” within the meaning of … Article 25 of Directive 2006/54 or 
a “person injured” having sustained “loss” or “damage”, within the meaning of Article 
18 of Directive 2006/54.’157 The ECJ did not then consider whether Mr Kratzer had 
suffered discrimination prohibited by the Charter; however, it is unclear what first order 
provision of Union law would have brought the situation of the applicant within the 
scope of the Charter here. What is more, the ECJ considered that Mr Kratzer’s actions 
may amount to an abuse of rights, which would prevent Mr Kratzer from relying on 
either Directive 2006/54 or the Charter since ‘EU law cannot be relied on for abusive 
or fraudulent ends’.158 
 
By consistently relying directly on secondary Union law in the first instance, the ECJ 
ensures respect for the principle of legal certainty, which ‘aims to ensure that situations 
and legal relationships governed by [EU] law remain foreseeable.’159 At the very least, 
resolving overlaps in this way offers greater predictability than the ECJ’s approach to 
overlaps between Article 157 TFEU and secondary Union law. When dealing with 
                                               
152 Case C-363/12 Z EU:C:2014:159, para. 60; Case C-167/12 D EU:C:2014:169, para. 55. 
153 Z (n 152), para. 52; D (n 152), para. 47. 
154 Z (n 152), para. 57; D (n 152), para. 52. 
155 Case C-423/15 Kratzer EU:C:2016:604, para. 26. 
156 Kratzer (n 155), paras 34-35. 
157 Kratzer (n 155), para. 36. 
158 Kratzer (n 155), para. 36. 
159 Case C-63/93 Duff and Others EU:C:1996:51, para. 20.  
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overlaps between the equal pay principle in the Treaty and in secondary law, the ECJ did 
not adopt a coherent method. In some cases, the ECJ specifically started its analysis 
with the relevant directive; however, it also adopted differing and even contradictory 
approaches. In several cases the ECJ relied directly on Article 157 TFEU even if the 
Treaty norm offered lesser protection from discrimination; in other cases, the ECJ 
interpreted Article 157 TFEU broadly in light of overlapping secondary law. The ECJ’s 
failure to articulate and adhere to principles of norm inter-relationship meant that it 
could not be predicted with any certainty what the outcome would be in a given 
situation. Uncertainty surrounded, in particular, whether the ECJ would interpret Article 
157 TFEU in light of or differently from overlapping secondary law. 
 
In contrast, by invariably adopting secondary law as the starting point of its analysis in 
cases where Article 21(1) CFR might be relevant, the ECJ’s approach better protects the 
principle of legal certainty: first, because – quite simply – the ECJ adopts a consistent 
approach to the inter-relationship between overlapping norms; secondly, due to the 
nature of the directives prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex that give specific 
expression to the broad prohibition in Article 21(1) CFR. Each directive offers more 
concrete guidance on what amounts to discriminatory conduct and on the permissible 
derogations from equal treatment. Relying on the relevant directive in the first instance 
offers greater clarity as to the applicable law. This is not to deny that uncertainties still 
persist regarding, for example, the meaning of sex discrimination and the scope of 
application of the Charter. However, the analytical framework set out in secondary law 
provides a clear starting point for the Court’s analysis. 
 
Furthermore, the ECJ’s approach to overlaps between Article 21(1) CFR and secondary 
Union law better respects the principle of institutional balance. As outlined above, the 
principle of institutional balance places constraints on the interpretative choices of the 
ECJ. However, some coincidence between the law-making power of the Union 
legislature and the task of interpretation is inevitable where, as here, primary rights 
overlap with legal bases empowering the Union legislature to further pursue the goal of 
equal treatment. By relying on secondary Union laws as a starting point, the ECJ shows 
greater respect for the role of the Union legislature. Furthermore, when decisions are 
grounded in secondary law and not primary law, the ECJ does not entrench its 
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interpretation of sex discrimination and thereby unduly dictate the approach of the 
Union legislature in future cases. 
 
It should be stressed that the ECJ’s approach to the inter-relationship between the 
Charter and secondary law here does not damage fundamental rights protection. 
Although not addressed by the case law on Article 21(1) CFR and overlapping sex 
discrimination directives, ECJ case law concerning discrimination on other prohibited 
grounds shows the potential application of the Charter in situations not covered by 
overlapping secondary law. For example, in Léger, the ECJ assessed the legality of 
national rules restricting men who have sexual relations with men from donating blood. 
The contested rule fell outside the material scope of Directive 2000/78 (prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as 
regards employment and occupation).160 As the principle of lex superior enables, the ECJ 
then went on to consider the potential application of Article 21(1) CFR. As the national 
rule implemented a directive on technical requirements for blood and blood 
components,161 the situation fell within the scope of the Charter. Any measure within 
the Charter’s field of application ‘must respect … Article 21(1) [CFR]’162 and so, after 
identifying a difference in treatment on the grounds of sexual orientation,163 the ECJ 
examined ‘whether the permanent contraindication to blood donation provided for in 
the [national law] for a man who has had sexual relations with another man none the 
less satisfies the conditions laid down by Article 52(1) of the Charter in order to be 
justified.’164 
 
The decision in Léger confirms the understanding of the lex superior principle adopted by 
this thesis. Although secondary Union law provides the starting point of the ECJ’s 
analysis, this does not prevent the ECJ from turning to Article 21(1) CFR if secondary 
Union law does not cover the situation. As will be recalled, Directives 79/7, 2004/113 
and 2006/54 do not prohibit sex discrimination in all areas of life; the Directives 
prohibit discrimination as regards social security, employment, access to goods and 
                                               
160 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16. 
161 Case C-528/13 Léger EU:C:2015:288, para. 47. 
162 Léger (n 161), para. 48. 
163 Léger (n 161), para. 49. 
164 Léger (n 161), para. 51. 
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services available to the public (apart from the content of media and advertising and 
education) and in self-employed activity. Léger indicates that outside of these discrete 
areas, the ECJ can still apply Article 21(1) CFR directly e.g. to sex discrimination in 
accessing education (so long as the situation falls otherwise within the scope of 
application of Union law).  
 
Similarly, the ECJ’s decision in Egenberger highlights that relying directly on secondary 
Union law does not prevent the ECJ from having recourse to overlapping primary law 
in horizontal disputes. Egenberger concerned an allegation of discrimination on grounds 
of religion or belief as prohibited by both Directive 2000/78 and Article 21(1) CFR. The 
dispute arose between private parties and so, after analysing Directive 2000/78, the ECJ 
held that:  
In the event that it is impossible to interpret the national provision at issue in the 
main proceedings in conformity with EU law … Directive 2000/78 does not itself 
establish the principle of equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation 
… That prohibition, which is laid down in Article 21(1) of the Charter, is sufficient 
in itself to confer on individuals a right which they may rely on as such in disputes 
between them in a field covered by EU law.165 
The ECJ is clear that relying directly on secondary Union law does not prevent recourse 
to the overlapping primary norm in a horizontal situation. The same would seemingly be 
the case in disputes between private parties relating to sex discrimination. 
 
3.4. Summary 
This Section demonstrated that, in the context of an overlap between Article 21(1) CFR 
and secondary Union law, ECJ practice coheres with the principle of lex superior. In 
practice, this means that recourse to Article 21(1) CFR is necessary only: (1) where the 
validity of overlapping secondary law is in question; (2) to aid the interpretation of 
overlapping secondary law; and (3) where a given situation falls outside the scope of the 
relevant Directive. When compared with the ECJ’s approach to overlaps between 
Article 157 TFEU and secondary Union law, the ECJ’s approach here better respects 
the principle of institutional balance and the principle of legal certainty. Furthermore, it 
does not appear to impact negatively on fundamental rights protection as the secondary 
                                               
165 Egenberger (n 127), paras 75-76. 
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norm does not limit or prevent the application of the overlapping primary norm where 
it offers greater protection. 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This Chapter assessed the ECJ’s approach to the inter-relationship between overlapping 
norms of primary and secondary Union law. Using sex-discrimination as a case study, 
this Chapter examined whether the principle of lex superior informs the ECJ’s approach 
to norm overlap in practice.  
 
When faced with an overlap between Article 157 TFEU and overlapping secondary law, 
extensive case law analysis shows that the ECJ’s approach is usually consistent with the 
lex superior principle – if understood as meaning that the higher-ranking norm should 
prevail. Chapter 2 argued that the lex superior principle may not always work well in the 
context of the EU legal system given the cross-cutting nature of EU legal bases. This is 
borne out in practice. Section 2 shows how, in the majority of cases, the ECJ relies 
directly on the higher-ranking norm. What the above discussion demonstrates is that 
this approach breaches the principle of institutional balance: first, because the ECJ 
entrenches one interpretation of the equal pay principle; and, secondly, because in 
several cases the ECJ essentially invalidates secondary Union law without expressly 
saying so. It is also damaging to legal certainty since it leaves the validity of overlapping 
secondary law in limbo.  
 
When faced with an overlap between Article 21(1) CFR and overlapping secondary 
Union law, the ECJ adopts a different approach. Still consistent with the lex superior 
principle, the ECJ grounds its decisions in the relevant secondary norm where possible. 
This does not prevent the ECJ from reviewing the compatibility of that secondary law 
with the Treaties or from applying the Charter right in situations not covered by 
secondary Union law. It is submitted that this approach better secures a balance 
between rights protection, legal certainty and institutional balance. 
 
Overall, this Chapter argues that the ECJ ought to emulate the approach adopted when 
faced with an overlap between Article 21(1) CFR and secondary Union law in the 
context of overlaps between Article 157 TFEU and overlapping secondary norms. The 
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ECJ should ground its decisions in the relevant secondary norm. This suggestion does 
not aim to undermine the hierarchy of the Treaty. If secondary law is in breach of the 
overlapping Treaty norm, it remains open to the ECJ to render the offending provision 
invalid. Otherwise, the ECJ should apply the relevant secondary norm. The primary 
norm should remain in the background as a systemic principle to guide the 
interpretation of overlapping secondary law and, of course, may still apply should a gap 
emerge in the secondary law framework. Inevitably, the proposed approach will mean 
more findings of invalidity. However, as Section 2 shows, this is in effect the 
consequence of the ECJ’s approach in many cases. It should also have the added benefit 
of requiring the ECJ to flesh out the standard of review of Union legislation in greater 
detail. 
 
Discussion now turns to examine the ECJ’s approach to norm inter-relationship where 
the question of validity does not arise. Chapter 4 discusses the ECJ’s approach to 









This Chapter examines how the ECJ interprets the inter-relationship between 
overlapping norms with the status of primary law. What this Chapter tests, more 
precisely, is the role played by priority clauses in mediating the inter-relationship 
between overlapping norms of the same hierarchical status. Chapter 2 argued that where 
a priority clause stipulates the inter-relationship between norms of the same hierarchical 
status, the expectation is that the ECJ will accord priority between norms on that basis. 
This Chapter examines ECJ case law in the field of nationality discrimination and 
assesses how the ECJ interprets priority clauses in practice.  
 
The first half of the Chapter zooms in on the inter-relationship between overlapping 
Treaty norms, specifically, Article 18 TFEU – prohibiting discrimination on grounds of 
nationality ‘[w]ithin the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to 
any special provisions contained therein’ – and the free movement provisions.1 After 
setting out the legal framework in greater detail, discussion turns to the expected 
implications of the ‘without prejudice’ clause for the inter-relationship between Article 
18 TFEU and the free movement rules. The results of extensive case law analysis are 
then set out. The main finding here is that ECJ practice usually coheres with the 
understanding of ‘without prejudice’ clauses as set out in this thesis. Overall, it is argued 
that this approach works well, although it is dependent on the ECJ clarifying when the 
free movement rules apply. A secondary finding is, however, that the ECJ departs from 
this approach in one line of case law the boundaries of which are difficult to determine.  
 
The second half of the Chapter turns to the inter-relationship between Article 21(2) 
CFR and Treaty provisions prohibiting nationality discrimination. Article 21(2) CFR 
                                               
1 Articles 34, 35, 45, 49, 56 and 63 TFEU. 
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replicates Article 18 TFEU and provides that ‘[w]ithin the scope of application of the 
Treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any discrimination on 
grounds of nationality shall be prohibited’. The relevant priority clause here – alongside 
the ‘without prejudice’ clause in Article 21(2) CFR – is Article 52(2) CFR, which 
specifies that ‘[r]ights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the 
Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those 
Treaties.’ As introduced in Chapter 2, this latter clause uses different language than most 
standard priority clauses and creates new interpretative challenges for the ECJ. The 
main finding here is that, in practice, the ECJ interprets Article 52(2) CFR as 
subjugating Article 21(2) CFR to the overlapping Treaty provisions and prevents Article 
21(2) CFR from playing an autonomous role. It is submitted that the ECJ’s approach is 
overly focused on legal certainty and overlooks the implications of including the 
prohibition on nationality discrimination in the Charter. 
 
2. OVERLAPS BETWEEN TREATY PROVISIONS 
2.1. Case Study: Article 18 TFEU and Overlapping Treaty Provisions 
This Section focuses on the overlap between the fundamental freedoms and Article 18 
TFEU. To recap from Chapter 1, a measure introducing discrimination on grounds of 
nationality may amount to an obstacle to the free movement of goods (Articles 34 and 
35 TFEU), persons (Articles 45 and 49 TFEU), services (Article 56 TFEU) or capital 
(Article 63 TFEU). Although framed around abolishing restrictions to intra-EU 
movement, each free movement rule encompasses a prohibition on nationality 
discrimination2 (a point confirmed by ECJ case law3). For the free movement rules to 
apply, certain definitional criteria must be met. For example, for ‘the rules on the free 
                                               
2 Article 36 TFEU allows for restrictions on the free movement of goods, provided that they do not 
constitute ‘arbitrary discrimination’; Article 45(2) TFEU requires the ‘abolition of any discrimination 
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and 
other conditions of work’; Article 49 TFEU requires that Union citizens in a host Member State can carry 
out activities as self-employed persons ‘under the conditions laid down for its own nationals’; Article 56 
TFEU requires that service providers are able to do so ‘under the same conditions as are imposed by that 
State on its own nationals. 
3 On Articles 34-35 TFEU, see e.g. Case 251/78 Denkavit Futtermittel EU:C:1979:252, para. 6; Case 15/79 
Groenveld EU:C:1979:253, para. 7. On Article 45 TFEU, see e.g. Case C-279/93 Schumacker EU:C:1995:31, 
para. 26; Case C-55/00 Gottardo EU:C:2002:16, para. 35. On Article 49 TFEU, see e.g. Case 2/74 Reyners 
EU:C:1974:68, para. 24. On Article 56 TFEU, see e.g. Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen EU:C:1974:131; [1974] 
ECR 1299, para. 25. On Article 63 TFEU, see e.g. Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal (Golden Shares) 
EU:C:2002:326, para. 24. 
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movement of persons to apply, the claimant must fall within the personal, material, and 
territorial scope of the Treaty provision; in addition, the claimant must be able to rely on 
the Treaty provision against the particular defendant.’4 Thus national rules restricting 
access to certain professions to nationals of that Member State will engage Article 45 
TFEU. The applicability of one of the free movement rules will also engage the residual 
prohibition on discrimination in Article 18 TFEU. According to that provision: 
Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special 
provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited. 
Article 18 TFEU is thus not freestanding; a situation must already fall ‘within the scope 
of application of the Treaties’ for Article 18 TFEU to apply i.e. there must be some 
connection to EU law.5 To summarise, where a discriminatory measure restricts intra-
EU movement, an overlap will arise between the relevant free movement rule and – in 
turn – the residual provision in Article 18 TFEU. What follows discusses the extent of 
this overlap and how the Treaty provisions accumulate and conflict. 
 
The free movement rules and Article 18 TFEU prohibit discriminatory restrictions on 
intra-EU movement. Common to all provisions is the meaning of nationality 
discrimination; each norm requires that ‘those who find themselves in the same situation 
… receive the same treatment in law irrespective of their nationality’.6 Each Treaty 
provision precludes ‘not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all 
covert forms of discrimination which, by the application of other distinguishing criteria, 
lead in fact to the same result’.7 Falling within the notion of covert or indirect 
discrimination are national measures introducing residency requirements8 or requiring 
that qualifications are obtained in the Member State.9 As a result, where the ECJ finds 
                                               
4 C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (5th edn, OUP 2016) 207. 
5 According to ECJ case law, a situation will fall within the scope of application of the Treaties where it 
relates to the EU’s competences and where a Union citizen has exercised the right to move and reside, see 
e.g. Case 152/82 Forcheri EU:C:1983:205, para. 17; Case 293/83 Gravier EU:C:1985:69, paras 21-25; Case 
C-73/08 Bressol EU:C:2010:181, para. 31. See further, S Prechal, S de Vries and H van Eijken, ‘The 
Principle of Attributed Powers and the “Scope of EU Law”‘ in L Besselink, F Pennings and S Prechal 
(eds), The Eclipse of the Legality Principle in the European Union (Kluwer Law International 2011) 213-247, 219. 
6 Case C-209/03 Bidar EU:C:2005:169, para. 31. 
7 On Article 45 TFEU, see e.g. Case 152/73 Sotgiu EU:C:1974:13, para. 11; Case C-57/96 Meints 
EU:C:1997:564, para. 44. On Article 49 TFEU, see e.g. Case C-337/97 Meeusen EU:C:1999:284, para. 29. 
On Article 56 TFEU, see e.g. Case C-224/97 Ciola EU:C:1999:212, paras 13-20. 
8 See e.g. Sotgiu (n 7), para. 11; Meints (n 7), para. 46; Bidar (n 6), para. 53. 
9 See e.g. Case 71/76 Thieffry EU:C:1977:65, para. 13; Case C-340/89 Vlassopoulou EU:C:1991:193, para. 
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that a measure amounts to (direct or indirect) nationality discrimination and is contrary 
to one of the free movement rules, that measure ‘will necessarily be contrary to Article 
[18 TFEU].’10 
 
Where differences do emerge is in relation to the framework for justifying 
discriminatory measures. Included alongside the fundamental freedoms are several 
express exclusions and derogations from free movement. Measures discriminating 
directly and indirectly on grounds of nationality are capable of justification where they 
concern ‘employment in the public service’11 and ‘activities … connected, even 
occasionally, with the exercise of official authority’12 and where they pursue public 
policy, public security or public health goals.13 Where recourse to one of the express 
derogations in the Treaties is not possible, an indirectly discriminatory restriction on 
free movement may still be justified if it furthers an additional public interest objective.14 
 
Article 18 TFEU, in contrast, does not include a series of express derogations and it is 
doubtful that Member States can justify directly discriminatory measures under Article 
18 TFEU.15 Ackermann argues that direct discrimination on grounds of nationality 
under Article 18 TFEU should be capable of justification since ‘[i]f (direct and indirect) 
                                               
15. 
10 Case C-20/92 Hubbard EU:C:1993:96, Opinion of AG Darmon, para. 14. See also Case 305/87 
Commission v Greece EU:C:1989:218, para. 12; Case C-246/89 Commission v UK EU:C:1991:375, para. 18; 
Case C-334/94 Commission v France EU:C:1996:90, para. 13; Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland 
EU:C:1999:216, para. 20; Case C-222/07 UTECA EU:C:2009:124, para. 38 
11 Article 45(4) TFEU. 
12 Articles 51 and 62 TFEU. 
13 Articles 36, 45(3), 52(1), 62 and 65(1)(b) TFEU. Article 65(1)(b) TFEU does not permit derogations on 
public health grounds. Article 36 TFEU additionally permits ‘restrictions on imports, exports or goods in 
transit justified on grounds of public morality … the protection of health and life of humans, animals or 
plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the 
protection of industrial and commercial property.’ 
14 On Articles 34 and 35 TFEU, see e.g. Joined Cases C-1/90 and C-176/90 Aragonesa de Publicidad 
Exterior EU:C:1991:327, para. 13. The ECJ employs slightly different language in the field of goods and 
refers to overriding public interest objectives as ‘mandatory requirements’ (e.g. Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon 
EU:C:1979:42, para. 8), ‘imperative requirements’ (e.g. Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior, para. 13) and to 
‘overriding requirements of general public importance’ (e.g. Joined Cases C-34-36/95 De Agostini 
EU:C:1997:344, paras 45-46) and describing national measures as ‘distinctly’ or ‘indistinctly applicable’ 
(e.g. Aragonesa de Publicidad Exterior, para. 13). In addition, the ECJ sometimes implies that public interest 
justifications can be relied upon to justify directly discriminatory measures, for discussion see Case C-
379/98 PreussenElektra EU:C:2000:585, Opinion of AG Jacobs, paras 220-234. On Article 45 TFEU, see 
e.g. Schumacker (n 3), para. 40; Case C-238/15 Bragança Linares Verruga EU:C:2016:949, para. 44ff. On 
Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, see e.g. Case C-347/06 ASM Brescia EU:C:2008:416, para. 60. On Article 63 
TFEU, see e.g. Case C-52/16 SEGRO EU:C:2018:157, para. 76ff. 
15 For discussion, see e.g. Case C-73/08 Bressol EU:C:2009:396, Opinion of AG Sharpston, paras 128-131; 
DAO Edward and RC Lane, Edward and Lane on European Union Law (Edward Elgar 2013) para. 8.03. 
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discrimination on grounds of nationality is, under certain conditions, permitted in the 
core area of the internal market that is guaranteed by the fundamental freedoms, there is 
no reason to be stricter if discrimination occurs in a context that is less vital for [EU] 
law.’16 However, no ECJ case law exists in favour of such a proposition17 and in several 
cases, after establishing direct discrimination, the ECJ did not go on to examine any 
potential justifications.18 Further, the ECJ repeatedly refers to how derogations from the 
Treaties ‘must be construed in such a way as to limit its scope to what is strictly 
necessary for safeguarding the interests’.19 Indirectly discriminatory measures remain 
capable of justification under Article 18 TFEU where – as in general – the contested 
measure is ‘appropriate for securing the attainment of the legitimate objective it pursues 
and must not go beyond what is necessary to attain it’.20  
 
For the free movement rules to apply, an applicant must be able to rely on that Treaty 
provision against a particular defendant. Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty provisions on 
persons are capable of horizontal effects while the position is less clear in relation to the 
provisions on goods and capital. The Treaty provisions relating to free movement of 
persons apply to ‘rules which are not public in nature but which are designed to 
regulate, collectively, self-employment and the provision of services’.21 Article 18 TFEU 
applies in a similar manner where ‘a group or organisation … exercises a certain power 
over individuals and is in a position to impose on them conditions which adversely 
affect the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Treaty’.22 Going 
beyond the position under Articles 18, 49 and 56 TFEU, the ECJ in Angonese held that 
                                               
16 See T Ackermann, ‘Case Comment on Data Delecta, Hayes and Saldanha’ (1998) 35(3) CMLRev 783, 796. 
17 There are hints that the ECJ might entertain justifications of direct discrimination, see e.g. Case C-
323/95 Hayes EU:C:1997:169, paras 23-34; Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala EU:C:1998:217, para. 64; Case C-
274/96 Bickel and Franz EU:C:1998:563, para. 27; Case C-164/07 Wood EU:C:2008:321, para. 15; Case C-
524/06 Huber EU:C:2008:724, para. 75. See Ackermann (n 16) 795 n 33 and the references cited therein. 
18 Gravier (n 5), paras 25-26; Case 186/87 Cowan EU:C:1989:47, para. 10; Joined Cases C-92/92 and C-
326/92 Phil Collins EU:C:1993:847, paras 32-33. 
19 See e.g. Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum EU:C:1986:284, para. 26; Case C-405/01 Colegio de Oficiales de la Marina 
Mercante Española EU:C:2003:515, para. 41. 
20 Bressol (n 5), para. 48. See further, e.g. Case C-398/92 Mund & Fester EU:C:1994:52, paras 13-21; Case 
C-103/08 Gottwald EU:C:2009:597, paras 28-30. 
21 Case C-309/99 Wouters EU:C:2002:98, para. 120. See also, Case 36/74 Walrave EU:C:1974:140, para. 17; 
Case 13/76 Dona EU:C:1976:115, para. 18; Case C-415/93 Bosman EU:C:1995:463, paras 83-84; Case C-
438/05 Viking Line EU:C:2007:772, para. 33; Case C-325/08 Olympique Lyonnais EU:C:2010:143, para. 30. 
22 Case C-411/98 Ferlini EU:C:2000:530, para. 50. See also, e.g. Bosman (n 21), paras 83-87. 
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‘the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality laid down in Article [45 
TFEU] must be regarded as applying to private persons as well.’23  
 
The case law on goods followed a different trajectory.24 Confining the free movement of 
goods to vertical effects, the ECJ interpreted Article 34 TFEU in Dassonville as applying 
to ‘all trading rules enacted by Member States’.25 Aside from limited suggestions 
otherwise,26 for a long time it seemed that the rules on goods did not apply horizontally 
even to collective action.27 The decision in Fra.bo called existing case law into question; 
the ECJ applied Article 34 TFEU to the ‘standardisation and certification activities of a 
private-law body, where the national legislation considers the products certified by that 
body to be compliant with national law and that has the effect of restricting the 
marketing of products which are not certified by that body.’28 What remains unclear 
following the decision in Fra.bo is whether Article 34 TFEU binds the same private 
parties as Article 18 TFEU.29 If not, then a divergence between overlapping non-
discrimination norms potentially emerges here; Article 18 TFEU could apply in a case 
involving obstacles to the free movement of goods where the discriminatory measure 
originates from a private actor acting in a collective manner or in a regulatory capacity. 
 
In relation to capital, ‘the issue of horizontal direct effect … has not been definitively 
addressed by the Court to date.’30 No consensus exists as to whether the ECJ is likely to 
recognise Article 63 TFEU as capable of horizontal direct effect. While Schepel argues 
                                               
23 Case C-281/98 Angonese EU:C:2000:296, para. 36. Confirmed in Case C-94/07 Raccanelli 
EU:C:2008:425, paras 45-46. 
24 There is considerable academic literature on the extent to which the free movement of goods is and 
should be horizontally effective, see MT Karayigit, ‘The Horizontal Effect of the Free Movement 
Provisions’ (2011) 18(3) MJ 303; C Krenn, ‘A Missing Piece in the Horizontal Effect Jigsaw: Horizontal 
Direct Effect and the Free Movement of Goods’ (2012) 49(1) CMLRev 177; LW Gormley, ‘Private Parties 
and the Free Movement of Goods: Responsible, Irresponsible, or a Lack of Principles?’ (2015) 38(4) 
Fordham International Law Journal 993. 
25 Case 8/74 Dassonville EU:C:1974:82, para. 5. 
26 E.g. Case 58/80 Imerco EU:C:1981:17, para. 17; Case 249/81 Commission v Ireland (Buy Irish) 
EU:C:1982:402, paras 26-27. 
27 E.g. Case C-159/00 Sapod Audic EU:C:2002:343, para. 74. 
28 Case C-171/11 Fra.bo EU:C:2012:453, para. 32. 
29 This conclusion follows from the fact that the ECJ did ‘not refer to any of its previous case law on the 
(limited) horizontal direct effect of the free movement rules, and especially the “collectively governs” case 
law [on Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU] in which Fra.bo seems to fit’, see H van Harten and T Nauta, 
‘Towards Horizontal Direct Effect for the Free Movement of Goods? Comment on Fra.bo’ (2013) 38(5) 
ELRev 677, 693. 
30 L Flynn, ‘Free Movement of Capital’ in C Barnard and S Peers (eds), European Union Law (2nd edn, 
OUP 2017) 447-476, 456. 
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that horizontal direct effect is the ‘logical consequence’ of existing case law,31 Barnard is 
far more circumspect noting that since ‘the Court has not yet expressly ruled that Article 
49 TFEU on freedom of establishment and Article 56 TFEU on free movement of 
services have full horizontal direct effect, it seems unlikely that Article 63 TFEU, a later 
developing freedom, will do so either.’32 The point remains unconfirmed by the ECJ, 
however, it seems unlikely that Article 63 TFEU binds private actors to the same extent 
as Article 18 TFEU. Again, a divergence potentially emerges here. 
 
In sum, where an applicant alleges discrimination on grounds of nationality, this may 
amount to an obstacle to intra-EU movement contrary to one of the fundamental 
freedoms and – in turn – engage Article 18 TFEU. Although the Treaty provisions 
overlap here, differences emerge regarding permissible limits and the capacity of each 
norm for horizontal direct effect. It is these divergences that make the ECJ’s approach 
to their-relationship between so important. Before turning to discuss ECJ practice, let us 
first examine the ‘without prejudice’ clause in Article 18 TFEU. 
 
2.2. The ‘Without Prejudice’ Clause 
Governing the inter-relationship between Article 18 TFEU and the overlapping free 
movement rules is an express priority clause. Article 18 TFEU codifies the lex specialis 
principle, specifying that the general prohibition on discrimination it enshrines is 
‘without prejudice to any special provisions contained [in the Treaties]’. It will be 
recalled from Chapter 2, that ‘without prejudice’ clauses are a technique adopted by 
drafters to accord priority to a norm other than the containing norm (i.e. Article 18 
TFEU). This Section sets out the guidance offered by the ‘without prejudice’ clause in 
Article 18 TFEU when an overlap arises with the free movement rules. 
 
Chapter 2 argued that, where a conflict arises, ‘without prejudice’ clauses grant priority 
to the other norm.33 In the context of this case study, where a measure is either 
                                               
31 H Schepel, ‘Constitutionalising the Market, Marketising the Constitution, and to Tell the Difference: 
On the Horizontal Application of the Free Movement Provisions in EU Law’ (2012) 18(2) ELJ 177, 192. 
32 Barnard (n 4) 526. 
33 See e.g. W Czapliński and G Danilenko, ‘Conflicts of Norms in International Law’ (1990) 21 Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 3, 14; JB Mus, ‘Conflicts between Treaties in International Law’ (1998) 45(2) 
Netherlands International Law Review 208, 214; A Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented 
Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis’ (2005) 74(1) NJIL 27, 40. 
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prohibited or permitted under one of the free movement rules this pre-empts the 
application of Article 18 TFEU. For example, when a directly discriminatory measure is 
justified on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health,34 this should 
preclude the application of Article 18 TFEU. The same is true for any measure falling 
within one of the express derogations in the Treaties or otherwise justified on the 
grounds of an overriding public interest. Where a national measure is contrary to one of 
the free movement provisions (and amounts to an obstacle to intra-EU movement), this 
should also preclude any consideration of Article 18 TFEU. 
 
As set out in Chapter 2, an ambiguity arises over what exactly it means for one norm to 
‘prejudice’ another. To illustrate this point, consider the wording of Article 45(2) TFEU; 
according to that provision, ‘freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any 
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards 
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.’ If a worker 
in a host Member State were to allege discrimination in a field other than ‘employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment’ (as expressly set out in 
Article 45(2) TFEU), would it prejudice Article 45(2) TFEU for that worker to rely on 
Article 18 TFEU? The difficulty stems from the fact that the Treaty-framers chose to 
list the situations in which discriminating against migrant EU workers on grounds of 
nationality is prohibited without specifying if this is exhaustive or non-exhaustive. If the 
Treaty-framers intended exhaustively to define those situations in which a Member State 
national working a host Member State could claim equal treatment, would it prejudice 
Article 45(2) TFEU to allow the applicant to rely on Article 18 TFEU? However, it is 
difficult to impute such an intention to the Treaty framers in the absence of an express 
permission or prohibition. Thus, as argued in Chapter 2, in general – and befitting the 
gap-filling role envisaged for Article 18 TFEU35 – the ECJ should still have recourse to 
Article 18 TFEU in such situations.  
 
Let us now compare ECJ practice against this baseline. 
                                               
34 See Articles 45(3), 52(1) and 62 TFEU. 
35 See B Sundberg-Weitman, Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality: Free Movement of Workers and Freedom of 
Establishment under the EEC Treaty (North-Holland Publishing Co 1977) 118; G More, ‘The Principle of 
Equal Treatment: From Market Unifier to Fundamental Right?’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The 
Evolution of EU Law (1st edn, OUP 1999) 517-53, 520-21. 




2.3. ECJ Practice Consistent with the ‘Without Prejudice’ Clause 
This Section presents the results of an extensive a survey of ECJ case law to show the 
ECJ’s approach in practice. The methodology adopted here differs from that employed 
in other Chapters for reasons for scope; the sheer volume of case law involving the free 
movement provisions and/or Article 18 TFEU makes it impractical to consider the 
ECJ’s approach in each case where a prima facie overlap arises. What is more, the 
language used by the ECJ makes it difficult to identify when a case concerns nationality 
discrimination. For example, the ECJ does not ask whether national rules restricting 
imports on goods are discriminatory, but whether they are ‘capable of hindering directly 
or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-[EU] trade’.36 Similarly, in relation to the free 
movement of persons, the ECJ frames the question around possible ‘deterrent’, 
‘discouraging’ or ‘dissuasive’ effects of a rule or whether it is ‘liable to hinder or render 
less attractive the exercise of’ or ‘impede’ the fundamental freedoms.37 For example, in 
Kraus, a German rule on the recognition of academic qualifications obtained outside of 
Germany amounted to discrimination on the grounds of nationality since non-nationals 
were more likely to obtain their qualifications outside of Germany.38 However, the ECJ 
did not refer to this point, but instead framed the German rule as being ‘liable to 
hamper or to render less attractive the exercise … of fundamental freedoms guaranteed 
by the Treaty’.39 What follows offers a representative sample of the cases surveyed and 
focuses on those cases in which the ECJ specifically applies or disregards Article 18 
TFEU. 
 
The main finding is that ECJ practice is almost always consistent with respect for the 
‘without prejudice’ clause as set out above; if the contested measure amounts to a 
restriction on intra-EU movement or is otherwise justified, the ECJ will apply the 
                                               
36 Dassonville (n 25), para. 5. 
37 On Article 34 TFEU, see e.g. Dassonville (n 25), para. 5; Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy (Motorcycle 
Trailers) EU:C:2009:66, para. 33. On Article 35 TFEU, see e.g. Case C-161/09 Kakavetsos-Fragkopoulos 
EU:C:2011:110, para. 29. On Article 45 TFEU, see e.g. Case C-190/98 Graf EU:C:2000:49, para. 23; Case 
C-18/95 Terhoeve EU:C:1999:22, para. 39. On Article 49 TFEU, see e.g. Case C-318/05 Commission v 
Germany (School Fees) EU:C:2007:495, para. 81; Case C-281/06 Jundt EU:C:2007:816, para. 52. On Article 
56 TFEU, see e.g. Case C-76/90 Säger EU:C:1991:331, para. 12; Case C-234/03 Contse and Others 
EU:C:2005:644, para. 33; Case C-158/96 Kohll EU:C:1998:171, para. 33. On Article 63(1) TFEU, see e.g. 
Commission v Portugal (Golden Shares); Case C-370/05 Festersen EU:C:2007:59, para. 24. 
38 Sotgiu (n 7), para. 11 
39 Case C-19/92 Kraus EU:C:1993:125, para. 32. 
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relevant free movement rule and will not consider Article 18 TFEU.40 The ECJ 
expressly refers to the ‘without prejudice’ clause as mediating the relationship between 
overlapping norms. In Hubbard, for instance, the ECJ held that: 
It should be noted in limine that, according to Article [18 TFEU], the prohibition of 
discrimination is effective “within the scope of application of [the] Treaty” and 
“without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein”. The latter phrase … 
refers in particular to other Treaty provisions implementing the general principle 
which it lays down in specific situations.41 
Similarly, the ECJ repeatedly highlights the more specialised nature of the free 
movement rules as the ‘without prejudice’ clause requires; it refers to the free movement 
rules as ‘special provisions’ prohibiting discrimination and to how they ‘guarantee’,42 
‘implement’,43 give ‘specific effect’ to,44 are a ‘specific application’ of,45 and are a ‘specific 
expression’46 of Article 18 TFEU. The applicability of one of the more detailed free 
                                               
40 See e.g. Reyners (n 3), para. 15ff; Case 118/75 Watson EU:C:1976:106, para. 22; Case 90/76 Van Ameyde 
EU:C:1977:101, para. 27ff; Case 136/78 Auer EU:C:1979:34, para. 19ff; Case 65/81 Reina EU:C:1982:6, 
para. 18; Case 137/84 Heinrich EU:C:1985:335, para. 12ff; Case 222/86 Heylens EU:C:1987:442, para. 7ff; 
Commission v Greece (n 10), para. 28; Case C-175/88 Biehl EU:C:1990:186, para. 11ff; Case C-10/90 Masgio 
EU:C:1991:107, para. 12ff; Case C-213/90 ASTI EU:C:1991:291, para. 10ff; Case C-179/90 Merci 
Convenzionali Porto di Genova EU:C:1991:464, paras 11-13; Case C-112/91 Werner EU:C:1993:27, paras 17-
20; Case C-20/92 Hubbard EU:C:1993:280, paras 10-15; Case C-419/92 Scholz EU:C:1994:62, para. 6ff; 
Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries EU:C:1994:195, para. 19ff; Case C-177/94 Perfili EU:C:1996:24, para. 14ff; 
Case C-131/96 Mora Romero EU:C:1997:317, para. 10ff; Case C-118/96 Safir EU:C:1998:170, paras 34-35; 
Case C-390/96 Lease Plan EU:C:1998:206, para. 31ff; Case C-55/98 Vestergaard EU:C:1999:533, para. 14ff; 
Case C-176/96 Lehtonen and Castors Braine EU:C:2000:201, para. 37ff; Case C-251/98 Baars 
EU:C:2000:205, para. 22ff; Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft and Others 
EU:C:2001:134, para. 38ff; Gottardo (n 3), paras 20-21; Case C-100/01 Oteiza Olazabal EU:C:2002:712, 
paras 24-25; Case C-422/01 Skandia and Ramstedt EU:C:2003:380, paras 61-62; Case C-289/02 AMOK 
EU:C:2003:669, paras 25-31; Case C-387/01 Weigel EU:C:2004:256, paras 58-59; Case C-306/03 Salgado 
Alonso EU:C:2005:44, paras 36-39; Case C-258/04 Ioannidis EU:C:2005:559, para. 37; Case C-222/04 Cassa 
di Risparmio di Firenze EU:C:2006:8, paras 99-100; Case C-185/04 Öberg EU:C:2006:107, para. 25; Case C-
40/05 Lyyski EU:C:2007:10, para. 34ff; Case C-392/05 Alevizos EU:C:2007:251, para. 80; Case C-443/06 
Hollmann EU:C:2007:600, para. 28ff; Case C-105/07 Lammers & Van Cleeff EU:C:2008:24, para. 14ff; Case 
C-311/08 SGI EU:C:2010:26, para. 31ff; Case C-384/08 Attanasio Group EU:C:2010:133, para. 36ff; Case 
C-240/10 Schulz-Delzers and Schulz EU:C:2011:591, para. 29ff; Joined Cases C-578/10 to C-580/10 van 
Putten EU:C:2012:246, para. 37ff; Case C-367/11 Prete EU:C:2012:668, para. 17ff; Case C-385/12 Hervis 
Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi EU:C:2014:47, paras 25-26; Case C-474/12 Schiebel Aircraft EU:C:2014:2139, 
paras 20-22; Case C-583/14 Nagy EU:C:2015:737, para. 24; Case C-492/14 Essent Belgium EU:C:2016:732, 
para. 118; Case C-296/15 Medisanus EU:C:2017:431, para. 62; Case C-566/15 Erzberger EU:C:2017:562, 
paras 25-27. 
41 Hubbard (n 40), para. 10. 
42 Watson (n 40), para. 22; Van Ameyde (n 40), para. 27. 
43 Reyners (n 3), para. 16; Commission v Greece (n 10), para. 12; Masgio (n 40), para. 13; Perfili (n 40), para. 15; 
Metallgesellschaft and Others (n 40), para. 39; Weigel (n 40), para. 58. 
44 Baars (n 40), para. 24. 
45 Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova (n 40), para. 12; Lehtonen and Castors Braine (n 40), para. 38. 
46 Mora Romero (n 40), para. 11; Vestergaard (n 40), para. 17; Lyyski (n 40), para. 34; Alevizos (n 40), para. 66; 
Attanasio Group (n 40), para. 31; Hervis Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi (n 40), para. 25; Schiebel Aircraft (n 40), 
para. 21. 
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movement rules precludes the application of Article 18 TFEU, which ‘applies 
independently only to situations governed by [EU] law in regard to which the Treaty 
lays down no specific prohibition of discrimination.’47  
 
Where a situation can be resolved under one of the free movement rules, the inter-
relationship between overlapping norms is quite clear cut. What is more equivocal is 
when Article 18 TFEU should apply given the ambiguities set out above over what it 
means to ‘prejudice’ the free movement rules. The ECJ does not discuss this point in 
any detail. However, several cases show how the ECJ approaches this issue in practice. 
In Neukirchinger, the ECJ was asked whether Article 18 TFEU applied to an Austrian 
rule requiring commercial balloon operators to hold an Austrian license. The case raises 
the meaning of the ‘without prejudice’ clause because, according to Article 58(1) TFEU, 
the ‘[f]reedom to provide services in the field of transport shall be governed by the 
provisions of the Title relating to transport’. In other words, would it prejudice the non-
applicability of the rules on services to transport for the ECJ to rely on Article 18 TFEU 
in a situation concerning transport? The Austrian authorities had fined Mr 
Neukirchinger – the owner-operator of a hot air balloon company established and 
licensed in Germany – for offering flights in Austria.48 It followed from Article 58(1) 
TFEU that Article 56 TFEU could not apply.49 The Treaty rules on transport left the 
regulation of air transport to the Union legislature,50 which had not adopted any 
legislation relating to ‘non-power driven aircraft’ i.e. hot air balloons.51 The ECJ held 
that allowing Mr Neukirchinger to rely on Article 18 TFEU would not prejudice the 
more specific rules on services.52 
                                               
47 Masgio (n 40), para. 12. See also ASTI (n 40), para. 10; Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova (n 40), para. 11; 
Scholz (n 40), para. 6; Vestergaard (n 40), para. 16; Baars (n 40), para. 23; Lehtonen and Castors Braine (n 40), 
para. 37; Metallgesellschaft and Others (n 40), para. 38; Oteiza Olazabal (n 40), para. 25; AMOK (n 40), para. 26; 
Weigel (n 40), para. 57; Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze (n 40), para. 99; Lyyski (n 40), para. 33; Hollmann (n 40), 
para. 28; Lammers & Van Cleeff (n 40), para. 14; UTECA (n 5), para. 37; Case C-269/07 Commission v 
Germany EU:C:2009:527, para. 98; SGI (n 40), para. 31; Attanasio Group (n 40), para. 37; Case C-25/10 
Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach EU:C:2011:65, para. 18; Case C-450/09 Schröder EU:C:2011:198, para. 28; 
Schulz-Delzers and Schulz (n 40), para. 29; Prete (n 40), para. 18; Hervis Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi (n 40), para. 
25; Schiebel Aircraft (n 40), para. 20; Medisanus (n 40), para. 62; Erzberger (n 40), para. 25. 
48 Case C-382/08 Neukirchinger EU:C:2011:27, paras 12-16. 
49 Neukirchinger (n 48), para. 22. 
50 Article 100(2) TFEU specifies that ‘[t]he European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, may lay down appropriate provisions for sea and air transport. 
They shall act after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.’ 
51 Council Regulation 2407/92 of 23 July 1992 on licensing of air carriers [1992] OJ L 240/1, Article 1(2). 
52 Neukirchinger (n 48), para. 28. See also Case C-628/11 International Jet Management EU:C:2014:171. 




The ECJ does not approach all exclusions from the free movement rules in the same 
way. Where national rules concern employment in the public service, the Treaties use 
the language of exclusion: Articles 45 and 51 TFEU specify that the free movement 
rules ‘shall not apply to employment in the public service’ and to activities ‘connected, 
even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority’ (emphasis added). Prima facie, 
similar to Article 58(1) TFEU, the wording of each of these provisions simply excludes 
the application of the free movement provisions rather than specifically permitting 
discrimination. In practice, however, the ECJ refers to Articles 45(4), 51 and 62 TFEU 
as ‘exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination’.53  
 
What would ‘prejudice’ an overlapping norm is thus something of a common sense 
determination. It would be illogical to apply Article 18 TFEU in situations where the 
very point is to allow Member States to appoint their nationals. In contrast, in 
Neukirchinger, applying Article 18 TFEU differs qualitatively from applying Article 56 
TFEU since the Treaty rules on services also prohibit non-discriminatory restrictions on 
intra-EU movement i.e. measures that are ‘liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the 
activities of a provider of services’ in a host Member State.54 As Horsley remarks in 
relation to Neukirchinger, the ‘distinction between the inapplicability of … Article 56 
TFEU and the applicability of Article 18 TFEU makes considerable sense’55 as it excludes 
the ECJ’s case law on non-discriminatory obstacles.56 
 
ECJ case law also clarifies the meaning of the ‘without prejudice’ clause in situations 
where an applicant falls within the personal scope of one of the free movement rules, 
but the situation otherwise falls outside the material scope of those rules (and vice versa). 
Ferlini, for example, raised the question whether the free movement provisions 
exhaustively determine the equal treatment rights of migrant workers in a host Member 
State. A Union citizen working for the EU institutions and residing in a host Member 
State (Luxembourg) challenged his liability to pay higher-rate hospital fees than 
                                               
53 Sotgiu (n 7), para. 4. See also ASTI (n 40), para. 19; Colegio de Oficiales de la Marina Mercante Española (n 
20), para. 41; Case C-47/02 Anker EU:C:2003:516, para. 60. Alevizos (n 40), para. 69; Case C-281/06 Jundt 
EU:C:2007:816, para. 36. 
54 Säger (n 37), para. 12. 
55 T Horsley, ‘Case Comment on Neukirchinger’ (2012) 49(2) CMLRev 737, 745 (emphasis in original). 
56 Horsley (n 55) 745. 
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nationals (as an EU official he did not pay into the Luxembourg system for healthcare). 
The Court began by confirming that Mr Ferlini fell within personal scope of the Treaties 
as a worker and that ‘a worker who is a Member State national, such as Mr Ferlini, may 
not be refused the rights and social advantages which Article [45 TFEU] … affords 
him’.57 However, he was unable to rely on the rules concerning the free movement of 
workers because ‘the application of scales of fees for medical and hospital maternity 
care which are higher than those applicable to persons affiliated to the national social 
security scheme cannot be characterised as a condition of work within the meaning of 
Article [45(2) TFEU]’.58 The ECJ thus had to determine whether it would it prejudice 
the outer limits of Article 45 TFEU – which did not cover the scale of hospital fees – to 
allow Mr Ferlini to rely on Article 18 TFEU. Martin argues that it would essentially 
undermine the limits in the free movement provisions (limits concerning who can claim 
equal treatment and for what) to allow Mr Ferlini to rely on Article 18 TFEU.59 He 
argues that Article 18 TFEU is not ‘independently applicable to employed persons, since 
they are covered by Article [45 TFEU] which specifically applies the principle of non-
discrimination to them’.60 
 
The ECJ in Ferlini did not follow the approach suggested by Martin. After concluding 
that ‘it is clear that … Article [45 TFEU] is [not] applicable in the present case’,61 the 
ECJ then held that ‘the question relating to the alleged discrimination must be examined 
in the light of [Article 18 TFEU].’62 What is implicit in the ECJ’s decision is that it does 
not ‘prejudice’ Article 45 TFEU to rely on Article 18 TFEU in this situation. The fact 
that the Treaty rules on workers do not include a right to the same level of hospital fees 
is thus not interpreted as meaning that discrimination is expressly permitted in that area. 
This determination makes sense since it would otherwise undermine the gap-filling 
nature of Article 18 TFEU. Martin’s concerns over the application of Article 18 TFEU 
perhaps reflect unease over what falls within the scope of EU law in a much more 
                                               
57 Ferlini (n 22), para. 43. 
58 Ferlini (n 22), para. 45. 
59 D Martin, ‘Case Comment on Ferlini, Elsen, Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, Borawitz and Hocsman’ 
(2001) 3(2) European Journal of Migration and Law 257, 260. 
60 Martin (n 59) 259. 
61 Ferlini (n 22), para. 46. 
62 Ferlini (n 22), para. 47. 
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general sense. In Ferlini, there is some uncertainty over whether national rules on the 
fixing of hospital fees fall within the material scope of the Treaties.63 
 
A point which the ECJ has not clarified is whether it would ‘prejudice’ the overlapping 
free movement rules to rely on Article 18 TFEU in horizontal situations. As outlined 
above, Article 18 TFEU applies to private actors exercising a ‘certain power over 
individuals’, whereas the capacity for Articles 34, 35 and 63(1) TFEU to apply in 
disputes between private individuals is (according to existing case law) more limited. 
Wyatt argues that Article 18 TFEU might apply residually in cases ‘involving the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms, in particular as regards discrimination on grounds of 
nationality in the supply of goods, services, business premises and housing’.64 In his 
opinion, such an approach would ‘reinforce fundamental freedoms and be conducive to 
achieving the aims of the internal market, without placing excessive burdens on private 
operators.’65 The ECJ is yet to rule on Wyatt’s proposal. What is not clear is whether it 
would ‘prejudice’ the ECJ’s determination regarding the actors which are subject to the 
free movement rules. For example, according to ECJ case law on the free movement of 
goods, ‘all rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be considered as 
measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions’.66 If a private actor of 
the collective or regulatory type (outside of those covered by the ruling in Fra.bo67) 
restricts the free movement goods, would it prejudice the ECJ’s interpretation of Article 
34 TFEU to allow and applicant to rely on Article 18 TFEU? 
 
Discussion now turns to an alternative approach to the inter-relationship between 
overlapping norms adopted by the ECJ in a small number of cases. 
 
                                               
63 See Prechal, de Vries and van Eijken (n 5); AP van der Mei, ‘The Outer Limits of the Prohibition of 
Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality: A Look through the Lens of Union Citizenship’ (2011) 18(1-
2) MJ 62. 
64 D Wyatt, ‘Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Freedoms and the Right to Equality after Viking and 
Mangold, and the Implications for Community Competence’ (2008) 4 CYELP 1, 15. See also Karayigit (n 
24) 333. 
65 Wyatt (n 64) 15. 
66 Dassonville (n 25), para. 5. 
67 As discussed above (see Section 2.1, especially n 29), the implications of the ECJ’s decision in Fra.bo 
remain unclear. 
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2.4. ECJ Practice Inconsistent with the ‘Without Prejudice’ Clause: Examining 
Article 18 TFEU Before the Treaty Freedoms 
In a cluster of cases relating to national procedural rules, the ECJ adopts a different 
approach to the inter-relationship between Article 18 TFEU and overlapping free 
movement provisions. Contrary to what the ‘without prejudice’ clause implies, and in 
contrast to the extensive body of case law set out above, in this line of case law the ECJ 
treats Article 18 TFEU and the free movement provisions as inter-changeable. 
 
In a line of cases starting with Phil Collins, the ECJ offers a different interpretation of the 
‘without prejudice’ clause from the understanding set out above (and followed in the 
vast majority of cases). What characterises the cases discussed here is that each concerns 
the legality of different national procedural rules. In Phil Collins, a national law offered 
non-national performers seeking to enforce their intellectual property rights lesser 
procedural protection; specifically, the performers, as non-nationals, were not granted 
an interim injunction.68 The remaining cases concerned a requirement for non-nationals 
to furnish security for costs in court proceedings.69 In each case the ECJ considered that 
the national rules in question engaged the free movement provisions.70 The ECJ 
recognised in Phil Collins, for example, that rights to artistic property ‘are subject … to 
the provisions … relating to the free movement of goods’71 and that ‘the activities of 
copyright management societies are subject to the provisions … relating to the freedom 
to provide services.’72 However, in none of the cases did the ECJ go on to determine 
whether the free movement provisions preclude the national procedural rules.  
 
What the ECJ does, instead, is to suggest that there is no need to first establish whether 
the free movement rules apply. According to the ECJ: 
… national legislative provisions which fall within the scope of application of the 
Treaty are, by reason of their effects on intra-[EU] trade in goods and services, 
necessarily subject to the general principle of non-discrimination laid down by 
                                               
68 Phil Collins (n 18), paras 3-10. 
69 Case C-43/95 Data Delecta Aktiebolag and Forsberg EU:C:1996:357, para. 4; Hayes (n 17), paras 2-4; Case 
C-122/96 Saldanha and MTS EU:C:1997:458, paras 4-7. 
70 Data Delecta (n 69), para. 13; Hayes (n 17), para. 14; Saldanha and MTS (n 69), para. 17. 
71 Phil Collins (n 18), para. 23 (emphasis added). 
72 Phil Collins (n 18), para. 24 (emphasis added). See also Case C-360/00 Ricordi EU:C:2002:346. 
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[Article 18 TFEU], without there being any need to connect them with the specific 
provisions [concerning goods and services].73  
By referencing the free movement provisions, the ECJ indicates that they apply. 
However, contradicting the large number of cases set out above, the ECJ then 
concludes there is no need to determine this point as Article 18 TFEU can apply 
instead. 
 
Ackermann argues that in Phil Collins, as well as in the cases following, ‘the ECJ certainly 
did not intend to take the position that the general prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality prevails over the specific provisions on the fundamental 
freedoms.’74 Perhaps such phrasing would be too strong. What the ECJ’s decision does 
is remove the necessity of determining which fundamental freedom applies and 
establishing whether the national measure is precluded by that freedom. The ECJ 
instead enables applicants to have recourse directly to Article 18 TFEU. Showing the 
impact of the ECJ’s reasoning in Phil Collins, Advocate General Cosmas considered that 
in that case the ECJ ‘chang[ed] to some extent its position regarding the “ancillary” 
nature of the first paragraph of Article [18 TFEU]’.75 It is submitted that the ECJ in 
these cases does not rely on the ‘without prejudice’ clause to structure the inter-
relationship between Article 18 TFEU and overlapping Treaty provisions; the ECJ’s 
decision instead implies that there is no need to reach any conclusions on the basis of 
the free movement rules where Article 18 TFEU can apply instead. If the free 
movement rules do not cover the situation, which is otherwise within the scope of 
application of Union law, the ECJ needs to clarify this point. 
 
One might question whether the ECJ’s application of Article 18 TFEU over the free 
movement provisions matters. Ackermann considers that ‘as long as the standards 
applied under Article [18 TFEU] are not stricter than those applied under the 
fundamental freedoms, drawing the line between these two areas is no matter of prime 
                                               
73 Data Delecta (n 69), para. 14. See also Phil Collins (n 18), para. 27; Hayes (n 17), para. 16; Saldanha and 
MTS (n 69), para. 17. 
74 Ackermann (n 16) 792. 
75 Case C-412/97 ED EU:C:1999:20, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para. 31. 
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importance.’76 The ECJ does itself acknowledge this point. In Huber, for example, the 
ECJ refers to how: 
… the order for reference does not contain any detailed information which would 
allow it to be established whether the situation at issue in the main proceedings is 
covered by Article [49 TFEU]. However, even if the national court were to consider 
that to be the case, the application of the principle of non-discrimination cannot 
vary depending on whether it finds its basis in that provision or on Article [18 
TFEU].77 
As set out above, the concept of discrimination on grounds of nationality is common to 
the free movement provisions and Article 18 TFEU. 
 
Article 18 TFEU is not, however, always inter-changeable with the overlapping free 
movement provisions. The free movement rules are, in one sense, broader than Article 
18 TFEU as they also prohibit non-discriminatory restrictions on free movement. By 
relying directly on Article 18 TFEU without first explaining why the free movement provisions do 
not apply, the ECJ potentially prevents an applicant from enjoying the more wide-ranging 
rules in the Treaty freedoms. Conversely, the framework for justifying discriminatory 
measures under Article 18 TFEU potentially differs from that under the free movement 
provisions. 
 
Examining Article 18 TFEU without concluding whether the contested measure 
complies with or is contrary to the free movement rules requires a contra legem 
interpretation of the Treaties. The ‘without prejudice’ clause in the Treaty prioritises the 
free movement rules – as more specific provisions – where they apply. Furthermore, the 
ECJ’s approach in these cases departs from the logic of the ‘without prejudice’ clause, 
which itself reflects the lex specialis principle. As will be recalled from Chapter 2, the 
rationale underpinning the lex specialis principle is to reflect more accurately the 
intentions of the legislature78 and to ensure the application of the more efficacious 
norm.79 The free movement rules, which set out in greater detail what amounts to a 
                                               
76 Ackermann (n 16) 793. 
77 Huber (n 17), para. 74. 
78 Michaels and J Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws: Different Techniques in the 
Fragmentation of Public International Law’ (2011-2012) 22(3) Duke Journal of Comparative & International 
Law 349, 354. See also, J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to 
other Rules of International Law (CUP 2003) 388; A Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented 
Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis’ (2005) 74(1) NJIL 27, 42. 
79 D Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict (OUP 2014) 324. 
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restriction and what is a permissible limitation will offer more precise guidance to the 
ECJ than Article 18 TFEU. 
 
Furthermore, adopting this approach could lead to legal uncertainty. The ECJ avoids 
defining the outer edges of the fundamental freedoms, leading to potential confusion 
over what does fall within their scope. For example, in Hubbard, a case also relating to 
national procedural rules, the ECJ held that those rules fell within the scope of the 
Treaty rules on services. What is not clear is why the situation in Hubbard fell within the 
scope of Article 56 TFEU. Like the contested rule in Data Delecta, Hayes and Saldanha , 
the case concerned a requirement that only those established in another Member State 
must furnish security for legal costs.80 Why is Article 56 TFEU applied in Hubbard, but 
recourse to Article 18 TFEU is necessary – or at least preferred – in the other cases? 
 
2.5. Summary 
This Section assessed how the ECJ resolves overlaps between Article 18 TFEU and the 
free movement provisions, in practice, against the expected meaning of the ‘without 
prejudice’ clause in Article 18 TFEU. What extensive case law analysis shows is that the 
ECJ almost always relies on that clause to prioritise the free movement provisions. 
Furthermore, the ECJ explicitly refers to the ‘without prejudice’ clause making express 
the role played by that clause in mediating the inter-relationship between norms. 
Precisely when recourse to Article 18 TFEU is will prejudice an overlapping norm 
remains somewhat ambiguous due to uncertainties over where the outer-edges of the 
free movement rules lie and what measures are caught by those rules. Greater clarity in 
that regard would make whether Article 18 TFEU applies more predictable.  
 
Case law research also highlighted a minority of cases in which ECJ practice does not fit 
with respect for the ‘without prejudice’ clause. In the line of cases following Phil Collins, 
the ECJ suggests that there is no need to establish whether one of the more specific free 
movement rules applies before considering Article 18 TFEU. However, not only does 
this approach have the potential to affect the outcome of the case as well as lead to 
                                               
80 Hubbard (n 40), para. 9. 
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uncertainty over the scope of the free movement rules, it is also contra legem an express 
clause in the Treaties. 
 
3. OVERLAPS BETWEEN THE CHARTER AND THE TREATIES  
3.1. Overview 
Discussion now turns to assess the ECJ’s approach to overlaps between provisions of 
the Treaty and the Charter. Of key importance here is Article 52(2) CFR, which 
mediates the Charter’s relationship with the Treaties and provides that the ‘‘[r]ights 
recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised 
under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties’ (emphasis added).  
 
3.2. Case Study: Overlaps between Article 21(2) CFR and the Treaties 
Prima facie, Article 21(2) CFR is identical to Article 18 TFEU and states that ‘[w]ithin the 
scope of application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited’.81 This Section considers 
three possible ways in which Article 21(2) CFR may diverge from Article 18 TFEU, 
despite barely perceptible differences in how the right is framed. These are: (1) by 
applying to third country nationals; (2) by applying in disputes between individuals; and 
(3) by setting out a different justification regime. 
 
To start, let us first outline the similarities between Article 21(2) CFR and overlapping 
Treaty provisions prohibiting nationality discrimination. At the core of Article 21(2) 
CFR, as with the overlapping Treaty provisions, is the prohibition on direct and indirect 
discrimination on grounds of nationality.82 More specifically, what suffices to trigger 
Article 18 TFEU (i.e. falls within the scope of the Treaties) is likely coterminous with 
the scope of application of Article 21(2) CFR following the ECJ’s broad interpretation 
of Article 51(1) CFR, which determines the Charter’s field of application.83 
                                               
81 Emphasis added to highlight the contrast with Article 18 TFEU which prohibits nationality 
discrimination ‘[w]ithin the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special 
provisions contained therein’. 
82 C Kilpatrick, ‘Non-Discrimination’ in S Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary (Hart 2014) 579-604, para. 21.45. 
83 See e.g. M Dougan, ‘Judicial Review of Member State Action under the General Principles and the 
Charter: Defining the “Scope of Union Law”’ (2015) 52(5) CMLRev 1201. 




Turning to the potential differences between Article 21(2) CFR and the overlapping 
Treaty framework, Article 21(2) CFR may offer greater protection by extending to 
(some) third-country nationals. The text of Articles 18 and 45 TFEU and Article 21(2) 
CFR does not limit their application to EU citizens (in contrast to Articles 49 and 56 
TFEU).84 However, the ECJ interprets Articles 18 and 45 TFEU as excluding third 
country nationals from their scope.85 It has been questioned whether Article 21(2) CFR, 
in keeping with the nature of the Charter as a human rights document, might allow 
challenges to differential treatment between EU citizens and third-country nationals.86 
This is especially so since Article 21(2) CFR applies ‘within the scope of application of 
the Treaties’ and, as Muir points out ‘[i]t can hardly be questioned that today’s Treaty is 
to a large extent applicable to the situation of third-country nationals. Moreover, the 
authors of the Treaty actually intended to expand its scope in that direction.’87 And, as a 
result of the extensive EU legislative framework specifically addressing non-EU 
nationals,88 eighty per cent of third-country nationals in the EU now fall within the 
scope of secondary Union law.89 
                                               
84 Articles 49 and 56 TFEU both refer to ‘nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member 
State’ and ‘nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the 
person for whom the services are intended’ respectively. 
85 Joined Cases C-22/08 and C-23/08 Vatsouras EU:C:2009:344, paras 52-53; Case C-45/12 Hadj Ahmed 
EU:C:2013:390, paras 40-41. 
86 Kilpatrick (n 82), paras 21.32-39. This point was raised in Case C-571/10 Kamberaj EU:C:2012:233, 
para. 55. However, the ECJ decided the case on the basis of Article 34 CFR. For a comprehensive 
argument as to why Article 18 TFEU should be extended to third-country nationals, see C Hublet, ‘The 
Scope of Article 12 of the Treaty of the European Communities vis-à-vis Third-Country Nationals: 
Evolution at Last?’ (2009) 15(6) ELJ 757. 
87 E Muir, ‘Enhancing the Protection of Third-Country Nationals against Discrimination: Putting EU 
Anti-Discrimination Law to the Test’ (2011) 18 MJ 136, 143 
88 See e.g. Council Regulation 859/2003 of 14 May 2003 extending the provisions of Regulation 1408/71 
and Regulation 574/72 to nationals of third countries who are not already covered by those provisions 
solely on the ground of their nationality [2003] OJ L 124/1; Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 
September 2003 on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L 251/12; Council Directive 2003/109/EC 
of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2003] 
OJ L 16/44; Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of 
third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment [2009] OJ L 155/17; Directive 
2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single 
application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of 
a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member 
State [2011] OJ L 343/1; Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of 
employment as seasonal workers [2014] OJ L 94/375; Directive 2016/801 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational 
projects and au pairing [2016] OJ L 132/21. 
89 This statistic comes from Muir (n 87) 139 citing Groenendijk, ‘Citizens and Third Country Nationals: 




Secondly, Article 21(2) CFR may enhance protection from discrimination in horizontal 
situations. As discussed above, although applicants may rely on Article 45 TFEU against 
private individuals, Article 18 TFEU and the Treaty rules on services and establishment 
are only invokable against private actors of a collective or regulatory nature. 
Importantly, the ECJ in Egenberger recently suggested that Article 21(2) might be 
applicable in disputes concerning ‘contracts between individuals’90 without the 
qualification that one actor is of a collective or regulatory nature. Egenberger concerned 
Article 21(1) CFR, but the reasoning could apply to Article 21(2) CFR. The ECJ built 
upon earlier case law requiring that, to apply horizontally, a Charter right is ‘sufficient in 
itself to confer on individuals an individual right which they may invoke’ in horizontal 
disputes.91 As Articles 18 TFEU can be invoked in (some) disputes between private 
parties, the prohibition on nationality discrimination in Article 21(2) CFR likely meets 
this threshold. When applying Article 21(1) CFR to a contract between individuals, the 
ECJ in Egenberger cited the ‘mandatory’ nature of that Charter right as the reason for its 
horizontal effect.92 Other provisions considered ‘mandatory’ by the ECJ include Articles 
18 and 45 TFEU93 suggesting that Article 21(2) CFR would meet this threshold. 
 
Thirdly, a potential divergence between Article 21(2) CFR and overlapping Treaty 
provisions emerges regarding the permissible limits to the prohibition on nationality 
discrimination. As discussed in Chapter 3, Article 52(1) CFR sets out the possibility of 
derogating from Charter rights. According to that provision: 
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter 
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. 
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are 
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union 
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
                                               
Differential Treatment or Discrimination’ in J Carlier and E Guild, The Future of Free Movement of Persons in 
the EU (Bruylant 2006) 85. 
90 Case C-414/16 Egenberger EU:C:2018:257, para. 77. 
91 Case C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale EU:C:2014:2, para. 47. 
92 Egenberger (n 90), paras 76-77. 
93 Egenberger (n 90), para. 77. Indeed, one might even question whether the ECJ intended to refer to 
Article 21(2) CFR as well as Article 21(1) CFR by referring just to ‘Article 21 of the Charter’ in Egenberger 
(although the facts of the case only engaged Article 21(1) CFR). 
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In one sense, Article 52(1) CFR appears to set a more stringent threshold for 
justification than previously set out in the ECJ’s case law. Under the free movement 
provisions and Article 18 TFEU, indirectly discriminatory measures are capable of 
justification if the measure aims to secure a legitimate objective, is appropriate for 
achieving that objective, and does not go beyond what is necessary. To limit rights 
under the Charter, Article 52(1) CFR adds two additional criteria: the contested measure 
must be ‘provided for by law’ and must ‘respect the essence’ of the Charter right. The 
Charter potentially provides an additional hurdle for justifying measures which 
discriminate on grounds of nationality. In another sense, Article 52(1) CFR offers less 
protection since it applies to ‘any limitation’ and so could potentially be relied upon to 
justify directly discriminatory measures. In contrast, under the free movement 
provisions direct discrimination is only permissible by having recourse to one of the 
express derogations while it is unlikely that directly discriminatory measures can be 
justified under Article 18 TFEU. 
 
To sum up briefly, in theory, Article 21(2) CFR could diverge from the Treaty 
framework. The discussion above is, however, dependent on how the ECJ interprets 
Article 52(2) CFR and the ‘without prejudice’ clause in practice. 
 
3.3. Article 52(2) CFR and the ‘Without Prejudice’ Clause 
Two distinct priority clauses regulate the inter-relationship between Article 21(2) CFR 
and overlapping Treaty provisions. The first, identical to that in Article 18 TFEU, grants 
priority to more specialised overlapping Treaty provisions: Article 21(2) CFR is ‘without 
prejudice to … specific provisions’ in the Treaties. In theory, the ‘without prejudice’ 
clause in Article 21(2) CFR should mimic the operation of the same clause in Article 18 
TFEU. When one of the free movement provisions applies in a given situation, the 
expectation is thus that this will preclude the application of Article 21(2) CFR just as it 
precludes the application of Article 18 TFEU. 
 
What is more complex is the inter-relationship between Article 18 TFEU and Article 
21(2) CFR. The equivalence of the two provisions removes the possibility of relying on 
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the principle of lex specialis as codified by the ‘without prejudice’ clause.94 Instead, the 
key provision mediating their inter-relationship is Article 52(2) CFR, which – rather than 
adopting the wording commonly used in priority clauses such as ‘shall not affect’, 
‘without prejudice’, ‘subject to’95 – specifies that ‘[r]ights recognised by this Charter for 
which provision is made in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and 
within the limits defined by those Treaties.’ The Explanations – to which due regard 
must be had when interpreting the Charter96 – clarify that Article 52(2) CFR: 
… refers to rights which were already expressly guaranteed in the Treaty establishing 
the European Community and have been recognised in the Charter, and which are 
now found in the Treaties (notably the rights derived from Union citizenship). It 
clarifies that such rights remain subject to the conditions and limits applicable to the 
Union law on which they are based, and for which provision is made in the Treaties. 
The Charter does not alter the system of rights conferred by the EC Treaty and 
taken over by the Treaties.97 
In addition, the Explanation relating to Article 21(2) CFR, that provision ‘must be 
applied in compliance with [Article 18 TFEU].’98  
 
Chapter 3 discussed the meaning of Article 52(2) CFR when a Charter right coincides 
with one of the legislative bases in the Treaties. The interpretation will differ here, 
however, given the overlap is with a directly equivalent Treaty right. In this context, 
there are three possible interpretations of Article 52(2) CFR: first, a narrow view, which 
restricts the application of Article 52(2) CFR to specific Treaty provisions that are 
subject to limits defined by Union secondary law, second, a middle view, focusing on 
the continued application of Article 52(1) CFR; finally, a broad view according to which 
Article 52(2) CFR essentially subjugates Article 21(2) CFR to the Treaties. The following 
discussion seeks to present each possible interpretation in its best light and concludes 
that the only feasible interpretation of Article 52(2) CFR is the third option (the broad 
view). 
 
                                               
94 According to Rossi, ‘[i]f the Charter and the Treaty had the same status, the former, as lex specialis, 
should trump the latter’, see LS Rossi, ‘Same Legal Value as the Treaties: Rank, Primacy, and Direct 
Effects of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2017) 18(4) GLJ 771, 775. For a contrasting view 
arguing that the Treaties are lex specialis, see R Schütze, ‘Three “Bills of Rights” for the European Union’ 
(2011) 30(1) YEL 131, 149. 
95 See Chapter 2, Section 3.2. 
96 Article 52(7) CFR. 
97 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/17, 33. 
98 Explanations (n 97) 24. 
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The ‘narrow view’ would mean that Article 52(2) CFR does not apply to the inter-
relationship between Article 18 TFEU and Article 21(2) CFR. Under this interpretation, 
Article 52(2) CFR only applies to Charter rights where the overlapping Treaty provision 
is explicitly subject to limitations in Union secondary law. Support for this view is found 
in the Explanations to Article 52(2) CFR, which draw a link to Union citizenship and 
the specific references to Article 52(2) CFR in the Explanations to Articles 39, 40, 41(3)-
(4), 43, 44 and 45 CFR all of which concern Union citizenship. Articles 20 and 21(1) 
TFEU on the rights of Union citizens set up an inverse hierarchy according to which 
the rights of Union citizens are to be ‘exercised in accordance with’ and ‘subject to the 
limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them 
effect.’ By focusing on the express relevance of Article 52(2) CFR for Union citizenship 
rights one can argue for a more limited reading of that provision.99 
 
However, the difficulty with the above reading of Article 52(2) CFR is that it involves a 
selective reading of the Explanations. Focusing on specific mentions of Article 52(2) 
CFR prioritises these individual references over the resounding conclusion that the 
‘Charter does not alter the system of rights conferred by the EC Treaty and taken over 
by the Treaties’ in the Explanations to Article 52(2) CFR. It also overlooks the explicit 
link drawn between Article 18 TFEU and Article 21(2) CFR in the Explanations, 
according to which the latter ‘must be applied in compliance with’ the former. 
 
The second interpretation of Article 52(2) CFR focuses of the continued relevance of 
Article 52(1) CFR (setting out the limits on limits to the Charter). Where both Article 
52(1) CFR and Article 52(2) CFR are engaged, does Article 52(1) still apply? If so, 
Article 21(2) CFR could provide an additional level of scrutiny; even where a 
discriminatory measure complies with Article 18 TFEU, it would still need to comply 
                                               
99 Furthermore, the Explanations to Articles 15(3), 23, 42 and 46 CFR each refer to Article 52(2) CFR. 
Article 42 CFR (on the right to access to documents) corresponds with Article 15(3) TFEU according to 
which ‘[g]eneral principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this right of 
access to documents shall be determined by the European Parliament and the Council, by means of 
regulations, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.’ Likewise, Article 15(3) CFR (on 
working conditions of third country nationals) corresponds with Article 153 TFEU, which empowers the 
EU to act to ‘support and complement the activities of the Member States [relating to the] conditions of 
employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory’. Finally, Article 23 CFR (on sex 
discrimination) overlaps with Article 157(4) TFEU both of which allow for legislative measures that aim 
to promote sex equality i.e. positive discrimination. 
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with Article 52(1) CFR. Article 52 CFR does not set out a hierarchy between provisions 
leaving the matter to the ECJ.100 One can argue that Article 52(1) applies to ‘any 
limitation’101 and not only those where Article 52(2) CFR does not also apply. This 
argument is unpersuasive as it overlooks the lex specialis nature of Article 52(2) CFR. In 
contrast to Article 52(1) CFR, which sets out general guidance for justifying limits on 
Charter rights, Article 52(2) CFR specifies the role of the Charter where an overlapping 
Treaty provision exists. Furthermore, if one interprets Article 52(1) CFR as applying to 
all limitations on Charter rights it would potentially lead to a reduction in existing 
protections, something the Charter express aims of ‘codification’ would seem to rule 
out. 
 
This takes us to the third view and the view preferred by the academic literature.102 On 
this view, Article 52(2) CFR mediates the inter-relationship between Article 18 TFEU 
and Article 21(2) CFR. However, it does not operate in the same manner as the ‘without 
prejudice’ clause. If it did, the applicability of Article 18 TFEU would preclude the 
application of Article 21(2) CFR. Linking to the situations outlined above, it would still 
permit recourse to Article 21(2) CFR in situations involving third-country nationals and 
potentially in contractual disputes between individuals (but not if the justificatory 
framework differed). The weight of evidence suggests that Article 52(2) CFR intended 
to pre-empt any independent application or added value of Article 21(1) CFR. The 
reasons are threefold: first, the aims behind the Charter strongly imply that it intended 
to codify and not alter existing Treaty rights. According to the Preamble, the Charter 
aims to ‘reaffirm’ existing rights and make those rights ‘more visible’.103 Secondly, 
viewing Article 52 CFR as a whole, Article 52(2) CFR – unlike Article 52(3) – does not 
include the possibility that the Charter might provide for ‘more extensive protection’.104 
                                               
100 Discussing the relationship between Articles 52(1) and 52(2) CFR, Peers and Prechal outline ‘three 
possible conflict rules: one of the two paragraphs could apply exclusively; two paragraphs could apply 
simultaneously, with the Charter right interpreted on the basis of the lowest common denominator (this 
could be described as a ‘lower standards’ approach); or the paragraphs could apply simultaneously with 
the most stringent interpretation rules applying (the ‘higher standards’ approach)’, see S Peers and S 
Prechal, ‘Scope and Interpretation of Rights and Principles’ in S Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart 2014) 1455-1522, para. 52.208. 
101 Peers and Prechal (n 100), para. 52.213. 
102 K Lenaerts and E de Smijter, ‘A “Bill of Rights” for the European Union’ (2001) 38 CMLRev 273, 282; 
Schütze (n 94) 149. 
103 Recital 4. 
104 Peers and Prechal (n 100), para. 52.213. 
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Finally, the original rationale for including Article 52(2) CFR was to ensure that the 
Charter did not affect the Treaties. The Working Group on ‘Incorporation of the 
Charter/ accession to the ECHR’ describe the ‘consensus… that the legal situation as 
defined by the EC Treaty should remain unaffected by the Charter’105 and describes 
Article 52(2) CFR as a ‘referral clause’ that ensures ‘complete compatibility between the 
statements of the rights in the Charter and their more detailed regulation as currently 
found in the EC Treaty’.106 
 
Discussion now turns to assess how the ECJ interprets the inter-relationship between 
Article 21(1) CFR and overlapping Treaty provisions in practice. 
 
3.4. ECJ Practice Consistent with the ‘Without Prejudice’ Clause and Article 
52(2) CFR 
The main finding presented here is that, in the context of an overlap between Article 
21(2) CFR and Treaty provisions prohibiting nationality discrimination, ECJ practice 
coheres with the approach set out above. 
 
Overlaps between Article 21(2) CFR and the free movement rules arose in twenty-nine 
cases.107 ECJ practice fits with respect for the ‘without prejudice’ clause in all cases. 
Where the ECJ determines that the contested measure falls foul of the free movement 
rules and amounts to an unjustified restriction on intra-EU movement, the ECJ does 
not turn to consider Article 21(2) CFR.108 As expected given the lex specialis nature of the 
                                               
105 Convention, ‘Final Report of Working Group II on incorporation of the Charter and accession to the 
ECHR’ (CONV 354/02) 6. 
106 CONV 354/02, 6. 
107 Only those cases falling within the temporal scope of the Charter – i.e. where the factual situation 
arose after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty – were analysed. Relevant cases were identified by 
searching the database of the Court of Justice of the EU (curia.eu) by provision i.e. Articles 34, 35, 45, 49, 
46 and 63(1) TFEU. Case law is up to date as of 16 July 2018. 
108 Case C-514/12 Zentralbetriebsrat der gemeinnützigen Salzburger Landeskliniken EU:C:2013:799, para. 45; 
Hervis Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi (n 40), para. 45; Case C-481/12 Juvelta EU:C:2014:11, para. 34; Joined 
Cases C-53/13 and C-80/13 Strojírny Prostějov EU:C:2014:2011, paras 60-61; Case C-423/13 Vilniaus 
energija EU:C:2014:2186, para. 56; Case C-333/14 Scotch Whisky Association and Others EU:C:2015:845, para. 
50; Case C-148/15 Deutsche Parkinson Vereinigung EU:C:2016:776, para. 27; Case C-114/15 Audace and 
Others EU:C:2016:813, para. 75; Case C-525/14 Commission v Czech Republic EU:C:2016:714, para. 69; 
Medisanus (n 40), para. 104; Case C-509/12 Navileme and Nautizende EU:C:2014:54, para. 24; Schiebel Aircraft 
(n 40), para. 29; Nagy (n 40), para. 37; Case C-420/15 U EU:C:2017:408, para. 31; Case C-20/16 Bechtel 
EU:C:2017:488, para. 80; Case C-651/16 DW EU:C:2018:162, para. 38; Case C-3/17 Sporting Odds 
EU:C:2018:130, para. 68; SEGRO (n 14), para. 75; Case C-466/15 Adrien and Others EU:C:2016:749, para. 
38; Case C-392/15 Commission v Hungary EU:C:2017:73, para. 143; C-300/15 Kohll and Kohll-Schlesser 
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free movement rules and the ‘without prejudice’ clause in Article 21(2) CFR, there is no 
mention of Article 21(2) CFR. Furthermore, as the Charter aims – at a minimum – to 
codify the existing level of rights protection in the EU it would be contrary to the logic 
underpinning the Charter to ‘rescue’ a national measure already found contrary to the 
Treaty. When the ECJ concludes that the contested measure is non-discriminatory or 
otherwise justified,109 the ECJ does not then turn to consider Article 21(2) CFR. As 
such, the Charter does not act as an additional layer of scrutiny here. 
 
Overlaps arose between Article 18 TFEU and Article 21(2) CFR in six cases.110 In line 
with the understanding of Article 52(2) CFR set out above, the ECJ does not turn to 
assess Article 21(2) CFR after finding that a national measure is contrary to Article 18 
TFEU.111 Admittedly, only one case – Rüffer – has arisen on the point so far and Article 
21(2) CFR was not mentioned. Had a party to the proceedings argued that the contested 
measure could be ‘saved’ by relying on Article 21(2) CFR, Pfleger provides an indication 
as to how the ECJ would respond. Pfleger concerned a national law on the pre-
authorisation of gambling machines and the compatibility of those pre-authorisation 
rules with EU law. It was alleged, first, that the national rules might be contrary to free 
movement law and, secondly, that the national rules infringed the freedom to conduct a 
business and the right to property enshrined in Articles 15-17 CFR. The ECJ began by 
analysing the Treaty rules on services112 and strongly suggested that the national rule was 
disproportionate to the aim pursued.113 The ECJ then turned to consider the arguments 
relating to the Charter. Dismissing the possibility that the national measure might 
comply with the Charter, the ECJ held that: 
                                               
EU:C:2016:361, para. 63; Case C-515/14 Commission v Cyprus EU:C:2016:30, para. 58; Case C-317/14 
Commission v Belgium EU:C:2015:63, para. 35; Case C-168/14 Grupo Itevelesa and Others EU:C:2015:685, para. 
84; Case C-151/14 Commission v Latvia EU:C:2015:577, para. 77; Case C-25/14 UNIS EU:C:2015:821, 
para. 46; Case C-344/13 Blanco EU:C:2014:2311, para. 48; Joined Cases C-39/13 to C-41/13 SCA Group 
Holding EU:C:2014:1758, para. 56; 
109 Erzberger (n 40), para. 41; Case C-195/16 I EU:C:2017:815, para. 79; Case C-496/15 Eschenbrenner 
EU:C:2017:152, para. 59; Case C-68/15 X EU:C:2017:379, para. 61; Case C-50/14 CASTA and Others 
EU:C:2016:56, para. 67; Case C-512/13 Sopora EU:C:2015:108, para. 36; Case C-342/15 Piringer 
EU:C:2017:196, para. 71 
110 This Section only considers cases falling outside the scope of the free movement provisions. 
111 Case C-322/13 Grauel Rüffer EU:C:2014:189, para. 27 
112 Case C-390/12 Pfleger and Others EU:C:2014:281, para. 39. 
113 Pfleger and Others (n 112), para. 54. 
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… an unjustified or disproportionate restriction of the freedom to provide services 
under Article 56 TFEU is also not permitted under Article 52(1) of the Charter in 
relation to Articles 15 to 17 of the Charter.114 
What is strongly implied by the ECJ is the redundancy of the Charter where there is an 
overlapping Treaty provisions. Clarifying the role of the Charter here, the ECJ ruled 
that: 
… an examination of the restriction represented by the national legislation at issue 
in the main proceedings from the point of view of Article 56 TFEU covers also 
possible limitations of the exercise of the rights and freedoms provided for in 
Articles 15 to 17 of the Charter, so that a separate examination is not necessary.115 
Nic Shuibhne refers to this as an ‘absorptive effect’ as what amounts to an unjustified 
restriction on free movement under the Treaty is also an unjustified restriction of the 
overlapping Charter right.116 
 
In the remaining cases, the ECJ finds that the contested national measure is not contrary 
to Article 18 TFEU.117 After reaching this conclusion the ECJ does not then assess 
whether Article 21(2) CFR might offer an additional layer of protection. For example, in 
Commission v Netherlands, the Commission brought infringement proceedings against the 
Netherlands for refusing to grant EU migrant students travel allowances granted to 
Dutch nationals. The case turned on the interpretation of Article 24(2) of Directive 
2004/38,118 according to which: 
… the host Member State shall not be obliged … to grant maintenance aid for 
studies, including vocational training, consisting in student grants or student loans to 
persons other than workers, self-employed persons, persons who retain such status 
and members of their families. 
The ECJ recognised that ‘Article 24(2) is a derogation from the principle of equal 
treatment provided for in Article 18 TFEU’ and so ‘must be interpreted narrowly’.119 
                                               
114 Pfleger and Others (n 112), para. 59. 
115 Pfleger and Others (n 112), para. 60. 
116 N Nic Shuibhne, ‘Integrating Union Citizenship and the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ in D Thym 
(ed), Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU (Hart 2017) 209-
240, 214. 
117 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic EU:C:2015:597, paras 57-58; Case C-299/14 García-Nieto EU:C:2016:114, 
paras 40-51; Case C-233/14 Commission v Netherlands EU:C:2016:396, para. 86.Case C-182/15 Petruhhin 
EU:C:2016:630, para. 50; Case C-191/16 Pisciotti EU:C:2018:222, para. 56. 
118 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States [2004] OJ L 158/77. 
119 Commission v Netherlands (n 117), para. 86.  
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The suggestion is that the provision is compatible with Article 18 TFEU and the 
remainder of the analysis focuses on whether the contested national measure falls within 
that derogation.120. No mention is made of Article 21(2) CFR.121 The implication of this 
case law is therefore that: measures compatible with the Treaty will also be compatible 
with the Charter. 
 
Supporting this reading of the case law, the ECJ examined an argument that the Charter 
might offer an additional layer of protection on top of overlapping Treaty rights in 
ONEm and M. After finding that the contested measure complied with Article 45 
TFEU, the ECJ then went on consider arguments that the contested measure breached 
Article 15(2) CFR, which also grants a right to free movement for workers. Addressing 
this point, the ECJ held that if the contested rule ‘complies with Article 45 TFEU … it 
also complies with Article 15(2) of the Charter.’122 While Article 52(2) CFR was not 
relied upon expressly to justify this conclusion, the ECJ cited its earlier case of Gardella 
in which it held that: 
As regards Article 15(2) of the Charter, it must be borne in mind that Article 52(2) 
thereof, which provides that rights recognised by the Charter for which provision is 
made in the treaties are to be exercised under the conditions and within the limits 
defined therein. In that vein, Article 15(2) of the Charter reiterates inter alia the free 
movement of workers guaranteed by Article 45 TFEU, as confirmed by the 
explanations relating to that provision.123 
Thus, if Article 21(2) CFR was not expressly ‘without prejudice’ to more specific 
provisions in the Treaties, Article 52(2) CFR essentially precludes Article 21(2) CFR 
from applying independently. 
 
3.5. Evaluation 
In sum, where Charter rights overlap with Treaty provisions, the ECJ’s interpretation of 
Article 52(2) CFR prevents those rights from having what Spaventa terms ‘an 
autonomous life’.124 The ECJ’s case law suggests that Article 21(2) CFR cannot apply 
                                               
120 Commission v Netherlands (n 117), para. 87ff. 
121 See also Alimanovic (n 117), paras 57-58; García-Nieto (n 117), paras 40-51; Petruhhin (n 117), para. 50; 
Pisciotti (n 117), para. 56. 
122 Case C-284/15 ONEm and M EU:C:2016:220, para. 34. 
123 Case C-233/12 Gardella EU:C:2013:449, para. 39. See also Case C-444/15 Associazione Italia Nostra 
Onlus EU:C:2016:978, paras 62-63 
124 E Spaventa, ‘Freedom of Movement and of Residence’ in S Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart 2014) 1161–1176, para. 45.34. 
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independently and that the replication of Article 18 TFEU in the Charter has little 
impact. Despite the potential for Article 21(2) CFR to add to the existing protection 
under the Treaty framework, as outlined above, the ECJ’s interpretation of Article 52(2) 
CFR means that Article 21(2) CFR does not – and cannot – add to the pre-Charter legal 
framework. 
 
One can recall here the tension between competing constitutional values and how 
different approaches to norm inter-relationship might alternately prioritise different 
constitutional principles, as discussed in Chapter 2. That tension manifests here. If the 
ECJ relied on Article 21(2) CFR as an additional check on legality (so that rules justified 
under the free movement provisions or Article 18 TFEU still had to satisfy Article 52(1) 
CFR), this would enhance protection from discrimination while increasing uncertainty 
over the compatibility of certain measures with Union law. The ECJ’s approach in the 
cases outlined above, i.e. interpreting Article 21(2) CFR as identical to Article 18 TFEU, 
thus prioritises the aim of legal certainty over the competing constitutional principle of 
fundamental rights protection. As Lenaerts and de Smijter argue, ‘from a standpoint of 
coherence of legal rules and thus of legal certainty it is to be applauded that the 
conditions of exercise of rights stated in the Charter are the same as those applying to 
the equivalent rights contained in the EC or EU Treaty.’125  
 
However, it is submitted that the ECJ’s approach perhaps goes too far in one direction 
and overly prioritises legal certainty over competing considerations. Arguably, a better 
balance might be to accept that Article 21(2) CFR cannot apply independently, but to 
recognise that the entry into force of the Charter – and the inclusion of an overlapping 
prohibition on nationality discrimination in a human rights document – should prompt 
a re-evaluation of the ECJ’s existing interpretation of Article 18 TFEU. For example, 
the ECJ might at least examine whether its interpretation of Article 18 TFEU as 
applying only to Union citizens is compatible with the post-Charter status of the 
prohibition on discrimination as a fundamental right. By overlooking the inclusion of 
the prohibition on nationality discrimination in the Charter, the ECJ ignores the 
qualitative shift in the nature of Article 18 TFEU further away from its market origins, 
                                               
125 Lenaerts and de Smijter (n 102) 282. 
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including what this might mean for the ECJ’s long-standing interpretation of that right. 
Such a reading would be compatible with Article 52(2) CFR, which only refers to the 
need for Charter rights corresponding with Treaty rights to ‘be exercised under the 
conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties.’  
 
In fact, the ECJ follows the proposed approach in Delvigne, which concerned the right to 
vote in elections to the European Parliament. Following his conviction for a serious 
crime, French law permanently removed Mr Delvigne from the electoral register.126 Mr 
Delvigne challenged the compatibility of the relevant French law with Article 39(2) 
CFR, according to which ‘members of the European Parliament shall be elected by 
direct universal suffrage in a free and secret ballot’. This Charter provision replicates – 
almost exactly127 – Article 14(3) TEU, which pre-existed the drafting of the Charter. The 
reasoning in Delvigne evidences a qualitative shift from pre-Charter case law on the right 
to vote in European Parliament elections. In the 2006 case of Eman and Sevinger, for 
example, the ECJ referred to how ‘the definition of the persons entitled to vote and to 
stand for election falls within the competence of each Member State in compliance with 
Community law.’128 In contrast, the ECJ in Delvigne expressly notes that Article 39(2) 
CFR ‘constitutes the expression in the Charter of the right of Union citizens to vote in 
elections to the European Parliament’.129 Van Eijken and van Rossem note how the 
ECJ’s decision in Delvigne suggests that ‘Union citizens have the right, qualitate qua, to 
vote in elections to the European Parliament … [and] departs from its earlier case law 
on electoral rights, in which it stressed that Union citizens … could not claim such an 
unequivocal right to vote.’130 The replication of a provision already found in the Treaties 
in the Charter leads the ECJ in Delvigne to alter its previous interpretation.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter assessed how the ECJ resolves overlaps between primary norms in 
practice. The conclusions differ as to: first, the inter-relationship different between 
                                               
126 Case C-650/13 Delvigne EU:C:2015:648, para. 15 
127 Article 14(3) TEU additionally specifies the term of the European Parliament. 
128 Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger EU:C:2006:545, para. 45. 
129 Delvigne (n 126), para. 44 
130 H van Eijken and JW van Rossem, ‘Prisoner Disenfranchisement and the Right to Vote in Elections to 
the European Parliament: Universal Suffrage Key to Unlocking Political Citizenship?’ (2016) 12(1) 
EuConst 114, 123. 
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Article 18 TFEU and the free movement rules; and, second, the relationship between 
Article 21(2) CFR and overlapping Treaty provisions. 
 
In relation to the inter-relationship between Article 18 TFEU and overlapping free 
movement rules, Section 2 establishes the significance of this issue. Divergences emerge 
between the overlapping norms discussed, which means the ECJ’s approach might alter 
the rights and obligations of parties to a dispute. An extensive analysis of ECJ case law 
shows how the ECJ almost always respects the ‘without prejudice’ clause in Article 18 
TFEU that essentially codifies the lex specialis rule. In the event of a conflict, the ‘without 
prejudice’ clause precludes the application of the containing norm i.e. Article 18 TFEU. 
The ‘without prejudice’ clause does not necessarily prevent Article 18 TFEU from 
offering additional rights; however, this is only in those situations where the 
discriminatory rules are not precluded or otherwise justified under the free movement 
rules. This can be ambiguous at the boundaries of the free movement rules, especially 
when a specific situation is excluded from or otherwise falls outside the scope of the 
free movement rules as in Neukirchinger and Ferlini. Overall, however, the ECJ does not 
interpret the ‘without prejudice’ clause as preventing the application of Article 18 TFEU 
in situations not explicitly regulated by the Treaty freedoms. 
 
In one sense it might have seemed quite banal to examine the inter-relationship between 
Article 18 TFEU and the free movement provisions. However, the value in doing so 
links to the point that there has actually been very little consideration of the principles 
and legal tools that govern the inter-relationship between norms in EU law. 
Furthermore, as analysis of the Phil Collins case law shows, the ECJ does sometimes 
depart from the ‘without prejudice’ clause thereby calling the residual nature of Article 
18 TFEU into doubt. Greater clarity over the application of such clauses is thus not 
unnecessary. Furthermore, what the above analysis shows is that the ‘without prejudice’ 
clause works well in practice. It offers predictability over the inter-relationship between 
norms and ensures that the more detailed and more efficacious norm will apply, in line 
with the lex specialis principle. 
 
On the inter-relationship between Article 21(2) CFR overlapping Treaty provisions, 
Section 3 offers a detailed analysis of how Article 52(2) CFR operates when there is an 
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overlapping Treaty provision. Despite the potential added value of Article 21(2) CFR, 
the ECJ’s interpretation of Article 52(2) CFR prevents that provision from playing any 
independent role. Where a Charter right overlaps with an equivalent Treaty right, this 
seriously limits the potential added-value of the Charter and makes the inclusion of a 
Treaty right in the Charter of Fundamental Rights essentially meaningless. It is argued 
that the ECJ’s approach does not sufficiently recognise the implications of the Charter. 
From the perspective of legal certainty, Article 21(2) CFR should not apply residually (in 
the same way Article 18 TFEU relates to the free movement rules). However, this 
should not prevent an assessment of whether the ECJ’s pre-Charter interpretation of 
Article 18 TFEU befits the nature of that Treaty provision as a fundamental right. 
 
Overall, as a technique for resolving questions of norm inter-relationship, this Chapter 
shows that the ECJ tends to follow priority clauses consistently. This fits with the 
argument made in Chapter 2 that priority clauses, such as the ‘without prejudice’ clause, 
can provide a workable approach that can guide the ECJ. This is, at least, the conclusion 
reached in relation to overlapping primary norms and ‘without prejudice’ clauses. 
Chapter 5 now turns to assess how the ECJ approaches overlaps between norms of the 











This Chapter focuses on another set of overlaps between norms of the same status: 
overlaps between different provisions of secondary Union law prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of nationality. Chapter 2 discussed the relevance of priority 
clauses and the principles of lex specialis and lex posterior – prioritising whichever norm is 
more specific or later in time – for determining overlaps between norms of the same 
rank. This Chapter assesses ECJ practice against this baseline and concludes that the 
ECJ should follow interpretative guidance offered by priority clauses (reaffirming the 
conclusion reached in Chapter 4) and the principle of lex specialis. 
 
As a testing ground, this Chapter focuses on overlaps between secondary norms 
prohibiting nationality discrimination; specifically, the Chapter examines secondary 
norms granting equal access to certain social benefits. Attention focuses on the overlap 
between Regulations 883/20041 and 492/20112 (replacing Regulations 1612/683 and 
1408/714 respectively) and Directive 2004/38.5 While there is a priority clause mediating 
the inter-relationship between the Regulations, no express clause determines the inter-
relationship between the Regulations and Directive 2004/38. It is argued that the 
principle of lex specialis offers the most logical guidance to the ECJ in this context, since 
                                               
1 Regulation 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L 166/1. 
2 Regulation 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of 
movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L 141/1. 
3 Regulation 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within 
the Community [1968] OJ Spec Ed (II) 475. 
4 Regulation 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons and their families moving within the Community [1971] OJ Spec Ed (II) 416. 
5 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States [2004] OJ L 158/77. 
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the different amendments to the Regulations make it difficult to identify the relevant 
date for effective application of lex posterior. 
 
Where a priority clause exists, this Chapter shows that the ECJ almost always follows 
such a clause. The overall conclusion reached is that respecting priority clauses works 
well and reaches a balance between competing concerns. In the absence of a priority 
clause, though, the ECJ does not follow a consistent approach. Despite the potential 
relevance of the lex specialis principle in the case study adopted, ECJ practice rarely 
concurs with this approach. However, where ECJ practice coheres with reliance on the 
lex specialis principle, this Chapter shows the attendant benefits from the perspective of 
legal certainty, institutional balance and fundamental rights protection. Overall, where 
there is no priority clause, it is argued that the ECJ ought to rely upon the principle of 
lex specialis more consistently than it does and should clearly articulate this. 
 
2. CASE STUDY: EQUAL ACCESS TO SOCIAL BENEFITS 
To test the ECJ’s use of priority clauses and priority principles when determining the 
inter-relationship between overlapping secondary norms, this Chapter concentrates on 
EU rules prohibiting nationality discrimination in connection with eligibility for social 
security and social assistance:6 Regulations 883/2004 and 492/2011 (replacing 
Regulations 1408/71 and 1612/68 respectively) and Directive 2004/38. While these 
measures do not usually coincide,7 each grants (some) EU citizens and their family 
members the right to equal treatment as regards certain social benefits. Put briefly, 
Regulation 883/2004 grants ‘nationals of a Member State … who are or have been 
subject to the legislation of one or more Member States’8 equal treatment in accessing 
social security benefits; Regulation 492/2011 grants migrant workers ‘the same social 
and tax advantages as national workers’;9 and Directive 2004/38 grants the right to equal 
                                               
6 For a more wide-ranging survey of EU laws prohibiting nationality discrimination, see Chapter 1. 
7 These measures are, in fact, largely distinct: Regulation 492/2011 aims to secure free movement of 
workers and covers access to employment and vocational training and employment rights; Regulation 
883/2004 coordinates social security entitlement across the EU and includes rules on entitlement to and 
aggregation of benefits as well as which Member State is responsible; and Directive 2004/38 sets out the 
conditions and administrative formalities for obtaining and retaining residence rights in a host Member 
State. 
8 Article 2(1). 
9 Article 7(2). 
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treatment ‘within the scope of the Treaty’10 to lawfully resident Union citizens (with 
certain exceptions). This Section highlights the similarities, but also the divergences, 
between these overlapping measures. 
 
2.1. Material Scope 
Each measure grants equal access to different – but overlapping – categories of social 
benefits. Regulation 883/2004 applies to social security11 and special non-contributory 
benefits,12 but explicitly does not cover social assistance.13 Regulation 492/2011 applies 
to the broader concept of social advantages,14 namely all benefits which: 
… whether or not linked to a contract of employment, are generally granted to 
national workers primarily because of their objective status as workers or by virtue 
of the mere fact of their residence on the national territory and whose extension to 
workers who are nationals of other Member States therefore seems likely to facilitate 
the mobility of such workers within the Community.15 
The wide definition of social advantages means that certain benefits fall within the 
material scope of both Regulations.16 An overlap emerges in relation to social security17 
and special non-contributory benefits18 under Regulation 883/2004, which are also 
social advantages. However, the concept of social advantages also encompasses benefits 
falling outside the scope of Regulation 883/2004 such as study finance19 and social 
assistance benefits.20 Directive 2004/38 added to these existing overlaps. The Directive 
                                               
10 Article 24(1). 
11 Article 3 of Regulation 883/2004 exhaustively lists the benefits classed as ‘social security’ as benefits 
relating to sickness, maternity and paternity, invalidity, old-age, survivors’, occupational accidents and 
diseases, death, unemployment, pre-retirement and family. To qualify as ‘social security’, a benefit must 
cover one of these risks and be granted as of right to recipients in a legally defined position, see e.g. Case 
1/72 Frilli EU:C:1972:56, para. 14; Case 249/83 Hoeckx EU:C:1985:139, para. 12. 
12 Special non-contributory benefits have the characteristics of both social security and social assistance. 
They were introduced by Regulation 1247/92 of 30 April 1992 amending Regulation 1408/71 [1992] OJ 
L 136/1. 
13 Article 3(5). A benefit will be social assistance ‘where it prescribes need as an essential criterion for its 
application and does not stipulate any re­quirement as to periods of employment, membership, or 
contribution’, see Frilli (n 11), para. 14; Case 187/73 Callemeyn EU:C:1974:57, para. 7. 
14 Article 7(2). See also Regulation 1612/68, Article 7(2). 
15 Case 207/78 Even EU:C:1979:144, para. 22; Hoeckx (n 11), para. 20; Case 122/84 Scrivner 
EU:C:1985:145, para. 24. 
16 Case C-111/91 Commission v Luxembourg (childbirth and maternity allowances) EU:C:1993:92, paras 22, 32; 
Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala EU:C:1998:217, paras 24, 26-27. 
17 Commission v Luxembourg (childbirth and maternity allowances) (n 16), paras 22, 32; Case C-310/91 Schmid 
EU:C:1993:221, para. 17; Martínez Sala (n 16), paras 24, 26-27. 
18 Case C-287/05 Hendrix EU:C:2007:494, paras 38, 49. 
19 Case 39/86 Lair EU:C:1988:322, para. 24; Case C-3/90 Bernini EU:C:1992:89, paras 23, 25; Case C-
337/97 Meeusen EU:C:1999:284, para. 19. 
20 Case 94/84 Deak EU:C:1985:264, paras 15, 22; Hoeckx (n 11), para. 22; Scrivner (n 15), para. 26. 
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covers all benefits falling within the scope of the Treaty,21 and so overlaps with social 
security and special non-contributory benefits under Regulation 883/2004 and social 
advantages under Regulation 492/2011.22  
 
The adoption of Directive 2004/38, which permits Member States to restrict eligibility 
to certain benefits covered by both the Directive and the Regulations, led to additional 
complications. According to Article 24(2) of the Directive, a ‘host Member State shall 
not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the first three months of 
residence or [to jobseekers] nor shall it be obliged, prior to acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence, to grant maintenance aid … to persons other than workers, self-
employed persons, persons who retain such status and members of their families.’ A 
potential conflict arises here since social assistance under the Directive does not cover 
only those benefits excluded from Regulation 883/200423 but also special non-
contributory benefits24 and social advantages. Similarly, maintenance aid for studies is a 
social advantage.25 Making the inter-relationship between norms crucial here, Directive 
2004/38 allows Member States to restrict access to certain benefits, while – in relation 
to the same benefits – Regulations 883/2004 and 492/2011 do not permit derogations 
from equal treatment.26  
 
A social benefit may, therefore, fall within the material scope of one or more of the 
measures considered here. In most instances, the different equal treatment rights 
accumulate. What creates complications are the permissible derogations from equal 
treatment in Directive 2004/38; the Directive conflicts with the overlapping Regulations 
by allowing Member States to limit equal treatment when the overlapping Regulations 
do not. Which measure the ECJ prioritises can thus alter the applicant’s entitlement to 
certain benefits. 
 
                                               
21 Article 24(1). 
22 Martínez Sala (n 16), paras 24, 26, 57. 
23 Case C-140/12 Brey EU:C:2013:565, para. 61. 
24 Brey (n 23), paras 33-36, 62. 
25 Case C-46/12 LN EU:C:2013:97, paras 34, 50. Maintenance aid is not a social security or special non-
contributory benefit and so falls outside the material scope of Regulation 883/2004, see Case C-33/99 
Fahmi and Esmoris Cerdeiro-Pinedo Amado EU:C:2001:176, para. 35. 
26 Regulation 492/2011 applies only to workers and their family members it is unlikely that a conflict 
emerges between Regulation 492/2011 and Directive 2004/38 regarding eligibility for social assistance. 
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2.2. Personal Scope 
In terms of who can claim equal treatment and with whom, each measure applies to a 
slightly different subset of Union citizens and grants equal treatment with nationals of 
either their home or host Member State. 
 
One overlap is quite simple: all of the measures apply to Union citizens working in a host 
Member State. Regulation 492/2011 grants the right to equal treatment to workers. 
Regulation 883/2004 applies to ‘nationals of a Member State … who are or have been 
subject to the legislation of one or more Member States’, clearly covering workers.27 
Directive 2004/38 applies to ‘all Union citizens residing on the basis of this Directive’,28 
which includes Union citizens working and residing in a host Member State.29 A Union 
citizen working and residing in a host Member State may thus be able to invoke all three 
measures. 
 
Generally, a Union citizen will be entitled to equal treatment with nationals of the 
Member State of employment.30 However, the different rules applying to frontier 
workers (i.e. Unions citizen working in one Member State while residing in another) can 
lead to conflicts between the measures. Under Regulation 492/2011, a frontier worker is 
always entitled to equal treatment with nationals of the Member State of past and 
present employment.31 Regulation 883/2004 usually adopts this approach; in some 
circumstances, though, the Regulation only permits frontier workers to claim equal 
treatment in the Member State of residence.32 Adding additional complexities, the personal 
scope of Directive 2004/38 is limited to ‘Union citizens who move to or reside in a 
                                               
27 Article 2(1). 
28 Article 24(1). 
29 Article 7(1). Worker status can be retained in the event of: (a) temporary inability to work due to an 
illness or accident; (b) involuntary unemployment after being in employment for over a year; (c) 
involuntary unemployment after less than a year of working; (d) study or vocational training. 
30 Regulation 883/2004, Article 11(3)(a) ‘a person pursuing an activity as an employed or self-employed 
person in a Member State shall be subject to the legislation of that Member State’; Directive 2004/38, 
Article 24(1), a Union citizen ‘residing on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member 
State shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State’; Regulation 492/2011, Article 7, 
‘A worker who is a national of a Member State…in the territory of another Member State…shall enjoy 
the same social and tax advantages as national workers’. 
31 Case C-57/96 Meints EU:C:1997:564, para. 43ff; Meeusen (n 19), paras 18-25; Case C-212/05 Hartmann 
EU:C:2007:437, para. 38. 
32 Under Regulation 883/2004, a frontier worker can only claim unemployment benefits and special non-
contributory benefits in the Member State of residence: Articles 63, 65(2), 70(4). See also, Regulation 
1408/71, Articles 71(1)(a)(ii), 10a. 
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Member State other than that of which they are a national’.33 Thus Article 24 of 
Directive 2004/38 grants frontier workers residing in a host Member State the right 
equal treatment with nationals of the Member State of residence, but does not cover 
frontier workers working in a host Member State but residing in their home Member 
State. The measures point in different directions here. 
 
All three measures also extend the right to equal treatment to family members of Union 
citizens. Family members of Union citizens falling within the personal scope of 
Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38 are able to invoke the right to non-
discrimination,34 whereas Article 7(2) of Regulation 492/2011 only indirectly benefits 
family members of a worker.35 
 
Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38, unlike Regulation 492/2011, also apply to 
the self-employed and to some economically inactive persons. In relation to the self-
employed, Regulation 883/2004 replaced Regulation 1408/71, which applied – after 
amendment36 – to both employed and self-employed persons. Directive 2004/38 also 
grants a right of  residence to Union citizens who are self-employed in a host Member 
State.37 As regards economically inactive Union citizens, Regulation 883/2004 expands 
the personal scope of  its predecessor (Regulation 1408/71) by adding ‘a new category 
of  non-active persons’38 who have been subject to the social security systems of  one or 
more Member States. The personal scope of  Directive 2004/38 is not as broad, 
extending to economically inactive Union citizens in three situations: (1) during their 
first three months of  residence;39 (2) if  they meet certain conditions regarding financial 
resources and sickness insurance;40 or (3) if  they ‘provide evidence that they are 
                                               
33 Article 3. 
34 Regulation 883/2004, Article 2. Directive 2004/38, Articles 6(2), 7(1)(d). Under the Directive, family 
members retain the right of residence – and thereby also the right to equal treatment – after the death or 
departure of the Union citizen and, sometimes, in the event of a divorce: Articles 12, 13. 
35 Case 32/75 Cristini EU:C:1975:120, para. 13; Case 63/76 Inzirillo EU:C:1976:192, para. 21; Case 261/83 
Castelli EU:C:1984:280, paras 10-12; Deak (n 20), paras 23-24. 
36 Council Regulation 1390/81 extending to self-employed persons and members of their families 
Regulation 1408/71 [1981] OJ L 143/1. 
37 Directive 2004/38, Article 7(1).  
38 Regulation 883/2004, Preamble, Recital 42. 
39 Directive 2004/38, Article 6. 
40 Economically inactive Union citizens must prove they have sufficient resources for themselves and 
their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State 
and have comprehensive sickness insurance cover (Article 7(1)(b)). Students must have comprehensive 
sickness insurance and be able to ‘assure’ the national authority that they have sufficient resources for 
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continuing to seek employment and that they have a genuine chance of  being 
engaged.’41 The main point of  contrast here is the additional requirements imposed by 
Directive 2004/38 such as self-sufficiency and health insurance; Regulation 883/2004 
only requires previous coverage by the social security system of  a Member State. 
 
A point requiring further clarification is the concept of  ‘residence’ and its differing role 
under each measure. ‘Lawful residence’ (or the lack thereof) determines the personal 
scope of  Directive 2004/38. Union citizens (and their family members) will be lawfully 
resident under the Directive if  they fall within the situations set out above, i.e. Union 
citizens residing in a host Member State who are working, self-employed, seeking work, 
in the first three months of  residence or who otherwise meet certain conditions relating 
to resources and health insurance. Lawful residence preconditions the right of  Union 
citizens or their family members to claim equal treatment: Article 24(1) prohibits 
discrimination against ‘Union citizens residing on the basis of [Directive 2004/38]’.  
 
Conversely, Regulation 883/2004 employs a concept of  residence to allocate responsibility 
for administering benefits and prevent the concurrent application of  national legislation 
or gaps in protection. Article 11 of  Regulation 883/2004 sets out the Member State 
responsible for paying social security benefits, while Article 70 sets out rules concerning 
which Member State is responsible for paying special non-contributory benefits. Under 
Article 11, the Member State where economic activity is carried out (which may differ 
from the Member State of  residence) usually decides entitlement to social security 
benefits.42 However, where a Union citizen is economically inactive, Article 11(3)(e) 
reallocates responsibility for social security provision to the Member State of  residence. 
The Member State in which a Union citizen resides is, however, always responsible for 
special non-contributory benefits.43 Residence here is a term of  art and differs from the 
notion of  ‘lawful residence’ under Directive 2004/38. 
 
Under Regulation 883/2004, determining the Member State of  residence is a factual test 
assessing where ‘the persons concerned habitually reside and where the habitual centre 
                                               
themselves and their family members (Article 7(1)(c)). 
41 Article 14(4)(b). 
42 Regulation 883/2004, Article 11(3)(a). 
43 Regulation 883/2004, Article 65, 70(4). 
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of  their interests is to be found’.44 As a consequence, a person may not meet the 
conditions of  residence under both measures:45 a person may be lawfully resident under 
Directive 2004/38 but not under Regulation 883/2004 and vice versa. For example, a 
Union citizen in a host Member State for less than three months will be lawfully resident 
under Directive 2004/38 but may not satisfy the criterion of  habitual residence under 
Regulation 883/2004. A Union citizen staying temporarily in one Member State may 
claim equal access to social benefits (so long as they do not amount to social assistance) 
under Directive 2004/38. If  that Union citizen does not meet the criteria for residence 
in that Member State under Regulation 883/2004, they could potentially also claim 
social benefits in the Member State where they habitually reside. Conversely, under 
Regulation 883/2004 an economically inactive Union citizen in a host Member State 
may be resident there if  it is the centre of  their interests and may be able to claim equal 
treatment in that Member State if  they fall within the personal scope of  Regulation 
883/2004 (i.e. they have been subject to the social security system of  one or more 
Member States). However, that Union citizen may not be lawfully resident under 
Directive 2004/38 (and so able to rely on the right to equal treatment under the 
Directive) unless they meet the additional criteria specified therein. 
 
In sum, the measures outlined above create a complex legislative framework of  
entitlement: each measure covers slightly different benefits with distinct conditions for 
equal treatment. The personal scope of  Directive 2004/38 is narrower than Regulation 
883/2004,46 while Directive 2004/38 permits certain derogations from equal treatment. 
The important question is, then, ‘[h]ow will the Court decide on which expression of  
the principle of  non-discrimination it will rely when determining a Union citizen’s right 
to equal treatment?’47 
 
                                               
44 In determining the centre of a person’s interests ‘account should be taken in particular of the employed 
person’s family situation; the reasons which have led him to move; the length and continuity of his 
residence; the fact (where this is the case) that he is in stable employment; and his intention as it appears 
from all the circumstances’, see Case C-90/97 Swaddling EU:C:1999:96, para. 29. 
45 See H Verschueren, ‘Free Movement of Persons in the European Union and Social Rights: An Area of 
Conflicting Secondary Law Instruments?’ (2011) 12(2) ERA Forum 287, 295. 
46 See Section 5. 
47 S O’Leary, ‘Free Movement of Persons and Services’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of 
EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 499-545, 518. 
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3. PRIORITY CLAUSES AND PRIORITY PRINCIPLES 
The divergences between the overlapping norms considered by this Chapter make their 
inter-relationship all the more important. A priority clause mediates the relationship 
between Regulation 492/2011 and Regulation 883/2004. No express clause determines 
the inter-relationship between Directive 2004/38 and either overlapping Regulation, 
though, thereby engaging the principles of  lex specialis and lex posterior. 
 
3.1. The ‘Shall Not Affect’ Clause 
The Union legislature included a priority clause in Regulation 492/2011, which 
subjugates that measure to Regulation 883/2004. According to Article 36(2) of  
Regulation 492/2011, that Regulation ‘shall not affect measures taken in accordance 
with Article 48 [TFEU]’.48 This includes Regulation 883/2004, the legal basis being 
(what is now) Article 48 TFEU.49 
 
Chapter 2 argued that the expected meaning of  ‘shall not affect’ clauses is that they 
prioritise one norm over the norm of  which they are part.50 Where a conflict arises 
between Regulation 492/2011 and Regulation 883/2004, the expectation is that the ECJ 
will prioritise Regulation 883/2004. For example, the Regulations sometimes differ in 
their treatment of  frontier workers. Under Regulation 492/2011, frontier workers can 
claim social advantages on equal terms with nationals of the Member State of past and 
present employment;51 whereas Regulation 883/2004 requires that frontier workers 
claim unemployment benefits and other special non-contributory benefits in the 
Member State of residence.52 In this context, the expectation is that the ‘shall not affect’ 
clause will grant precedence to the solution under Regulation 883/2004; this would 
                                               
48 Regulation 1612/68 included an analogous priority clause, which subjugated that measure to Regulation 
1408/71 and, later, Regulation 883/2004: Regulation 1612/68, Article 42(2). 
49 Regulation 883/2004 is also based upon Articles 21(2) and 352 TFEU. 
50 The drafting history of Regulations 1612/68 and 492/2011 provides no further guidance on the 
intended meaning of the ‘shall not affect’ clause; neither the Commission’s original proposal nor the 
resolutions of the Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament make any reference to 
the ‘shall not affect’ clause, see Commission, ‘Proposition d’un règlement du Conseil relatif à la libre 
circulation des travailleurs à l’intérieur de la Communauté’ [1967] OJ 145/11; Economic and Social 
Committee, ‘Consultation du Comité économique et social au sujet d’une proposition de règlement du 
Conseil relatif à la libre circulation des travailleurs à l’intérieur de la Communauté’ [1967] OJ 298/9; 
European Parliament, ‘Procès-verbal de la séance du mardi 17 octobre 1967’ [1967] OJ 268/7, 9. 
51 See n 31. 
52 Regulation 883/2004, Articles 63, 65(2), 70(4).  
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preclude any claims to equal treatment in the Member State of  residence. Agreeing with 
Verschueren, where the Regulations conflict: 
… the provisions of Regulation 1408/71 and Regulation 883/2004, as lex specialis, 
take precedence over the provisions of Regulation 1612/68. This means that if 
Regulation 1408/71 or Regulation 883/2004 is applicable to a particular situation, 
the solution ensuing from the application of the provisions of Regulation 1408/71 
or Regulation 883/2004 would take precedence over any solution that might ensue 
from applying the provisions of Regulation 1612/68.53 
As Verschueren points out, the ‘shall not affect’ clause recognises the lex specialis nature 
of Regulation 883/2004 in comparison to Regulation 492/2011. The former Regulation 
provides detailed rules regarding the coordination of Member State social security 
schemes, which Member State is responsible for paying benefits as well as the 
entitlement of Union citizens to certain benefits. It would counter the aims behind that 
Regulation if the application of Regulation 492/2011 could displace the detailed 
coordinating rules. 
 
The same ambiguity discussed in Chapter 4 over what it means for one norm to ‘affect’ 
or ‘prejudice’ another arises again here. The broad concept of a social advantage means 
that Regulation 492/2011 often grants Union citizens equal access to benefits other 
than those covered by Regulation 883/2004. For example, Regulation 492/2011 covers 
benefits amounting to social assistance whereas Regulation 883/2004 expressly does not 
apply to social assistance.54 The import of the ‘shall not affect’ clause becomes 
somewhat opaque here. Would it ‘affect’ the exclusion of certain benefits from 
Regulation 883/2004 if a Union citizen relies on Regulation 492/2011 to claim equal 
access to social assistance benefits? If one reads Regulation 883/2004 as defining 
exhaustively what benefits migrant Union citizens can claim equal access to, allowing a 
Union citizen to rely on Regulation 492/2011 might be understood as contradicting – 
and potentially ‘affecting’ – the limits set out in that measure. The difficulty with this 
argument, as set out in Chapter 2 and again reiterated in Chapter 4, is that Regulation 
883/2004 does not purport to exhaustively determine the extent of the prohibition on 
nationality discrimination. Furthermore, given that Regulation 883/2004 does not 
prohibit Union citizens from claiming social assistance in a host Member State (but just 
                                               
53 Verschueren, ‘Free Movement of Persons in the European Union and Social Rights’ (n 45) 292. See 
also F Pennings, European Social Security Law (6th edn, Intersentia 2015) 138. 
54 Article 3. 
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does not regulate entitlement to social assistance) one can understand the Regulations as 
complementary here. Indeed, Advocate General Cosmas argues that the notion of 
‘social advantage’, when first included in Regulation 1612/68, was intended to operate 
residually and cover benefits not classed as social security.55 
 
3.2. The Principles of Lex Specialis and Lex Posterior 
The EU legislature did not provide ‘any guidance as to the hierarchy or priority between 
[Directive 2004/38 and overlapping measures] … nor … principles for solving possible 
conflicts’.56 The ECJ is responsible for determining the relations between overlapping 
norms. As set out in Chapter 2, existing principles of norm inter-relationship should 
offer the ECJ guidance here. Where norms of the same hierarchical status overlap, this 
engages two different priority principles; first, the principle of lex specialis that prioritises 
the more specific norm and, secondly, the principle of lex posterior that prioritises the 
more recent norm. 
 
No hierarchy exists between the principles of lex specialis and lex posterior. Instead, judges 
must decide ‘contextually as to whether the degree of speciality or the time of 
emergence of the norm is more important’.57 In the context of the case study considered 
here, the date of adoption appears less important. The Union legislature adopted 
Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38 on the same date meaning the principle 
cannot prioritise between overlapping norms here. In the context of overlaps between 
Regulation 492/2011 and Directive 2004/38 and Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 
2004/38, the principle of lex posterior does not reach a logical conclusion. The difficulty 
here is that Regulation 492/2011 codified Regulation 1612/68; applying the principle of 
lex posterior would mean the subjugation of the rules on equal treatment of workers to 
Article 24 of Directive 2004/38 until the codification of those rules in 2011 at which 
point the relationship of priority would reverse. As Regulation 492/2011 did not change 
the rules on equal treatment the principle of lex posterior seems almost arbitrary here. 
                                               
55 Case C-160/96 Molenaar EU:C:1997:599, Opinion of AG Cosmas, paras 99-100. 
56 M Coucheir and others, ‘The relationship and interaction between the coordination Regulations and 
Directive 2004/38/EC’ (trESS Think Tank Report, Project DG EMPL/E/3, 2008) 3. 
57 ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law: Conclusions’ (18 July 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.702 (‘Fragmentation Report 
Conclusions’), para. 9. See also D Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict (OUP 2014) 
322-23. 




Can the principle of lex specialis offer more workable interpretative guidance to the ECJ 
when faced with overlaps between Directive 2004/38 and the Regulations? Under the 
principle of lex specialis, the more specific norm precludes the application of the more 
general norm, although it does not invalidate the lex generalis.58 The difficulty with 
applying the principle is the identification of the lex specialis. In general, as noted in 
Chapter 2, the more specific norm will: (1) set out how a general rule applies in 
particular circumstances; or (2) provide an exception to a more general rule.59 To 
determine which norm is the lex specialis, a contextual examination of the different 
norms will often be necessary. According to the International Law Commission, 
identifying the lex specialis: 
… is entirely dependent on the normative considerations for which it provides 
articulation: sensitivity to context, capacity to reflect State will, concreteness, clarity, 
definiteness. Its functioning cannot be assessed independently of the role of 
considerations of the latter type in specific context of legal reasoning. How does a 
particular agreement relate to the general law around it? Does it implement or 
support the latter, or does it perhaps deviate from it? Is the deviation tolerable or 
not? No general, context-independent answers can be given to such questions. In 
this sense, the lex specialis maxim cannot be meaningfully codified.60 
What follows tries to apply these criteria to the overlaps between Directive 2004/38 and 
the Regulations. 
 
In relation to Regulation 492/2011 and Directive 2004/38, their largely distinct 
character (aside from overlapping equality provisions) makes conceiving one measure as 
a specific application of or derogation from the other difficult. Purely from the 
perspective of specificity, the personal and material scope of Regulation 492/2011 are 
narrower than that of Directive 2004/38. The Regulation applies only to workers and to 
social advantages, whereas Directive 2004/38 applies to all Union citizens and their 
family members residing on the basis of that Directive and to all benefits falling within 
the scope of the Treaty. When looked at more contextually, Directive 2004/38 sets out 
                                               
58 ILC, ‘Fragmentation Report Conclusions’ (n 57) para. 9. 
59 ILC, ‘Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law’ (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (‘Fragmentation Report’), para. 88; A Lindroos, 
‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis’ (2005) 74(1) 
NJIL 27, 45. 
60 ILC, ‘Fragmentation Report’ (n 59) para. 119  
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the basic rights of all Union citizens and their family members residing in a host 
Member State while the Regulation establishes a specific regime solely for workers. In 
this sense it is possible to understand Regulation 492/2011 as the lex specialis since it 
specifically grants additional rights to migrant Union citizens working in a host Member 
State on top of the basis established by Directive 2004/38. 
 
Scholars disagree over the relationship between Directive 2004/38 and Regulation 
883/2004. While Regulation 883/2004 has been referred to as a lex specialis in relation to 
the Directive,61 Lhernould and others recently argued against this on the grounds that: 
Both legal instruments … are different in their legal character …The Regulation 
creates immediate and direct individual rights; the Directive, however, is addressed 
to the Member States and makes them create domestic legislation in line with the 
EU Directive’s standard. Therefore, both instruments have a different legal impact: 
the Regulation creates rights or duties, whereas the Directive empowers the Member 
States to take legislative action in the future.62 
The form of the legal act is not necessarily fatal to the application of the principle of lex 
specialis.63 What is more, although directives are not ‘directly applicable’ like Regulations, 
the ECJ confirms their capacity for vertical direct effect. Looking to the context of the 
measures, Regulation 883/2004 seems more specialised. Directive 2004/38 focuses on 
the position of all EU citizens and their family members to move to and reside in a host 
Member State, while Regulation 883/2004 coordinates the social security entitlement for 
Union citizens exercising that right. In relation to equal access to social benefits, then, 
one would expect Regulation 883/2004 to be treated as lex specialis. 
 
Treating the Regulations as lex specialis in relation to Directive 2004/38 should mean 
that, where a situation falls within the material and the personal scope of one of the 
Regulations, the outcome determined by the Regulation prevails. The lex generalis 
                                               
61 Coucheir and others (n 56) 29; H Verschueren, ‘The EU Social Security Co-Ordination System: A Close 
Interplay between the EU legislature and judiciary’ in P Syrpis (ed), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU 
Internal Market (CUP 2012) 177-204, 179. 
62 JP Lhernould and others, ‘Assessment of  the impact of  amendments to the EU social security 
coordination rules to clarify its relationship with Directive 2004/38/EC as regards economically inactive 
persons’ (FreSsco Analytical Report 2015) 14. 
63 On the application of the principle of lex specialis between different legislative acts, see Case T-123/99 
JT’s Corporation v Commission EU:T:2000:230, para. 50. On the use of the principle in overlaps between 
Treaty and custom, see ILC, ‘Fragmentation Report’ (n 59) para. 66. 
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remains in the background, however, and may still apply in situations falling outside of 
the personal or material scope of one of the Regulations. 
 
3.3. Summary 
The express clause in Regulation 492/2011 and basic principles of priority, suggest that: 
(1) Regulation 883/2004 takes precedence over both Regulation 492/2011 and 
Directive 2004/38; and, (2) Regulation 492/2011 takes precedence over Directive 
2004/38 in relation to workers. Discussion now turns to assess whether the ECJ follows 
this approach in practice as well as the pros and cons of doing so. 
 
4. ECJ PRACTICE CONSISTENT WITH THE ‘SHALL NOT AFFECT’ 
CLAUSE AND THE LEX SPECIALIS PRINCIPLE 
4.1. Introduction 
Extensive case law analysis identified a prima facie overlap between:64 (1) Regulation 
492/2011 and Regulation 883/2004 (or their predecessors) in eighty cases; (2) 
Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38 in seven cases; (3) Regulations 1612/68 
and 492/2011 and Directive 2004/38 in two cases. This Section sets out those cases in 
which ECJ practice accords with the orthodox approach – even if the ECJ fails to 
articulate the relevant principles of interpretation clearly. The Section then offers a 
preliminary evaluation of this approach. 
 
Most cases dealing with an overlap between two or more secondary norms fit with the 
approach set out in Section 3: the ECJ respects the ‘shall not affect’ clause (where 
applicable) and otherwise prioritises the more specific norm. Apparent divergences 
emerge in some cases, but on closer inspection the difference is more cosmetic than real 
and does not suggest the ECJ is applying a different principle of interpretation. These 
                                               
64 Case law was identified by searching the curia.eu database. Searches were carried out by specific 
legislative provision (i.e. Regulation 883/2004, Article 4; Regulation 492/2011, Article 7(2); Directive 
2004/38, Article 24) and by the following keywords: ‘social assistance’, ‘social security’, ‘social advantage’, 
‘maintenance aid’ ‘non-discrimination’, ‘equal treatment’. A case involves an ‘overlap’ when it involves a 
claim for equal treatment to some form of social benefit that could prima facie fall within the scope of 
both Regulations. This discounts cases in which, after finding the situation fell outside the scope of 
Regulation 883/2004 or its predecessors, the ECJ then turned to consider Article 45 TFEU. Case law is 
up to date as of 26 July 2018. 
Chapter 5 – Overlaps between Secondary Norms 
 
 183 
cases are instead indicative of the failure of the ECJ to articulate clearly what is a fairly 
consistent approach to the inter-relationship between overlapping norms. 
 
4.1.1 Following the Expected Approach Exactly 
In seventy per cent of the cases involving an overlap prima facie between Regulations 
883/2004 and 492/2011 (and their predecessors), ECJ practice is consistent with the 
application of the ‘shall not affect’ clause. The ECJ first analyses the situation under 
Regulation 883/2004. If the benefit is social security and the national measure 
constitutes discrimination, the ECJ will not then discuss Regulation 492/2011.65 The 
ECJ will turn to consider whether the measure is in breach of Regulation 492/2011 only 
if the situation falls outside the personal or material scope of Regulation 883/2004.66 
 
However, the ECJ rarely refers to the ‘shall not affect’ clause as part of its rationale for 
prioritising Regulation 883/2004. Only in one case – Commission v France – does the ECJ 
explicitly discuss the ‘shall not affect’ clause. After deciding that a benefit fell outside 
Regulation 1408/71, the ECJ held that turning to consider Regulation 1612/68 was 
‘consistent with [the ‘shall not affect’ clause]’.67 The suggestion is that, otherwise, turning 
to Regulation 1612/68 would be contrary to the clause. One can draw a contrast here 
with the ECJ’s approach to the inter-relationship between Article 18 TFEU and the free 
movement provisions discussed in Chapter 4. In the vast majority of cases, the ECJ 
explicitly refers to the priority clause in Article 18 TFEU as the reason that provision 
does not apply. 
                                               
65 Frilli (n 11), para. 4ff; Case 39/74 Costa EU:C:1974:122, paras 11-13; Case 7/75 Fracas EU:C:1975:80, 
paras 17, 21; Case 237/78 Toia EU:C:1979:197, para. 19; Joined Cases 82 and 103/86 Laborero 
EU:C:1987:356, para. 28; Case 33/88 Allué EU:C:1989:222, para. 22; Case C-307/89 Commission v France 
EU:C:1991:245, para. 14; Case C-146/93 McLachlan EU:C:1994:282; Case C-308/93 Cabanis-Issarte 
EU:C:1996:169, para. 44; Case C-211/97 Gómez Rivero EU:C:1999:275, para. 26; Case C-124/99 Borawitz 
EU:C:2000:485, para. 35; Case C-43/99 Leclere and Deaconescu EU:C:2001:303, para. 31; Case C-286/03 
Hosse EU:C:2006:125, para. 56; Case C-346/05 Chateignier EU:C:2006:711, para. 36; Case C-332/05 Celozzi 
EU:C:2007:35, para. 40; Case C-399/09 Landtová EU:C:2011:415, para. 41ff; Case C-523/13 Lachar 
EU:C:2014:2458, para. 28ff. 
66 Even (n 15), paras 15, 24; Hoeckx (n 11), paras, 14-15, 22-25; Scrivner (n 15), paras 21, 26; Deak (n 20), 
paras 16, 23-24; Case 256/86 Frascogna EU:C:1987:359, paras 17, 25; Case C-243/91 Taghavi 
EU:C:1992:306, paras 9, 11; Schmid (n 17), para. 12ff; Case C-278/94 Commission v Belgium EU:C:1996:321, 
para. 25; Case C-35/97 Commission v France EU:C:1998:431, para. 35ff; Meints (n 31), paras 42, 51; Fahmi 
and Esmoris Cerdeiro-Pinedo Amado (n 25), para. 36ff; Case C-138/02 Collins EU:C:2004:172, paras 52-53; 
Case C-386/02 Baldinger EU:C:2004:535, paras 18-19; Hartmann (n 31), paras 11, 15ff; Case C-213/05 
Geven EU:C:2007:438, paras 8, 11ff. 
67 Commission v France (n 65) para. 44. 




When faced with an overlap between one of the Regulations and Directive 2004/38, 
ECJ practice does not always cohere with the lex specialis principle. In the two cases 
involving a prima facie overlap between Regulation 492/2011 and Directive 2004/38, 
ECJ practice is consistent with treating the Regulation as a lex specialis.68 In both cases 
the ECJ prioritises the result reached under Regulation 492/2011,69 stressing in Bragança 
Linares Verruga that the restrictions relating to maintenance aid in Directive 2004/38 
relate to ‘a context other than that of equal treatment of national workers and migrant 
workers.’70 When a case involves workers, the suggestion is that Regulation 492/2011 
takes precedence over Directive 2004/38. The ECJ does not, however, refer explicitly to 
the principle of lex specialis or use the language of specificity in its judgment.  
 
In only two of  the seven cases involving a prima facie overlap between Regulation 
883/2004 and Directive 2004/38 does ECJ practice accord with treating Regulation 
883/2004 as lex specialis.71 In those cases, the ECJ does not cite Directive 2004/38 and 
so it is unclear why the ECJ prioritises Regulation 883/2004. It may be because there is 
some economic activity on the part of  the Union citizen72 (preventing Member States 
from relying on the derogation under Directive 2004/38) or the ECJ may view the 
provisions of  Regulation 883/2004 as more specialised.73 The ECJ does not, however, 
articulate the principle of interpretation upon which it is relying. The remaining case law 
concerning the overlap between Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 2000/38, which 
does not cohere with the lex specialis principle, will be discussed in Section 5 below. 
 
4.1.2 Apparent Inconsistency: Still Considering the Lex Generalis  
In less than five per cent of cases involving an overlap between Regulations 883/2004 
and 492/2011 (and their predecessors), after finding a national measure discriminatory 
under Regulation 883/2004, the ECJ still analyses Regulation 492/2011.74 Strictly 
                                               
68 LN (n 25); Case C-238/15 Bragança Linares Verruga EU:C:2016:949. 
69 LN (n 25), paras 48-51; Bragança Linares Verruga (n 68). 
70 Bragança Linares Verruga (n 68), para. 66. 
71 Case C-507/06 Klöppel EU:C:2008:110; Case C-284/15 ONEm and M EU:C:2016:220. 
72 Klöppel (n 71), paras 8-10; ONEm and M (n 71), paras 11-12. 
73 ONEm and M (n 71), para. 28. 
74 Callemeyn (n 13), paras 11, 14; Inzirillo (n 35), paras 15-18; Case C-206/10 Commission v Germany 
EU:C:2011:283, paras 31, 49. 
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speaking, if Regulation 883/2004 applies, this should be unnecessary (although 
reference to Regulations 1612/68 or 492/2011 after establishing that Regulations 
1408/71 or 883/2004 do not apply is unproblematic). Further discussion of Regulation 
492/2011 could imply the decision under Regulation 883/2004 is not final or does not 
prevail over Regulation 492/2011. As the national measure is discriminatory under both 
Regulations, the better view is that referring to both bolsters the ECJ’s decision and 
provides extra guidance to the national court. Underscoring this point, the ECJ uses the 
language of ‘moreover’75 and ‘[f]urthermore’76 rather than any suggestion of altering the 
decision reached under Regulation 883/2004 (or 1408/71). Were the ECJ to rationalize 
the inter-relationship between norms more explicitly, this would provide much needed 
clarification on the benefits and persons covered by each measure. 
 
4.1.3 Apparent Inconsistency: Considering the Lex Generalis First 
In about twenty-five per cent of cases involving the possible inter-relationship between 
Regulations 883/2004 and 492/2011, the ECJ considers Regulation 492/2011 first or 
omits to consider Regulation 883/2004 at all. Prima facie, this suggest the ECJ is not 
relying upon the ‘shall not affect’ clause. On closer inspection, however, these cases 
result from unsystematic reasoning by the ECJ but not a different interpretative 
principle. 
 
A simple explanation can account for most of the cases discussed here: the benefit in 
fact falls outside the scope of Regulation 883/2004.77 What is lacking is an explicit 
clarification of this critical point. Thus, these cases do not amount to a divergence from 
orthodoxy. The ECJ’s approach here contributes to the lack of clarity regarding how the 
measures inter-relate. For instance, the ECJ held in Castelli that it was ‘appropriate’ to 
analyse Regulation 1612/68 before any other norms78 and did not consider Regulation 
                                               
75 Callemeyn (n 13), para. 14. Watson, discussing the reference to Regulation 1612/68 in Callemeyn, argues 
that ‘[t]he Court would seem to have found in these provisions an additional basis for its decision’ (P 
Watson, Social Security Law of the European Communities (Mansell Publishing 1980) 107). 
76 Inzirillo (n 35), para. 18. 
77 This is the case in several cases relating to study finance: Joined Cases 389/87 and 390/87 Echternach 
EU:C:1989:130; Meeusen (n 19),; Case C-542/09 Commission v Netherlands EU:C:2012:346; Case C-359/13 
Martens EU:C:2015:118; Case C-20/12 Giersch EU:C:2013:411; Bragança Linares Verruga (n 68); Joined 
Cases C-401/15 to C-403/15 Depesme and Kerrou EU:C:2016:955. 
78 Castelli (n 35), para. 8. 
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1408/71 after finding the national measure to be discriminatory.79 Yet, at no point in its 
judgment did the ECJ explain why – was it because Mrs Castelli fell outside the personal 
scope of Regulation 1408/71 or because the benefit claimed was not social security? 
National courts faced with questions regarding the same benefit or similar personal 
circumstances may then struggle to determine which Regulation is applicable. This 
thesis calls for a more systematic approach. 
 
The remaining cases are explicable by features of the case or how the case was argued. 
In Commission v Greece (benefits for large families) several benefits were in question, all of 
which were social advantages80 while only some relating to health care were family 
benefits under Regulation 883/2004.81 It may have seemed more sensible to start by 
discussing the bulk of the benefits in question before moving to the specific point 
regarding Regulation 883/2004. In Mora Romero, the referring court did not mention 
Regulation 883/2004 and so the ECJ perhaps decided first to clarify why the provisions 
cited by the referring court did not apply.82 In Commission v Luxembourg the parties 
conceded that the benefit was a social advantage and had centred their arguments 
around this.83 Although the end result did not differ because the ECJ considered 
Regulation 492/2011 first in each of these cases, if the ECJ had better communicated 
the role of the ‘shall not affect’ clause, applicants could better present their arguments. 
 
4.2. Evaluation 
So far, this Section has examined ECJ case law consistent with respect for the ‘shall not 
affect’ clause or the principle of lex specialis. At no point, however, does the ECJ confirm 
the principles of interpretation upon which it is relying. In most cases involving an 
overlap between Regulation 1612/68 or 492/2011 and Regulation 1408/71 or 
883/2004, ECJ practice is consistent with the respecting the ‘shall not affect’ clause. In 
cases involving Directive 2004/38 there is far less case law. ECJ practice suggests that 
Regulations 1612/68 and 492/2011 take priority over the Directive, but that Regulation 
883/2004 does not. Discussion now turns to offer an assessment of this approach in the 
                                               
79 Castelli (n 35), para. 13. 
80 Case C-185/96 Commission v Greece (benefits for large families) EU:C:1998:516, para. 21. 
81 Commission v Greece (benefits for large families) (n 80), para. 26. 
82 Case C-131/96 Mora Romero EU:C:1997:317, para. 9. 
83 Commission v Luxembourg (childbirth and maternity allowances) (n 16). 
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context of the specific case study adopted. The main argument put forward below is 
that respecting the ‘shall not affect’ clause and applying the principle of lex specialis 
secures the rights of Union citizens without damaging legal certainty.84  
 
The first point to note is that respecting the ‘shall not affect’ clause and applying the 
principle of lex specialis will not always maximise the rights of Union citizens. For 
example, Section 2 outlined how Regulation 883/2004 – in contrast with Regulation 
492/2011 and (in specific circumstances) Directive 2004/38 – does not always permit 
frontier workers to claim equal treatment in the Member State of employment. Should a 
conflict emerge between the measures here, complying with the ‘shall not affect’ clause 
in Regulation 492/2011 and the lex specialis nature of Regulation 883/2004 vis-à-vis 
Directive 2004/38 entails respect for the determination reached under Regulation 
883/2004. This is so even if, under Regulation 492/2011, frontier workers can claim 
equal treatment in the Member State of employment. 
 
However, the contention made here is that respect for the ‘shall not affect’ clause and 
for the principle of lex specialis do not unduly restrict the rights of Union citizens. In 
particular, neither principle prevents the non-prioritised norm or the lex generalis from 
applying residually. One measure can fill gaps left by the other in the framework for 
protecting Union citizens and their family members exercising the right to free 
movement. The result is a ‘belt and braces’ approach to the protection of equal 
treatment. For example, if a situation falls outside the material scope of Regulation 
883/2004, the ECJ can still turn to Regulation 492/2011 to fill any lacunae.85 In Schmid,86 
Mr Schmid was trying to claim a disability benefit for adults on behalf of his adult 
daughter. While the benefit fell within the definition of ‘social security’ under Regulation 
1408/71 (as then in force), both Mr Schmid and his adult daughter fell outside the 
personal scope of that Regulation.87 The ECJ then turned to consider Regulation 
                                               
84 One can interpret the inter-relationship between overlapping norms in a manner that always maximises 
fundamental rights protection. However, as will be discussed below, that approach lacks sufficient 
support in the applicable legal framework and is damaging to the general principle of legal certainty. 
85 Verschueren, ‘Free Movement of Persons in the European Union and Social Rights’ (n 45) 291. 
86 Schmid (n 17). 
87 Mr Schmid fell outside the scope of the Regulation as he had not been subject to Belgian social security 
legislation (para. 8). His daughter could not rely on the Regulation as members of a worker’s family could 
only claim derived rights (para. 12). 
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1612/68. The ECJ held that the disability benefit was a ‘social advantage’88 and so Mr 
Schmid – as a former migrant worker – could rely upon the right to equal treatment.89 
Regulation 1612/68 filled a gap left by Regulation 1408/71 here on the equal treatment 
rights of workers (or former workers) where otherwise an obstacle to the free 
movement of workers may have arisen under Article 45 TFEU.  
 
Linking to the ambiguity highlighted in Section 3, one might criticise the ECJ’s 
application of Regulation 1612/68 in Schmid on the grounds that it undermines the 
specific decision by the EU legislature not to regulate these matters.90 According to 
Advocate General Geelhoed the approach in Schmid ‘cancels out’ the decision to exclude 
certain persons from the scope of a particular measure.91 From the perspective of norm 
inter-relationship, though, such a critique suffers from a fatal flaw: the measures do not 
conflict. If Regulation 1408/71 explicitly permitted discrimination against persons in the 
position of Mr Schmid and his daughter, allowing Mr Schmid to rely on Regulation 
1612/68 would ‘affect’ that measure. When a person falls outside the personal scope of 
Regulation 1408/71, it is quite a leap to read this as a determination by the legislature 
that such persons should not be able to claim equal treatment to benefits covered by 
that Regulation. 
 
The same would be true as regards the inter-relationship between Regulations 883/2004 
and 492/2011 and Directive 2004/38: the Regulations, as lex specialis, set out specific 
rules on the prohibition of discrimination against the backdrop of Directive 2004/38 as 
the lex specialis. When a situation falls outside the material scope or personal scope of 
one of the Regulations, the principle of lex specialis does not prevent the ECJ from 
applying the lex generalis. Thus, in Bragança Linares Verruga, the ECJ suggested that 
Directive 2004/38 could be relied upon to determine eligibility for maintenance aid in 
cases not involving ‘equal treatment of national workers and migrant workers.’92 Where 
a situation falls within the personal and material scope of the lex specialis, there is no 
                                               
88 Schmid (n 17), para. 18. 
89 Schmid (n 17), para. 21. 
90 M Dougan, ‘Expanding the Frontiers of Union Citizenship by Dismantling the Territorial Boundaries 
of the National Welfare States?’ in C Barnard and O Odudu (eds), The Outer Limits of European Union Law 
(Hart 2009) 119-165, 139; Verschueren, ‘The EU Social Security Co-Ordination System’ (n 61) 199. 
91 Case C-212/05 Hartmann EU:C:2006:615, Opinion of AG Geelhoed, para. 50. 
92 Bragança Linares Verruga (n 68), para. 66. 
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scope for the lex generalis to apply. However, where the lex generalis also covers situations 
falling outside the lex specialis, ‘nothing precludes that the lex generalis is still relevant and 
adds certain rights or obligations.93 The aim of the lex specialis principle, as set out in 
Chapter 2, is to ensure respect for the intentions of the Union legislature. While one 
should be sensitive to context, the adoption of a lex specialis with narrower scope does 
not necessarily mean that the Union legislature intended to exclude the operation an 
overlapping norm with more general scope.94 
 
Respecting the ‘shall not affect’ clause and the principle of lex specialis could be described 
as value neutral. Interpreting Regulation 883/2004 as a lex specialis in relation to 
Directive 2004/38 means, for instance, that more Union citizens can claim equal 
treatment given the broader personal scope of the Regulation. However, it also entails 
further restrictions given the habitual residence requirement (c.f. residence for the first 
three months under Directive 2004/38). There is, therefore, a trade-off inherent in 
adopting this approach: while it does not necessarily lead to the greatest possible respect 
for the right to equal treatment, it does respect explicit decisions of EU legislature, the 
institution empowered by the Treaties to adopt the measures necessary to secure free 
movement and equal treatment. 
 
4.3. Summary 
In sum, this Section showed how the vast majority of cases – particularly when an 
overlap arises between Regulations 883/2004 and 492/2011 – cohere with the expected 
approach. However, the ECJ fails to articulate clearly the principles it is relying upon in 
these cases. The following Section now turns to a minority of cases in which the ECJ 
adopts a different approach to the inter-relationship between overlapping norms. 
 
                                               
93 J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International 
Law (CUP 2003) 412. Similarly, the ILC notes how ‘[t]he application of the special law does not normally 
extinguish the relevant general law’, see ILC, ‘Fragmentation Report’ (n 59) para. 82. 
94 Chapter 4 discussed how the exemption of activities connected to ‘public service’ from the free 
movement rules is best interpreted as precluding the application of Article 18 TFEU. 
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5. ECJ PRACTICE INCONSISTENT WITH THE ‘SHALL NOT AFFECT’ 
CLAUSE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LEX SPECIALIS 
5.1. Two Lines of Case Law 
ECJ practice does not accord with applying either the ‘shall not affect’ clause or the 
principle of lex specialis in two different lines of case law: Hendrix and the ‘lawful 
residence’ cases. This Section starts by considering in detail how ECJ practice departs 
from the approach suggested by priority clauses and priority principles. Discussion then 
turns to why the ECJ might adopt a different approach and what principles the ECJ 
relies upon in the alternative to structure the inter-relationship between overlapping 
norms. 
 
5.1.1 Hendrix and the ‘Shall Not Affect’ Clause 
Only in one case, out of the eighty cases identified involving an overlap between the 
Regulations, does the ECJ adopt a different approach to the ‘shall not affect’ clause: 
Hendrix. Mr Hendrix – a Dutch national – was both working and residing in the 
Netherlands while in receipt of the Wajong (a special non-contributory benefit95 and a 
social advantage96). After he moved his place of residence to Belgium, but continued to 
work in the Netherlands, the Dutch authorities stopped his Wajong payments.97 The 
ECJ had to answer the question: did the Netherlands act lawfully in stopping Mr 
Hendrix’s entitlement to the benefit?98  
 
The overlapping Regulations conflicted here regarding who may claim equal treatment 
and in which Member State. On the one hand, Meints, Meeusen and Hartmann confirmed 
that frontier workers and reverse frontier workers (i.e. Union citizens working in their 
Member State of nationality and residing in a host Member State) could rely on 
Regulation 1612/68 to claim equal access to social advantages in a Member State of 
                                               
95 Hendrix (n 18), paras 17-18. 
96 Hendrix (n 18), para. 49. 
97 Hendrix (n 18), para. 19. In Case C-112/91 Werner EU:C:1993:27, the ECJ held that ‘reverse frontier 
workers’ fell outside the scope of the free movement provisions. However, in Hartmann and Hendrix, the 
ECJ confirmed that a person who transfers their residence, but not their place of employment falls within 
the scope of the free movement provisions, see Hartmann (n 31), paras 17-20; Hendrix, para. 46. See 
further M Cousins, ‘Free Movement of Workers, EU Citizenship and Access to Social Advantages’ (2007) 
14(4) MJ 343, 344; C O’Brien, ‘Case Comment on Hartmann, Geven and Hendrix’ (2008) 45(2) CMLRev 
499, 504. 
98 Hendrix (n 18), para. 34. 
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(past) employment.99 Under Regulation 1612/68, Mr Hendrix could thus potentially 
export Wajong payments to Belgium (his Member State of residence) from the 
Netherlands (his Member State of employment). Complicating matters, according to 
Article 10a of Regulation 1408/71, ‘persons to whom this Regulation applies shall be 
granted the special non-contributory cash benefits … exclusively in the territory of the 
Member State in which they reside, in accordance with the legislation of that State’. As 
Mr Hendrix fell within the personal scope of Regulation 1408/71, that Regulation 
prevented him from exporting the Wajong payments to Belgium. Respecting the ‘shall 
not affect’ clause in Regulation 1612/68 (as in the extensive body of case law discussed 
above in Section 4), should mean that Article 10a of Regulation 1408/71 prevails. 
 
When deciding Mr Hendrix’s entitlement to Wajong payments, the ECJ began its 
analysis with Regulation 1408/71 (as the ‘shall not affect’ clause suggests), finding the 
decision to stop paying the benefit to be compatible with EU law. As a special non-
contributory benefit, the Netherlands did not have to extend the Wajong to non-
residents.100 However, the ECJ then considered the position under Regulation 
1612/68,101 holding that any residence condition was indirectly discriminatory and 
required objective justification.102  
 
Had the ECJ followed the ‘shall not affect’ clause, the analysis – if not the eventual 
decision given the ECJ’s conclusion that the Dutch law was objectively justified and 
proportionate103 – would have been quite different. After finding that the benefit was a 
special non-contributory benefit, the ECJ should have gone on to hold that the benefit 
                                               
99 Meints (n 31), para. 51; Meeusen (n 19), para. 25; Hartmann (n 31), para. 38. 
100 Hendrix (n 18), para. 38. 
101 In earlier case law the ECJ had accepted the exportability of some social advantages for frontier 
workers, although Regulation 1408/71 had not applied in any of those cases. 
102 Hendrix (n 18), para. 50. This aspect of Hendrix has been criticised for contributing to the de-
territorialisation of welfare. See M Dougan, ‘Cross-border educational mobility and the exportation of 
student financial assistance’ (2008) 33(5) ELRev 723, 731; O’Brien, ‘Case Comment on Hartmann, Geven 
and Hendrix’ (n 97) 512. What is more, the test applied by the ECJ has been criticised for leading to 
considerable legal uncertainty. The ECJ held that when determining if the restriction on movement was 
objectively justified the national court must be satisfied the national law does not lead to an “unacceptable 
degree of unfairness”’, see Hendrix (n 18), paras 56-57. Martin notes that this ‘test is one which seems 
impossible to answer in an objective way, so that it might be answered in radically different ways by 
judges in the same Member State’, see D Martin, ‘Case Comment on Jia, Hartmann, Geven and Hendrix’ 
(2007) 9 European Journal of Migration and Law 457, 471. 
103 Hendrix (n 18), paras 54-56. This does not detract from the ECJ’s willingness to depart from the rules 
set out in Regulation 1408/71. 
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was non-exportable under Regulation 1408/71. In earlier cases relating to the export of 
social advantages, Regulation 1408/71 did not apply and so the application of the ‘shall 
not affect’ clause did not arise; the benefit claimed in Meints and Meeusen fell outside the 
material scope of Regulation 1408/71,104 while the applicant in Hartmann fell outside the 
personal scope of that Regulation.105 Similarly, if the case had involved e.g. social 
assistance – benefits not covered by Regulation 1408/71106 – turning to Regulation 
1612/68 would be consistent with the ‘shall not affect’ clause.107 Instead, contrary to the 
steady line of case law discussed above, the ECJ did not grant priority to Regulation 
1408/71. 
 
5.1.2 Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38: One Measure Preconditions the 
Other  
The second strand of case law – the ‘lawful residence’ cases – concerns the inter-
relationship between Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38. Out of seven cases 
in which an overlap arises prima facie between these measures,108 five appear to diverge 
from the orthodox principles of interpretation set out above:109 Brey,110 Dano,111 
                                               
104 The ECJ expressly made this point in Meints, noting that ‘Regulation No 1408/71 does not apply to a 
compensation scheme, such as that in issue in the main proceedings, under which agricultural workers, 
whose contract of employment has been terminated… receive a benefit in the form of a single 
payment…following the termination of his contract of employment’ (Meints (n 31), para. 35). In Meeusen, 
the applicant claimed study finance for their dependents. 
105 Mr Hartmann was a civil servant and so not an ‘employed person’ under Regulation 1408/71 
(Hartmann (n 31), para. 11). 
106 Article 4(4). 
107 Similarly, the ECJ in Leclere and Deaconescu held that ‘[i]t follows that, for the purpose of examining their 
validity, those two categories of exceptions are not similar in nature since one, relating to special 
childbirth and adoption allowances, merely excludes certain categories of benefits from the scope of 
Regulation No 1408/71, while the other, concerning special non-contributory benefits, establishes that 
the State in which the recipient of the benefits concerned resides is responsible for paying such benefits’ 
(Leclere and Deaconescu (n 65) para. 27). 
108 The referring court in Gusa asked whether, should the applicant fail to meet the criteria for lawful 
residence under Directive 2004/38, the applicant could nevertheless rely on Regulation 883/2004 to claim 
equal access to jobseekers allowance (a special non-contributory benefit). However, the relationship 
between the measures did not arise as the ECJ concluded that Mr Gusa retained the status of ‘self-
employed person’ on the grounds that ‘after having lawfully resided in and worked as a self-employed 
person in another Member State for approximately four years, that national has ceased that activity, 
because of a duly recorded absence of work owing to reasons beyond his control, and has registered as a 
jobseeker with the relevant employment office of the latter Member State’, see Case C-442/16 Gusa 
EU:C:2017:1004, para. 46. 
109 For discussion of the other two cases, see Section 4 above. 
110 Brey (n 23). 
111 Case C-333/13 Dano EU:C:2014:2358. 
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Alimanovic,112 García-Nieto113 and Commission v UK.114 These cases have generated 
considerable comment in academic literature; however, existing analysis does not focus 
on how the measures overlap or on their inter-relationship.115 
 
Each case involved a challenge to national laws that either only granted equal access to 
certain benefits if the Union citizen fell within the personal scope of Directive 2004/38 
– i.e. economic activity or sufficiency of resources – or sought to rely upon the 
derogations from equal treatment in the Directive. This was so even though the benefits in 
question fell within the material scope of both measures.116 It will be recalled that 
Regulation 883/2004 has a broader personal scope and does not allow the same 
possibility to derogate. Each applicant (presumably) fell within the personal scope of 
Regulation 883/2004 and was habitually resident in the host Member State117 and so 
denying the applicants benefits appeared incompatible with that measure. However, the 
applicants either were not lawfully resident under Directive 2004/38118 or their situation 
fell within a derogation from the right to equal treatment.119 The potential repercussions 
                                               
112 Case C-67/14 Alimanovic EU:C:2015:597. 
113 Case C-299/14 García-Nieto EU:C:2016:114. 
114 Case C-308/14 Commission v UK EU:C:2016:436. 
115 Criticism of the case law has focused around: (1) the issue of proportionality and individualised 
assessment (see e.g. H Verschueren, ‘Free Movement or Benefit Tourism: the Unreasonable Burden of 
Brey’ (2014) 16(2) European Journal of Migration and Law 147, 170; D Thym, ‘When Union Citizens Turn into 
Illegal Migrants: the Dano Case’ (2015) 40(2) ELRev 249, 255; H Verschueren, ‘Preventing “Benefit 
Tourism” in the EU: A Narrow or Broad Interpretation of the Possibilities Offered by the ECJ in Dano?’ 
(2015) 52(2) CMLRev 363, 373; M Cousins, ‘Case Comment on Dano’ (2015) 22(2) Journal of Social Security 
Law 95, 100ff; P Minderhoud, ‘Job-Seekers have a Right of Residence but no Access to Social Assistance 
Benefits under Directive 2004/38’ (2016) 23(2) MJ 342, 346; N Nic Shuibhne, ‘“What I Tell You Three 
Times is True” Lawful Residence and Equal Treatment after Dano’ (2016) 23(6) MJ 908, 920); (2) the 
indirectly or directly discriminatory nature of national rules (see e.g. M Cousins, ‘“The Baseless Fabric of 
this Vision”: EU Citizenship, the Right to Reside and EU law’ (2016) 23(2) Journal of Social Security Law 89, 
102; C O’Brien, ‘The ECJ Sacrifices EU Citizenship in Vain: Commission v United Kingdom’ (2017) 54(1) 
CMLRev 209, 225-26); and (3) that the case law may lead to ‘the creation of poverty on the territory of the 
host state’ (see e.g. H Verschueren, ‘Free Movement of EU Citizens: Including for the Poor’ (2015) 22(1) 
MJ 10, 28). 
116 In all cases except Commission v UK, the benefits claimed were social assistance under Directive 
2004/38 and special non-contributory benefits under Regulation 883/2004: Brey, paras 33, 62; Dano (n 
111), paras 63, 83; Alimanovic (n 112), paras 43-44; García-Nieto (n 113), paras 37, 52. In Commission v UK, 
the ECJ does not clarify the status of the benefits under Directive 2004/38, however the appear to meet 
the criteria for falling within the scope of the Treaty under the Directive and social security under the 
Regulation, see Commission v UK (n 114), para. 61. 
117 Very little consideration is given to either of these aspects in the decisions. When discussing Brey and 
Dano, Lhernould and others argued that the applicants met the criteria for habitual residence, see 
Lhernould and others (n 62) 13. 
118 The applicants in Brey and Dano failed to satisfy the sufficient resources requirement and meeting this 
threshold was a requirement for receiving benefits in Commission v UK: Brey (n 23), para. 57ff; Dano (n 
111), paras 73-81; Commission v UK (n 114), paras 72, 80. 
119 Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 allows a Member State to refuse social assistance during the first 
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of which norm the ECJ prioritises become clear here: denial of equal treatment appears 
compatible with Directive 2004/38 but not with Regulation 883/2004. 
 
Confusingly, the ECJ does not prioritise either measure, presenting its solution as 
compatible with both measures. However, it reaches this result by reading – or 
‘embroidering’120 – the (more restrictive) conditions for accessing benefits under 
Directive 2004/38 into Regulation 883/2004.121 How the ECJ does this is worth 
considering in detail. When considering the compatibility of the national measures with 
Regulation 883/2004, the ECJ skirted over the distinct personal scope, non-
discrimination clause and residence tests under that measure. Instead, the ECJ focused 
on Articles 11(3)(e) and 70(4) of Regulation 883/2004 which allocate responsibility 
among Member States.122 According to the ECJ, these provisions do not ‘lay down the 
conditions creating the right to social security benefits’123 and it is for each Member 
State to lay down those conditions. What this statement ignores is the distinct personal 
scope of Regulation 883/2004 and the autonomous residence test under Articles 70(4) 
and 11(3)(e) for determining which Member State will be responsible.124 This 
interpretation of the Regulation as only coordinating national laws and not setting any 
conditions allows the ECJ to conclude that imposing a lawful residence test is not 
unlawful.125 
 
                                               
three months of residence and to jobseekers. The applicants in Alimanovic were jobseekers, while the 
applicants in García-Nieto were in their first three months of residence: Alimanovic (n 112), paras 49-63; 
García-Nieto (n 113), paras 40-49. 
120 O’Brien, ‘Case Comment on Commission v UK’ (n 115) 209. 
121 See Brey (n 23), paras 43-44; Dano (n 111), para. 83; Alimanovic (n 112), para. 63; García-Nieto (n 113), 
para. 52; Commission v UK (n 114), paras 65-68. This interpretation of the case law is supported by 
Verschueren who noted that by ‘applying the “right to reside”-test and the “unreasonable burden”-test 
under Directive 2004/38, the Court has added a supplementary requirement not present in the political 
agreement on the special non-contributory cash benefit’, see Verschueren, ‘Free Movement or Benefit 
Tourism’ (n 115) 162. See also, C O’Brien, ‘Civis Capitalist Sum: Class as the New Guiding Principle of EU 
Free Movement Rights’ (2016) 53(4) CMLRev 937, 951. 
122 See Section 2.2. 
123 Commission v UK (n 114), para. 65. See also Brey (n 23), para. 41; Dano (n 111), para. 83; García-Nieto (n 
113), para. 52. 
124 This is despite the autonomous residence test being recently confirmed by Case C-394/13 B 
EU:C:2014:2199, paras 26, 34 and by Regulation 987/2009 which lists a number of relevant factors for 
determining where a person’s centre of interest lies. These include the duration and continuity of presence 
in the relevant Member States, family status and family ties of the person concerned (and does not include 
sufficiency of resources) Regulation 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
September 2009 laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems [2009] OJ L 284/1. 
125 Commission v UK (n 114), paras 67-68. 
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Were the ECJ applying the principle of lex specialis – prioritising Regulation 883/2004 – 
the result would have been quite different. The applicants appeared to satisfy the 
personal scope of Regulation 883/2004126 and the benefits concerned fell within its 
material scope as special non-contributory benefits or social security. After establishing 
this much, it should only have remained for the ECJ to confirm the responsible 
Member State (under Articles 11(3)(e) or 70(4)) by applying the habitual residence test. 
Under Regulation 883/2004 alone the applicants could claim equal treatment in the host 
Member State with the ensuing consequence that any restriction based on ‘lawful 
residence’ failed to implement EU law properly. The applicants would still need to satisfy 
other national conditions for receiving the benefit such as fitting into the required 
income brackets, having a child or being of a certain age.127 These national conditions 
cannot, however, curtail the personal scope of the Regulation or what amounts to 
habitual residence given the fundamental role of these concepts fundamental in 
coordinating entitlement.128 In adopting an approach that overrides these aspects of 
Regulation 883/2004, the ECJ departs from the principle of lex specialis. 
 
5.1.3 Summary 
Both the Hendrix judgment and the lawful residence cases summarised above do not 
follow the guidance derived from the ‘shall not affect’ clause or the principle of lex 
specialis. The question arising is why, and what principles of interpretation the ECJ is 
relying upon instead. Do these decisions, while departing from what most might assume 
concerning the inter-relationship between norms, in fact represent carefully reasoned 
exceptions? 
 
5.2. Alternative Rationales 
The ECJ’s failure to explain cases fully makes it difficult to identify what prompted the 
departure – especially in Hendrix – from consistent case law. This Section attempts to 
                                               
126 The applicants in each case had moved their place of residence to the host Member State with family 
members and/or to join family members already residing in the host Member State. In Alimanovic all the 
children were born in the host Member State and lived there for several years before returning to their 
Member State of nationality for several years. 
127 Coucheir and others (n 56) 6; O’Brien, ‘Case Comment on Commission v UK’ (n 115) 221. 
128 See, Commission v UK (n 114), para. 71. 
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infer any alternative interpretative principles upon which the ECJ might be relying. To 
begin with, though, discussion considers why the ECJ adopted a different approach 
 
The ECJ’s decision in Hendrix manifests a misunderstanding of the role of priority 
clauses. The Court cites the ‘shall not affect’ clause,129 but still turns to consider 
Regulation 1612/68 even after establishing that Regulation 1408/71 did not require 
export of the benefit in question. This differs from the large number of cases discussed 
in Section 4 in which the ECJ appears to prioritise Regulation 1408/71– at least 
implicitly – on the grounds of the ‘shall not affect’ clause.130 As noted above, in 
Commission v France, the ECJ held that turning to consider Regulation 1612/68 was 
consistent with the ‘shall not affect’ clause because the benefit in question fell outside the 
material scope of Regulation 1408/71;131 thereby implying that if Regulation 1408/71 
covers the benefit, turning to Regulation 1612/68 would breach the ‘shall not affect’ 
clause. This exact situation occurred in Hendrix. Why then did the ECJ not follow this 
approach? 
 
The ECJ says no more on this point. The Advocate General is, however, more 
forthcoming. She considered that the ‘shall not affect’ clause did not imply ‘any 
precedence for [Regulation 1408/71] rather it requires … [that] the regulations should 
apply independently of one another, that is to say, in parallel.’132 Allowing for the 
exportability of special non-contributory benefits, on this reasoning, was not 
incompatible with the ‘shall not affect’ clause since it understands the Regulations as 
being on separate tracks with the clause doing little to introduce any priority between 
them. However, this is a fundamental departure from the generally accepted 
consequences of such a clause, as evidenced by the weight of authority before Hendrix, 
which is usually understood as prioritising one measure over another.133 Which norm 
ought to apply becomes, if anything, more complicated. 
 
                                               
129 Hendrix (n 18), para. 51. 
130 See Section 4 above. 
131 Commission v France (n 65), para. 44. 
132 Case C-287/05 Hendrix EU:C:2007:196, Opinion of AG Kokott, para. 54. 
133 See Chapter 2, Section 3.2. 
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Advocate General Kokott also discussed the principle of lex specialis, even though the 
existence of a priority clause should have rendered recourse to priority principles 
unnecessary. Her reflections suggest confusion over how priority principles operate, 
underscoring the need for the ECJ to rely on priority clauses more explicitly when faced 
with norm overlaps. Advocate General Kokott in Hendrix considered that even though 
‘Regulation No 1612/68 is formulated in general terms whereas Regulation No 1408/71 
contains specific provisions for the field of social security [this does not] permit the 
conclusion that Regulation No 1408/71 as lex specialis takes precedence over Regulation 
No 1612/68.’134 However, it is not clear why she rejects the relevance of the lex specialis 
principle: is it because she considers that the principle itself has no role to play in 
determining the inter-relationship between norms in the EU legal order, or is it because 
the overlapping Regulations lack the necessary connection to understand one of them as 
a lex specialis? 
 
One could also explain the residence cases on the grounds that it was not clear how the 
principle of  lex specialis operated in this context. Section 3 outlined how the application 
of  the principle of  lex specialis is not always clear-cut and often involves a contextual 
assessment. In the residence cases, the explanation for the outcome might be that the 
ECJ understands Directive 2004/38 as more specialised. The ECJ stressed the role of  
Regulation 883/2004 as a measure for coordination which ‘is not intended to lay down the 
conditions creating the right to social security benefits’.135 and implies, as Nic Shuibhne 
notes, that Regulation 883/2004 is somehow lacking in content and could not ‘be the 
sole source of  conditions determining eligibility for social security benefits’.136 However, 
as set out above, Regulation 883/2004 appears more specialised following a contextual 
analysis. 
 
Turning now to consider the possible rationales underpinning the ECJ’s case law, one 
way of understanding both lines of case law is that the ECJ shapes the relationship 
between norms to fit a particular substantive value. On this view, it does not matter 
                                               
134 Hendrix, Opinion of AG Kokott (n 132), para. 55. 
135 Dano (n 111), para. 83. See also Brey (n 23), para. 41; García-Nieto (n 113), para. 52. 
136 Nic Shuibhne (n 115) 915. 
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which measure is more specific or whether there is a priority clause: the ECJ interprets 
the measures in a manner that best achieves the substantive goal. 
 
The ECJ in Hendrix arguably interprets the overlapping measures in line with the aim of 
achieving the greatest freedom of movement for workers. The ECJ outlines the need to interpret 
Regulation 1408/71 in line with this aim.137 Only after asserting this point does the ECJ 
turn to Regulation 1612/68. Similarly, in the residence cases, one can understand the 
ECJ as interpreting the measures in a manner that aims to safeguard Member State welfare 
systems.138 The ECJ relies instrumentally on Recital 10 of Directive 2004/38, which states 
that ‘[p]ersons exercising their right of residence should not … become an unreasonable 
burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State.’139 And the cases are 
replete with references e.g. to preventing economically inactive Union citizens from 
relying on ‘the host Member State’s welfare system to fund their means of 
subsistence’.140 Furthermore, in Alimanovic, the ECJ held that if a person without a right 
of residence under Directive 2004/38 could claim social benefits on the same terms as 
nationals of the host Member State, this ‘would run counter to an objective of the 
directive… namely preventing Union citizens who are nationals of other Member States 
from becoming an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State.141 Given that this would be the precise consequence of prioritising 
Regulation 883/2004 this ‘all paint[s] a picture of a new teleological principle – the need 
to accommodate Member States’ desires to discriminate, in order to avoid offending 
national welfare sensitivities’.142 
 
Another possible rationale behind both lines of case law is that the ECJ attributes 
greater weight to one measure. This introduces a hierarchy through the back door: we 
                                               
137 Hendrix (n 18), para. 52. 
138 Commission v UK does not fit with the rest of the case law here as the factors listed below do not feature 
in the ECJ’s decision. The result would, however, fit with this approach. 
139 Brey (n 23), para. 54; Dano (n 111), para. 74; Alimanovic (n 112), para. 50; García-Nieto (n 113), para. 39. 
There is an attempt made in Brey to rebalance the focus of the judgment and introduce other aims via 
proportionality analysis. In particular, the ECJ refers to Directive 2004/38’s objective ‘to facilitate and 
strengthen the exercise of Union citizens’ primary right to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States’ (Brey (n 23), para. 71). Later cases appear to depart from this approach, see 
Minderhoud (n 115) 346. 
140 Dano (n 111), para. 76. 
141 Alimanovic (n 112), para. 50. See also Case C-333/13 Dano EU:C:2014:341, Opinion of AG Wathelet, 
paras 106-07. 
142 O’Brien, ‘Case Comment on Commission v UK’ (n 115) 240. 
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have two measures of the same formal status but the ECJ elevates one, not on the basis 
of recognised interpretative techniques that apply in most of the relevant case law, but 
on its normative underpinnings. 
 
One could understand the ECJ in Hendrix as giving greater weight to Regulation 
1612/68 on the grounds that it is more closely connected to the aims of free movement 
and thereby also to the Treaty. Evidence for this approach is found in the statement that 
Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68 is ‘the particular expression’ of the right to equal 
treatment in the Treaty and so requires the same interpretation.143 An effort is made in 
this statement to link Regulation 1612/68 to Article 45 TFEU in a way that Regulation 
1408/71 is not. But the brevity of the ECJ’s reasoning makes it difficult to determine 
which factor is more important – the need to secure free movement or the particular 
link between Regulation 1612/68 and Article 45 TFEU. If the latter, why not just rely 
directly on Article 45 TFEU? 
 
There are some signs of implicit recourse to Article 45 TFEU: Advocate General 
Kokott notes that ‘the requirements of the Treaty as a superior source of law must be 
observed’ and that simply because ‘a national measure may be consistent with a 
provision of secondary legislation… does not have the effect of removing that measure 
from the scope of the Treaty’s provisions.144 Similarly, the ECJ notes that ‘Mr Hendrix 
falls within the scope of the provisions of the Treaty on freedom of movement for 
workers.’145 One reading of the case is, then, that while the ECJ does not invalidate 
Regulation 1408/71, there is still a need to consider whether the situation is consistent 
with the Treaty.146 If the ECJ is relying on Regulation 1612/68 as a proxy for Article 45 
TFEU, it fails to clarify this point. Throughout the judgment in Hendrix, the ECJ 
                                               
143 Hendrix (n 18), para. 53. This could also be understood as suggesting that the situation still falls within 
the scope of the Treaty. 
144 Hendrix, Opinion of AG Kokott (n 132), para. 56 (emphasis added). See also Cousins, ‘Free Movement 
of Workers, EU Citizenship and Access to Social Advantages’ (n 97) 351. 
145 Hendrix (n 18), para. 60. 
146 This argument is made by Dougan who notes ‘the Court in cases such as Hendrix was clearly willing to 
employ the primary Treaty provisions as a means of distorting the allocation of financial responsibilities 
intended by the Union legislature in respect of certain benefits’, see M Dougan, ‘Judicial Activism or 
Constitutional Interaction? Policy making by the ECJ in the Field of Union Citizenship’ in H Micklitz and 
B De Witte (eds), The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States (Intersentia 2011) 113-
147, 144. See also Dougan, ‘Expanding the Frontiers of Union Citizenship’ (n 87) 144; Verschueren, ‘The 
EU Social Security Co-Ordination System’ (n 61) 192-96. 
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reasons on the basis of Regulation 1612/68 and appears to rely upon that measure to 
achieve the desired result. How Article 45 TFEU relates to Regulation 1612/68 also 
becomes less rather than more clear on this understanding. Linking back to the 
conclusions reached in Chapter 3, if – as would be suggested by reliance of Regulation 
1612/68 as a proxy for Article 45 TFEU – Regulation 1408/71 is in breach of the 
overlapping Treaty norm, the ECJ should engage in legality review and invalidate the 
offending provision. If the rule preventing the export of certain benefits under 
Regulation 1408/71 is compatible with the Treaties,147 then Chapter 3 suggests that that 
Regulation ought to be determinative. 
 
Clearer evidence of hierarchy between the secondary measures themselves is found in 
the cases concerning Directive 2004/38 and perhaps better explains the ECJ’s reasoning 
in that line of case law. In Commission v UK, Advocate General Cruz Villalón suggests 
that Directive 2004/38 is of a more foundational status than Regulation 883/2004, and 
underlies the exercise of the right to move and reside. After outlining the limits in the 
Treaty on the exercise of the right to move and reside148 he noted that these limits are 
laid down in substance in Directive 2004/38.149 Given that Regulation 883/2004 is 
closely linked to Union citizenship and the right to move and reside,150 the Advocate 
General held that the conditions set out in Directive 2004/38 must ‘remain fully 
effective within the framework of [Regulation 883/2004]’.151 While the ECJ does not 
explicitly adopt this reasoning, the result is the same – the requirements of the Directive 
precondition the right to equal treatment under the Regulation, at least for the 
economically inactive. Directive 2004/38 is then given the status of ‘super-norm’152 or a 
‘higher constitutional principle of exclusion’.153 
 
                                               
147 The ECJ accepted that the rule preventing export fell well within the leeway granted to the legislature 
in this area, see Case C-20/96 Snares v Adjudication Officer EU:C:1997:518, para. 49. 
148 Case C-308/14 Commission v UK EU:C:2015:666, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, paras 67-69. Article 
18(1) TFEU only grants the right to non-discrimination ‘[w]ithin the scope of application of the Treaties 
and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein’. Articles 20 and 21 TFEU state that the 
right to move and reside are subject to the ‘conditions and limits defined by the Treaties and by the 
measures adopted thereunder’. 
149 Commission v UK, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 148), para. 71. 
150 Commission v UK, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 148), para. 70. 
151 Commission v UK, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón (n 148), para. 72. 
152 Nic Shuibhne (n 115) 926. 
153 O’Brien, ‘Case Comment on Commission v UK’ (n 115) 241. 
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In both lines of case law discussed here the ECJ appears to adopt either a different 
understanding of how the principle of lex specialis and the ‘shall not affect’ clause apply 
or ignores them. Certainly, the ECJ appears more concerned by other factors. In 
Hendrix, the ECJ appears to interpret the measures in a manner that achieves the 
greatest possible free movement or prioritises Regulation 1612/68 on the grounds that 
it gives expression to Article 45 TFEU. In the lawful residence cases, it is possible to 
explain the ECJ’s reasoning as aiming to safeguard Member State welfare systems, or as 
based upon an understanding that Directive 2004/38 is somehow more fundamental 
and so supersedes the Regulation. 
 
5.3. Evaluation 
It is argued here that prioritising a particular substantive result or elevating one measure 
due to a particular understanding of  the EU legal order does not work well in the 
context of  overlapping norms. More specifically, the ECJ’s approach in Hendrix and the 
lawful residence cases has the potential to undermine both legal certainty and 
institutional balance. 
 
In opting not to follow the ‘shall not affect’ clause in Hendrix the ECJ engenders 
considerable legal uncertainty. What is problematic about the decision is not just the 
reversal of  extensive earlier case law on the inter-relationship between Regulations 
883/2004 and 492/2011 – case law research identifying seventy-nine earlier cases 
adopting a different approach; it is instead the lack of  underlying rationalisation. It is 
not clear whether the ECJ reaches its decision because it is prioritising a particular 
substantive result, or because it is elevating one measure due to a particular 
understanding of  the EU legal order. 
 
If one asks why this value (i.e. the greatest possible free movement) or why understand 
Regulation 1612/68 as more fundamental, it is difficult to find a persuasive answer and 
see how the ECJ’s approach in Hendrix could translate into a more general principle of  
norm inter-relationship. In several cases the ECJ accepts limitations on the right to 
equal treatment, even if these did not achieve the greatest possible freedom of 
Chapter 5 – Overlaps between Secondary Norms 
 
 202 
movement.154 Similarly, although there is some justification for understanding Regulation 
1612/68 as especially linked to directly effective rights in the Treaty – the preamble to 
Regulation 1612/68 refers to how that measure is necessary to ‘enable the objectives 
laid down in Articles [45 and 46 TFEU] in the field of freedom of movement’ whereas 
Regulation 1408/71 only makes explicit reference to Article 48 TFEU – Regulation 
1408/71 is also closely linked to Article 45 TFEU. The legal basis of Regulation 
1408/71 (Article 48 TFEU) only empowers the Union legislature to adopt ‘such 
measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of 
movement for workers’ and the ECJ acknowledges that ‘the principle of non-
discrimination laid down in Article 45 TFEU was implemented, in relation to social 
security for migrant workers, by Article 3(1) of Regulation No 1408/71.’155 This lack of 
any clear rationale explaining the ECJ’s approach makes it difficult to see how it could 
offer guidance in other cases. 
 
The ECJ’s approach in the lawful residence cases also suffers from a lack of clarity, 
again potentially damaging the principle of legal certainty. Instead of a relationship of 
priority between Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38, their inter-relationship 
will oscillate depending upon which measure best achieves the selected aim in the 
circumstances. Furthermore, the legal gymnastics relied upon by the ECJ in the lawful 
residence cases suggests that predicting how the measures will inter-relate will be 
particularly difficult; especially, since there are several different ways to achieve one aim. 
What is more, it is hard to identify the limits of the ECJ’s approach; in Commission v UK, 
for instance, the Court comes close to rewriting Regulation 883/2004. 
 
It is also difficult to see how the ECJ’s approach to the inter-relationship between 
Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38 could translate into workable guidance for 
other norm overlaps. Again, the ECJ offers little justification for why it structures the 
relationship between norms around the aim of protecting Member State welfare 
systems. While Directive 2004/38 does refer to the need to protect welfare systems, 
other aims are set out in the preamble156 and there is scant support in primary law for 
                                               
154 E.g. Case C-154/05 Kersbergen-Lap EU:C:2006:449, para. 44; Case C-208/07 von Chamier-Glisczinski 
EU:C:2009:455, paras 53-54. 
155 Lachar (n 65), para. 28 
156 E.g. Recitals 1-3. 
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the protection of the public finances of the Member State; instead, there is a primary 
right to equal treatment as well as social policy goals to combat poverty and exclusion.157 
Similarly, the rationale that Directive 2004/38 is somehow more fundamental also rests 
on shaky foundations. Regulation 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38 were adopted on the 
same day (29 April 2004) making it ‘very strange that the Union legislature would have 
wanted to limit the entitlement to a benefit established by the first instrument to a 
supplementary condition laid down in the second instrument.’158 There is also no 
hierarchy between the legal bases and Regulations 883/2004 and Directive 2004/38, 
which were both adopted using the same legislative procedure, thereby granting each 
the same degree of democratic legitimacy. It is difficult to find sufficient justification for 
why the requirements or conditions of one measure should be elevated over another 
measure with the same status and how this approach might offer guidance in other 
situations. 
 
In contrast, as noted above, respecting priority clauses and the principle of lex specialis 
offers more workable guidance and greater predictability in outcome. As evidenced by 
the extensive body of case law pre- and post-dating the ECJ’s decision in Hendrix, there 
is a generally accepted understanding of priority clauses that the ECJ usually follows. 
Where there is no priority clause, there may initially be some uncertainty over norm 
inter-relationships due to the difficulties surrounding which norm is the lex specialis. 
Chapter 2 set out certain criteria for identifying the lex specialis that Section 3 of this 
Chapter showed could be applied, with some success, to the overlap between the 
Regulations and Directive 2004/38. Were the ECJ to set out more clearly the relevant 
criteria for identifying the lex specialis, this would enhance legal certainty. After 
clarification by the ECJ of which norm is the lex specialis, the inter-relationship between 
norms would be more predictable. 
 
Prioritising a particular aim or elevating one measure above another also has the 
potential to undermine the principle of institutional balance and the principle of mutual 
sincere cooperation between institutions set out in Article 13(2) TEU. Given that 
Articles 46 and 48 TFEU (alongside Articles 18 and 21 TFEU) specifically empower the 
                                               
157 See e.g. Article 3(5) TEU; Article 34(3) CFR. 
158 Verschueren, ‘Free movement or benefit tourism’ (n 115) 162. 
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Union legislature to adopt measures combatting nationality discrimination, securing the 
free movement of workers and coordinating entitlement to social security, the Treaty 
framers clearly intended for the Union legislature to have a say in defining the extent of 
the right to non-discrimination on grounds of nationality in the exercise of free 
movement rights. Unless that legislation is inconsistent with EU primary law (in this 
context, the ECJ had previously accepted that the measures adopted fell well within the 
leeway granted to the legislature159), the principle of institutional balance suggests that 
the ECJ ought to respect the decisions reached by Union legislature about where the 
balance between free movement and protection of public finances should lie. Instead, as 
O’Brien argues, the result is that the ECJ has ‘curbed, rewritten, and even rendered 
obsolete, provisions of Regulation 883/2004’ (and Regulation 1408/71).160 
 
5.4. Summary 
This Section outlined ECJ practice that does not cohere with either the ‘shall not affect’ 
clause or the principle of lex specialis (depending upon the overlap) and argued that, 
instead, other factors appear to motivate the ECJ’s approach. In Hendrix, the ECJ’s 
approach is consistent with either prioritising free movement as a goal or elevating 
Regulation 1612/68 on the grounds of its connection to Article 45 TFEU. In the lawful 
residence cases, the ECJ appears to grant superior status to Directive 2004/38 as 
underlying the right to move and reside.  
 
The tension between competing constitutional concerns becomes apparent here. By 
prioritising certain substantive goals or by according certain legislative measures 
particular significance, the ECJ negatively impacts upon both legal certainty and 
institutional balance. In contrast, respecting the ‘shall not affect’ clause or the principle 
of lex specialis entails accepting the choices made by the Union legislature over who can 
claim equal access to which benefits, which – as noted in Section 4.2 above – may not 
maximise the rights of Union citizens per se. The balance between competing 
considerations will always be difficult to strike, but the uncertainty and the impact on 
institutional balance that follow from the ECJ’s decisions in Hendrix and the lawful 
residence cases suggest that accepting certain limitations on the equal treatment rights of 
                                               
159 Snares (n 147), para. 49. 
160 O’Brien, ‘Case Comment on Commission v UK’ (n 115) 242. 
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Union citizens is a worthwhile trade off. As argued in Chapter 3, should secondary law 
unduly restrict the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of nationality as set out in 
the Treaties, it remains open to the ECJ to invalidate (parts of) secondary Union law. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter assessed how the ECJ resolves overlaps between secondary norms. As a 
case study, this Chapter examined overlapping norms of secondary Union law 
prohibiting discrimination of grounds of nationality specifically with regard to accessing 
certain social benefits. The Chapter reaches two main conclusions; first, the ECJ will 
almost always respect any priority clauses; but, secondly, in the absence of a priority 
clause, ECJ practice does not always cohere with the approach dictated by conventional 
interpretative principles, even though this would better maintain a balance between 
competing constitutional considerations. 
 
Where overlapping norms of the same status overlap, existing approaches to norm 
inter-relationship suggest that the ECJ should apply any priority clauses and – in the 
absence of an express clause – either the principle of lex specialis or the principle of lex 
posterior. In the context of the case study adopted, existing approaches meant ‘shall not 
affect’ clause in Regulation 492/2011 should prioritise Regulation 883/2004 in the event 
of a conflict. On the relationship between the Regulations and Directive 2004/38, 
Section 3 showed how reliance on the lex posterior principle would lead to illogical 
conclusions but argued that the principle of lex specialis offered workable guidance to the 
ECJ. Focusing on the personal and material scope of the measures as well as looking to 
each measure in its wider context, it was argued that the Regulations should both be 
understood as lex specialis vis-à-vis Directive 2004/38. 
 
Extensive case law analysis then showed that, where there is a priority clause, the ECJ 
will almost always rely on that clause to structure the inter-relationship between 
overlapping norms. This finding coheres with those of Chapter 4 on the role played by 
the ‘without prejudice’ clause and suggests that it would be good practice for the Union 
legislature to include priority clauses when it foresees the possibility of overlap. The ECJ 
does cite the priority clause as justification for its resolution of a question arising from 
norm overlap in one case. In most cases, the ECJ does not expressly cite the priority 
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clause as underpinning norm inter-relationships, which can sometimes – as discussed in 
Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 – lead to confusion (even if only prima facie). Were the ECJ to 
refer more explicitly to the ‘shall not affect’ clause, this would avoid any ambiguity over 
norm inter-relationship. Where there is no priority clause, ECJ practice only coheres 
with the principle of lex specialis in less than half of the cases identified. Furthermore, in 
none of the cases surveyed does the ECJ refer to the principle of lex specialis. 
 
Section 5 examined the Hendrix decision and the lawful residence cases in which ECJ’s 
approach to norm inter-relationship did not fit with application of the ‘shall not affect’ 
clause or the principle of lex specialis. All of these cases attracted considerable academic 
comment, although not from the perspective of norm overlap.161 What is interesting, as 
also seen in Chapter 3, is the correlation between cases widely perceived as controversial 
and a departure from standard approaches to norm inter-relationship. When searching 
for an alternate rationalisation of the ECJ’s approach to norm inter-relationship in 
Hendrix and the lawful residence cases, it was argued that the ECJ’s approach better fits 
with a guiding principle that either aimed to prioritise a particular value, or attributed 
particular weight to one measure. What is striking about the ECJ’s decisions in Hendrix 
and the lawful residence cases is how the ECJ essentially uses norm inter-relationship to 
rebalance conclusions reached by the Union legislature in favour of alternative policy 
goals. As this Chapter shows, this can have serious consequences for legal certainty and 
the principle of institutional balance. Focusing on guiding principles guards against 
impulses to ‘re-decide’ and places the onus for determining a Union citizen’s eligibility 
for social benefits back on the Union legislature, which is where the Treaties also 
allocate such responsibility. 
 
Having discussed overlaps between primary and secondary Union law and between 
norms of the same rank, discussion now turns to an overlap that evades easy 
classification: between the Charter and general principles of Union law. 
                                               





Interactions between the Charter and 
Overlapping General Principles 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter examines how the ECJ approaches the inter-relationship between the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and overlapping general principles of Union law. Article 
6 TEU confirms not only that ‘[t]he Union recognises the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out in the Charter … which shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties’,1 but also that ‘[f]undamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] and as they 
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute 
general principles of the Union’s law.’ What is not explicit is the inter-relationship 
between these different sources of EU fundamental rights.  
 
In contrast to other Chapters, when faced with an overlap between the Charter and 
general principles prima facie it is not clear whether there is a priority clause or which 
priority principle might offer interpretative guidance to the ECJ. The horizontal clauses 
in the Charter (such as Articles 52(2) and 52(4) CFR) and Article 6 TEU do not refer 
expressly to the relationship between the Charter and general principles. The unwritten 
nature of general principles also leads to controversy over their rank in the hierarchy of 
norms, their content and when they became legally binding. This leads to difficulties in 
determining which out of the principles of lex superior, lex specialis and lex posterior could 
apply. This Chapter argues that only Article 6(3) TEU and the principle of lex superior 
offer any workable guidance to the ECJ when faced with an overlap between the 
Charter and general principles. Treating the Charter as lex superior requires a 
modification of the principle for the specific context of the EU legal order and, briefly 
put, requires that the Charter essentially ‘replaces’ the overlapping general principle, 
                                               
1 Article 6(1) TEU. 
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even if (although unlikely) the overlapping general principles offered more extensive 
protection from discrimination.2 
 
To test the ECJ’s approach to norm inter-relationship here, this Chapter examines the 
inter-relationship between Article 21(1) CFR and overlapping general principles 
prohibiting status discrimination. Article 21(1) CFR prohibits: 
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. 
Despite the Charter’s aim to codify the rights already protected by Union law, Section 2 
shows that several divergences remain between Article 21(1) CFR and overlapping 
general principles.  
 
Doctrinal analysis shows that, while the ECJ normally relies directly on the Charter, the 
ECJ still refers to general principles. Overall, it is submitted: first, that the ECJ needs to 
clarify better the continuing role of general principles to prevent any confusion; and, 
secondly, the ECJ needs to base its reasoning in fundamental rights cases more explicitly 
on the Charter. This should, it is argued, enhance EU fundamental rights protection. 
 
2. CASE STUDY: THE OVERLAP BETWEEN GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
AND ARTICLE 21(1) CFR 
This Chapter examines the ECJ’s approach to overlaps between Article 21(1) CFR and 
general principles prohibiting status discrimination. According to Article 21(1) CFR: 
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation shall be prohibited. 
This provision, as well as adding additional prohibited grounds of discrimination, gives 
written expression to the general principles previously recognised by the ECJ, namely, 
                                               
2 An exception here might be Article 41 CFR, which is of more limited application to Union institutions 
and expressly refers to general principles. See further, HH Hofmann and BC Mihaescu, ‘The Relation 
between the Charter’s Fundamental Rights and the Unwritten General Principles: Good Administration 
as the Test Case’ (2013) 9 EuConst 73. 
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prohibitions of discrimination on the grounds of sex,3 age,4 race and ethnic origin,5 
religion6 and sexual orientation.7 A general principle prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds of disability has not been explicitly recognised, but the ECJ has referred to ‘the 
general principle of non-discrimination’ in cases relating to disability.8 Relatedly, the ECJ 
has recognised ‘a general principle of equality tout court (i.e. a principle that is not linked 
to any discrimination ground)’9 which ‘requires that similar situations shall not be treated 
differently unless differentiation is objectively justified’.10 
 
Article 21(1) CFR and the corresponding general principles also overlap with several 
directives. This secondary law framework – outlined in Chapter 1 (and discussed, in 
connection with the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of sex in Chapter 3) – 
receives only brief mention here. The reason for this is that the existence of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights means that the relationship between general principles and 
secondary Union law to some extent hinges on the ECJ’s approach to overlaps between 
general principles and the Charter. This is not to say that the inter-relationship between 
general principles and secondary law does not remain a live issue; however, this is 
mostly in areas not covered by the Charter and so falling outside of the non-
discrimination case study adopted by this thesis.11 
 
Some comment on the various directives prohibiting status discrimination is somewhat 
inevitable, though, so it is necessary briefly to recap the main measures here. Article 
21(1) CFR and the general principle prohibiting sex discrimination overlap with 
                                               
3 Case 149/77 Defrenne III EU:C:1978:130, paras 26-27. 
4 Case C-144/04 Mangold EU:C:2005:709, para. 75. 
5 Case C-83/14 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria EU:C:2015:480, para. 58. 
6 Case 130/75 Prais EU:C:1976:142, para. 10; Case C-414/16 Egenberger EU:C:2018:257, para. 76.  
7 Case C-147/08 Römer EU:C:2011:286, para. 60. 
8 Case C-354/13 FOA EU:C:2014:2463, para. 32 
9 C Tobler, ‘The Prohibition of Discrimination in the Union’s Layered System of Equality Law: From 
Early Staff Cases to the Mangold Approach’ in A Rosas, E Levits and Y Bot (eds), The Court of Justice and the 
Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law (TMC Asser Press 2013) 443-469, 
444. 
10 Joined Cases 201 and 202/85 Klensch EU:C:1986:439, para. 9. 
11 For discussion, see Case C-101/08 Audiolux EU:C:2009:410, Opinion of AG Trstenjak. 
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Directives 79/7,12 2004/113,13 2006/5414 and Directive 2010/4115 prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of sex in the fields of social security, access to goods and 
services, employment and self-employment respectively. Article 21(1) CFR and 
corresponding general principles also overlap with Directive 2000/43 prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of race;16 and Directive 2000/78 prohibiting discrimination 
on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards 
employment and occupation.17 
 
This Section starts by outlining how overlaps developed between the Charter and 
general principles. Although the history of fundamental rights protection in the EU is 
well-known,18 some context is necessary since – as is argued here – the development of 
EU fundamental rights protection affects how the ECJ should approach overlaps.  
 
                                               
12 Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle 
of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security [1979] OJ L 6/24. 
13 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services [2004] OJ L 373/37. 
14 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters 
of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L 204/23. The Directive 2006/54 consolidates and 
amends several earlier Directives including Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay 
for men and women [1975] OJ L 45/19; Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [1976] OJ L 39/40; Council Directive 
86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women in occupational social security schemes [1986] OJ L 225/40; Council Directive 96/97 amending 
Directive 86/378 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in 
occupational social security schemes [1997] OJ L14/13; Directive 2002/73/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [2002] OJ L 269/15. For further discussion, 
see Chapter 3. 
15 Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the 
application of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-
employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/EEC [2010] OJ L 180/1. 
16 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22. 
17 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L 303/16. 
18 See further e.g. J Coppel and A O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously’ 
(1992) 29(4) CMLRev 669; JH Weiler and NJ Lockhart, ‘“Taking rights seriously” seriously: The European 
Court and its fundamental rights jurisprudence – part I’ (1995) 32(1) CMLRev 51; JH Weiler and NJ 
Lockhart, ‘“Taking rights seriously” seriously: The European Court and its fundamental rights 
jurisprudence – part II’ (1995) 32(2) CMLRev 579; P Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (OUP 1999); S 
Smismans, ‘The European Union’s fundamental rights myth’ (2010) 48(1) JCMS 45; G de Búrca, ‘The 
Evolution of EU Human Rights Law’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, 
OUP 2011) 465-97. 
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2.1. The Development of EU Fundamental Rights 
The Treaty of Rome included no express reference to fundamental rights.19 However, 
partly responding to declarations by national courts (particularly the German 
Constitutional Court) that – if necessary – they would review EU law against domestic 
fundamental rights standards,20 the ECJ held in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft that: 
… respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of 
law protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired 
by the constitutional traditions common to member states, must be ensured within 
the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community.21 
Later, in Nold, the ECJ clarified that the EU fundamental rights standard also drew 
upon ‘international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member 
States have collaborated or of which they are signatories’.22 Emphatically, national and 
international law only supplied ‘guidelines’23 for the development of an autonomous EU 
standard. 
 
Over the decades following Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the ECJ developed an 
unwritten catalogue of fundamental rights enshrined in the general principles of Union 
law. Alongside the judicial construction of EU fundamental rights protection, the 
Member States incorporated additional references to fundamental rights within the 
Treaty framework. The Maastricht Treaty formally recognised that fundamental rights 
were part of EU law,24 while compliance with fundamental rights became part of the 
formal criteria for accession to the EU after Amsterdam.25 A European Council meeting 
in 1999 marked a turning point; the Conclusions announced that: 
Protection of fundamental rights is a founding principle of the Union and an 
indispensable prerequisite for her legitimacy … There appears to be a need, at the 
present stage of the Union’s development, to establish a Charter of fundamental 
                                               
19 On how this came about, see G de Búrca, ‘The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global 
Human Rights Actor’ (2011) 105(4) AJIL 649. 
20 See BVerfG, Judgment of 29 May 1974, 37 BvR 271 (Solange I); BVerG, Judgment of 22 October 1986, 
73 BvR 339 (Solange II). 
21 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft EU:C:1970:114, para. 4. By this point the ECJ had already 
made brief mention of ‘the fundamental rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law’, see 
Case 29/69 Stauder EU:C:1969:57, para. 7. 
22 Case 4/73 Nold v Commission EU:C:1974:51, para. 13. 
23 Nold v Commission (n 22), para. 13. 
24 Now the updated Article 6 TEU. 
25 Now found in Article 49 TFEU which provides that ‘Any European State which respects the values 
referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the 
Union.’ 
Chapter 6 – Overlaps between General principles and the Charter 
 
 212 
rights in order to make their overriding importance and relevance more visible to 
the Union’s citizens.26 
The Charter was first ‘solemnly proclaimed’ by the European Parliament, Council and 
Commission at Nice on 7 December 2000. With the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009, the Charter became legally binding.27 
 
The mandate given to the Convention drafting the Charter expressly referred to the 
codification of existing fundamental rights protection by requiring ‘the fundamental 
rights applicable at Union level [to] be consolidated in a Charter and thereby made more 
evident.’28 In recognition of this codification aim, the Preamble to the Charter specifies 
that ‘it is necessary to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights … by making 
those rights more visible in a Charter’29 and refers to how the Charter ‘reaffirms’ 
fundamental rights ‘as they result in particular, from the constitutional traditions and 
international obligations common to the Member States, the [ECHR], the Social 
Charters adopted by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the 
[CJEU] and of the ECtHR.’30 Significantly, the sources informing the development of 
Charter rights had previously been recognised as inspirational sources for the 
development of general principles.31 Furthermore, the drafters of the Charter clearly 
intended to maintain continuity between the Charter and general principles since 
Articles 52(2)-(4) CFR tie the interpretation of the Charter to the inspirational sources 
of general principles (the ECHR and the constitutional traditions of the Member States) 
and to existing Treaty rights (as discussed in Chapter 4). 
 
The resulting Charter is not identical to overlapping general principles. As O’Leary 
warns, ‘[a]ny codification exercise carries a risk … that the principles which it is sought 
                                               
26 Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council on June 4 1999. 
27 Article 6(1) TEU. 
28 Presidency Conclusions (n 26). 
29 Recital 4. 
30 Recital 5. 
31 See e.g. Case C-438/05 Viking Line EU:C:2007:772, paras 43-44; Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri 
EU:C:2007:809, paras 90-91. The ECJ in Viking Line and Laval cited the European Social Charter and the 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers to support the ECJ’s conclusion that 
‘the right to take collective action, including the right to strike, must therefore be recognised as a 
fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general principles of Community law the 
observance of which the Court ensures’. On the ‘special significance’ of the ECHR as an inspirational 
source for the development of general principles, see e.g. Case C-260/89 ERT EU:C:1991:254, para. 41; 
Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères SA, para. 25; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger EU:C:2003:333, para. 71. 
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to codify may be altered or distorted’.32 The Charter is no exception here. The text of 
the Charter makes manifest a tension between ‘its conception as a constitutional 
instrument for polity building and its conception as a simple consolidation of the 
previous fundamental rights acquis aimed at guaranteeing regime legitimacy’.33 The 
extensive list of rights in the Charter in many ways goes beyond those previously 
expressly recognised as general principles by the ECJ. Article 21(1) CFR is a prime 
example here as it includes several prohibited grounds of discrimination not yet 
expressly recognised as forming part of the general principles of EU law, such as colour, 
social origin, genetic features, language, political or any other opinion, membership of a 
national minority, property and birth.34 However, the language of the Charter often 
suggests that its applicability is more limited than that of general principles. As a result, 
although there is a high degree of similarity between the overlapping sources of the 
prohibition on discrimination here, several prima facie differences emerge between the 
prohibition on status discrimination protected under the Charter and under the general 
principles of EU law. Discussion now turns to discuss these prima facie differences 
starting with apparent differences rendered insignificant in practice. 
 
2.2. Differences Diminished by Interpretation 
Several apparent differences in the applicability of the Charter and general principles did 
not manifest, specifically including those relating to: (1) the Charter’s field of 
application; (2) the Charter’s capacity for horizontal effects and (3) the territorial scope 
of the Charter. 
 
The first possible divergence between the applicability of Article 21(1) CFR and 
corresponding general principles arose in relation to their respective fields of 
                                               
32 S O’Leary, ‘Free Movement of Persons and Services’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of 
EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 499-545, 513. 
33 M Poaires Maduro, ‘The Double Constitutional Life of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union’ in T Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: A Legal Perspective (Hart 2002) 269-99, 269. 
34 The ECJ did not explicitly refer to general principles prohibiting discrimination on grounds of race, age 
or sexual orientation until after the drafting of the Charter (although in cases either before it gained 
binding force or falling outside its temporal scope). Gualco describes this as an ‘endogenous process’ by 
which ‘general principles are expressly discovered within the values and the rights protected by the 
Treaties themselves’, see E Gualco, ‘General Principles of EU Law as a Passe-Partout Key within the 
Constitutional Edifice of the European Union: Are the Benefits Worth the Side Effects?’ (2016) 
Birmingham Law School Institute of European Law Working Paper No. 05, 2. 
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application. Initially, fundamental rights as general principles of EU law bound the EU 
institutions.35 The ECJ later confirmed that EU fundamental rights as general principles 
bind the Member State when ‘implementing’36 EU law (e.g. where a Member State 
transposes a directive into national law) and when acting ‘within the scope’ of Union 
law.37 Although the outer boundaries of what falls within the scope of application of EU 
law are difficult to define,38 the concept expands to cover situations where a Member 
State derogates from EU law on the basis of express derogations39 or mandatory 
requirements.40  
 
The horizontal clause defining the Charter’s field of application seems to adopt a 
narrower formulation than relied upon in ECJ case law. According to Article 51(1) CFR 
‘[t]he provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law’ (emphasis added). While prima 
facie confining the Charter to a more restrictive field of application,41 the Explanations to 
the Charter – which are to be ‘given due regard’42 – clarify that ‘it follows 
unambiguously from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the requirement to respect 
fundamental rights defined in the context of the Union is only binding on the Member States 
when they act in the scope of Union law’.43 Interpreting Article 51(1) CFR broadly (and 
removing any concerns of divergence that the scope of application of that Charter 
differs from that of general principles) the ECJ in Åkerberg Fransson declared that the 
                                               
35 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (n 21). 
36 Case 5/88 Wachauf EU:C:1989:321, para. 19. 
37 E.g. ERT (n 31), para. 42; Case C-368/95 Familiapress EU:C:1997:325, para. 24. 
38 See e.g. AG Toth, ‘Human Rights as General Principles of Law, in the Past and in the Future’ in B Ulf 
and J Nergelius (eds), General Principles of European Community Law: Reports from a Conference in Malmo, 27-28 
August 1999 (Kluwer Law International 2000) 73-92, 84; Editorial Comments, ‘The Scope of Application 
of the General Principles of Union Law: An Ever Expanding Union?’ (2010) 47(6) CMLRev 1589; S 
Prechal, ‘Competence Creep and General Principles of Law’ (2010) 3 Review of European Administrative Law 
5; S Prechal, S de Vries and H van Eijken, ‘The Principle of Attributed Powers and the “Scope of EU 
Law”‘ in L Besselink, F Pennings and S Prechal (eds), The Eclipse of the Legality Principle in the European Union 
(Kluwer Law International 2011) 213-247; X Groussot, L Pech and GT Petursson, ‘The Scope of 
Application of Fundamental Rights on Member States Action: In Search of Certainty in EU Adjudication’ 
(2011) Eric Stein Working Paper No 1. 
39 ERT (n 31), paras 42-43. 
40 Familiapress (n 37), para. 24. 
41 On the drafting of Article 51(1) CFR, see G de Búrca, ‘The Drafting of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights’ (2001) 26(2) ELRev 126, 136. 
42 Article 52(7) CFR. 
43 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C 303/17, 32 (emphasis added). 
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‘applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter.’44  
 
Precisely when the Charter binds the Member States remains somewhat contested45 and 
is not helped by the inconsistent language employed by the ECJ when describing what 
falls within the concept of ‘implementing’ under the Charter. For instance, in Hernández, 
the Court referred to the need for: 
… a degree of connection between the measure of EU law and the national measure 
at issue which goes beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those 
matters having an indirect impact on the other …46 
Whereas in Ymeraga, the Court ruled that for the Charter to apply: 
… it must be ascertained among other things whether the national legislation at 
issue is intended to implement a provision of European Union law, what the 
character of that legislation is, and whether it pursues objectives other than those 
covered by European Union law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting that law, 
and also whether there are specific rules of European Union law on the matter or 
capable of affecting it.47  
Despite the uncertainty over the precise field of application of the Charter, the ECJ 
does not approach the question as if it were distinct from the applicability of general 
principles. As such, Dougan considers that the situations in which the Charter and 
general principles apply ‘can now be treated as (almost) interchangeable’.48 In sum, no 
divergence seems to emerge here. 
 
A second apparent divergence concerned the capacity for general principles prohibiting 
discrimination and Article 21(1) CFR to apply in disputes between private parties. It is 
well-established that the Charter and general principles are capable of vertical direct 
effect and so can be invoked in situations involving public authorities.49 In the landmark 
                                               
44 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson EU:C:2013:105, para. 21. 
45 On what constitutes ‘implementing’ under Article 51(1) CFR, see e.g. F Fontanelli, ‘Implementation of 
EU Law through Domestic Measures after Fransson: The Court of Justice Buys Time and “Non-
Preclusion” Troubles Loom Large’ (2014) 39(5) ELRev 682; F Fontanelli, ‘The Implementation of 
European Union Law by Member States under Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2014) 
20(3) CJEL 193; M Dougan, ‘Judicial Review of Member State Action under the General Principles and 
the Charter: Defining the “Scope of Union Law”‘ (2015) 52(5) CMLRev 1201. 
46 Case C-198/13 Julian Hernández and Others EU:C:2014:2055, para. 34. 
47 Case C-87/12 Ymeraga and Ymeraga-Tafarshiku EU:C:2013:291, para. 41. 
48 Dougan ‘Judicial Review of Member State Action under the General Principles and the Charter’ (n 45) 
1204. 
49 On general principles see e.g. e.g. Klensch (n 10), paras 8-13; Case 222/84 Johnston EU:C:1986:206, paras 
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Mangold ruling the ECJ confirmed individuals can rely on (at least) some general 
principles against private persons.50 The wording of Article 51(1) CFR led scholars to 
argue that the Charter could apply horizontally since according to Article 51(1) CFR the 
Charter applies to the ‘EU institutions and to the Member States’ when they are 
implementing EU law, but does not mention private parties.51 
 
Following the suggestion in AMS, albeit obiter dicta, that Article 21(1) CFR applies 
between private parties,52 the ECJ confirmed in Egenberger that Article 21(1) CFR is 
invokable in disputes between private parties. The Court ruled that: 
The prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of religion or belief is mandatory 
as a general principle of EU law. That prohibition, which is laid down in Article 
21(1) of the Charter, is sufficient in itself to confer on individuals a right which they 
may rely on as such in disputes between them in a field covered by EU law.53 
It then clarified that: 
As regards its mandatory effect, Article 21 of the Charter is no different, in 
principle, from the various provisions of the founding Treaties prohibiting 
discrimination on various grounds, even where the discrimination derives from 
contracts between individuals.54 
                                               
13-21; Case C-442/00 Rodríguez Caballero EU:C:2002:752, paras 29-33. On Article 21(1) CFR see e.g. Case 
C-356/12 Glatzel EU:C:2014:350; Case C-528/13 Léger EU:C:2015:288. 
50 Mangold (n 4), para. 75ff. See also Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci EU:C:2010:21, para. 50ff; Case C-441/14 
DI EU:C:2016:278, paras 36-37. It is not clear whether all general principles prohibiting discrimination 
are, or should be, capable of horizontal application. In Egenberger, the ECJ held that ‘[t]he prohibition of 
all discrimination on grounds of religion or belief is mandatory as a general principle of EU law [and] … 
is sufficient in itself to confer on individuals a right which they may rely on as such in disputes between 
them in a field covered by EU law’, see Egenberger (n 6) para. 76. However, it did not refer to other general 
principles. Tridimas has argued there is nothing to preclude a priori the horizontal effect of general 
principles, see T Tridimas, ‘Horizontal Effect of General Principles: Bold Rulings and Fine Distinctions’ 
in U Bernitz, X Groussot and F Schulyok (eds), General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law 
(Kluwer Law International 2013) 213-32, 214. 
51 See e.g. AW Heringa and L Verhey, ‘The EU Charter: Text and Structure’ (2001) 8(1) MJ 11, 21; Case 
C-282/10 Dominguez EU:C:2011:559, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, paras 80–83; LF Besselink, ‘The 
Protection of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon: The Interaction between the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and National Constitutions’ (Report of 25th 
FIDE Congress 2012), 19; K Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ 
(2012) 8(3) EuConst 375, 377. For counter arguments, see e.g. C Ladenburger, ‘Protection of Fundamental 
Rights Post-Lisbon – The Interaction between the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European 
Convention of Human Rights and National Constitutions’ (2012) Report of 25th FIDE Congress 34-35; 
P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (6th edn, OUP 2015) 196; E Frantziou, ‘The 
Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering the Reasons for 
Horizontality’ (2015) 21(5) ELJ 657, 659. 
52 Case C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale EU:C:2014:2, para. 47. 
53 Egenberger (n 6), para. 76. 
54 Egenberger (n 6), para. 77. 
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It is again unlikely, therefore, that a divergence will emerge here between general 
principles and the Charter as regards their capacity to apply in horizontal disputes. 
 
A final potential divergence suggested by the wording of the Lisbon Treaty concerned 
the territorial scope of the overlapping non-discrimination norms. Poland and the UK 
negotiated a Protocol – Protocol No 30 – which aimed to clarify the reach of the 
Charter within their domestic systems. According to Article 1(1) of the Protocol: 
The Charter does not extend the ability of the [CJEU], or any court or tribunal of 
Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the United Kingdom 
are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it 
reaffirms.55 
Confirming the generally dismissive view of this so-called ‘opt-out’ in the academic 
literature,56 the ECJ in NS held that ‘Protocol (No 30) does not call into question the 
applicability of the Charter in the United Kingdom or in Poland, a position which is 
confirmed by the recitals in the preamble to that protocol.’57 Instead, Article 1(1) of the 
Protocol merely ‘explains Article 51 of the Charter with regard to the scope thereof and 
does not intend to exempt the Republic of Poland or the United Kingdom from the 
obligation to comply with the provisions of the Charter or to prevent a court of one of 
those Member States from ensuring compliance with those provisions.’58 It is again 
unlikely that any divergence will emerge here and meaning that the territorial scope of 
both the Charter and general principles is the same 28 Member States. 
 
2.3. Potential Divergences in the Protection from Discrimination 
Where divergences do (potentially) emerge between the protection from discrimination 
under Article 21(1) CFR and general principles of EU law concerns: (1) the relevant 
framework for justifying discriminatory treatment and (2) the grounds of discrimination 
prohibited. 
                                               
55 Article 1(2) applies only to the rights in Title IV of the Charter and so does not apply to Article 21(1) 
CFR. 
56 E.g. P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP 2011) 238-40; RC White, ‘A New 
Era for Human Rights in the European Union?’ (2011) 30(1) YEL 100, 111; D Anderson and CC 
Murphy, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights’ in A Biondi, P Eeckhout and S Ripley (eds), EU law after 
Lisbon (OUP 2012) 155-179, 166-69. 
57 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS EU:C:2011:865, para. 119. 
58 NS (n 57), para. 120. See further S Peers, ‘The ‘Opt-Out’ That Fell to Earth: The British and Polish 
Protocol Concerning the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 12(2) Human Rights Law Review 375. 




First, a divergence potentially emerges as regards the ‘limits on limits’ to Article 21(1) 
CFR and general principles prohibiting discrimination. In pre-Charter case law, the ECJ 
does not discuss permissible limits on general principles prohibiting discrimination per 
se.59 Instead the ECJ refers to the general principles alongside discussion of express 
derogations in secondary Union law. According to Directives 2000/43, 2000/78, 
2004/113 and 2006/54, a measure is not indirectly discriminatory where it is ‘objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary’;60 specific grounds of justification are also found in secondary Union law 
relating to genuine occupational requirements, religious institutions, age and public 
safety.61 No case exists in which the ECJ strikes down any of these derogations as 
incompatible with general principles. Indeed, when interpreting Article 6(2) of Directive 
2000/78 on age-related derogations,62 the ECJ held that the:  
… directive gives specific expression, in the field of employment and occupation, to 
the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, which is regarded as being a 
general principle of European Union law … Since Article 6(2) of Directive 2000/78 
allows Member States to provide for an exception to the principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age, that provision must be interpreted restrictively.63 
The conclusion is thus that the justification framework under general principles 
prohibiting discrimination does not differ from that under the non-discrimination 
directives. 
 
                                               
59 The precise test for limiting fundamental rights protected as general principles is somewhat unclear, 
making it difficult to assess whether Article 52(1) CFR introduces a more or less stringent test. See e.g. 
Case C-227/04 P Lindorfer v Council EU:C:2006:748, Opinion of AG Sharpston para. 62; S Peers, ‘Taking 
Rights Away? Limitations and Derogations’ in S Peers and A Ward (eds), The European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (Hart 2004) 141-180, 151; Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (n 56) 221. 
60 Directive 2000/43, Article 2(2)(b); Directive 2000/78, Article 2(2)(b); Directive 2004/113, Article 2(b); 
Directive 2006/54, Article 2(1)(b). 
61 Limitations meeting ‘genuine occupational requirements’ are permitted under: Directive 2000/43, 
Article 4; Directive 2000/78, Article 4(1); Directive 2006/54, Article 14(2). For permitted limitations on 
equal treatment relating to religious institutions, see Directive 2000/78, Article 4(2). For age-related 
limitations on equal treatment, see Directive 2000/78, Article 6. On the protection of public safety, see 
Directive 2000/78, Article 2(5). 
62 According to Article 6(2), ‘Member States may provide that the fixing for occupational social security 
schemes of ages for admission or entitlement to retirement or invalidity benefits, including the fixing 
under those schemes of different ages for employees or groups or categories of employees, and the use, in 
the context of such schemes, of age criteria in actuarial calculations, does not constitute discrimination on 
the grounds of age, provided this does not result in discrimination on the grounds of sex.’ 
63 Case C-476/11 HK Danmark EU:C:2013:590, paras 45-46. See also, e.g. Joined Cases C-297/10 and C-
298/10 Hennigs and Mai EU:C:2011:560, paras 53-78; Case C-447/09 Prigge and Others EU:C:2011:573, 
para. 37ff. 
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The permissibility of limiting rights protected under the Charter is set out in Article 
52(1) CFR: 
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter 
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. 
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are 
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union 
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
As introduced in Chapter 3, in one sense, the Charter might offer lesser protection here 
since limits to directly discriminatory measures are potentially justifiable under Article 
52(1) CFR. In another sense, the threshold for justifying differential treatment under the 
Charter potentially differs from that under overlapping general principles by introducing 
the additional requirements that any limits are ‘provided for by law and respect the 
essence of  those rights and freedoms’. 
 
A second divergence potentially emerges between Article 21(1) CFR and overlapping 
general principles regarding the grounds of discrimination prohibited. Strictly speaking, 
EU law recognises general principles prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex, age, 
race and ethnic origin, religion and sexual orientation. The express list in Article 21(1) 
CFR additionally prohibits discrimination on grounds of colour, social origin, genetic 
features, language, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, 
property and birth. What is more, the grounds listed in Article 21(1) CFR are only 
indicative, the provision expressly prohibiting ‘[a]ny discrimination based on any ground 
such as…’. Prima facie the Charter prohibits further grounds of discrimination; what 
complicates matters here is the ambiguity over whether there is simply one general 
principle of equal treatment or several general principles prohibiting status 
discrimination on particular grounds.64 If reference to a general principle prohibiting 
discrimination on a particular ground is simply understood as a specific manifestation of 
the general principle of equality then it may be that a divergence does not arise here. 
                                               
64 L Woods and P Watson, Steiner & Woods EU Law (12th edn, OUP 2014) 169. Indeed, several 
Advocates General have argued against the recognition of specific general principles, see e.g. Case 
C-227/04 P Lindorfer v Council EU:C:2006:748, Opinion of AG Sharpston paras 52-58; Case C-411/05 
Palacios de la Villa v Cortefiel Servicios SA EU:C:2007:106, Opinion of AG Mazák, paras 87-97; Case C-
267/06 Maruko EU:C:2007:486, Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, fn 82; Case C-427/06 Bartsch 
EU:C:2008:297, Opinion of AG Sharpston, paras 34-65. There is no need to resolve this question here: 
either there is a general principle prohibiting discrimination on each of the grounds listed in Article 21(1) 
CFR or each ground would surely be covered by a principle of equality tout court. 
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Crucially, it may also leave scope for the recognition of further general principles 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds beyond those prohibited by the Charter. This 
point is picked up again below when considering whether the ECJ recognises new 
general principles prohibiting discrimination on a specific ground. 
 
Overall, very few divergences should emerge in practice between Article 21(1) CFR and 
overlapping general principles and there is little scope in practice for general principles 
to have added value. This high degree of  similarity makes sense when one considers that 
aim of  the Charter was to consolidate existing fundamental rights protection and how 
the horizontal clauses in the Charter (specifically, Articles 52(3) and 52(4) CFR) require 
the interpretation of  the Charter as ‘the same’ or ‘harmoniously’ with the inspirational 
sources of  general principles: the ECHR and constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States. Two distinct divergences do potentially arise, however. The first 
difference relates to the level of  protection; i.e. where discrimination is alleged on a 
ground prohibited under both Article 21(1) CFR and a general principle, an applicant 
may benefit from greater protection by relying on the general principle. The second 
difference relates to the grounds of  discrimination prohibited, which may also be more 
extensive under general principles.  
 
3. IDENTIFYING A STARTING POINT 
3.1. Possible Priority Clauses 
When an overlap occurs between general principles of  Union law and the Charter, it is 
not obvious which of  the existing legal tools and principles discussed in Chapter 2 
could guide the ECJ. Neither the Treaties nor the Charter expressly define the 
relationship between competing sources of  EU fundamental rights. However, since any 
priority clause would take precedence over an applicable priority principle, this Section 
starts by assessing whether any of  the horizontal provisions in the Charter (specifically 
Articles 52(2), 52(4) and 53 CFR) and/or Article 6 TEU offer any guidance to the ECJ 
here. The conclusion reached is that only Article 6(3) TEU offers any guidance 
regarding the continuing role of  general principles of  EU law now codified in the 
Charter.  
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Let us begin by considering the potential utility of  Article 52(2) CFR, according to 
which ‘[r]ights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties 
shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties.’65 
If  one focuses on the fact that general principles find their origins in the Treaties66 and 
are set out in Article 6(3) TEU as one of  the sources of  EU fundamental rights, it is 
possible to include general principles within the reference to ‘the Treaties’.67 Interpreting 
Article 52(2) CFR as a priority clause would mean that where a Charter right 
corresponds with a general principle, that ‘Charter right is subject to the limitations 
established by the Treaties for the general principle’.68  
 
The difficulties with any attempt to extend Article 52(2) CFR to general principles are 
twofold. First, as Chapters 3 and 4 also concluded, the Explanations to Article 52(2) 
CFR strongly suggest that this provision only applies to rights in the Charter that 
explicitly find their origins in the Treaty; the Explanations clarify that ‘rights which were 
already expressly guaranteed in the Treaty establishing the European Community and 
have been recognised in the Charter, and which are now found in the Treaties (notably 
the rights derived from Union citizenship)’.69 Secondly, as Peers and Prechal argue, if  
Article 52(2) CFR intended to link the Charter expressly to general principles, this would 
render the other provisions of  Article 52 CFR unnecessary;70 the codification nature of  
the Charter which ‘according to its preamble, seeks to “reaffirm” the rights set out in 
the same sources as the general principles and make them “more visible” … would turn 
the specific provision of  Article 52(2) into the general rule.’71 Article 52(2) CFR does 
                                               
65 For discussion of Article 52(2) CFR in the context of an overlap between the Treaties and the Charter, 
see Chapter 4, Section 3. 
66 The ECJ cites Article 19(1) TEU – specifying that the ECJ ‘shall ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed’ – as authority for the development of general principles, 
see Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du pêcheur EU:C:1996:79, para. 27. Scholars also refer to 
Article 263(2) TFEU as authority for the development of general principles since it refers ‘the Treaties or 
of any rule of law relating to their application’ (emphasis added), see e.g. T Hartley, The Foundations of European 
Union Law (8th edn, OUP 2014) 146. 
67 S Peers and S Prechal, ‘Scope and Interpretation of Rights and Principles’ in S Peers and others (eds), 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart 2014) 1455-1522, para. 52.93. 
68 R Schütze, ‘Three “Bills of Rights” for the European Union’ (2011) 30(1) YEL 131, 149. 
69 Explanations (n 43) 33. 
70 Peers and Prechal (n 67), para. 52.96. 
71 Peers and Prechal (n 67), para. 52.96. 
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not, therefore, appear to offer any guidance to the ECJ on the inter-relationship 
between Article 21(1) CFR and overlapping general principles.72 
 
Turning now to assess whether Article 52(4) CFR might offer any guidance here. 
According to Article 52(4) CFR, ‘[i]n so far as this Charter recognises fundamental 
rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, 
those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions.’ Thus, that provision 
links the interpretation of the Charter to common constitutional traditions, which form 
one of the inspirational sources of general principles.73 It would, however, be a logical 
jump too far to interpret Article 52(4) CFR as tying the interpretation of Charter rights 
to the corresponding general principles. 
 
Article 52(4) CFR recognises the role played by national constitutional traditions in 
shaping fundamental rights protection in the EU and the need for the Charter to keep 
pace with evolving national conceptions of fundamental rights. The Explanations to the 
Charter clarify this point by referring to the ECJ’s decision in Hauer74 (in which the ECJ 
examined the right to property in different Member States) and noting that: 
… rather than following a rigid approach of “a lowest common denominator”, the 
Charter rights concerned should be interpreted in a way offering a high standard of 
protection which is adequate for the law of the Union and in harmony with the 
common constitutional traditions.75  
Even if one can stretch the meaning of Article 52(4) CFR to include an indirect 
reference to general principles, that provision only refers to the need for ‘harmonious’ 
interpretation. To interpret the Charter in harmony with overlapping general principles 
is a qualitatively different obligation from that included in Articles 52(2) and 52(3) CFR: 
the former referring to the exercise of Charter rights ‘under the conditions and within 
the limits defined by’ the Treaties and the latter stating that where Charter rights are also 
protected in the ECHR ‘the meaning and scope of those rights shall be [at least] the 
                                               
72 For discussion of the role of Article 52(2) CFR when there is an equivalent Treaty provision, see 
Chapter 4, Section 3. 
73 Article 6(3) TEU. The ECJ has explicitly recognised such traditions as inspiring the general principles 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age and sexual orientation Mangold (n 4), para. 74; Römer (n 7), 
para. 59. This probably extends to other grounds as Recital 1 of both the Framework Directive and the 
Race Directive refers to common constitutional traditions. 
74 Case 44/79 Hauer EU:C:1979:290. 
75 Explanations (n 43) 34. 
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same’. Harmonious interpretation, as the Explanations clarify, instead refers to an 
interpretation which is congruous with protection across the EU. 
 
A third possible priority clause is Article 53 CFR, which specifies that ‘[n]othing in this 
Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of  application, by Union 
law’. One could read Article 53 CFR as guiding the ECJ to apply whichever source of  
the prohibition on status discrimination offers the greatest protection to the individual. 
Consider the possibility, as noted above, of  directly discriminatory measures that are 
capable of  justification under the Charter but not under general principles. On this 
reading of  Article 53 CFR, the ECJ should apply the general principle here; otherwise, 
the result would be a reduction in human rights protection and a ‘restriction’ of  general 
principles. 
 
However, this reading of  Article 53 CFR is not persuasive. According to the 
Explanations to the Charter, Article 53 CFR aims to ‘maintain the level of  protection 
currently afforded within their respective scope by Union law, national law and 
international law’.76 No mention is made of  a continuing system of  protection under the 
general principles. According to Bering Liisberg, the main concern during the drafting 
of  Article 53 CFR was to secure the minimum status of  the ECHR and the phrase ‘in 
their respective fields of  application’ never intended to refer to the applicability of  
general principles.77 Instead, it aimed to clarify ‘that national constitutions could only 
prevail in the (limited) sphere of  exclusive national competence.’78 Article 53 CFR thus 
also does not appear to offer any guidance to the ECJ on the inter-relationship between 
the Charter and overlapping general principles. 
                                               
76 Explanations (n 43) 35. 
77 J Bering Liisberg, ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of 
Community Law? Article 53 of the Charter: a fountain of law or just an inkblot?’ (2001) Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No 4, 11-22. As de Boer notes, Article 53 CFR ‘resembles closely Article 53 of the ECHR, 
which lays down that the ECHR is a minimum rights-standard above which the contracting parties are 
free to retain a higher rights protection’, see N de Boer, ‘Addressing rights divergences under the Charter: 
Melloni’ (2013) 50(4) CMLRev 1083, 1092. See also L Besselink, ‘The Member States, the National 
Constitutions and the Scope of the Charter’ (2001) 8 MJ 68, 73; B de Witte, ‘Level of Protection’ in S 
Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart 2014) 1523–1538, para. 
53.07. 
78 Bering Liisberg (n 77) 15. An interpretation that was borne out in practice in Case C-399/11 Melloni 
EU:C:2013:107. See also, de Boer (n 77) 1093. 




Discussion now turns to assess whether Article 6(3) TEU, which affirms the continued 
existence of  general principles as a source of  fundamental rights, offers any 
interpretative guidance to the ECJ on the continuing role of  the general principles 
prohibiting status discrimination. Hofmann and Mihaescu argue that Article 6 TEU 
evidences ‘the intention of  the constitutional legislator to confer on the EU courts the 
power to act as the arbiter between the different and – on occasion – competing or 
overlapping sources of  fundamental rights’.79 In their view, under Article 6(3) TEU: 
… overlapping sources of fundamental rights … require comparison and balancing, 
with the objective of maximisation of their respective scopes of applicability … all 
different possible sources of fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
EU have to be taken into account in such a balancing exercise designed to maximise 
the possible applicability of each single right.80 
This implies a maximalist reading of  Article 6(3) TEU akin to that discussed above in 
relation to Article 53 CFR. Construing the potential guidance offered by Article 6(3) 
TEU slightly differently, Iglesias Sánchez suggests that if  the ECJ interpreted Article 
51(1) CFR (on the field of  application) narrowly, general principles might apply 
residually in areas not covered by the Charter.81 On this view, Article 6(3) TEU is akin to 
a ‘shall not affect’ or a ‘without prejudice’ clause. 
 
The drafting history of  Article 6(3) TEU suggests a more limited reading. Motivating 
the inclusion of  Article 6(3) TEU in the Treaties was the need to reaffirm the possible 
development of  additional general principles.82 Ladenburger – an EU official involved in 
the drafting of  the Charter – notes how: 
… there had been a debate on whether it was appropriate still to keep, after full 
incorporation of the Charter into primary law, an express provision referring to 
fundamental rights as general principles of law. The view prevailed that such an 
                                               
79 Hofmann and Mihaescu (n 2) 81. 
80 Hofmann and Mihaescu (n 2) 81. 
81 S Iglesias Sánchez, ‘The Court and the Charter: the Impact of the Entry into Force of the Lisbon Treaty 
on the ECJ’s Approach to Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 49(5) CMLRev 1565, 1597. See also C 
Grabenwarter and K Pabel, ‘Article 6 [Fundamental Rights – The Charter and the ECHR]’ in HJ Blanke 
and S Mangiameli (eds), The Treaty on European Union (TEU): A Commentary (Springer 2013) 287-348. 
82 This approach is supported by e.g. D Anderson and CC Murphy, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
History and Prospects in Post-Lisbon Europe’ (2011) EUI Working Paper LAW No. 08, 7; Besselink 
‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon’ (n 51) 13; T Tridimas, ‘Fundamental rights, general 
principles of EU law, and the Charter’ (2014) 16 CYELS 361, 377. 
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article would indeed be useful to clarify that the Court remains free to identify 
further fundamental rights not enshrined in the Charter.83 
Supporting Ladenburger’s point, the trauvaux préparatoires of  the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty state that the equivalent of  Article 6(3) TEU aims: 84 
… to make clear that incorporation of the Charter does not prevent the Court of 
Justice from [recognising] additional fundamental rights which might emerge from 
any future developments in the ECHR and common constitutional traditions. That 
is in line with classic constitutional doctrine which never interprets the catalogues of 
fundamental rights in constitutions as being exhaustive, thus permitting the 
development, through case-law, of additional rights as society changes.85 
Article 6(3) TEU thus offers little guidance regarding the continuing role of  general 
principles in the context of  an overlap with Article 21(1) CFR. It cannot tell us, for 
example, which norm should be the starting point of  the ECJ’s analysis or which norm 
should prevail in the event of  conflict. The provision only reaffirms the possibility of  
recognising additional general principles where it is not possible to interpret the Charter 
in line with evolving fundamental rights protection in the Member States and in 
international treaties.86 This could include additional general principles prohibiting status 
discrimination, although it is difficult to foresee when this might be necessary given the 
non-exhaustive list of  prohibited grounds in Article 21(1) CFR. 
 
Given the limited relevance of  Article 6(3) TEU here, discussion now turns to the 
potential relevance of  the classical priority principles (lex superior, lex specialis and lex 
posterior) that accord priority between norms based on rank, specificity and date 
respectively. 
 
3.2. Priority Principles 
Prima facie it is not clear which priority principle overlaps between the Charter and 
general principles engage. There is no easy answer to the question of  whether Article 
                                               
83 Ladenburger (n 51) 4. 
84 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe [2003] OJ C 169/1. For the final agreed text see, 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe [2004] OJ C 310/3. 
85 European Convention, ‘Commentary on Arts 1-16 of the Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty’ 
CONV 528/03, 13. Grabenwarter and Pabel argue that this interpretation ‘as suggested in the 
Explanatory Note would entail the eminent danger that the ECJ deduces new fundamental rights from 
the common constitutional traditions of the MS whenever the court finds the scope of a right derived 
from the EUCFR to be too narrow. This would undermine the EUCFR and the competence to amend 
the EUCFR in accordance with Article 48 TEU’, see Grabenwarter and Pabel (n 81) para. 88. 
86 Besselink ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights post-Lisbon’ (n 51) 13. 
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21(1) CFR or overlapping general principles constitute the applicable norm that is 
higher-ranking, more specific or later in time. The unwritten status of general principles 
‘makes it questionable, if they can be defined, labelled and categorized as if they were 
written norms with a clear status in norm hierarchy.’ 87 The possibility to invoke general 
principles to review the legality of  secondary Union law means they have a ‘a status of  
higher law’,88 however, it does not necessarily follow that general principles are of  equal 
ranking with the Treaties. No consensus exists in the academic literature concerning the 
position of  general principles in the hierarchy of  norms. A survey of  existing 
scholarship shows competing viewpoints over whether general principles have the same 
hierarchical status as the Treaties and the Charter,89 are superior even to the constitutive 
Treaties90 or fall below the Treaties forming the ‘second tier of  the hierarchy of  
norms’.91 The development of  general principles via judicial elaboration means it is also 
difficult to assess their specialty and the date on which they come into being. Their 
content is inevitably contentious92 and it is unclear if  general principles ‘pre-exist’ their 
explicit recognition by the ECJ or if  they ‘become valid law by (gradual) judicial or 
legislative recognition’.93 
 
Looking to the rationale underpinning the different priority principles, though, quite 
quickly discounts the utility of  the lex specialis and lex posterior principles (even if  a more 
                                               
87 J Raitio, The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law (Springer 2003) 117. 
88 B de Witte, ‘Institutional Principles: A Special Category of General Principles of EC Law’ in B Ulf and J 
Nergelius (eds), General Principles of European Community Law: Reports from a Conference in Malmo, 27-28 August 
1999 (Kluwer Law International 2000) 143-59, 143. On the use of general principles to review EU acts see 
e.g. Case 114/76 Bela-Mühle EU:C:1977:96, paras 5-8; Case 122/78 Buitoni EU:C:1979:43, para. 16ff; Case 
224/82 Meiko-Konservenfabrik EU:C:1983:219, para. 11ff; Case C-309/89 Codorniu v Council EU:C:1994:197, 
para. 26ff; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi v Council and Commission EU:C:2008:461, paras 
283-327. 
89 See e.g. S Koukoulis-Spiliotopoulos, ‘Amended Equal Treatment Directive (2002/73): An Expression 
of Constitutional Principles/Fundamental Rights’ (2005) 12(4) MJ 327, 331; T Tridimas, The General 
Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 51; Audiolux, Opinion of AG Trstenjak (n 11), para. 70; K 
Lenaerts and others, European Union law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 2011); A Rosas 
and L Armati, EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction (2 edn, Hart 2012) 56. 
90 Toth (n 38) 78. This is as an outlying position within the edited collection, though, see K Lenaerts and 
M Desomer, ‘General Principles of European Community Law’ (2002) 39(4) CMLRev 904, 905. 
91 B de Witte, ‘Legal Instruments and Law-Making in the Lisbon Treaty’ in S Griller and J Ziller (eds), The 
Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Springer 2008) 79-108, 79; Craig and de 
Búrca, 111. 
92 M Bell, ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment: Widening and Deepening’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), 
The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 611-639, 628. 
93 C Semmelmann, ‘General Principles in EU Law between a Compensatory Role and an Intrinsic Value’ 
(2013) 19(4) ELJ 458, 464. See also, N Walker, ‘The Philosophy of European Union Law’ in A Arnull and 
D Chalmers (eds), The Oxford Handbook of EU Law (OUP 2015) 17-19. 
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specific or later norm could be identified). It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that the 
principles of  lex specialis and lex posterior both aim to secure the intentions of the 
legislature. When applying the more recent norm, the idea is that the legislature is aware 
of the earlier law and intends to overrule it.94 In relation to the more specific norm the 
assumption is that a lawmaker, ‘in regulating a specific area, wants to create special rules 
that trump the general rules in the field.’95 The criteria of  specialty and date may, 
however, actually contradict the intentions of  those responsible for drafting the Charter 
if  relied upon to structure its relationship to overlapping general principles. The express 
aim of  the Charter was to ‘strengthen the protection of  fundamental rights in the light 
of  changes in society, social progress and scientific and technological developments by 
making those rights more visible in a Charter’ (emphasis added).96 If  Article 21(1) CFR is not 
always the lex specialis or the lex posterior, this would ‘ignore the clear will of  the Treaty 
drafters to furnish the Union with a written bill of  rights, intended to act as the primary 
repository of  fundamental rights protection, and capable of  having direct legal effects 
of  its own’.97 
 
In contrast, recognising the Charter as a lex superior fits with the underlying rationales of  
that principle. The principle of  lex superior allows states to entrench certain fundamental 
principles and aims to ensure that the norm with the greatest democratic legitimacy 
prevails98 (assuming that, as an organising principle, hierarchy ranks ‘legal acts in 
accordance with the democratic legitimacy of  their respective authors and adoption 
procedures’99). On this view, the Charter should take precedence over overlapping 
general principles. The Convention assembled to draft the Charter included 
representatives of Member State governments and national Parliaments, a member of 
                                               
94 ILC, ‘Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law’ (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (‘Fragmentation Report’), para. 226. 
95 R Michaels and J Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws: Different Techniques in the 
Fragmentation of Public International Law’ (2011-2012) 22(3) Duke Journal of Comparative & International 
Law 349, 354. See also, J Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to 
other Rules of International Law (CUP 2003) 388; A Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented 
Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis’ (2005) 74(1) NJIL 27, 42. 
96 Preamble, Recital 4. See also, M Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts’ 
(2008) 45(3) CMLRev 617, 664; Tridimas, ‘Fundamental rights, general principles of EU law, and the 
Charter’ (n 82) 377. 
97 Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007’ (n 96) 664. 
98 R Bieber and I Salome, ‘Hierarchy of norms in European Law’ (1996) 33(5) CMLRev 907, 910. 
99 K Lenaerts and M Desomer, ‘Towards a Hierarchy of Legal Acts in the European Union? 
Simplification of Legal Instruments and Procedures’ (2005) 11(6) ELJ 744, 745. 
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the Commission, members of the European Parliament and held public meetings in 
which individuals and NGOs were invited to comment.100 Each of  Member then had to 
ratify the Lisbon Treaty (and with it the Charter) before it entered into force. In contrast 
general principles are judicially recognised principles whose status as higher law stems 
from the fact that ‘their origins lie in the… Treaty’101 and from the normative import of  
the principles they embody.102 Neither seems sufficient to elevate general principles to 
the same level as the Treaties; the Treaties provide the overall justification for their 
existence and, once codified, the argument from normativity fades away. Further 
downgrading the status of  general principles in relation to the Charter, the methodology 
and the threshold for recognition as a general principle of  Union law remains unclear.103 
For example, when the ECJ recognised a general principle of non-discrimination on 
grounds of age in Mangold, only two of the (then) 25 Member States (Finland and 
Portugal) referred to the principle in their constitutions and the principle is not found 
among the rights of the ECHR.104 These differences between general principles and 
written primary law in terms of  their democratic legitimacy support the idea that the 
Charter is a lex superior.  
 
The application of  the lex superior principle in the context of  an overlap between Article 
21(1) CFR and general principles prohibiting status discrimination differs from the 
application of  the principle in the context of  an overlap between primary and secondary 
Union law, as considered in Chapter 3. There is no need, for example, for the lower-
ranking norm (i.e. general principles) to be the starting point of  ECJ’s analysis: general 
principles do not aim to implement the Charter nor does the Charter act as a check on 
                                               
100 P Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP 2012) 494. 
101 Tridimas, General Principles of EU Law (n 89) 51. 
102 Tridimas, General Principles of EU Law (n 89) 51; Audiolux, Opinion of AG Trstenjak (n 11), para. 70. 
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103 Herdegen, ‘General Principles of EU Law’ (n 102) 346. Some general principles appear to lack support 
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104 See M Dougan, ‘In Defence of Mangold?’ in A Arnull and others (eds), A Constitutional Order of States? 
Essays in EU law in honour of Alan Dashwood (Hart 2011) 220-21 and references cited therein. 
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the legality of  general principles.105 The ECJ should instead begin its analysis directly 
with the Charter rather than with the overlapping general principle.  
 
Understanding the Charter as a lex superior here militates against the application of  
general principles as an additional layer of  scrutiny or a ‘safety valve’106 i.e. if  the general 
principles offered more extensive protection from discrimination. Applying the 
overlapping general principle residually would enable a hierarchically inferior norm to 
bypass ‘the limits negotiated and agreed upon by the Union institutions and the Member 
States.’107 It is less clear whether understanding the Charter as a lex superior would militate 
against the recognition of  additional general principles prohibiting status discrimination. 
The lex superior notion and Article 6(3) TEU are to some extent in tension here. Given 
the express authority in the Treaties for the development of  new general principles, it is 
suggested that the development of  further general principles prohibiting status 
discrimination should remain a possibility. However, recourse to general principles 
should only follow an attempt to bring any developing general principles prohibiting 
discrimination under the rubric of  Article 21(1) CFR.  
 
When faced with an overlap between Article 21(1) CFR and general principles of  Union 
law, the principle of  lex superior suggests that the Charter should be the only applicable 
source of  the prohibition status discrimination. This is unless further prohibited 
grounds of  discrimination develop in Member State law and in international human 
rights norms that cannot be brought under Article 21(1) CFR (although it is very 
difficult to envisage this possibility). This does not, however, dismiss the relevance of  
existing (pre-Charter) case law on the general principles prohibiting status 
discrimination for determining the standard of  protection under the Charter. In light of  
its codification aim, the Charter should capture the level of  fundamental rights 
protection that existed under general principles. Existing case law on the scope and 
interpretation of  overlapping general principles should, therefore, remain relevant for 
                                               
105 On this point, see Chapter 2, Section 3.3.1 and Chapter 3, Section 2.3. 
106 Gualco ‘General Principles of EU Law as a Passe-Partout Key’ (n 34) 3-4. Several scholars have 
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determining the meaning of  the Charter. Neither does this argument preclude a role for 
the methodology of  ‘discovering’ general principles (as essentially mandated by Articles 
52(3) and 52(4) CFR) in the identification of  new status discrimination grounds in the 
future, which can then be formally accommodated by the ‘such as’ wording of  Article 
21(1) CFR. Discussion now turns to assess whether the ECJ adopts this approach in 
practice. 
 
4. ECJ PRACTICE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF LEX 
SUPERIOR 
This Section compares ECJ practice against the baseline established above. The focus 
here is on how the ECJ approaches the inter-relationship between the Charter and 
overlapping general principles when an applicant alleges discrimination on one of  the 
grounds listed in Article 21(1) CFR (the continued recognition of  general principles 
prohibiting discrimination is discussed further below). The major finding is that ECJ 
practice coheres with the understanding of  the lex superior principle as outlined above: 
only Article 21(1) CFR applies, although the ECJ still draws upon earlier case law to 
inform the standard of  protection under that right. 
 
Overlaps between Article 21(1) CFR and general principles prohibiting discrimination 
arose in thirty-three cases.108 Twenty-seven of  these cases did not raise any questions 
about the inter-relationship between the Charter and overlapping general principles 
since the situation either fell outside the scope of  EU law109 or could be resolved on the 
                                               
108 Overlaps were identified by searching the curia.eu database. Searches were carried out, first, by legal 
provision or act (i.e. Article 21(1) CFR and the non-discrimination directives) and, second, for the 
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of the Charter. Admittedly, the ECJ does sometimes apply the Charter in cases falling outside its temporal 
scope. In Paoletti, for example, the ECJ held that the fact that the ‘acts in the main proceedings took place 
during 2004 and 2005, that is to say before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 
2009… does not preclude the application, in the present case, of Article 49(1) [CFR (the principle of 
legality)]’ (para. 26). The ECJ justified its decision on the grounds that, ‘[e]ven before the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon… the Court held that [the principle of legality] followed from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States and, therefore, had to be regarded as forming part of the 
general principles of EU law, which national courts must respect when applying national law’ (para. 25). 
See, Case C-218/15 Paoletti and Others EU:C:2016:748. Cases falling outside the temporal scope of the 
Charter are not considered here because: (1) general principles prohibiting discrimination do not have the 
same longevity as the principle of legality; (2) the ECJ has not made a similar declaration in relation to 
Article 21(1) CFR; and (3) following the ECJ’s approach in Paoletti would involve the complicated task of 
identifying precisely when each general principle prohibiting discrimination on a particular ground gained 
binding force. 
109 Case C-122/15 C EU:C:2016:391, paras 27-29. 
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basis of  the relevant non-discrimination directive. Similar to the pattern identified in 
Chapter 3, the ECJ does not apply the Charter following a determination on the basis 
of  secondary Union law that the contested national measure: (1) fell within an express 
derogation;110 (2) amounted to discrimination;111 or (2) complied with the relevant non-
discrimination directive.112 The ECJ also did not have recourse to the Charter when 
asked to expand on the interpretation of  secondary Union law.113 
 
The cases most relevant for present purposes, and to which discussion now turns, are 
six cases involving either a reference concerning the validity of  secondary Union law or 
a situation falling outside the scope of  the non-discrimination directives. In none of  
these cases does the ECJ articulate what principle of  interpretation guides the inter-
relationship between Article 21(1) CFR and overlapping general principles prohibiting 
status discrimination.114 However, on close inspection, the ECJ’s approach is consistent 
with the principle of  lex superior as outlined above in all bar one of  these cases i.e. where 
discrimination is alleged on a ground prohibited by Article 21(1) CFR, that provision 
alone determines the outcome. 
 
In cases involving judicial review of  secondary Union law, the ECJ relies on the Charter 
as the primary reference point and not the overlapping general principle. In Test-Achats, 
Glatzel and Fries, the ECJ relies on the Charter as the applicable yardstick for assessing 
                                               
110 Case C-152/11 Odar EU:C:2012:772, para. 54; Case C-529/13 Felber EU:C:2015:20, para. 40; Case 
C-515/13 Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark EU:C:2015:115, para. 45; Case C-258/15 Salaberria Sorondo 
EU:C:2016:873, para. 50; Case C-443/15 Parris EU:C:2016:897, para. 78; Case C-143/16 Abercrombie & 
Fitch Italia EU:C:2017:566, para. 47. 
111 Case C-286/12 Commission v Hungary EU:C:2012:687, para. 81; Case C-595/12 Napoli EU:C:2014:128, 
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112 Case C-132/11 Tyrolean Airways Tiroler Luftfahrt EU:C:2012:329, para. 31; Case C-432/14 O 
EU:C:2015:643, para. 39; Case C-137/15 Plaza Bravo EU:C:2015:771, para. 30; Case C-539/15 Bowman 
EU:C:2016:977, para. 33; Case C-354/16 Kleinsteuber EU:C:2017:539, para. 68; Case C-46/17 John 
EU:C:2018:131, para. 32; Case C-482/16 Stollwitzer EU:C:2018:180, para. 47. 
113 FOA (n 8), para. 42ff; Case C-363/12 Z EU:C:2014:159, paras 46, 68; Case C-395/15 Daouidi 
EU:C:2016:917, para. 42; Case C-668/15 Jyske Finans EU:C:2017:278, para. 14; Case C-451/16 MB 
EU:C:2018:492, para. 26ff. 
114 The ECJ has not offered any clarification in cases outside the non-discrimination context either. The 
referring court in Iida, asked whether ‘the “unwritten” fundamental rights of the European Union 
developed in the Court’s case-law… [can] be applied in full even if the Charter is not applicable in the 
specific case; in other words, do the fundamental rights which continue to apply as general principles of 
Union law under Article 6(3) TEU stand autonomously and independently alongside the new fundamental 
rights laid down in the Charter in accordance with Article 6(1) TEU?’ The ECJ did not, however, offer a 
substantive reply to this question, see Case C-40/11 Iida EU:C:2012:691, para. 32. 
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the legality of  secondary Union law. In Test-Achats, the ECJ held that ‘since recital 4 to 
Directive 2004/113 expressly refers to Articles 21 and 23 of  the Charter, the validity of  
Article 5(2) of  that directive must be assessed in the light of  those provisions’.115 In 
Glatzel, the ECJ was clear that ‘[i]t must be determined whether the EU rules at issue in 
the main proceedings [are] contrary to Article 21(1) of  the Charter’116 before setting out 
the justification framework under Article 52(1) CFR.117 Similarly, the ECJ in Fries 
reframed the question referred as asking ‘in essence, whether [secondary Union law] is 
valid in the light of… Article 21(1) of  the Charter’.118 At the justification stage, the ECJ 
then referred to how that Union law was ‘nevertheless compatible with Article 21(1) of  
the Charter in that it satisfies the criteria set out in Article 52(1) thereof.’119  
 
In assessing the compatibility of  national measures with EU fundamental rights, the 
ECJ is similarly clear that the Charter provides the governing standard. In Léger, the ECJ 
starts by examining whether the situation falls within the scope of  application of  the 
Charter120 before explaining how the national measure must respect Article 21(1) 
CFR.121 Referring to the horizontal effect of  the Charter in Egenberger, the ECJ 
concluded that the national court must ‘ensure within its jurisdiction the judicial 
protection for individuals flowing from [Article 21(1) CFR]’.122 
 
Although the ECJ relies on the Charter as the primary reference point in the above 
cases, it does still refer to the corresponding general principle. In Glatzel, Léger, Fries and 
Egenberger the ECJ refers to how Article 21(1) CFR ‘enshrines’ or ‘lays down’ a 
corresponding general principle prohibiting discrimination.123 In one sense this is simply 
a status of  fact; the general principle pre-existed the Charter right to non-discrimination. 
This reference could, however, imply a continuing relevance for the general principle 
alongside the Charter. It is submitted here that in none of  these cases does the ECJ 
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121 Léger (n 49), para. 48. 
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apply the general principle as a distinct source of  the prohibition on status 
discrimination. Consistent with the notion of  the Charter as a lex superior, the ECJ relies 
on previous case law relating to the general principle simply to inform the standard of  
protection under Article 21(1) CFR.  
 
In Glatzel, for example, the referring court questioned the validity of  secondary Union 
law setting out the minimum visual acuity to be able to drive certain vehicles. When 
assessing the compatibility of  the contested directive with the prohibition of  
discrimination on grounds of  disability, the ECJ applied the justification framework 
found in Article 52(1) CFR. To assess whether the contested directive aimed to 
‘genuinely meet objectives of  general interest’ (as required by Article 52(1) CFR), the 
ECJ noted how it had previously held: 
… as regards the general principle of equal treatment in the context of grounds such 
as age or sex, that a difference of treatment which is based on a characteristic related 
to such grounds does not constitute discrimination … where, by reason of the 
nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which 
they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the 
requirement is proportionate.124 
The ECJ then reasoned ‘[i]n the same vein’ that differences in treatment on grounds of  
eyesight are not ‘contrary to the prohibition on discrimination based on disability within 
the meaning of  Article 21(1) of  the Charter’.125 The ECJ’s approach prioritises the 
Charter but uses earlier case law to inform the meaning of  Article 21(1) CFR. 
 
The ECJ draws on past case law in a similar manner in Test-Achats and Fries. In the 
former decision, the ECJ referred to earlier case law on the general principle of  equal 
treatment to inform the meaning of  discrimination under the Charter itself. The ECJ 
cited ‘consistent’ case law ‘that the principle of  equal treatment requires that comparable 
situations must not be treated differently, and different situations must not be treated in 
the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified’.126 Similarly, in Fries the ECJ 
drew from earlier decisions on the principle of  equality and the requirement of  
                                               
124 Glatzel (n 49), para. 49. 
125 Glatzel (n 49), para. 50. 
126 Test-Achats (n 115), para. 28. The ECJ also cited earlier case law on what is a comparable situation, see 
Test-Achats (n 115), para. 29.  
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comparability127 to determine the meaning of  ‘discrimination’ under the Charter. Most 
recently, in Egenberger, the general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of  
religion or belief  is relied upon to establish the horizontal direct effect of  Article 21(1) 
CFR. The ECJ notes how: 
The prohibition of all discrimination on grounds of religion or belief is mandatory 
as a general principle of EU law. That prohibition, which is laid down in Article 
21(1) of the Charter, is sufficient in itself to confer on individuals a right which they 
may rely on as such in disputes between them in a field covered by EU law.128 
The ECJ then cites the earlier case of  AMS in support, in which it stated that ‘the 
principle of  non-discrimination on grounds of  age at issue in that case, laid down in 
Article 21(1) of  the Charter, is sufficient in itself  to confer on individuals an individual 
right which they may invoke as such.’129 The general principle does not apply, nor does it 
limit the Charter. Instead it simply informs the interpretation to be given to Article 21(1) 
CFR. 
 
Referring to earlier case law in these cases does not imply that general principles might 
continue to apply alongside Article 21(1) CFR. Instead previous case law helps to 
establish a base level of  protection under the Charter. This fits with the nature of  the 
Charter as ‘reaffirm[ing] rights as they result, in particular, from … case-law’.130 Where 
the question facing the ECJ has not been the subject of  prior judicial consideration, the 
overlapping general principle is unlikely to be of  much assistance. The unwritten nature 
of  general principles means that they are somewhat ephemeral until they are concretised 
in case law. Indeed, Léger highlights the impracticalities of  interpreting general principles 
as determining the limits of  Article 21(1) CFR and perhaps explains why general 
principles are not included in Article 52 CFR as one of  the relevant sources to guide the 
interpretation of  the Charter. The case concerned the legality of  restrictions on giving 
blood for men who have had sex with men,131 which the ECJ had not previously 
discussed. As such, the ECJ could not draw upon existing case law.  
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Only in one case, Milkova, is the ECJ more equivocal on the role of  overlapping general 
principles and at some points in the judgment the ECJ comes close to suggesting the 
dual application of  general principles alongside overlapping Charter rights. The case 
concerned the interpretation of  Directive 2000/78 and whether it precluded national 
measures designed to enhance the protection of  disabled workers. In establishing 
whether the national rules in question were compatible with the prohibition on 
discrimination on grounds of  disability, the ECJ’s decision started by recognising that 
the national measure ‘falls within the implementation of  EU law within the meaning of  
Article 51(1) [CFR]’.132 The ECJ then switched to discussing general principles, noting 
that ‘Member States must exercise their discretion [when implementing EU law] in 
accordance with general principles of  EU law’133 and that ‘the national legislation 
applicable to the main proceedings falls within the implementation of  EU law, which 
means that, in the present case, the general principles of  EU law, including the principle 
of  equal treatment, and of  the Charter are applicable’.134 In referring to general 
principles in this way, the ECJ suggests that general principles prohibiting discrimination 
persist as an ‘autonomous system of  protection’.135 The ECJ interpreted the Charter and 
general principles as reaching the same conclusion here and so an additional role for 
general principles did not come up. 
 
The ECJ’s decision in Milkova highlights the need for clear articulation of  the inter-
relationship between Article 21(1) CFR and overlapping general principles. If  two 
separate regimes were thought to exist – one under the Charter and another under the 
overlapping general principle(s) and each with ‘slightly different contours and 
characteristics’136 – this would detract from the Charter as the primary repository of  
fundamental rights protection in the EU. What is more, continuing to apply general 
principles – which are by nature unwritten and somewhat more contentious137 – could 
(as noted above) contradict the stated aim behind the Charter to make the ‘overriding 
                                               
132 Milkova (n 123), para. 50. 
133 Milkova (n 123), para. 53. 
134 Milkova (n 123), para. 54. 
135 N Lazzerini, ‘The Scope of the Protection of Fundamental Rights under the EU Charter’ (PhD thesis, 
European University Institute 2013) 76. See also Iglesias Sánchez (n 81) 1597. 
136 P Oliver, ‘Case Comment on DEB’ (2011) 48(6) CMLRev 2023, 2037. 
137 Bell (n 92) 628. 
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importance and relevance [of  fundamental rights] more visible to the Union’s 
citizens’.138 
 
In addition, should national judges misinterpret the ECJ’s continued reference to general 
principles alongside overlapping Chapter rights, this could engender considerable legal 
uncertainty particularly for private actors who would be required to comply with the 
nuances of  both regimes.139 Treating the Charter as a lex superior instead provides an 
easily accessible frame of  reference for private individuals. As Gabinaud argues, ‘[i]t is 
easier for individuals to know which provision applies to them when these norms are 
laid down in written provisions’.140 If  general principles continue to apply residually, 
private actors also have to be aware that an overlapping general principle might exist, 
might apply horizontally, might be applied residually, and might lead to a different 
result.141 It is almost impossible for private actors gain this knowledge.142 Indeed, this 
was the concern motivating the Danish Supreme Court when it refused to apply the 
general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of  age horizontally.143 The 
Danish Supreme Court had referred a question to the ECJ asking if  it could balance the 
general principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of  age ‘and the issue of  its 
direct effect against the principle of  legal certainty and the related principle of  the 
                                               
138 Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council on June 4 1999, Annex IV. 
139 As discussed in Chapter 2, the principle of legal certainty is a general principle of EU law, see Case 
98/78 Racke EU:C:1979:14, para. 20. 
140 A Gabinaud, ‘Case Comment on Kücükdeveci’ (2011) 18(1-2) MJ 189, 197. 
141 On the implications of the horizontal effect of general principles for legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations, see, F Fontanelli, ‘General Principles of the EU and a Glimpse of Solidarity in the 
Aftermath of Mangold and Kücükdeveci’ (2011) 17(2) European Public Law 225, 234; E Gualco and L 
Lourenço, ‘“Clash of Titans”. General Principles of EU Law: Balancing and Horizontal Direct Effect’ 
(2016) 1(2) European Papers 643, 650 
142 Dominguez, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, para. 164. 
143 For the decision of the Danish Supreme Court, see Case 15/2014 DI, acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v. 
Estate of A. English translation available at: 
<www.supremecourt.dk/supremecourt/nyheder/pressemeddelelser/Documents/Judgment%2015-
2014.pdf> accessed 14 August 2018. See further E Gualco, ‘“Clash of Titans 2.0”. From Conflicting EU 
General Principles to Conflicting Jurisdictional Authorities: The Court of Justice and the Danish Supreme 
Court in the Dansk Industri Case’ [2017] European Forum 1; S Haket, ‘The Danish Supreme Court’s Ajos 
judgment (Dansk Industri): Rejecting a Consistent Interpretation and Challenging the Effect of a General 
Principle of EU Law in the Danish Legal Order’ (2017) 10(1) Review of European Administrative Law 135; R 
Nielsen and CD Tvarnø, ‘Danish Supreme Court Infringes the EU Treaties by its Ruling in the Ajos Case’ 
[2017] 2 Europaraettslig Tidskrift 303; U Šadl and S Mair, ‘Mutual Disempowerment: Case C-441/14 Dansk 
Industri, acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen and Case no. 15/2014 Dansk Industri 
(DI) acting for Ajos A/S v The estate left by A’ (2017) 13(2) EuConst 347. 
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protection of  legitimate expectations and to conclude on that basis that the principle of  
legal certainty must take precedence’.144  
 
To conclude this Section, nearly all ECJ case law on the overlap between Article 21(1) 
CFR and general principles of  Union law coheres with the idea of  the Charter as a lex 
superior. The ECJ does still refer to the overlapping general principle, but this is usually 
just to inform the standard of  protection under the Charter. Only in Milkova is the ECJ’s 
decision more ambiguous on the continuing role of  overlapping general principles. As 
noted above, a clear statement from the ECJ on this point would remove any lingering 
‘confusion’145 over the role of  general principles that may otherwise ‘ultimately weaken 
the overall EU system of  fundamental rights protection’.146 
 
5. ARTICLE 6(3) TEU AND THE RECOGNITION OF NEW GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES 
Discussion now turns to examine how the ECJ interprets the inter-relationship between 
Article 21(1) CFR and overlapping general principles when discrimination in alleged on 
a ground not listed in Article 21(1) CFR.147 To recap, Article 21(1) CFR prohibits: 
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social 
origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. 
One can envisage allegations of  discrimination on additional grounds. Examples include 
‘physiological conditions such as appearance or size, psychological characteristics such 
as temperament or character, or social factors such as class or status’.148  
 
Section 3 highlighted a conceivable tension between the idea that Article 21(1) CFR is a 
lex superior compared to general principles prohibiting status discrimination and Article 
                                               
144 DI (n 50), para. 20. The ECJ held that the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations could 
not alter the obligation to either interpret national law consistently with Union law or otherwise to 
disapply inconsistent national law (para. 43). 
145 Oliver (n 136) 2037. Similarly, de Mol argues it may lead to a lack of coherence, see M de Mol, 
‘Dominguez: A Deafening Silence’ (2012) 8(2) EuConst 280, 296. 
146 N Lazzerini, ‘The Scope of the Protection of Fundamental Rights under the EU Charter’ (PhD thesis, 
European University Institute 2013) 76. 
147 The related question of whether EU law permits the recognition of a new general principle prohibiting 
discrimination on ground expressly listed in Article 21(1) CFR (e.g. colour, genetic features, property) is 
not addressed here. 
148 Case C-354/13 FOA EU:C:2014:2106, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para. 17 
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6(3) TEU, which reaffirms the recognition of  rights not included within the Charter as 
general principles of  Union law. The key question is whether Article 21(1) CFR 
determines exhaustively the grounds of  discrimination prohibited by Union law. Or, can 
the ECJ recognise new general principles prohibiting further grounds of  discrimination 
where these cannot be brought within Article 21(1) CFR? Discussion here is limited to 
the development of  general principles prohibiting discrimination and does not dismiss 
the possibility that new rights might emerge in other areas. 
 
Only one post-Lisbon case concerns allegations of  discrimination on a ground not 
listed in Article 21(1) CFR:149 FOA.150 The applicant in FOA, Mr Kaltoft, challenged his 
dismissal by a Danish local authority where he worked as a childminder. His employer 
claimed that his dismissal was due to a reduction in the number of  children requiring 
care151 whereas Mr Kaltoft alleged that he was dismissed on grounds of  his obesity.152 
The Danish court referred a question to the ECJ asking whether ‘there is an EU 
prohibition of  discrimination on grounds of  obesity’.153 Obesity is not found in Article 
21(1) CFR’s indicative list of  prohibited grounds of  discrimination, nor had the ECJ 
previously recognised such a general principle. 
 
The ECJ’s approach here is inconsistent with the idea that the Charter is a lex superior. To 
begin with, the ECJ examined ‘whether EU law must be interpreted as laying down a 
                                               
149 Pre-Lisbon, several cases arose in which the ECJ was asked about the existence of general principles 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds other than those set out in Article 19 TFEU. See e.g. Case C-13/05 
Chacón Navas EU:C:2006:456 (regarding the existence of a general principle prohibiting discrimination of 
grounds of sickness; Case C-101/08 Audiolux EU:C:2009:626 (regarding the existence of a general 
principle of equality between shareholders). 
150 FOA (n 8). Questions relating to discrimination on grounds of obesity were raised in Ruiz Conejero (n 
109). However, the ECJ did not reconsider whether the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of 
obesity is a general principle or precluded by Article 21(1) CFR. For discussion of other aspects of FOA, 
see e.g. J Damamme, ‘How Can Obesity Fit Within the Legal Concept of Disability?’ (2015) 8(1) EJLS 
147; L Waddington, ‘Saying all the Right Things and Still Getting It Wrong:: The Court of Justice’s 
Definition of Disability and Non-Discrimination Law’ 22(4) MJ 576; DL Hosking, ‘Fat Rights Claim 
Rebuffed: Kaltoft v Municipality of Billund’ (2015) 44(3) ILJ 460; G de Beco, ‘Is Obesity a Disability: The 
Definition of Disability by the Court of Justice of the European Union and Its Consequences for the 
Application of EU Anti-Discrimination Law’ (2016) 22(2) Columbia Journal European Law 381; A Bourbon, 
‘Will Expanding the Definition of Disability to Include Obesity Lead to an Expanding Waistline in 
Europe’ (2016) 24(2) Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 351. 
151 FOA (n 8), paras 25, 28. 
152 FOA (n 8), para. 29. At the time of his dismissal Mr Kaltoft was obese according to the World Health 
Organisation’s definition (para. 18). 
153 FOA (n 8), para. 30. 
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general principle of  non-discrimination on grounds of  obesity’.154 The ECJ reached a 
negative conclusion on the basis, first, of  the EU’s competences and, second, by 
referring to secondary Union law. On the EU’s competences, the ECJ noted how ‘no 
provision of  the TEU or TFEU prohibits discrimination on grounds of  obesity as 
such.’155 Specifically, the ECJ singled out how ‘in particular’ neither Article 10 TFEU 
(according to which ‘[i]n defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union 
shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’) nor Article 19 TFEU (providing a legislative 
basis for the Council ‘appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial 
or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’) refer to obesity.156 
Turning to Article 19 TFEU, the ECJ recapped how that provision ‘contains only the 
rules governing the competencies of  the EU and that, since it does not refer to 
discrimination on grounds of  obesity as such, it cannot constitute a legal basis for 
measures of  the Council of  the European Union to combat such discrimination.’157  
 
Quite why the ECJ examined the existence of  legislative competences or existing 
primary law provisions is unclear and is contrary to the supposedly inspirational sources 
of  general principles i.e. the ECHR and constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States.158 Additionally, the ECJ justified the conclusion that no general principle 
exists by referencing EU secondary law prohibiting status discrimination. The ECJ 
noted how the anti-discrimination directives do not ‘lay down a general principle of  
non-discrimination on grounds of  obesity as regards employment and occupation.’159 
The ECJ held that ‘the scope of  Directive 2000/78 should not be extended by analogy 
beyond the discrimination based on the grounds listed exhaustively in Article 1 
thereof ’160 and so, in conclusion, ‘obesity cannot as such be regarded as a ground in 
addition to those in relation to which Directive 2000/78 prohibits discrimination’.161 
 
                                               
154 FOA (n 8), para. 31. 
155 FOA (n 8), para. 33. 
156 FOA (n 8), para. 33. 
157 FOA (n 8), para. 33. 
158 Article 6(3) TEU. See also n 30 above and the references cited therein. 
159 FOA (n 8), para. 35. 
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Significantly, only after reaching a negative conclusion on the existence of  a general 
principle162 did the ECJ examine the potential applicability of  the Charter. Had the ECJ 
understood Article 21(1) CFR as a lex superior here, the analysis carried out above – i.e. 
assessing whether a prohibition on obesity discrimination is prohibited as a general 
principle – could have been carried out in relation to the Charter. Specifically, the ECJ 
could have assessed whether Article 21(1) CFR, which is worded in a non-exhaustive 
manner, can be interpreted as prohibiting obesity discrimination. Relevant here are the 
horizontal provisions in the Charter, specifically Articles 52(2)-(4) CFR, which set out 
interpretative guidelines for establishing the meaning of  Charter rights. Instead, the ECJ 
simply noted that there is ‘nothing to suggest that the situation at issue in the main 
proceedings, in so far as it relates to a dismissal purportedly based on obesity as such, 
would fall within the scope of  EU law’,163 leading the Court to rule that ‘the provisions 
of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union are likewise inapplicable 
in such a situation’.164 
 
It is difficult to identify precisely what principle determines the relationship between the 
Charter and general principles in FOA. By concentrating on whether a general principle 
exists and stating without any further analysis why the Charter did not apply, the ECJ 
implies that Article 21(1) CFR does not limit the grounds of  discrimination prohibited 
by Union law. Advocate General Jääskinen – the Advocate General in FOA – offers one 
potential explanation for the ECJ’s approach in both his Opinion in FOA and in 
academic writing.165 He argues that interpreting Article 21(1) CFR to cover obesity 
discrimination was not a possibility open to the ECJ and would be ‘blocked by the rules 
that are relevant to the material scope of  the EU Charter’.166 On this view, a potential 
gap arises in the protections offered by the Charter making recourse to general 
principles permissible by virtue of  Article 6(3) TEU (as noted above, the aims behind 
Article 6(3) TEU were to ensure that the Charter did not prevent the development of  
new rights). In support of  this view, he cites the following provisions:(1) Article 6(1) 
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165 N Jääskinen, ‘Discrimination on Grounds of Obesity’ in S Vogenauer and S Weatherill (eds), General 
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TEU, which states that the Charter ‘shall not extend in any way the competences of  the 
Union as defined in the Treaties); (2) Article 51(2) CFR, according to which the Charter 
does not ‘establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as 
defined in the Treaties’; and (3) the Explanations relating to the Charter which state that 
Article 21(1) CFR ‘does not alter the extent of  powers granted under Article 19 [TFEU] 
nor the interpretation given to that Article’. According to the Advocate General, ‘[t]hese 
provisions set out an outer-boundary of  EU fundamental rights law that is pertinent [in 
FOA]’.167 
 
Where Advocate General Jääskinen’s argument struggles, however, is in the assumption 
that the recognition that Article 21(1) CFR prohibits obesity discrimination would 
amount to a new ‘competence’, ‘power’ or ‘task’ for the EU. Following the Advocate 
General’s reasoning to its logical conclusion suggests a very narrow reading of  Articles 
6(1) TEU and 51(2) CFR. If  those provisions prevent the expansion of  the Charter so 
that additional grounds of  discrimination are prohibited on the basis that this would 
expand the competences and powers of  the EU, surely it also implies that any of  the 
grounds of  discrimination listed in the Charter which are not found in Article 19 TFEU 
(i.e. colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, political or any other 
opinion, membership of  a national minority, property, birth) also cannot be relied upon 
since this would be tantamount to expanding the competences or powers of  the EU? 
The effect would be to render those grounds of  discrimination prohibited by the 
Charter but not prohibited elsewhere in EU law as purely political or aspirational. 
 
The existing interpretation of  Articles 6(1) TEU and 51(2) CFR suggests that Article 
51(2) CFR is not understood in this manner by the ECJ. The few cases citing Article 
51(2) CFR have employed that provision in conjunction with Article 51(1) CFR on the 
scope of  application of  the Charter. In McB, for example, the ECJ referred to how: 
… according to Article 51(1) of the Charter, its provisions are addressed to the 
Member States only when they are implementing European Union law. Under 
Article 51(2), the Charter does not extend the field of application of European 
Union law beyond the powers of the Union, and it does not “establish any new 
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power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the 
Treaties”.168 
In consequence, the Charter could only be relied upon ‘the Charter should be taken into 
consideration solely for the purposes of  interpreting [EU secondary law]’169 and not 
national law. Articles 51(1) and 51(2) CFR were, thus, instrumental in restricting the 
application of  the Charter but not the rights protected under it. 
 
Even if  the Advocate General were correct in his conclusion that Articles 6(1) TEU and 
51(2) CFR block the interpretation of  Article 21(1) CFR as prohibiting additional 
grounds of  discrimination, he does not explain why recourse to general principles is 
appropriate instead. Article 51(2) CFR codifies earlier ECJ case law relating to general 
principles. As the Explanations relating to the Charter clarify, Article 51(2) CFR 
‘confirms that the Charter may not have the effect of  extending the field of  application 
of  Union law beyond the powers of  the Union as established in the Treaties.’170 The 
Explanations attribute the origins of  this rule to the decision in Grant. In that case, the 
ECJ declined to reinterpret Article 157 TFEU on equal pay as prohibiting – not only 
discrimination on grounds of  sex – but also discrimination on grounds of  sexual 
orientation. Underpinning this decision was the conclusion that: 
…although respect for the fundamental rights which form an integral part of those 
general principles of law is a condition of the legality of Community acts, those 
rights cannot in themselves have the effect of extending the scope of the Treaty 
provisions beyond the competences of the Community.171 
Similarly, the lack of  a corresponding EU competence was instrumental in the ECJ’s 
conclusion that no general principle prohibiting obesity discrimination exists. 
 
Attempts to rationalise the decision in FOA on the grounds that Article 21(1) CFR is 
somehow subject to limitations that do not also apply to general principles prohibiting 
discrimination are, therefore, unpersuasive. Were Article 21(1) CFR treated as a lex 
superior here, the expectation is that the ECJ would start by clarifying why Article 21(1) 
CFR does not apply. Instead, the ECJ starts its analysis by considering if  a general 
principle exists without first offering explaining why a general principle prohibiting 
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obesity discrimination might exist, but obesity discrimination cannot be encompassed 
within the non-exhaustive wording of  Article 21(1) CFR. Admittedly, this is only one 
case, but ECJ practice does not cohere with the notion of  the Charter as a lex superior 
when it comes to the recognition of  additional prohibited grounds of  discrimination. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter assessed how the ECJ resolves the inter-relationship between Article 21(1) 
CFR and overlapping general principles prohibiting discrimination. The Chapter started 
in Section 2 by setting out the development of  EU fundamental rights and, specifically, 
the adoption of  the Charter to codify EU fundamental rights protected as general 
principles of  Union law. As a result, the protection offered by each source – Article 
21(1) CFR and general principles prohibiting discrimination – is very similar, even if  the 
wording of  the Charter suggested greater divergences. Given the existence of  two – 
highly alike – overlapping sources of  the prohibition on status discrimination, this 
Chapter turned to investigate how the ECJ determines their inter-relationship. 
 
As a baseline against which to compare ECJ practice, Section 3 examined whether any 
of  the horizontal provisions in the Charter might operate as a priority clause and 
whether any of  the priority principles set out in Chapter 2 might aid the ECJ here. It 
was concluded, in relation to priority clauses, that only Article 6(3) TEU offers any 
guidance to the ECJ concerning interactions between the Charter and overlapping 
general principles. Article 6(3) TEU only refers, however, to the permissible 
development of  new general principles that extend beyond those enumerate by the 
Charter. In relation to the possible application of  any priority principles, Section 3 
highlighted that it is in one sense difficult to identify an appropriate starting point due to 
the unwritten nature of  general principles. It was argued, however, that Article 21(1) 
CFR should be understood as a lex superior in relation to general principles and should – 
as regards grounds of  discrimination prohibited under each – replace overlapping 
general principles. 
 
Sections 4 and 5 then went on to assess ECJ practice against this baseline. The main 
finding here was that, where discrimination is alleged on a ground listed in Article 21(1) 
CFR, the ECJ usually applies only Article 21(1) CFR. The ECJ continues to refer to pre-
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existing jurisprudence on general principles, but this is largely only to determine the 
meaning of  the Charter right. Indeed, the aims behind the Charter to strengthen and 
make more visible EU fundamental rights requires – at least – a parity in the level of  
protection pre- and post-Charter. Only in one case, Milkova, is the ECJ more ambiguous 
about the continued role of  general principles. 
 
Where discrimination is alleged on a ground not listed in Article 21(1) CFR, ECJ 
practice does not cohere with the notion of  the Charter as a lex superior. In FOA, 
establishing whether Article 21(1) CFR could extend to prohibit obesity discrimination 
is only an afterthought. The ECJ starts by considering the existence of  a general 
principle without first explaining why Article 21(1) CFR could not apply. This approach 
– even if  one accepts a continued role for general principles as enshrining new 
fundamental rights not enumerated in the Charter – obfuscates the constitutional 
significance of  the Charter as a bill of  rights for the EU. As Tridimas reminds us: 
… the primary point of reference for the protection of fundamental rights should be 
the Charter. This is in keeping with the intentions of the Treaty authors, which 
granted the Charter the same value as that of the Treaties, and also the objectives of 
the Charter as a document which defines the values of the EU polity.172 
The risk is that the ECJ’s approach undermines the status of  the Charter as the main 
source of  fundamental rights for the EU.  
 
In many ways, the ECJ’s reasoning in FOA shows how the inter-relationship between 
general principles of  Union law and overlapping written sources remains somewhat 
contested. The ECJ’s search for new general principles in the Treaties and secondary 
Union law is not only contra legem the express wording of Article 6(3) TEU, but it also 
indicates a wider reluctance to place the Charter at the centre of cases involving 
fundamental rights around the Charter. The ECJ is perhaps keen to retain the greater 
room for manoeuvre for which general principles allow. As seen also in Chapter 5, it is 
often in hard cases that the ECJ departs from existing principles of interpretation. 
However, the conclusion reached in this Chapter is that treating the Charter as a lex 
superior and articulating this point more clearly will have wider benefits for the overall 
system of rights protection in the EU. Relying on the Charter forces the ECJ to be more 
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transparent in its reasoning, which is highly significant given the liability of fundamental 






This thesis examined how the ECJ interprets the inter-relationship between overlapping 
norms of Union law. Through a series of case studies, this thesis assessed the role 
played by classical principles of norm inter-relationship – respect for express clauses and 
the principles of lex superior, lex posterior and lex specialis – in ECJ case law. The initial 
rationale for carrying out this assessment (i.e. comparing the ECJ’s approach to norm 
inter-relationship against the approach suggested by existing priority clauses and priority 
principles) was to show the limited utility of existing approaches in the context of norm 
overlap. In turn, identifying where existing principles fell short was supposed to pave 
the way for the development of new guiding principles addressed to the ECJ. Instead, 
with each case study came the conclusions: first, that the ECJ’s approach to norm inter-
relationship in fact usually followed the guidance offered by existing principles, although 
without expressly saying so; and, secondly, that the problem cases were those in which 
the ECJ departed from existing principles.  
 
In many ways, this thesis offers an old solution to a new problem. Existing scholarship 
mentions distinct overlaps arising in different areas of Union law, but only in a 
piecemeal manner. This thesis built on these discrete observations to develop the 
concept of norm overlap, which raises difficult questions for the ECJ. By drawing 
attention to the existence of norm overlap and the prima facie applicability of multiple 
norms prohibiting discrimination in certain situations, this thesis highlighted a 
previously un(der-)recognised phenomenon in Union law and showed how norm 
overlap is a very real issue. The novel problem identified by this thesis is not that norms 
overlap per se, it is instead the lack of clarity about how they should interact and the 
constitutional weight that hangs upon this determination. 
 
The difficulties that norm overlap creates and the significance of the problem are borne 
out by each of the different case studies. Chapter 2 demonstrated that how the ECJ 
approaches the inter-relationship between overlapping norms can have wide-ranging 
constitutional implications, which extend beyond the outcome of an individual case. 
The doctrinal analysis carried out for this thesis shows how the ECJ’s interpretative 




rights, the balance of powers between the EU and the Member States, institutional 
balance, and legal certainty. Each of the substantive Chapters shows that the ECJ does 
sometimes fall prey to political pressures and that the relationship between overlapping 
norms is often at the heart of controversial cases. 
 
It is here that classical solutions to norm inter-relationship come in. The conclusion 
reached in each Chapter is that existing approaches to norm inter-relationship offer 
workable guidance to the ECJ when faced with overlaps between norms. To frame the 
solution identified as ‘old’ is perhaps somewhat misleading. Priority clauses and the 
principles of lex superior and lex specialis are well-established methods of resolving norm 
conflicts in national and international law; however, in the context of both Union law 
and norm overlap, the potential role these principles could play remains largely 
untapped. In this way, the thesis fills a gap in the literature by examining how priority 
clauses and priority principles might apply in the EU legal order. 
 
Existing approaches do not always translate perfectly to the EU context or to the 
context of norm overlap. Chapter 3 showed, for example, that the lex superior principle is 
too blunt a tool to determine the inter-relationship between overlapping primary and 
secondary Union law and should be subsumed, in part, by legality review. The lex superior 
principle instead operates best in the context of the EU legal order as a systemic 
principle ensuring the interpretation of secondary Union law in line with the Treaties. 
Chapter 5 also cast doubt on the relevance of the lex posterior principle for Union law. 
What each of the case studies shows, though, is that respect for priority clauses and 
priority principles – with some modifications – maintains a balance between competing 
constitutional values. If the ECJ were to articulate its conventional method more clearly 
and consistently follow the legal principles that underpin it, it would avoid the pull in 
hard cases – such as Barber, Hendrix and Brey – to try and achieve a certain outcome. In 
doing so this leaves the appropriate space for other actors, particularly the Union 
legislature, to resolve persisting problems within the legal framework. It should also lead 
to greater legal certainty as to the outcome in individual cases. 
 
The conclusions reached by this thesis are, therefore, dependent on a shift in reasoning 




employ the language of established guiding principles. Thus even though ECJ practice 
often coheres with existing approaches to norm inter-relationship, it does not 
acknowledge the relevance of priority clauses and priority principles in its decisions. It 
would also be wrong to imply that relying on priority clauses and priority principles will 
always offer an easy solution. There are often tricky questions surrounding, for example, 
which norm is more specialised and when one norm will ‘prejudice’ or ‘affect’ the 
conclusions reached under another. 
 
In many ways, this thesis only scratches at the surface of the problem of norm overlap 
and the role of priority clauses and priority principles in determining questions of norm 
inter-relationship. The sheer number of overlaps in the field of non-discrimination alone 
precluded a detailed examination of the ECJ’s approach in other instances of norm 
overlap identified. Furthermore, the mediating role that priority principles do and 
should play warrants further exploration. For instance, it is unclear if the lex posterior 
principle has any role to play in EU law. However, focusing on norm inter-relationship 
draws our attention to the justification for competing choices and throws new light on 
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This thesis centres on the following core question: where one legal provision replicates 
– at least to some extent – the content of an existing provision, which should apply in a 
particular case? To exemplify the problem, envisage two different rules each prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of sex; however, one provision allows employers to 
discriminate against female employers where ‘necessary’ in the interests of the business. 
When a woman alleges unfair dismissal on account of her gender, which provision does 
and should apply? If a court prioritises the provision allowing for discrimination in 
certain circumstances, this may alter the outcome of the case.  
 
In this thesis, I show how the replication of legal rules (what I term ‘norm overlap’) is a 
recurring phenomenon in European Union (EU) law that has gone largely unnoticed by 
legal scholars. This thesis explains the reasons for the development of overlapping 
provisions of EU law and shows why overlap between provisions presents the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) with difficult interpretative choices. 
 
Though a series of linked case studies, each dealing with different aspects of the 
prohibition on discrimination, I examine how the ECJ approaches the question outlined 
above i.e. which provision, where there are two or more similar provisions, should apply 
in a particular case? Extensive research leads to the conclusion that there already exists a 
series of guiding principles that the ECJ follows when faced with this question, 
although, the ECJ does not explicitly refer to these principles and sometimes departs 
from this approach without explanation. This thesis argues, first, for a clearer 
articulation of the principles applied by the in practice and, secondly, for the ECJ to 
follow this approach consistently due to the serious constitutional consequences that 
follow when the ECJ departs from its usual practice. 
